POSSIBLE PARTITION LINES FOR CYPRUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500110004-3
For Official Use Only.
Possible Partition Lines For Cyprus
BGI RP 75-12
December 1974
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In the event of negotiations to attempt to
settle the Cyprus problem by partition, delimitation
of partition lines will be a major issue.
This paper assesses the impact of partition on
the economy and population of Cyprus, first under
the de facto partition resulting from the Turkish
invasion, and then under nine alternative partition
lines. These lines are representative of innumerable
possible partition lines: some have been selected
because they.reflect positions taken by Greek Cypriot
or Turkish officials, and others are variants of
these lines that trade off agricultural, mineral
resource, industrial, or tourist areas vital to the
economic well-being of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
The text should be read in conjunction with
the two summary tables and the map at the end of
the report. A historical summary of Turkish and
Greek involvement in Cyprus is also appended.
NOTE.-- This Research Paper was produced by the
Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
RTAT
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297ROO0500110004-3
Turkish armed forces have captured approximately
40 percent of Cyprus and have gained control of
most of the island's key agricultural, mining,
manufacturing, tourist, and transportation facilities.
The line of Turkish advance extends from a point
east of Kokkina, on the southwest coast of Morphou
Bay, through the capital city of Nicosia, south-
eastward to positions less than ten miles north
and northwest of Larnaca, along the British sovereign
base of Dhekalia, to a point south of Cyprus's
major port, Famagusta.
The following key economic areas are within
Turkey's zone of occupation. Loss of control over
them jeopardizes Greek Cypriot economic survival.
More than half of the best cropland -- including
all of the highly developed Morphou Bay area;
most of the irrigated plain of Eastern Messaoria;
the island's 'most productive citrus groves,
west of Famagusta and near Karavas and Lapithos
in Kyrenia's Serrakhis Valley; and the second
best potato growing region on Cyprus, along
the Nicosia-Morphou road. Cultivated areas
include more than half of the island's acreage
in wheat, barley, potatoes, ci-trus, carrots,
and olives.
n
A Major copper mining region south of Lefka
that includes operations of the largest copper
company, the U.S.-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation
(CMC). Open pit operations at Apliki and
Skouriotissa and the Mavrovouni underground
mine produce more than 18,000 tons of copper
annually.
The popular Kyrenia and Famagusta tourist
areas, depriving Greek Cypriots of a flourishing,
Greek-owned hotel business.
State and privately owned forests that produce
roughly one-third of the island's timber.
Major areas include the Korno-Kyparissovouno,
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297ROO0500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500110004-3
Buffavento, Helevga, Koronia, Akradhes, Apostoles
Andreas, Salamis, Kormakiti-Ayia Irini, and
parts of the Patho forest.
Light industries in the Nicosia and. Famagusta
areas that process local products for both
home consumption and export -- such as wineries,
carob-processing plants, metal works, and'
timber mills.
All of the perennial springs in the Kyrenia
mountain range -- three of which, located
near Kythrea and Lathos, are according to
Greek claims the best on the island.
The effects of this partition are potentially
disastrous to the Greek Cypriot community. Most
of the area remaining under Greek control is moun-
tainous terrain (Troodos Mountains and foothills),
where grazing, viticulture, olive growing, mining
(copper, iron pyrites, and chromite), lumbering,
and tourism are the chief occupations. Prime
agricultural land left to the Greek Cypriots --
the fertile lowland areas of the eastern Messaorian
Plain and narrow coastal strips -- includes less
than half of the island's acreage in wheat, barley,
potatoes, and citrus crops. It is unlikely that
food grown in the Greek zone could support a popu-
lation of 356,000 indigenous Greek Cypriots boosted
by some 147,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from the
Turkish zone who might have to be resettled there.
Continued Turkish occupation of most of Cyprus's
prime agricultural lands -- as well as its industrial
parks, highways, and tourist 'facilities -- would
leave the Greek Cypriot population in a state of
severe economic crisis, with reduced production,
underemployment, sharply curtailed foreign trade,
food shortages, and a general decline in the standard
of living.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SELECTED PARTITION LINES
The first eight lines (A-H) are in order of
increasing advantage for the Greek Cypriots. Lines
A through D. fall reasonably close to Turkish claims
based on the Attila Line. Lines G and H probably
go beyond the limits of Turkish acceptance. Line
I illustrates a Turkish proposal made in Geneva
during the cease-fire period following Phase One
of the invasion of Cyprus. It would create Turkish
coastal enclaves.
Line A is the only partition of the nine in
which Turkish Cypriots would receive a greater
share of the island than that originally claimed
by Turkey in August 1974.
Line B divides the island along the Attila
Line, as proposed by Turkey in 1964 and again in
early August 1974.
Line F reflects in part proposals made by
the Greek Cypriots.
Line H illustrates a partition in which the
size of the Turkish zone would correspond roughly
to the proportion of the Turkish Cypriot population
(18 percent).
Lines C. D, E, and G are intermediate lines
based on key economic factors that would probably
be raised in negotiations for Turkish withdrawal
from their line of farthest advance.
Line A
Line A is between the line of the farthest
advance of the Turkish armed forces and the Attila
Line. Its adoption would return to Greek Cypriot
control 167 square miles of land, much of it under
irrigation, as well as the important Kouklia and
Ayios Nikolaos reservoirs, the southern portion
of the city of Famagusta with its nearby beach
resorts, and the key roads connecting Nicosia with
Famagusta and Larnaca. East of Nicosia, Turkey
would retain control over 67 square miles of the
Messaorian Plain south of the Attila Line, bounded
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
by the Nicosia-Famagusta highway through Asha and
Vatili to Lysi and by a secondary road connecting
Lysi with Prastio. From Prastio, Line A follows
the highway to Famagusta and divides the port city,
leaving the old-(Turkish) part of town and the
harbor under Turkish control.
Although the return of 121 square miles of
good arable land, plus two important reservoirs
in the Famagusta area, would significantly benefit
Greek Cypriots, partition along Line A would leave
the Greek Cypriot population in an only slightly
better economic situation than partition along
the line of farthest Turkish advance. Farm pro-
duction and employment would still fall far short
of meeting the requirements of some 503,000 people,
and Greek Cypriots would bitterly oppose such a
settlement.
Line B
Line B is the so-called Attila Line, a division
of the island proposed by Turkey in Geneva in early
August 1974, which generally coincides with the-
1964 proposal of the Turkish Communal Chamber.
It runs from Kokkina to the Nicosia-Troodos Mountains
highway south of the Skouriotissa copper mine.and
follows this highway to Nicosia, passing just north
of the international airport. In Nicosia, the
Attila line will probably be defined as the line
dividing Turkish- and Greek-settled portions of
the city. East of-Nicosia, the line probably runs
along the road leading northeastward from Nicosia
to Palekythro and Exometokhi. Near Exometokhi
it joins the old Nicosia-Famagusta highway and
proceeds eastward to Famagusta via Angastina, Prastio,
and Gaidhouras.
The significant difference from Line A is
the return to Greek control of 67 square miles
of the Messaorian Plain, most of it irrigated fields
under wheat and barley cultivation. Economic survival
.for Greek and Turkish Cypriots will depend to a
large degree on how much of the fertile Messaorian
Plain each controls.. Line B'would partition that
area as follows:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297ROO0500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
.
Turkish Control*
Cropland 692 sq. mi.
(57%)'456 sq, mi.. (380)
Irrigated , Cropland 168 sq. mi.
(46%)
184 sq. mi.
(50%)
Barley Cultivation 88 sq. mi.
(44%)
90 sq. mi.
(45%)
Wheat Cultivation 3.6 sq.-mi.
(33%)
67,sq. mi.
(62%)
* Remainder is under British control.
Although Line B provides the Greek Cypriot
population of some 503,000 persons with more than
two-thirds of the island's croplands and nearly
half of its irrigated lands, the Greek majority
would still face a difficult economic situation.
Much of their land would still be in the rugged
Troodos Mountains. Food production by Greek Cypriots
would be insufficient, and they would depend heavily
on-imports and foreign aid. Greek population density
would increase from a pre-invasion level of 181
to some 219 persons per square mile. Weighing
these.factors.against the possibility that Turkey
may be..persuaded to moderate its Attila Line claims
somewhat, Greek Cypriots would probably consider
Line B negotiable and seek a more favorable partition
of the island.
The Turkish Cypriot population of some 116,000,
on the other hand, would profit handsomely. Much
more land would be gained in the north than would
be given up-in the south. The average population
density in the Turkish-held area would drop from
a pre-invasion level of 185 to 99 per square mile.
In addition, Turkish Cypriots would retain almost
all of the key economic centers. Having proposed
the Attila Line originally, Turkey would probably
accept a partition settlement along Line B.
Line C
Line C incorporates a trade-.off of-territory
north and south of the Attila Line (Line B) as
a result of which Greek Cypriots would gain a net.
51 square miles of intensively cultivated irrigated
farmland. Compared with Line B, Turkey would lose
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297ROO0500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
some 32 square miles of coastal land in the Morphou
Bay region and some 45 square miles of farmland
west and northeast of Nicosia. In turn, it would
gain control. over some 26 square miles of irrigated
Messaorian cropland south of the Attila Line some
9 miles east of Nicosia.
The westernmost section of Line C begins. at
Petra Tou Limniti, rocky islands in Morphou Bay,
and follows secondary roads southward through the
villages,,of.Limnitis, Loutros, and Galini to the
mountain peak Moutti Tis Pallouras (2,377 ft).
It then turns east and winds along the foothills
of the Troodos Mountains to the village of Evrykhou
on the main Nicosia-Troodos-Limassol Highway.
Along this segment of the boundary, Greek Cypriots
would regain the settlement of Kokkina and 14 other
villages. Between Evrykhou and Nicosia, the parti-
tion line follows the Attila line to the village
of Astromeritis,then swings north to Kato Kopia,
from where it follows a secondary road to Nicosia
via Yero-Lakhos. This northward detour of the
line returns to Greek control some 38 square miles.
of an intensely cultivated citrus region along
the Serrakhis River. East of Nicosia, the partition
line follows the old Famagusta road via Trakhon,
Palekythro,:Asha, Mousoulita, and Prastio. Along
this stretch, Turkey would lose 7 square miles
of land extending northeastward from Nicosia, including
the industrial park near Mia Milea, but would gain
a 26-square-mile bulge of irrigated Messaorian
farmland between Trakhoni and the town of Asha.
Partition along Line C obtains for Greek Cypriots
a slightly better terrain and economic posture
than that offered by Turkey under the Attila Line
proposal. With minor territorial gains, including
the return of some light industry, the economic
condition of-Greek Cypriots would improve somewhat
from that under Line B but would remain basically
untenable. Greek Cypriots would most likely bargain
for a larger slice of arable land from the Messaorian
Plain. Turkey, on the other hand, may consider
the net loss. from the Attila Line as minimal and
may be willing to settle the Cyprus issue along
Line C.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297ROO0500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Line D
Adoption of Line D would return to Greek'Cypriot
control the Lefka copper mining region and the
western half of the Morphou Bay area in exchange
for the Messaorian Plain area south of the Attila
Line and east of Nicosia described under Line A.
Ankara has already indicated its willingness to
consider-the return of the Lefka.:copper mining
region to Greek Cypriots. The trade would net
the Greeks 25square miles of land over partition
by Line B. The Greek area under Line D would be
26 square miles less than under Line C, but Greeks
would gain valuable economic resources. - The Lefka
region includes-not only the copper mines of the
U.S.-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation (at Apliki,
Skouriotissa, and Mavrovouni) and its flotation
and leaching plant at Xeros, but also a conveyor
belt loading installation for iron pyrite ore owned
-by the Hellenic Mining Co. at Karavostasi on Morphou
Bay. The latter has a ship loading capacity of
1000 tons of ore-per hour. The Lefka mining region
accounts for approximately two-thirds of Cypriot
mineral production and mineral export earnings.
Partition-Line D begins some 4 miles northeast
of Lefka and follows a single-lane hard surfaced
road through the villages Elea, Petra, and-Angolemi,
to Kato Koutraphas on the Nicosia-Troodos-Limassol
highway. From here it follows Line A via-Nicosia,
Asha, Lysi, and Prastio to Famagusta.
Settlement under Line D would give Greek Cypriots/
control of all the known mineral resources on the
island. This factor coupled with a fairly reasonable
division of arable land might induce Greek Cypriot
negotiators to accept Partition Line D. Turks -
on the other hand would still retain a large portion
of the Messaorian Plain, including some fertile -
lands south of the Attila Line.
Line E further reduces Turkish-controlled
territory by returning to Greek Cypriots the south-
western part of the Morphou region, including the
town of Morphou. In the west Line E would be
some 8 miles to the north of-Line D. It would
-8-
p ~.
x
FOR OFFICIAL`USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297ROO0500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY=
run along the hard-surfaced roads connecting the
coastline with the town of Morphou and with the
villages of Kato Zodhia and Astromeritis. From
Astromeritis it would follow Lines A and D through
Nicosia, Asha, Lysi, and Prastio to Famagusta.
Partition Line E would most likely be acceptable
to Greek Cypriots because of the return of?41 square
miles of highly prized'cropland in the Morphou.
area,:one of the richest agricultural areas in
Cyprus, and the town of Morphou, with a pre-invasion,
population of nearly 7,000 Greek inhabitants.
Well provided with water from the Troodos hills,
the area produces a multitude of crops and contains
large orange and grapefruit groves. The area is.
also well known for its strawberries, an important
export to Europe. Turkish agreement to this partition
scheme, however, will depend largely on the value
Turkish Cypriots place on the 67 square miles of
irrigated agricultural land they would retain. in
the area east of Nicosia south of the Attila Line.
A strong possibility exists that in spite of pre-
viously announced willingness to consider giving
up the Morphou area, Line E would encounter Turkish
objections.
Line F
This partition would return the entire Morphou
Bay area and the Serrakhis Valley, with its extensive
citrus orchards, to Greek Cypriot control. It
would also boost the Greek Cypriot economy by re-.
turning sizable timber operations in.the Kormakiti-
Ayia Irini forest, north of Morphou. The Greek-
occupied zone would increase by 177 square miles
over that of Line E. Agricultural holdings would
offer adequate means of Greek economic survival
on the island.
Partition Line F reflects in part a Greek
Cypriot proposal. However, that proposal included an
additional 76 square miles of land east of Tymbou on
the Messaorian Plain. Turkish acceptance of this
line is uncertain. Although the Turkish zone contains
much of the prime farmland of the Messaorian Plain,
it covers only 27 percent of the island -- short
of the minimum 30 percent demanded earlier. Under
-9-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
this partition only half of the Turkish-controlled
area of 924 square miles would be useable for agri-
culture or lumbering.
Line G
..The most strenuous. Greek objection to. Partition
Lines A through ,F would probably be based on the
fact that in~all cases the partition line between
Prastio and: Famagusta virtually isolates the south-
eastern tip of Cyprus, a Greek-inhabited triangular
area of some 90 square miles. This situation arises
because the Nicosia-Famagusta road, which the Turks
will probably demand., provides the only good road
access to the southern portion of Famagusta and
the southeastern tip of Cyprus. This area is bounded
on the west by the UK Dhekelia base, and all other
roads to it pass through British-controlled territory.
It includes a hotel strip south of Famagusta as
well as several large settlements -- the most promi-
nent of which are Dherinia and Paralimni.
Line G offers an alternative that avoids this
problem by giving the Greek Cypriots 106 square
miles of scenic mountains, forested foothills,
and productive farmlands in the province of Kyrenia
in exchange for the isolated southeast, which would
come under Turkish Cypriot control. Although the
Greek Cypriots would lose the port of Famagusta
and its coastal resort strip as well as some productive
farmland, they would gain some scenic West Kyrenian
tourist areas, including the historic settlements
of Lapithos, Lambousa, and Myrtou. The trade-off
in territory would result in a net gain of 15 square
miles for the Greeks.
The partition line starts 3 miles west of
the port of Kyrenia and runs south across the Kyrenian
mountain range, passing west of the famous Byzantine
castle of St. Hilarion (which would remain.in Turkish
hands), and then skirts the main highway from Kyrenia
to Nicosia. From Nicosia it follows the Famagusta
road south of Mia Milea, Trakhoni, and Mousoulita
to Famagusta. Some 2 miles northwest of Famagusta
it swings south to the Ayios Nikoleos Reservoir -
and then follows the eastern boundary of the UK
base territory of Dhekelia to the sea.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Greek acceptance of Partition Line G would
depend on their ultimate willingness to give up
the port of Famagusta and nearby sea resorts for e
other major gains (tourist areas and. citrus groves)
that would generate quick revenue with which to
pay for food products they would have to import.
Turkish interest in this partition may be
aroused by some of its strategic, economic; and
political benefits. The line places under Turkish
control most of the northern and all of the eastern
coastline of the island, the port of Famagusta,
and the best sea resorts of the island along Famagusta
Bay.' In addition, it offers undisputed control
over large fresh water lakes west and south of
Famagusta which feed irrigation projects. Although
the Turkish zone would be slightly smaller than
one-fourth of the island (23.5%), it would still
allow the Turkish population more than adequate
living space. Line G would give the Turks a common
boundary with the UK sovereign base territory of
Dhekelia. This could provide Turkish Cypriot. farmers
the opportunity to cultivate some of the British
territory. It could also lead to future Turkish
Cypriot acquisitions should the British decide.
to leave the island. Despite the advantages Partition
Line G offers the Turks, their agreement to this
solution would depend on the difficulty of reaching
an agreement under any of the other partition plans
and on their'reluctance to settle for so much less
territory than was originally demanded.
This line illustrates a partition in which
the size of the Turkish zone would correspond roughly
to the 18 percent of the Turkish Cypriot minority
on the island. It is based on the proclaimed Greek
willingness to divide the island according to the
size of the ethnic population. The Turkish zone
would cover 744 square miles, approximately 21
percent of the island. The partition line generally
follows the Kyrenia-Nicosia and the Nicosia-Famagusta
highways. It encloses into the Turkish zone the
Karpas Peninsula, most of the Kyrenia mountain
range, and the city of Kyrenia, the Turkish sector
of Nicosia, and the old city of Famagusta.
-11-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Partition along this line would return to
Greek Cypriot control much more territory than
the Turks are currently willing to consider. It
would amount to surrender of approximately half
of the territory they now hold -- including all
of the Lefka copper mining area, the Morphou citrus
region, and the intensively farmed irrigated area
south of the Attila Line. Clearly favoring Greek
Cypriots, this settlement plan would probably be
rejected by the Turks.
Line I
This set of lines presents a cantonal approach
to partition of the island and illustrates the
alternative Turkish proposal made at Geneva during
the cease fire period following the first phase
of the invasion. In this scheme, five autonomous
Turkish Cypriot cantons would be carved out of
the island. The main canton would consist of the
northeastern portion of the island, and the others
would be large enclaves near Larnaca, Paphos,
Polis, and Lefka.
Built-in weaknesses in this partition adversely
affect.both Turkish and Greek interests.in the
long run. The ports of Famagusta, Kyrenia, and
possibly Paphos would be controlled by Turks.
A Turkish enclave would probably include part of
the port of Larnaca. Greeks would control most
of the island's arable lands and mining areas,
but Turks would control the sources of much of
the water supply and most of the coastal tourist
attractions. The four Turkish enclaves would be
isolated far from the main Turkish canton. Sur-
rounded by Greek territory and a hostile Greek
Cypriot majority population, the Turkish inhabitants
would find themselves in a difficult economic and
military position.
Turkey now considers Line I impractical and
would probably reject it. President Makarios,
however, recognized its advantages for the Greek
Cypriots and recently stated that it would be his
first choice in dividing the island.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
Appendix
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Turkish claims to Cyprus, particularly those
to the northern region of Kyrenia, reach as far
back as the 16th century. The Greek-inhabited
island of Cyprus was conquered in 1571 by the Turks,
who ruled the island until 1878 when it came-under
British occupation and administration. The island
remained nominally Turkish territory, however,
and it was not until after the outbreak of war
between Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1914
that it was annexed to the British Crown. Following
World War I, the Turkish Republic renounced all
rights to Cyprus, and it became a British Crown
Colony in 1925. Turkey renewed its historic claim
.to the island after World War II when it became
increasingly concerned over the status of some
104,000 Turkish Cypriots sprinkled throughout the
island. Agitation for union with Greece (enosis),
violence and guerilla warfare against the British
in 1955, intercommunal strife and bloodshed between
1958 and 1960, and finally the establishment of
a Greek-oriented. independent republic under Arch-
bishop Makarios in August 1960 have heightened
Ankara's desire for a presence on the island.
The unequal distribution of wealth and real
estate between Turkish and Greek Cypriots -- with
Greeks enjoying a better standard of living and
controlling most of the choice farmland, businesses,
and administrative positions -- has long been a
source of irritation on the Turkish mainland.
Turkey's role in Cypriot affairs increased signif-
icantly in the wake of bloody intercommunal strife
in the early Makarios years. The subsequent estab-
lishment of Turkish Cypriot enclaves for better
protection against overwhelming Greek odds has
led to Turkish Cypriot economic dependence on Turkey
in the form of a substantial annual subsidy in
support of the enclaves. The long awaited justification
for a Turkish invasion of the island was finally
provided by Athens in July 1974 when the Greek
Junta inspired a coup that overthrew the Makarios
regime and established a pro-enosis government
on the island.
FOR'OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110004-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500110004-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1 6-10 GZ ~. ' I.
,...Estimated-,.Population- Densi,tyr
,.;in a Divided Cyprus.*
(.per `square mile)
Greek-Cypriot
Line Zorie.
Fa=rthe-st,I ?S 243.
Advanced ; 3
ass, oof
99 J/ 7, 'k00
104
101
-10 5
126
156
1^
113
;.- i~ ,-,I 'r
64'SOo
z1 ~~aa