THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 30, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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HIGHLIGHTS
The Viet Cong have already begun to exploit
the bombing of the US Embassy in Saigon, hailing
it as a great victory by their armed forces.
Peiping and Hanoi can be expected to chime in
with additional support as the Asian Communists
make a major propaganda effort to depict the in-
cident as symbolic of US weakness-and the futility
of US policy in South Vietnam. The hall in'-miai-:,
terry activity continues. The VNAF?::attack,,ou Dong Hoi
Airfield in the DRV destroyed severa-1 buildings and
cratered the'runway.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Viet Cong activity during the past hours was
highlighted by the terrorist bombing of the US Em-
bassy in Saigon, causing heavy American and Viet-
namese casualties and considerable property damage
(Para. 2). No major guerrilla actions in the
countryside have been reported by MACV, as the Viet
Cong continued-to emphasize small-scale harassments,
terrorism, and sabotage (Paras. 3 and 4). MACV
reports that Communist military activity during the
week 21-28 March remained at generally the same re-
`duced level of the previous week, with government
casualties and weapons losses again showing a de-
cline (Paras. 9 and 10). RVNAF desertion rates
reflected a slight increase in the month of February.
(Para.,12). Reports of Viet Cong troop movements
northward anddof:orders for local guerrillas to turn in
their arms may possibly represent a deliberate Com-,
munist ruse.(Paras. 14 and 15).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam
The Liberation Front ra o as claimed that the
"people's armed forces in Saigon" used a mine to
damage the US Embassy today and hailed the achieve-
ment as a blow dealt at the "imperialists" in line
with the Front's appeal of 22 March (Para. 1). Viet
Cong guerrillas are also reportedly spreading~prop-
aganda that North Vietnam is not being hurt by the
air strikes (Para. 2).
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III, Military. Developments in North Vietnam:
The strike against ong Hof r e on arc
destroyed several buildings and cratered the run-
way (Para. 1), It now'appears that the priority
construction project reported'under way on the out-
skirts of Hanoi is an industrial-type building,
possibly with no military significance (Para. 2).
A new group of North Vietnamese pilots was re-
ported to have begun training in the USSR in
February (Para. 3) There is still no confirmation
of the arrival of Soviet military equipment in the
DRV.
IV.. Other Communist Military Developments:
No bloc,mi iary movements connected with-=e sit-
uation in Vietnam have.been detected today.
V. Communist Political Developments: The
Asian Communists can be expected to make a major
propaganda effort to exploit the bombing of the
US Embassy in Saigon (Paras. 1 and 2).
VI. Other`:Major Aspects- The air strikes
on the DR are apparently having an adverse effect
on Japanese trade with North Vietnam (Para. 1).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Viet Cong activity during the past 24 hours was high-
lighted by the terrorist bombing of the US Embassy in Saigon.
Guerrilla operations in the field remained relatively light,,
with no major actions reported by MACV. Large-scale govern-
ment operations again failed to make any significant contact
with guerrilla main force units.
2. The latest casualty report from today's bombing of
the US Embassy in Saigon lists two Americans dead and 54
wounded. Eleven Vietnamese were killed and 129 wounded,
of which 48 required hospitalization. The explosive charge,
estimated by MACV at between 200 and 250 pounds of TNT or
equivalent, was detonated in a parked car at the side of the
embassy. Two Viet ?Cong terrorists were directly involved-in
the incident; one was killed and the second was wounded and
captured. A Section of the street ~-, adj acent to the embassy
was cratered toga dept)ji of three to four feet. The explosion
blew in the walls of the consular section on the ground floor
of the five-story building. All glass and grill work were
blown through the embassy from the first through the third
floor, causing' extensive damage. The upper stories.were
damaged primarily bk41ying glass.
3. MACV's military report for 28 March lists 71 Viet
Cong = initiated incidents, nine of which occurred during the
reporting period. No armed attacks or,ambushes were reported;
however, there were several incidents of sabotage against the
coastal railroad and harassing fire actions against govern-
ment,posts, hamlets, and watchtowers.
4. No. current actions were reported in the I Corps.
Within the II Corps, an escorted passenger train and a repair
train detonated Viet Cong mines in Khanh Hoa'Province on 28
and 29 March, respectively. One of the engines, two freight
cars, and one armored car were derailed, and five rail sec-
tions and 30 steel cross-ties were damaged. Three railroad
employees, were injured. An unescorted passenger train was
fired on by Communist guerrillas in Binh Thuan Province. In
Darlac Province, an unknown number of Viet Cong entered and
harassed two new life hamlets. In the III Corps, new life
hamlets in Binh Duong and Bien Hoa provinces received small
arms harassing fire. Within the IV. Corps, the Viet Cong
fired on a bridge in Kien Phong Province and harassed a
watchtower in Chuong Thien Province.
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5. The level of government-initiated ground
operations of battalion-.size or larger remained un-
changed. Six operations were initiated and six
terminated, leaving 20 in progress on.28 March.
ARVN night ground reconnaissance and rapid mili-
tary reaction to Viet Cong activities in Phuoc
Thanh Province have resulted in the capture and
destruction of a sustantial quantity of enemy
foodstuffs and materiel. According to delayed re-
ports for 26 March, two ARVN battalions were dis-
patched to an area about 14 km. south-of:the prov-
ince: capital of Phuoc Vinh where the Viet Cong
reportedly had unloaded a supply convoy. The
search, which continued throughout the next day,
resulted in Communist losses of approximately
300 tons of bagged rice and paddy, seven tons of
scrap iron, 5,000 mine detonators, 300 meters of
nylon cloth, and one ton of salt. Government los-
ses in the operation were nine wounded, all but
one as the result of:booby traps planted in rice
bags and other material. Light enemy resistance
was encountered, consisting mainly of occasional
sniper fire,
6. Unconfirmed press reports state that 13
Viet Cong were killed yesterday in an engagement
with South Vietnamese troops in Hau Nghia Prov
rote,; immediately northwest of Saigon. The press
also reports that four government soldiers were
killed and 12 wounded yesterday in Kontum Pro-
vince, 275 miles northwest of Saigon, when an
ARVN battalion engaged a Viet Cong unit of unde-
termined strength. The operation reportedly
continues today.
7. Company-strength or smaller operations
conducted on 28 March numbered 2,640, a sharp rise
from the previous day's total of 1,943. Thirteen
contacts were made with the Viet Cong, with minor
losses on both sides.
8. Both USAF and VNAF interdiction sorties
reflected a considerable increase. Continued
widespread bombing and strafing of Communist
guerrilla targets throughout South Vietnam on 28
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March has resulted in pilot reports of 44 Viet Cong killed and
360 structures destroyed. Twenty-seven of the combat air op-
erations were flown by USAF B-57/F-100 aircraft.
9. According to MACV, Viet Cong terrorist and military
activity during the week 21-28 March remained at substantially
the same reduced level of the previous week. No large-scale
attacks were reported, and the Viet Cong continued to avoid
contact with major ARVN units. The general lull in activity
continued to be reflected in the declining number of govern-
ment personnel and weapons losses. Viet Cong sabotage kept
Highways 1 and 7 closed in Phu Yen Province and Highway 1 from
Phu My to Phu Cat in Binh Dinh Province. Railroad sabotage
increased during the week; the coastal road remained open and
operational only north of Da Nang and south of Nha Trang. A
statistical comparison of last week's Communist activity with
that of the previous week follows:
Time
Period
Attacks
Terrorism
Sabotage
Propaganda
Anti-
Aircraft
Total
Incidents
Mar 14-20
13
274
56
28
28
399
Mar 21-28
13
338
47
24
26
448
10. According to MACV's weekly military report, ARVN
casualties during the period 21-28 March totaled 396 (89 KIA,
242 WIA, and 65 MIA/Captured), a slight decline from the 470
casualties (103 KIA, 274 WIA, and 93 MIA/Captured) sustained
during the previous week. ARVN weapons losses numbered 117,
a decrease from the 144 reported lost last week.
11. During 21-28 March, the Viet Cong suffered 431 known
casualties (325 KIA and 106 Captured), an increase in comparison
with the previous week's total of 364 casualties (258 KIA and
106 Captured). Government forces captured 114 weapons (one
crew-served), a decline from the 154 weapons (seven crew-served)
seized last week.
12. MACV reports a slight increase in RVNAF desertions
for the month of February 1965. In the Regular Force, the
number and rate per thousand for February (2532 - 10.33) ex-
ceeded that of January 65 (2384 - 9.71) and the calender year
(CY) 64 monthly average (1836 - 3.32). Regional Force deser-
tion (812 - 8-.20) decreased appreciably from January (1160-
1.90), and were significantly below the CY 64 monthly average
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(1343 - 15.25). Desertions in the Popular Force
increased in February (3894 - 23.84) over January
(3359 - 20.15) and surpassed in number the CY 64
monthly average (3039). However, in view of the
currently greater strength of the Popular Force,
the rate per thousand for February (23.84) was
below the CY 64 average (25.46).
13. RVNAF strength figures as of 15 March
1965 are as follows:
Regular Force:
246,500
Regional Force:
100,000
Popular Force:
162,000
Coastal Force:
4,140
National Police:
33,600
CIDG:
19,150
56 5t390
14.
In the past two weeks,
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Viet Cong guerril-
las in some northern provinces are being ordered
to turn in their weapons, that some main force
units south of Saigon have been moving to the
central and northern provinces, and that some
Viet Cong cadres have been ordered to go "north."
15. It is possible that these reports are
being deliberately spread by the Viet Cong in
connection with their recent drop in military ac-
tivity in order to create a false sense of security
among government troops over the effectiveness of
recent air strikes. A Vietnamese staff officer in
northern I Corps, while agreeing that some local
Viet Cong troops may have been disarmed because of
a need for tighter Viet Cong weapons control fol-
lowing the recent sinking of two Communist supply
ships, states that the army is giving the rumors
little credence. He speculated that the Viet Cong
may launch sudden attacks against villages in govern-
ment-controlled areas when they conclude that the
army and government paramilitary troops are sufficiently
off guard.
I-4
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II.. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FIN :SOUTH.,. VIETNAM
1. A Liberation Front broadcast today said
that the bombing of the US Embassy was carried out
by the "people's armed forces in Saigon," using a
mine. The bombing is described as a great achieve-
ment dealt at the heads of the "US imperialists"
following the Front's appeal in its "important 22
March statement."
2. Local Viet Cong propaganda. reaction to
the air strikes against North Vietnam is described
in a report that a guerrilla group recently stopped
a bus north of Saigon and lectured passengers on
the ineffectiveness of the strikes. The propaganda
stressed that the Communists have not yet been de-
feated and boasted of North Vietnam's success in
downing US aircraft.
3. A recent Liberation Front broadcast, de-
scribing the enthusiasm of peasants in the delta
over "repeated successes of the people's army in
the North and the South" and the competition of
the peasants to pay their "resistance" taxes prob-
ably reflects an effort to boost popular responsive-
ness to Viet Cong exactions. There have been sev-
eral indications that increased Viet Cong taxation over
the,past year has caused restiveness among peasants
under Viet Cong control.
4. The Apostolic Delegate to South Vietnam
yesterday told Deputy Ambassador Johnson that the
'Vietnamese Catholic hierarchy had ordered all
priests to avoid participation in any demonstra.-
tions or coup plots, and that he believed such
orders would be obeyed. Referring to the unhappi-
ness among Catholic refugees, the delegate-said
he personally found no substance to charges that
some generals like Thi and Ky were anti-Catholic
or pro-Buddhist,. nor did he consider the politi-
cally.motivated Buddhist leaders anything more
than a small, if undisciplined, minority. He
said he considered governmental stability of prime
importance, felt the Quat government was a good
one, and saw no threat to the Catholics except
from the Viet Cong.
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5. Despite these remarks, various Catholic
refugee circles, including some priests, continue---
to argue that Quat must eventually go, They indi-
cate sympathy with plotters like Colonel Thao.
6; The South Vietnamese Government news agency
today reported that a Buddhist monk burned himself
to death two days ago,to protest Viet Cong abuses
of "religious people" and pagodas, and to urge Bud-
dhists to "return to the nationalist cause." The
incident reportedly occurred in the delta south of
Saigon, where the Buddhist Institute is relatively
unorganized.
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.,
NORTI?i t.
VIETNAM
104
CHINA
oil
18-
THAILAND
STRIKE TARGETS
30 March 1965
A VNAF STRIKE TARGET
loo
CHINA
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1. Initial ;photoanalysis of the strike on Dong
Hoi Airfield reveals that five buildings were de-
stroyed and several others damaged out of approxi-
mately 15 buildings at the field. The runway was
cratered in approximately 12 places. Dong Hoi has
not been used by North Vietnamese aircraft since
February, when the air strikes began. Prior to
that time it was used infrequently by DRV transport
aircraft.
2. The most recent report from Canadian sources
in Hanoi indicates that the priority construction
project under way on the outskirts of the city is
probably not arAAA or SAM site as previously be-
lieved possible. The Canadian ICC representatives
revisited the site on 23 March. Construction at that
time consisted in part of four concrete columns about
50 feet high in a row.. The erection of these columns,
along with the fabrication of roof trusses, suggested
that an industrial-type building was going up. The
reason for the obvious high priority accorded the
work is still unknown. The lack of roadblocks and
guards around the site, however, suggests that the
North Vietnamese are not concerned about security
and that the building may have no military signifi-
cance.
Soviet Union in late February. according to the
3. There is still no firm evidence of Soviet
military'aid deliveries to the.DRV since Kosygin's
visit. However, another group of North Vietnamese
pilots apparently began fighter training in the
group o aviation engineers also began eir
training at the same time. Previous reports had in-
dicated that around 600 North Vietnamese trainees
had been receiving various types of flight train-
ing prior to the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin in-
cidents. Following this crisis, they apparently
returned to the DRV.
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4. In other recent DRV developments bearing
on the war., the North Vietnamese minister of
agriculture, writing in an army journal, has
indicated that the 1964 DRV rice production in-
creased only five percent over the poor harvest of
1963. He said that a ten-percent increase to five
million tons will be needed for '1965, and he tied
the need for more production to the "struggle in
the South" and the need to build up "reserves...
of food larger than in previous years." The DRV
has seldom been able to reach its planned goal's
for rice production, and the hoped-for increase
in 1965 is probably no exception. The DRV has
had to import some food grains in the last four
years to supplement domestic production.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. No bloc military developments related to
the situation in Vietnam have been noted in the past
24 hours.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL, DEVELOPMENTS
1. Asian Communist propaganda on the bombing
of the US Embassy in Saigon has so far been mainly
reportorial in nature. They can be expected, how-
ever, to make a major effort to, exploit the inci-
dent, probably along the lines of earlier attacks
on American facilities at Bien Hoa and Qui Nhon.
These assaults were used to illustrate Communist
claims of'US vulnerability to Viet Cong warfare in
South Vietnam in an,effort to prove to the Vietnamese
people that US action cannot be expected to change
the outcome of the war.
2. Previous assaults on US'facilities by the
Viet Cong appeared to be coordinated ahead of time
with Hanoi; If the embassy bombing was also ordered
by the DRV, it would clearly indicate a North Viet-
namese willingness to risk a stiff US retaliatory-
response in the apparent belief that the psycholog-
ical and physical damage to the US position in South
Vietnam would be worth the punishment.
3. Bloc propaganda otherwise continues to fo-
cus on gas warfare charges against the US. Hanoi's
domestic service, as well as its broadcasts to South
Vietnam on 27 and 28 March.-devoted nearly one third
of their programs to this topic.
4. Soviet developments consisted mainly of a
conversation between Soviet delegate Federenko and
Ambassador, Yost at a UN Security Council luncheon
yesterday. Federenko, who has publicly condemned
the US for "aggression" in Vietnam', studiously
avoided any reference to Vietnam, but stressed the
theme that world peace depends on "understanding
and cooperation" between the US and USSR. He'said
that this point is "fully understood" in the Soviet
Union. He insisted that there is "firm determina-
tion" in Moscow to avoid war because the consequences
would be "unthinkable" and because the'Soviets wish
to concentrate on developing their economy-and public
welfare; Federenko went on to contrast this view at
some length;and very bitterly,with the views of the
Chinese Communists. He said 'they are "totally reckless
as to the consequences to the people of''the world."
V-1
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VI, OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS'
1. Japanese trade with North Vietnam is ap-
parently being curtailed as a result of the air
strikes on the DRV. According to unconfirmed
press reports, six Japanese shipping firms han-
dling coal shipments from North Vietnam have now
decided to halt their sailings to DRV ports. It
is known that Japanese shipping interests have
been under pressure from the moderate Seamen's.
Union to avoid North Vietnamese waters since the
Tonkin Gulf incidents last fall. A shipment of
1,000 tons of gasoline for Haiphong has report-
edly been held up as a result of the Union's re-
fusal to staff the vessel because of the danger
involved.
2. An assessment of the status of free world
shipping to North Vietnam is being made for this
publication and will be carried when completed.
VI-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900030016-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030016-2
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030016-2