UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTHS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020076-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 76
• Publication Date: January 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ACROSS TIE BOARD
JANUARY 1982
,a a . hT -
Unatlernfav*a ae 010ru
iinter" ' to n 3 .
by Paul Wilkinson
here are only two real sur-
prises about the fierce and
confused debate that has
raged since the Reagan Adminis-
tration, in its first week in office,
Paul Wilkiaso a. professor of Interna-
tlonal Relations at the Uaiverrity of
Aberdeen, in Scotland, 18 author of
Political Terrorism. Terrorism and the
'Liberal State. and other works. A pre-
vions piece of his. in across the board.
January 1981, was titled "Still work-
ing for the extinction of mankind'
an assessment of the significance of the
resurgence of fascist terroriser in West-
ern Europe.
bluntly accused the Soviets of com? _most_ pew{e_ did.. not eaoect_ it_ to
plicity in' terrorism around the start oneratintt as an auencv of d'
world, and the State Department inforrtiatioen;gCIA a-? al+cs toy
released a dossier to prove Soviet, be suffering from. a. bag bout of.
and Cuban involvement in terror- amnesia, for one of itsowwresearch'
ism in Central America. The first is studies . on. internatio:tal terroristrt-?
that some usually well-informed published its. April... l976, stated.",
people expressed genuine surprise "... after a period of hesitancy
at these ?" revelations." The second Ihr,_soviets he na
al+ann tins:
is that a CIA analysis,. either-, fluids. weapons, and other assis-
through incompetence and naiveti tance to fedayeen troops thronith a
or for more devious political'res-number of intermediaries in 1969.
sons, sought to deny the link One? All indications are that they contln-
had become aware that, since Viet--- ue to do so today, Similarly, they
cant .an ater te,-the- CIA had'' have continued their long-standintt
become dangerously-rundown and -program (the more innocuous as-
inadequate as the intelligence arm- pects of which are publicly use-
of the leading Western? power-, bur-crated with Moscow's I'aatriee
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mamba University of bringing the Polisario, the Armenian Secret
young revolutionaries from all Army, and SWAPO) on an oppor-
parts of the Third World-to the tunistic basis, with a view to using
Soviet Union for training and them as instruments of proxy war
indoctrination. And . . . some of to further Soviet interests abroad.
these individuals have subsequently One valuable source of evidence
cropped uo on the tr?ansnational about the precise nature of Soviet
terrorist scene. . . . There is also a help has come from interviews with
considerable' body of circumstau '-captured terrorists. For' example,
?tial evideaoo linking Moscow to David Shipley of Tice New York
various terrorist formations in Tfiney has published a very full
Western Europe- . account of his conversation with
The same..976-EIA..repoet.goes ?.Adnan Jaber, commander of a
on to emphasize that much of the PLO terrorist squad that killed six
work of channeling aid to terrorist Jewish Worshipers in a Sabbath
movements as done by interm 'ambush at Hebron in May 1978.
lea and proxies such as the Warsaw ' The"twd-hour interview was as-
Pact countries. Cuba, Libya and rahged"at the'request of The Times
the PLO, "who, a expos_ , can and conducted in the presence of an
plausibly represented as having Israeli Army public relations a&
acted on their own initiative. a crs'and'ivith no guards or interro-
stu y concluded that although "the ' gators present:TheSoviets must. of
true dimensions of Soviet involve- course, be aware that it' is impossi-
ment remain extremely difficult to ble'to'keep their terrorist' training
ascertain their efforts to gain activities secret. even if they partic-
some handle on 'extremist activity ularly wzantedto. For the orgeitiza-
have, together with their pursuit of tions they assist, such as the PLO,
less congruent objectives, done -openly admit its extent: indeed they.
more to aggravate than-to contain boast about it, no doubt in the
the current rash of transnational belief that It adds to their move.
terrorist activity." ment's status and credibility and
the impression of power and imin-
his cautious assessment did, no cibility they wish to create. Saber
I I more than endorse the eonclu- claimed that he was selected for
sions of the small. but fast-growing, special training in the. Soviet
Western community of academics. Union,' following preliminary
security analysts. and investigative courses in Syria and Lebanon. He
journalists specializing in the study was sent. to & ,camp at Skhodnya,
of terrorist phenomena in the mid- about, 20 miles from Moscow.
Seventies. But over the last few where he received training in the
years we have had more and more- use of weapons, how to command a
material brought to light: which group of about 30 guerrillas, mill-
confirms that Soviet leaders, oper tary tactics, political ideology and
ating through the machinery of the. propaganda techniques. Jaber said
International Department of: the he and his fellow trainees were not
Secretariat of the Soviet Commu? 'allowed. tohave any contact with
nisi party, and the KGB, have been . Soviet citizens other than their in-
up to their necks in direct support struetors- .
for terrorist activities, pumping vi- Further details of the terrorist
tai training, cash and weapons,.and training camps within the USSR
valuable propaganda and diplomat- were revealed by Herbert Krosney
is support to selected "national . in a September 1979 article in New
liberation movements" (such as the York magazine and in his TV doc-
PLO, the Omani Liberation Front;.,. umentary on the PLO shown by the
PBS and CBC the following week.
Drawing on intelligence reports
and Interviews with PLO officials,-
Krosney was able to provide a very
interesting description of the six-
month specialist training co"
made available to selected mem-
bers of major PLO factions at the
Soviet foreign-military academy at.,
Sanprobal near Simferopol on the
Black Sea. Under the innoce-at title
"engineering... selected "national
liberation- movement : personnel
are taught: regular and electric det-
onators; production of incendiary
devices; preparation of an electrical
charge using a? detonator; fuse
types; blowing up vehicles and am-
munition dumps; and mhny other
technical skills of terrorism. Kros-
ney's sources estimate that. up un-
til 1979, roughly 1.000 PLO opera-
tives had been sent to training
camps either in the Soviet Union or
in other Soviet. bloc countries. This
program was stepped up after
1977-78. when the Soviets decided
to make greater use of the PLO to
counteract the Sadat peace iraitia-
tive with Israel and the Camp Da-
vid process. The PLO Representa-
tive to Moscow, Muhammad ash-
Shader. confirmed the continuing
importance attached by the Soviet
regime and the PLO to this pro-
gram when he said. in February
.198I: "Hundreds of Palestinian of-
ficers holding the rank of brigade
commander have already been
.accredited by Soviet- military
academies, and- members of the
PLO use arms of Soviet and East
European manufacture...."'It is
important to stress that such sup-
port given by the Soviets to the
PLO has a far wider significance in.
the- furtherance of international
terrorism, because the PLO is the
most important conduit fat weap-
ons, funds and expertise to other
terrorist movements, including
some of the main groups active in
Western Europe. For example. se-
lected IRA members. have been
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sent to Palestinian camps for basic
training since the early 1970s, and
since 1976 approximately 10 IRA
members have been arriving in
Southern Lebanon for training
every month. Many IRA weapons
have also been obtained through
the PLO: in 1972 an arms shipment
from Fatah to the IRA was de-
tained at Antwerp; in November
1977 five tons of weapons. includ-
ing mortars. rocket launchers, ex-
plosives, and automatic weapons en
route to the IRA from the PLO
were intercepted in Belgium, where
the weapons were found to have
i been hidden in electrical trans.
formers en route from Cyprus to
the Irish Republic.
The PLO is not the only Soviet
ally acting as? a conduit for aid to
other terrorist movements. Cuba,
Libya, Southern Yemen, Vietnam,
and North Korea all play a signifi-
cant role in training'and in provi-
sion of weapons. Shipley's infer-
want. Jaber, claimed that Viet-
namese training Was. particularly
highly valued by the terrorist
groups, because it was, so up-to.
date. Southern Yemen is an impor.
tant training base, with an esti-
mated 700 Cubans, 1,500 Soviets
and over 100 East Germans 'en.
gaged in training terrorists from
numerous groups in three camps at
Mukalla. Hauf, and Al-Gheida.
Libya has also been an important
center for training and weapons.
supply. For example, Thomas
McMahon, the IRA man found
guilty of the murder of Lord
Mountbatten and members of his
family, acquired his expertise in
constructing remote-control bombs
in a camp in Libya, under the
direction of Soviet specialists.
There is?a network of Libyan train-
ing camps catering to a wide vari-
ety of West European and other
terrorist groups. Apart from the
Libyan role in helping train and
arm the PFLP. and other groups
such as the .IRA. Qaddafi has
recently concentrated efforts on
training terrorists to subvert his ad
versaries in the Arab world, such as
Egypt and the Sudan.
Cuba's participation in funneling
practical assistance and armed
"advisers" to foreign movements is
fully documented. Its activities as a
Soviet' proxy in Africa are well
known, and it is clear that the KGB
has taken a particularly close inter.
est in the establishment and super-
vision of Soviet-style terrorist train.
ing in Cuba. The State Depart-
meat's dossier on the tragic situa-
tion in El Salvador underlines the
importance of Cuba as a Soviet
proxy for the subversion of the vul-
nerable and unstable regimes in
Central America. What is less well
known is. that Cuban "advisers"
and support are increasingly being
channeled to areas and insurgent
groups further afield, such as with-
in the United States' own borders,
and in the Middle East.It has beem
reported that some 400 Cubans
have been sent to assist the PLO in
Lebanon. and that in return the
PLO has promised to help "free.
dom fighters" in Latin America,
Asia and Africa. One fruit of this
arrangement has been. presum-
ably, the PLO aid to insurgents in
Central America.
The great advantage for the So-
viets of this use of proxies for sub-
version and terrorism is. of course,
that they can disclaim any respon-
sibility while in practice reaping
the strategic benefits of undermin-
ing noncommunist states, increas-
ing the dependency of their client
states and movements, and thereby
hoping' to gain still greater control
over them. By helping "national
liberation movements" in strategic
areas of the Third World, such as
the gulf, the Horn, the Caribbean
and Southern Africa, they clearly
hope to gain control over key stra-
tegic "choke points" where they
could sever vital sea-lanes which
supply the West, and gain control
over key suppliers of strategic natu-
ral resources such as oil, "yellow-
cake" uranium and bauxite.
rospects of rather different?tac.
tical gains may attract than to
aiding the often tiny but potentially
disruptive terrorist groups active
within the NATO democracies,
own borders. Except in certain i
cases-for example, Turkey in
1979-80._00 Soviets must know
that terrorists in Western countries
has little chance of destabilizing
the whole political system. On the
other hand. it has great prospects of
weakening them by disruption and
attrition. The Soviets are not un-
aware that protracted terrorist
campaigns in democracies tend to
force Western governments to
spend more on internal security and
to divert their already inadequate
conventional forces away from the
tasks of external defense. thus
weakening NATO in its major task
of countering the Soviet and War-
saw Pact buildup. Soviet leaders
would not find it easy to refrain
from aiding, at least covertly,
groups that are such a thorn in the
throbbing flesh of their adversary
capitalist states. And, the export of
political violence constitutes a low-
cost, low-risk weapon in the service
of Soviet interests. Because it is
undeclared, and, to a large extent,
clandestine, it can be used without
bringing the danger of a major con-
ventional war escalating to nuclear
conflict between the superpowers.
Needless to say, the Soviet Union
is not prepared to explain its true
motives and interests in promoting
terrorism and political violence on
an opportunistic basis around the
world. The USSR does not want its
true role revealed because it would
destroy tactical advantages. such as
surprise-or the opportunity of
helping both sides simultaneously
(as happened in the Horn of Afri-
ca) so that they are bound to be
ultimately on.. the winning side;
Where their cover is blown or they
officially admit involvement; of
course, the last thing the Soviets
will do is to attempt to justify it
purely in terms of national inter.
at. . ...
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 ticular national liberation amve-
meat or revolutionary- faction is
judged to be on the side of the "pro-
g-7t-.ive forces" of Marxism-Lanin-
ittm, as led and interpreted by the
Soviet vanguard. and hence against
the "capitalist-im perfalist reaction.'
aries," it can be ideologically legiti.
mated as part of Moscow's mission
to further the world revolution's
Inevitable *.c final victory.
This is l tea..,. a:ow the Xxomlin
justified its- (ultimately deceive)
Me in supporting the Vietcong.
They use the same terms when they
".adopt" meveme nts such as the
PLO today. History tells us that in
every recent. struggle by. national
liberation movements.. terrorism
has invariably been adopted. by
some. If not all, of the movement's
factions, as-one of their weapons of
struggle.. Yet the Soviets, of course,
angrily disavow the terrorism label
for any of the campaigns or actions
they support.: They claim that, as
they leading revolutionary power in -
the world. they have the duty to aid
national liberation movements to
the fullest possible extent,' and they
,caa even quote UN resolutions on
.struggles forself-determination to
both explains vnd justifies duce!
and indirect 'use of violence beyond
the borders of the USSR under cm,.
tain circumstances. Whores a- par.
e trust repreainher three t}"e and The $ovtets Ovt'p ''t n` tem61[i:~n41l t e1x1 ? . e c:xn::n d ',?.:,. }y;,. '-~
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media they control need a con lbasic facts. The Soviet Ambassador P' Is's insight, in "The Roots of
nient ideological framuworx tl. in London admitted, in a BBC ~:vement- in fntervr nerve, Tee
radio interview, in March 1981. J orLrm Challenge, acrd Rarportre,
that his government is involved in that the Bolsheviks were the benefi.
she activities I have describe!. esaries of the procesaof terrorism in
What is really in dispute is the Russia that bad. helped undermines
hsterrprefation of these facts. The the country's traditional values and
Soviets claim that they are engaged institutions, in the prerevolutionary
only in aiding legitimate national . per- Thus, Pipes argue, despite
liberation struggles. Many Ameri.. their rhetoric rejecting tczvorisns,
cans and other Western observers, this experience left -an indelible
including this writer, question the imprint on the minis of the Soviet
credentials of some of the national ? leadership," and thus they adopted
liberation movements the. Soviets . to rori_sm as part of their repertoire
are sponsoring, and point out: first, of global stategy because this was
these movements, now and in that "a natural adaptation to foreign
pas4 have carried out barbarous policy of methods which had been
acts of terrorism,' defibe rately and learned by the Bolsheviks and their,
systematically attacking the rolls!. allies when they. were in the under-
cent; and second, the most infuen. . ground fighting.the Imperial re-
tial of these client movements. the gime." ;
PLO. in addition to~its own tt
1st activities, is heavily engaged in . A party's the Soviet communist
helping to- sustain a whole host of party's app rctcuki have an
other smaller but equally lethal ter ? almost instinctive feeling for the
rorist movements, many of which use of terror as a weapon of inter.
are mounting their attacks within" ? nil control, I believer therm are at
the. Western deatocraciars, or . ins t three powerful reasons why
against. Western targets in Third ? they continue to show considerable
World countries. caution in employing terrorism as a
tool of Soviet foreign policy. First,
As many historians of Russia' they must be afraid of the weapon's
have pointed out, the official rebounding on their internal system
attitude of the Soviet regime to. of control. The Soviet Empire is
ward terrorism has always been . full of disaffected groups and per:
highly equivocal. On the one hand, secuted ethnic and religious minor.
Lenin. condemned individual ter- ities who might all too readily emu-
rorism as a waste of valuable sew_ late, terrorism as a*
means of
steppert their claim that these activ- olutlonary lives. as a possible pro- . . fighting 'the Soviet ? regime, tape..
isles are perfectly within the rules voker of repression that would only easily if tlr31 saw the method works.
Of irsterrtat:onal law. Moreover. the inhibit the development of the revo. ' ? lag against other East European
iv3e tr- eonstantiy reiterate their dutionary movement among the Communist regimes with a less se-
belief that. this kind of aid is to. . masses, and as a possible means of . care grip on their populations.
tally compatible with East-West turning the people against the rove- . Richard Pipes may be a otsec- i U._*
o
___4 tra
e and s :ientific
exchanges, as precluding tz?heir right
to - c8tat nusr to wage ideological
K srfase.l- support of world con-
true ; .ski t.-ver and ? wherever
t.!tev' wish.,, . 'm
47 : ''a
Hrenc . weer should observe that
then great dispute between the West
?
dot m. W for they have. never xo- lution. On the other; Lenin and the claim that the Soviet Union has in
rdsd the process of negotiating Bolshevik party eagerly embraced . reality a lower tolerance for teener,.
agents - en such mdttrau. as mass terror as a method of'extir- ... ism than the pluralist states of the
d
gating `,?couater-revolutionary" eke'- West. If the omniscience and power
meats and consolidating their con- ' of.the Soviet state were to be serf.
trot.. over the ' new. revolutionary ously challenged by internal vie...
states.And.a dictatorship that has lens.' then the whole system of
used. and experienced mass terror. Communist party 'control could
on the- scale. of a Stalin. is hardly rapidly crumble. This may help to
likely to hesitate at the. thought of ' ? =Plain the Soviet Ioaders' paranoid
using terror as a weapon beyond its reaction to dissent of any kind. and
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their massive repression against its
smallest manifestations. Perhaps it
was this kind of consideration that
helped persuade them to stop aid-
ing the Red Army Faction terror-
ists in Germany, and to initiate a
limited cooperation between their
Warsaw Pact allies and Wcst Ger-
many in tracking down German
terrorists who had escaped to East-
am Europe.
Second, the Soviets must be well
aware of the dangers inherent in
their own lack of control over their
prot6g6 foreign terrorist move-
ments. It is true that the Russians
can always conceal or disown their
connection, but suppose the pro-.
tegb, using the firepower and ex-
pertise acquired from the Soviets,
causes a major international con.
Ilict that threatens to escalate out
of control? If It is difficult for the
Soviets to completely subjugate in-
dividual Warsaw Pact states to
their will, if they become vexed
with the idiosyncratic policies of a
more distant ally like Qaddafi, just
imagine the problems of trying to
control a national liberation or ter
rorist movement sustaining i:seIf on
the basic belief that it is a self-
deterartining actor, the scale true
representative of its "own people."
Whatever the realities of depen-
dency in terms of cash and arms,
the Soviets must be aware that they
are dealing. with highly at:.tono-
mous volatile entities that, with the
aid of modern weapons of mass de-
struction, could cause conflicts en-
dangering the Soviets' interests and
national security.
Third. the Soviets are clearly
aware that for them to be asso-
ciated with sponsorship of interna-
tional terrorism is a definite disad-
vantage in their attempts to woo-
sectors of opinion in Western and
Third World countries. Terrorism
is definitely what T.D. Weldon, in
The Vocabulary of Politics, once'
called "a boo! word." The touchy,
indeed angry, reaction of the So-
viets to the Reagan. Administra-
tion's charge of Soviet complicity
in international terrorism, is evi.
dente that the Kremlin realizes
that any visible sign of their
backing for terrorism may be coun.
es such as Rely,
terproductive in the longer term by - Spain. France and the United
alienating international opinion. Kingdom of Great Britain and
The truth is that, for all their Northern Ireland must primarily,
aggressive and exaggerated rheto be borne by their own police forces,
ric, the Russians have' been forced. intelligence, military. judiciaries,.
on to the defensive about their role . citizens,. and. social and political
in exporting and sustaining vio? institutions. Improved internatios.
lance and terrorism. Soviet radio al cooperatlon and more pressure
supported- last year's IRA hunger- on the state terror sponsors can of
strikers, and portrayed Britain as course help by further limiting ter.
'oppressors." and the Maze prison rorist firepower and resources or by
as "a concentration camp," but denying some terrorists sanctuary.
tried to emphasize that the Soviets 0 Effective pressure on one state
did not endorse the IRA and its sponsor, however powerful. is not
extreme forms of struggle' which. going to yield any dramatic results
they claim. do not help solve the in combating international. terror-
Irish problem. ism. because there are sufficient
rogue states in the game.-Cu
f the Reagan Administration re-. Libya, ' Southern Yemen, . North
ally desires to go further than Korea, Vietnam. East Germany,
opening up a national and Interne- Iran, Syria. Iraq, to name only the
tional debate on terrorism, and sin- best known-to provide alternative
cerely wishes to do something to channels of support. It is worth
curb this scourge, it has to re cog- . recalling that even the United
nize some uncomfortable . home States has in the past lent its pow-
truths about international terror- erful resources to terrorist activity
ism. They are: when it was believed expedient.
0 It is. a wenPon employed by a I
Y have described in Terroriant and
hundreds of extremist groups and. t ? rrt rate how the CIA
movements with myriad different .built up u n anti- astro QrA~+?.
aims. ideologies and grievances: to hit Cuban tartlets. When 4
neo-Marxists, Trotskyists, anar policy changedand the CIA tried
chists. nationalists. racists, fascists, to ca off these attacks they found
neo-Nazis, and even religious cults tt awe they had created a Caliban
and sects. . which they were quite unable to
O Most of these groups have a _ control. Ironically this has now
genuine indigenous base of sup
ort
p
created an addtl hd
,iionaeaache for
however small. in the country of
Arfot" and the overstretched FBI and the local
quite coolish to assume that the sew- numerous factional feuds and ter
arias of all their external links with rorist attacks by various Cuban
sponsor states and supporting, _groups have occurred in recent
movements. abroad, even if this. ears.
were possible, would end the terror- In addition to these facts. of life
ist? campaigns within Western about international terrorism, there
states. at the drop of a hat. of is yet another uncomfortable truth
course foreign help is often a signif- ? that should be brought home to
icant aid to such groups, but it is American public opinion. Ever
far from indispensable. In demo- since the current phase ofthetragic
crati' states the terrorist is able to conflict in Northern Ireland began,
exploit, and even to thrive on, the in 1969, there has been a sector of.
very freedoms of association, ex- American opinion at has equivo-
pression and movement that the ? tail, at worst downright proterror-
totalitarian terrorists are working
to destroy. Thus the burdens and
tasks of combating terrorism con-
fronted by countri
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 g
errortsm is rndr
British prejudices. They played on tenses before courts of law almost Visible; it is a battle for the human'
the widespread : ignorance of the identical in character. to.-courts. rights of the innocent. -llg.
.
emocracies
pity to whip up traditional anti- convicted of serious criminal of- stru
ggie a
ainst t
the American media., especially on ? that what the IRA really wanted in
the East Coast,, and .the American- the hunger strike was full political
Irish community, used the opportu ; status for prisoners who had been
Unfortunately, a.. large section of . . it made clear to American Opinion
hayed voitli impeccal;le restraint"'
and responsibility,. The PresideszC'
and his advisers were clearly awnra ?
of the complexities of the conflict in
Ulster and the dangers of any inter
vention that might aggravate the
problems and put more lives at risk.
the major obstacles to peace. and
reconciliation in Ireland. and is an
? enemy of parliamentary democra-..
cy, north and south of the border in
Ireland.
.During the -IRA= hunger-strike--
President,Reagan_and..his..col-
leagues in thcr U.S. government t; ' .
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organizations as the Irish Northern
Aid Committee (NORAID) and
through pro-IRA propaganda they
have been significantly assisting'
the Provisional IRA to sustain a
.murderous campaign of violence
and intimidation that has destroyed
the human rights. of hundreds of
Britons.Yet the' I RA (together with-
the- so-called Protestant "loyaliit"
terrorist groups) constitutes one of -? .
d4The Soviets
? must be well
aware of the dangers
inherent in their
own lack of control
over their protegg. '
foreign terrorist
movements. [Suppose ,...
the protegej,
_asic facts of the Northern Ireland
situation, in some cases even,nc.
glecting W mention the.. million
Protestant northerners who are ad--
amantly opposed to unification
conflict?yp
with the Republic and who would
wage civil war to resist it. Nor was
dealing with similar oflenses?in the
Irish Republic. Neither the United
States, nor the Irish Republic--.or
Indeed any W,sstern democracy...
would subvert its own rule of law
by conceding political status to ter-
rorists. It was sheer hyprocrisy '.to
demand that the British govern.
meat give in to the blackmtf of the
hunger strikers and concede this
demand. Mrs. Thatcher and her
ministers were right to stand auto.
Our American friends should pause
to consider that their.media and
dangerously simplistic responses to
IRA propaganda could do more to
keep IRA terrorism going than any
help from the KGB. the PLO and
Colonel Qadda&
:.,.,. ,
' .:s.
L ?. et there be no mistake; the only
sure way of witholding victory
from the terrorists in the long run
is .. through the superior, moral .
strength and will. of the. democra-
cies acting together. All the best
conventions and agreements in the.
world are useless unless our govern..
meets and our fellow citizens show
the will, determination and courage
to. uphold the authority of demo.
cratic governments and enforce the
rule -of law
The d
11 _. .. ~.?M~,.,-.., me.~..~ Approved For Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020076-8 i!