Directorate of
Intelligence
India:
Congress Party in Flux
NESA 84-10113
March 1984 .
Copy 358
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India:
Congress Party in Flux
This paper was prepared by~f the
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
of the
with a contribution from
Office of Central Reference. It was coordinated with
the Directorate of Operation
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
Secret
NESA 84-10113
March 1984
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necrei
India:
Congress Party in Flux
Key Judgments The Congress Party under Prime Minister Gandhi's personal leadership
Information available has deteriorated since her.return to power in 1980 and may fragment in fu-
as of 15 March 1984 ture elections. Despite its weakened state, the Congress remains the single
was used in this report.
largest political organization in India and is likely to retain power on the
strength of Gandhi's personal popularity unless the now-disparate opposi-
tion can form a united front.0 . 25X1
In our judgment, Gandhi's efforts since her return to power in 1980 to
transform the party into an instrument of personal power have:
? Atrophied the party organization and undermined its ability to govern.
? Eroded its popular support.
? Stimulated moves by the fragmented opposition parties to unite against
Gandhi's Congress Party.
? Encouraged destabilizing regional movements and heightened caste and
religious tensions.
? Contributed to foreign policy stances that have strained India's relations
with neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan, and strengthened New
Delhi's ties with Moscow in the near term. 25X1
We believe Gandhi's centralization of party and government leadership in
her own hands reflects in part her determination to deflect challenges while
she ensures the succession of her son Rajiv. To this end, she has removed
dissenters from the party, declared herself party president, clipped the
wings of state Congress Party leaders, and retained direct control of key
government functions. We judge she has for the short run successfully
cleared the field of rivals within the party, but Rajiv has yet to demonstrate
the mettle he would require to win such leadership if Gandhi died or lost
power before effecting his succession. 25X1
Although we believe India's near-term political stability is secure, Gandhi's
personalized style of rule has sapped the vigor of her party; undermined its
state governments; and devitalized Parliament, the court system, and the
bureaucracy-key institutions of long-term national stability. Weak Con-
gress state governments appointed and directed from New Delhi have been
unable to curb factionalism, contain dissidence, or administer effectively.
The government's quick resort to repression in the face of unrest has
loosened historic ties between the party and minorities, eroding its electoral
base and fueling regional, caste, and religious conflict. Unless Gandhi or
her successor devolves some power to state units of the party and rebuilds
its grassroots organization, the Congress Party could lose dominance in the
Secret
NESA 84-10113
March 1984
We judge that the Congress Party is on the defensive in this national
election year. Poor showings in state and local elections held since the last
national contest in 1980 have exposed the party's organizational weakness-
es. The party's apparent vulnerability has spurred efforts by opposition
parties to unite before the elections, which must be held before next
February. Prospects for a durable coalition remain problematic. Despite
the possibility of imminent national elections, opposition leaders continue
to spar among themselves. Some have even considered joining Gandhi.
Gandhi's political liabilities have led her to seek foreign as well as domestic
scapegoats, to the detriment of India's foreign relations. In our view,
Gandhi's hostile stance toward neighboring countries reflects preelection
political pressures at home as well as enduring foreign policy concerns-
such as fears that the US-Pakistani security relationship threatens India.
Gandhi's harsh rhetoric has soured India's relations in the region and
undercut earlier efforts to balance close ties with Moscow by improving
relations with regional states and the United States. We judge these
developments have provided new opportunities for Moscow's efforts to
discredit the United States and Pakistan and are likely in the short term to
ensure closer Indo-Soviet ties at some expense to ties with Washington.
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25X1
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Non-Congress-Party-governed
state
300 Kilornelere
300 Mlles
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India:
Congress Party in Flux
Strong Dynastic Leadership
Returned to power in 1980 after a three-year hiatus
on the strength of Prime Minister Gandhi's personal
popularity, the Congress Party has become virtually a
one-woman organization. Although the party remains
the most powerful and the largest in the nation-with
a membership estimated by Indian press analysts at
15 million-we judge that Gandhi has secured her
dominance at some cost to the party's ability to
govern effectively and mobilize votes. According to
Indian public opinion polls, Gandhi's personal popu-
larity remains high, but we believe the Congress
Party-for over 30 years the backbone of stability and
of democratic and secular values in the Indian politi-
cal system-faces the national election to be held
before next February without the vitality that hitherto
ensured its dominanc
We believe Gandhi viewed her victory in 1980 as a
mandate to emphasize the strong personal leadership
that characterized her previous 11 years as Prime
Minister. In an apparent effort to preclude challenges
to her authority and her son Rajiv's succession, she
has avoided delegating much authority in government
or party. As head of the party that controls about two-
thirds of the seats in Parliament and 16 of the 22 state
governments, Gandhi dominates party affairs, con-
trols appointments of national and state party offi-
cials, and formulates domestic and foreign policy
almost sin lehandedly,
As a result, virtually every important
issue gravitates to New Delhi
Gandhi's unchallenged control of the Congress Party,
in our view, enhances the likelihood that she will be
able to transfer the party leadership to her son
Rajiv-providing she is still in power to do so. US
diplomats and Indian commentators assess that Rajiv
still lacks the political acumen and popularity among
old guard party officials to secure the Congress
leadership on his own merits. Although Rajiv is
nominally but one of five party general secretaries,
Gandhi has positioned him to take over sometime
after the national election that must be held by next
February, according to Embassy reports. Both Gan-
dhi's supporters and detractors have discounted her
public denials of any dynastic intent. President Zail
Singh-elected for a five-year term in 1982-is per-
sonally loyal to the Nehru family and favors the
continuation of the Gandhi dynasty, according t25X1
Indian media sources.)
Costs of Gandhi's Leadership: Institutional Decay
In our view, Gandhi's overbearing rule has debilitated
her party and eroded other vital institutions. Gandhi's
critics assert that, although she has stopped short of
breaching her constitutional authority as she did
during the two-year Emergency she declared in 197 25X1
her policies and leadership style have eroded the
autonomy and legitimacy of Parliament and the court
system as well as the Congress Party organization and
bureaucracy. According to Embassy and Indian press
reports, Gandhi's dismissive attitude toward Parlia-
ment and her party's manipulation of parliamentary 25X1
proceedings have undermined the national legisla-
ture's intended role as a check to executive power and
is under pressure to support government policy, fur-
ther narrowing the institutional base from which
future governments will have to cope with change and
manage unrest.) 25X1
In our judgment, the Congress Party under Gandhi 25X1 25X1
has lost some of the capabilities that have made it a
vital source of stability since independence. According 25X1
to US scholars, the Congress machine until the early 25X1
1970s was uniquely able to accommodate diverse
constituencies and provide opportunities for compet-
ing political elites. Gandhi's policy of purging dissent-
ers from the party has diminished the party's ability
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Indira Gandhi dominates Indian politics. Despite her
party's poor showing in several state byelections last
year, we judge she remains personally popular as she
faces the national election to be held before next
February. She has used her position as chairman of
the Nonaligned Movement since March 1983 to
reinforce her image as a world leader. Besides serving
as Prime Minister, Gandhi holds the Atomic Energy,
Space, and Science and Technology portfolios in the
25X1
Style. According to US diplomats, Gandhi is more a
doer than a thinker. Her tendency to respond to the
pressure of events or perceived threats to her author-
ity rather than to take the initiative often produces
inconsistencies. She has a shrewd instinct for survival
and a superb sense of political timing. The US
to preempt opposition causes and contributed to the
rise of regional parties, according to Indian commen-
tators. To ensure that the party's governing bodies
will not again become power bases for political ri-
vals-as they did in the 1960s-Gandhi has eschewed
party elections and instead packed the organization at
all levels with appointees who owe their status solely
to her good graces, according to the same sources.
This practice has made the party leadership less
Embassy reports that adversity brings out her com-
bativeness and that she intersperses periods of inac-
tivity with bold moves to catch her opponents by
surprise. Although she can be aloof and arrogant, US
diplomats have frequently observed her charm and
graciousness, especially toward foreign visitors. Gan-
dhi deeply resents personal criticism and has con-
vinced herself and others that her intuitions are
infallible and that jealous rivals are conspiring
After t 1 years as Prime Minister, Gandhi was sound-
ly defeated in the parliamentary elections in 1977
and spent the next three yearsfghting court cases for
alleged abuses of power. She was expelled from
Parliament and briefly imprisoned during this period.
She rebuilt her political base, however, and staged a
remarkable comeback in the election of January
1980. She viewed her reelection as public approbation
of her leadership and integrity, according to US
diplomats. Since the death of her elder son Sanjay in
1980, she has groomed her surviving son Rajiv to
representative, blocked advancement by aspiring
young officials, and ruptured the flow of information
and support from the grassroots upward through a
25X1
25X6
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Genesis. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress
Party-known as "Congress(I)"for 'Indira'-is the
result of successive splits in the All India Congress
Party founded 100 years ago. The first split occurred
in 1969, three years after Gandhi first became prime
minister. The organization led by Gandhi-called the
"Congress(O) "for "Opposition'-broke away from
the old guard Congress politicians, who formed the
Following the victory of the coalition Janata Party in
the 1977 national election, the defeated Congress(O)
Party again divided as a result of differences over the
role of Gandhi and her son Sanjay during the Emer-
gency period (1975-77). Gandhi's ni-
zation returned to power in 1980.CongressI orga
Hitherto, after each split, Gandhi has successfully
consolidated her strength within her party and even-
Ideology. Although formally committed to "demo-
cratic socialism, "a secular state, and a nonaligned
foreign policy, the Congress(I)-like the All India
Congress Party before it-has garnered support from
a range of religious, caste, and economic groups by
avoiding a clear-cut ideological position. Its pragmat-
ic policies formulated by Gandhi with little internal
party debate-are often described as "centrist.
Support Base. The Congress(I) could until recently
count on traditional support inherited from the All
India Congress Party among untouchables, Muslims,
the urban poor, and landless labor. Voters of the elite
Brahmin caste also tended to support the Congress
Party. In elections since 1980, however, these groups
have demonstrated a willingness to consider other
The weakening of the party's organization has shifted
the onus for maintaining political stability to the
bureaucracy-but we believe this "permanent govern-
ment" has itself deteriorated, except in New Delhi.
The Home Minister recently acknowledged in public
that growing corruption is undermining the integrity
and capabilities of the bureaucracy at all levels and
gave assurances that New Delhi was taking steps to
deal with the problem. Indian commentators, howev-
er, have imputed much of the corruption to interfer-
ence by Congress Party politicians, arbitrary transfers
and promotions, and low pay-all conditions caused
by New Delhi's policies. In contrast, at the national
level Gandhi's mistrust of other politicians has im-
pelled her to bypass her cabinet ministers and deal
directly with the highest echelon of the bureaucracy
within each ministry, which she has sought to insulate
from ministerial interference] 25X1
We believe Gandhi's concentration of decisionmaking25X1
in her own hands has simplified policymaking at the
expense of New Delhi's ability to respond effectively
to crises. She has assured her preeminence by fre- 25X1
quently reshuffling her cabinet and at times directly
controlling some key portfolios-such as Defense and 25X1
Atomic Enerev.
25X1
Indian political observers note that Gandhi
has appointed ineffectual cabinet ministers who rub-
berstamp her decisions rather than offer up policy
options. she depends al-
most exclusively on advice from experienced bureau-
crats who pose no political threat to her-notably P.
C. Alexander, her Principal Private Secretary, and
retired civil servant G. Parthasarathi. According to an
authoritative Indian commentator, Gandhi's personal
role in managing both domestic and foreign affairs
has created bottlenecks in decisionmaking that often
preclude preventive actions and create drift in foreign
State Government: The Congress Party's Achilles'
Heel
We believe the moribund condition of Congress Party
state units poses the single greatest challenge to
Gandhi's claim to provide "government that works."
Having broken the hold of state Congress Party bosses
who challenged her authority in the 1970s, she has
purposely appointed state chief ministers who lack an
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independent popular base. This practice has fueled
factional challenges in the party and reduced its
support, according to US academics. In our view,
Gandhi has further destabilized Congress-ruled states
by interfering frequently to depose chief ministers
who have lost her trust. Insecure chief ministers have
been unable to deliver on campaign promises, respond
effectively to regional concerns, defuse religious and
ethnic tensions, or nurture grassroots party organiza-
We judge that popular disenchantment with corrupt,
ineffectual Congress state governments coupled with
the emergence of strong opposition challengers in
many states has made the party increasingly vulnera-
ble in elections since 1980. US diplomats have attrib-
uted the party's humiliating electoral upsets in two
key southern states last year to the poor image and
performance of the Congress state governments and
the decay of grassroots organizations-a trend also
evident in subsequent state and local elections. Candi-
dates have returned to office with diminished support,
according to Indian press analysis. At the same time,
US scholars note that the emergence in most states of
a single opposition party capable of credibly challeng-
ing Congress preeminence has meant that Congress 25X1
can no longer be assured of state victories as a result
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Secret
of a divided opposition. Indian media sources note
that since 1980, 14 of the 26 Congress candidates who
have run for seats in the lower house of Parliament
have lost-a trend that in our judgment signals the
growing susceptibility of the party's parliamentary
In our analysis, the deterioration of Gandhi's party in
the states has been a major factor in the erosion of its
decades able to rely on support from the social
and economic extremes-notably Muslim, untouch-
able, and tribal minorities as well as the socially elite
Brahmin caste. Recently, however, the perceived fail-
ure of Congress state governments to reduce Hindu-
Muslim tensions, protect the interests and persons of
Muslims and untouchables, and deliver promised
benefits to minority groups has contributed to the
breakdown of longstanding electoral alliances, accord-
ing to the US Embassy. Leaders of these groups are
also complaining that they are underrepresented in
the party's governing bodies, now manned by Gan-
dhi's appointees, according to the Indian media. The
loss of Muslim, tribal, untouchable, and Brahmin
votes has contributed to Congress Party losses in
several recent state and local elections and could pose
a threat to national Congress rule in the parliamenta-
New Delhi's Response
We believe that Gandhi, while recognizing that her
party faces an uphill battle in future elections, re-
mains unwilling to address the problems caused large-
ly by her leadership style. In our view, she is unlikely
to relinquish her tight control of party and govern-
ment until she has secured Raiiv's succession.
although Gan i has
paid lipservice to party reforms she still gives little
weight to party organization, even in the face of
growing evidence of its electoral weakness. Gandhi
has responded to the party's bad news by repeatedly
justifying her strong leadership as a necessary re-
sponse to growing internal and external threats and
discrediting the opposition as an alternative, accord-
In our view, Gandhi's highhanded tactics in recent
months reflect her recognition that options for recoup-
ing the party's losses before the national election are
dwindling. Besides accusing opposition parties of ev-
ery stripe of "antinationalism," Gandhi has also
sought to topple opposition-led governments in Karna-
taka, Jammu and Kashmir, and Andhra Pradesh
through moves that include impugning their legitima-
cy and bribing their representatives to defect to the
Gandhi seems to have calculated that what her party
may lose in public sympathy by her recent maneuver-
ing it may gain in increased electoral strength if it
succeeds. At a minimum, her tacit threat of imposing
direct rule from New Delhi on Jammu and Kashmir
will, in our judgment, probably prompt regional lead-
ers to soften their public opposition to her. Gandhi
will probably seek electoral deals with such regional
parties as the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (ADMK) in Tamil Nadu and the Telugu
Desam in Andhra Pradesh to secure additional parlia-
mentary seats in exchange for promises of economic
aid or state autonomy. Despite her party's precarious
standing, we doubt that Gandhi will resort to reimpos-
ing emergency rule to avoid holding elections because
she fears that such a move would spark instant
Prospects for the Congress Party
We judge that the unity of Gandhi's Congress will be
at risk in the short term if it fails to retain a
parliamentary majority in the coming national
election:
? If the Congress Party lost outright, Gandhi would
have to step down, reducing Rajiv's chances of
eventual party leadership.
? If the party lost or had to share power, it would"
probably succumb to factional splits under any
leadership.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Issues. Gandhi seeks to:
? Make national unity and security the major issue,
claiming that only her leadership can protect India
against the internal and external threats that face
it.
? Portray the regionalization of politics, as a threat to
the nation-not just her party's political tenure.
? Discredit opposition coalition government as an
alternative to her rule.
? Claim credit for the economic gains resulting from
a favorable monsoon and domestic petroleum
production.
? Blame opposition parties for exacerbating adverse
developments that they blame on her policies and
leadership style, including:
-Regionalism and secessionism.
-Caste and religious-based conflict.
-Declining observance of law and order, particu-
larly in rural areas.
-Tensions between national and state govern-
ments over the division of authority and resource
controlF____~
Tactics To Undercut the Opposition. Gandhi is trying
to.,
? Induce regional parties to form electoral alliances
with Congress rather than join opposition
coalitions.
? If Congress returned to power with only a slim
majority, party unity would be particularly vulnera-
ble in the event of Gandhi's death,' which could spur
politicians whom she has forced out of the party to
In our view, the outcome of this election will depend
less on Gandhi's popularity than on the ability of the
opposition to forge a united front that would present a
credible alternative to Congress rule. Analysis of the
? Lure votes from left-leaning parties by reviving the
rhetoric of Indian socialism, without accompanying
policy changes.
? Siphon Hindu votes in the crucial Hindi-speaking
belt from the conservative Bharatiya Janata Party
and Lok Dal, while also underlining Congress's
continuing commitment to its longtime Muslim and
Advantages of Incumbency. According to the Indian
press, opposition party leaders fear that Gandhi may
try to parlay government prerogatives into electoral
advantage for her party by:
? Undertaking to extend television coverage to 75
percent of the country by 1985-presumably before
elections. India's government-owned television has
consistently served as the mouthpiece of the party
in power. 25X1
? Imposing direct rule from New Delhi on the states
at election time-possibly by a constitutional
amendment to make such rule automatic before all
elections, as proposed recently by the Election
Commission. Gandhi has imposed "President's
Rule" over 40 times in 16 years, often with partisan
1980 election that returned the party to power reveals
the extent of its vulnerability to a united opposition.
In that election, Congress won 351 of the 525 contest-
ed seats in the Lok Sabha-148 with a plurality of the
popular vote, not a majority-only because the oppo- 25X1
sition was weak and divided, according to US aca-
demics. Indian analysts project a Congress victory in
the coming election-though with a diminished par-
liamentary majority-only if the party again faces a
divided opposition, as it did in 1980. These sources
predict that a united front comprising the major
Wall posters that advertise the
national Congress Party meet-
ing held in Calcutta last De-
cember feature Gandhi and Ra-
jiv equally.
MPA
opposition parties could secure a parliamentary ma- a degree of autonomy and authority to party units at
jority and replace Congress with a coalition govern- all levels by measures that include:
ment-a judgment with which we agree. ? Holding party elections.
? Permitting the Congress Working Committee to
In the longer term, we believe the Congress Party's play its intended role as the party's "parliament."
ability to survive intact and compete successfully for
power rests on the willingness of its leaders to restore
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ac'-act
Figure 1
Congress Party Results in Parliamentary
Elections, 1952-80
This graph highlights the advantage accruing to the Congress Party under
India's single-representative constituency system-against a fragmented
opposition. Congress candidates have been able to capture seats with only a
plurality of the vote-hence the disproportionate gain in parliamentary seats
from 1977 to 1980, with a gain of only 8.2 percent of the popular vote.
Tamil Nadu, where it controls
state government. Supported by
broad cross section of populace,
excluding Brahmins.
chief ministers who possess political clout grounded National Conference Chiefly among Muslims in
in electoral support. (Farooq Abdullah) Jammu and Kashmir, where it
? Offering incentives for state party officials to revive holds power.
district and local party organizations not only at Akali Dal . Punjab-among Sikhs.
Parties belonging to National Democratic Alliance
Lok Dal a Greatest strength in Uttar Pra-
(Charan Singh) desh and Haryana among small
landowners and farmers. Some
strong areas in Bihar, Orissa.
Bharatiya Janata Party Support concentrated among
(A. B. Vajpayee) landowners, traders, civil
servants in Hindi-belt states-
especially Himachal Pradesh,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan.
Janata Party a Principally among urban edu-
(Chandra Shekhar) cated voters in Hindi-speaking
belt, with pockets of support in
Karnataka (whose state govern-
ment it controls), Maharashtra,
Bihar, Gujarat.
Congress(S) a
(Sharad Pawar)
pockets of Uttar Pradesh,
where Bahuguna was chief
minister.
Rashtriya Sanjay Mancha Limited support in Uttar
(Maneka Gandhi) Pradesh.
Major regional parties 25X1
Telugu Desam Andhra Pradesh, where it con-
(N. T. Rama Rao) trols state government.
? Encouraging the election in Congress-ruled states of DMK
M. Karunanidhi)
? Tolerating a measure of disagreement within the
party, though not at the cost of organizational
discipline.
In our view, were Gandhi to institute such changes
before installing Rajiv as party leader, she would
probably lose the leverage to ensure his succession and
would have to face the now-latent resistance of many
party members to his promotion at their expense-a
price we doubt she would willingly incur. Although we
doubt Gandhi would risk challenges to her own
authority by relaxing her control, we believe Rajiv or
another successor might reverse the party's decay by
Communist Party of India Scattered support nationally.
(C. Rajeshwar Rao)
Communist Party Marxist Support principally in West
(E. M. S. Namboodiripad) Bengal, where it controls state
government, with some support
in Kerala.
a Parties formed by splinters or breakaway factions of the Congress
Party-therefore potential rivals for its mantle.
Foreign Policy Implications
We believe Gandhi's evident determination in recent
months to reap electoral benefits from tensions in
South Asia has resulted in a tough political posture
toward neighboring countries that could adversely
affect US interests in the region. According to Em-
bassy sources, Gandhi is seeking to rally domestic
support before the national election by appealing for
national unity under her leadership in the face of
external threats. She has charged Pakistan, Sri Lan-
ka, Bangladesh, and Nepal as well as the United
States with pursuing policies that damage India's
security and unity and has asserted New Delhi's right
to counter these developments, according to the Indi-
an press. Although sparked by elections, New Delhi's
harsh line toward neighboring states in our view has
engendered long-term strains that increase the risk of
conflict and favor increased uence in India
in the short term.
In our view, Gandhi's recent foreign policy initiatives
aim to build support among specific domestic constit-
uencies as well as counter developments that she
claims adversely affect Indian interests. Accordingly,
she has:
? Unilaterally announced plans to build a wall along
the Indo-Bangladeshi border to keep out illegal
immigrants. The move probably seeks to placate
predominantly Hindu native Assamese who believe
competition from the largely Muslim immigrants
has reduced their job and educational opportunities.
? Accused Islamabad of fueling Sikh dissidence in
Indian Punjab, protested the announced sale by the
United States of Harpoon missiles to Pakistan, and
stalled negotiations with Pakistan for a nonaggres-
sion pact. New Delhi's charges that Pakistan is
planning a military offensive against India will
probably appeal to conservative Hindu voters, while
recent moves to normalize trade, communications,
and travel between the two countries will probably
please Muslim voters, according to US diplomats.
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This cartoon from the English-language Statesman Weekly lam-
poons Gandhi's versatile political stands as she appeals to diverse
constituencies before elections. The "Rashtriya Swayam Sevak"is
a Hindu nationalist organization that has increased its following in
Jammu and Kashmir with the rise of Muslim chauvinism there.
? Criticized Washington's alleged intentions of ob-
taining a naval base in Sri Lanka. New Delhi
probably calculates that its reaction will help deflect
pressure on Gandhi to support Tamils in Sri Lanka
as a means of securing Tamil votes in Tamil
Nadu-the only southern state she can hope to
carry in the national election, according to US
consular officials.
In our judgment, although the elections have provided
the impetus for Gandhi's tough stance toward neigh-
boring countries, she is genuinely concerned that such
developments as Pakistan's growing ability to inflict
damage on India and the rumored introduction of
foreign bases into South Asia threaten New Delhi's
We believe the domestic political pressures and secu-
rity concerns that are fueling India's new hard line
toward its neighbors will also warm Indo-Soviet rela-
tions in the near term, at some expense to relations
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Secret
with Washington. In our judgment, heightened Indo-
Pakistani tensions have reinforced a key element of
New Delhi's relationship with Moscow-the shared
interest in keeping Pakistan weak and blocking coop-
eration among the United States, Pakistan, and
China. Longstanding Soviet efforts to chill India's
relations with these countries through disinformation
campaigns are in tune with Gandhi's recent public
statements about India's "encirclement" by unfriend-
ly powers associated with the United States. The
Soviets will probably try to capitalize on her concerns
by pushing for increased exchanges of intelligence and
joint measures against Pakistani President Zia, but
we judge India's opposition to an increased Soviet
presence in South Asia will limit such cooperation.
Moscow's endorsement of Gandhi's leadership as she
faces an increasingly united opposition before elec-
tions probably will also favor closer Indo-Soviet ties,
at least over the next year. The spate of visits by high-
level Soviet officials signals Moscow's desire to bolster
he participation of a Soviet delega-
tion in a plenary meeting of the Congress Party in
December 1983-the first such meeting held in eight
years-underscores the leftward slide of the party
noted by Embassy observers. Indian commentators
believe Gandhi will continue her efforts to attract
support from leftwing voters but is unlikely to alter
her foreign or domestic policy substantially to do so-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000300120003-6
secret