REFLECTIONS ON THE MOOD IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00146R000300250006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 16, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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December 16, 1983
CONE I DID
MEMORANDUM
FROM: INR/WEA - Alan W. Lukens ,,'/
SUBJECT: Reflections on the Mood in Europe
The attached thoughts are based principally on my trip
through Northern Europe in October but include some musings
on the current mood in Europe as well.
Attachment:
As stated.
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Some Thoughts on the mood in Northern Europe - Fall 1983
Northern Europeans in this last quarter of 1983 are uneasy
and tense. Some look forward to INF deployment with hostility,
some with acceptance of the inevitable, but very few with
enthusiasm. Many view US-European relations with alarm, some
apathetically, almost none with creative ideas for improving these
relations. A forest and trees syndrome seems to be in effect almost
everywhere in that small issues overshadow larger ones; critics of
the Alliance are certainly more vocal than its supporters.
Two weeks in October on a visit to Scandinavia, Benelux, FRG,
and the UK were not sufficient to draw many lasting conclusions.
Indeed, the purpose was to define the mood, pick up impressions and
exchange ideas. Discussions in each country with Embassy officers,
with Foreign Office personnel and in some countries with opposition
leaders focused on INF deployment, cohesion within the Alliance,
and problems besetting the Economic Community. Perhaps the most
telling impression throughout the trip was the manner in which
Social Democrats, formerly in government majorities, had reneged
on the 1979 NATO decision and were not cooperating with peace
groups to forestall deployment of Pershings and Cruise missiles.
There is a dichotomy between an apparent majority in Europe
in favor of NATO and the widespread opposition to INF. This is
reflected in the generation gap--the older ones remember the War
and the Marshall Plan, the younger ones Vietnam and Watergate.
In Germany, there is much introspection underway, ranging from
the "Who am I?" line to one of espousing German unity and
neutrality in preference to NATO and EC membership. Almost every-
where there seems to be a myopia on world problems, as each is
addressed from a very parochial base. The result is a lack of
understanding of US objectives and the fact that we have to face
problems on a world-wide basis.
Sweden's case is a special one, so some of the commonalities
which apply to the Northern tier of NATO are not applicable here.
Nevertheless, the NATO umbrella is very much a part of the Swedish
psyche even when the skies are clear. Nats Bergquist, in charge
of Europe at the Foreign Office, and Katarina Brodin, political
advisor to the Defense Minister, both stressed'that "stability"
was the key word in the Nordic area and referred to their "quiet
corner of Europe." They went on to say that the "Nordic balance"
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DECL: OADR
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was "stable but not static" and had to be flexible enough to meet
new challenges. Among these were the Soviet build-up in the Kola
Peninsula, Soviet submarine incursions, and the perception, if
not the fact, that the Soviet northern fleet had grown in size
and activity.
Sovietologist Goran..`Lundstrom analyzed the recent Soviet
threats to Sweden. Some,bf these--behind the scene--were heavy-
handed and overbearirig;-intimidation was the key note. In looking
at the Soviet submarine incursions, which, according to Lundstrom
were more frequent than the GOS admitted publicly, the Swedes
feared that new technological break-throughs would leave their
defenses outmoded. Specifically, the Swedes thought that Russian
mini-subs, operating from mother ships, could slip under the
present anti-submarine nets protecting their naval bases. Swedish-
Soviet watchers do not buy the line that the military has
preempted the political leadership in Moscow; on the contrary,
they assume that every submarine incursion which took place was
sanctioned by the hierarchy.
One expert expounded the theory that the Soviets still regard
the Baltic as a "Russian lake." This leads them to the rationale
that harassment is a natural part of maintaining control. If the
Swedes, Finns, or even Danes and Norwegians--react to this Soviet
aggressiveness by protesting against incursions, the Soviets
become even more aggressive. Curiously, the Soviet Union does not
seem to see the paradox in advocating a nuclear-free zone at the
same time as it continues to harass its neighbors. There was an
obvious difference of attitude between the Swedish Foreign and
Defense Ministry officials towards the Soviets as compared to that
of the Socialist Party majority. While perhaps not deluding them-
selves about the Soviets, Palme and his friends still believe they
can act as intermediaries between the superpowers, and, therefore,
hesitate to criticize the Soviets openly.
The Swedes were ambivalent in discussing the famous Nordic
nuclear-free zone. Palme has been wedded to the scheme for so
long that he has refused to give it up or modify it even in the
face of the submarine incursions. The key problem is whether the
Soviets would refrain from sending nuclear-armed submarines
through the Baltic. When asked this question by Swedish officials,
the Soviets have taken the line that when and if the Nordic NATO
powers (Denmark and Norway) promise to exclude all nuclear weapons,
in wartime as well as peacetime, they (the Soviets) would consider
the necessary steps. It was clear that the Swedish defense
experts whom I saw did not put much faith in Palme's nuclear-free
zone. Nevertheless, they made it clear that it was politically
important to maintain the NNFZ as a possible Swedish initiative
when the CDE opens in January.
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In discussions about the CDE, it was easy to discern that the
Swedish Foreign office is paying a great deal of attention to it,
not only as the host country but in looking for ways in which
Sweden can, as a leader of the NNA group, negotiate compromises
between East and West. The Swedes stressed that agreement on
CBM's (confidence-building measures) was important to them and that
they would be advocating the adoption of as many as possible of
these when the conference begins. The Swedes expressed the thought
that if the INF talks became stalemated or if the Russians walked
out (as they now have), the CDE would become the prime venue for
East-West contact on arms control. It may be difficult to dampen
their enthusiasm for what CDE can possibly accomplish. As the
host country and self-proclaimed leader of the NNA group, Sweden
is ready to make the most out of CDE.
Norway
Despite its proximity to Sweden, Norwegian attitudes differ
enormously. Supporting the exposed Northern flank of NATO,
Norwegians are well-aware of the responsibility they bear; some
feel that they are asked by the Alliance to do more than they
should; others that their contribution is too much taken for-
granted; and a third group stressing that without arms control
progress, Norway will be unduly exposed.
The present Norwegian government exists with only a one-vote
majority. Under the Constitution elections are held every four
years, not when the government is upset or Parliament dissolved.
Each MP has a deputy who may or may not agree with his principal's
policy. If occasionally the sitting MP cannot be present for a
key vote, it is possible that his deputy would vote the other way.
What is more likely and more frightening_is that in the event of
an MP's death, his deputy would take over. A change of only one
vote would bring down the government. Despite the cliff-hanging
aspects of this, the Willoch regime has remained steadfast in its
determination lq support the Alliance on INF.
Amb.Austad is a pessimist and told me he fears that growing
anti-Americanism on the part of Norwegian youth, who would rather
be "red than dead," will weaken Norway's resolve. Austad had just
returned from a vist to Tromso in the north where he believed he
was a victim of a plot to embarrass him. Not only was he picked
up by the police in the middle of the night and quickly released,
but he found himself the target of a hostile audience which h'e was
addressing on our Central American policy. His exploits were
described in the press in a manner which he described as "degrad-
ing." Austad observed that the citizens of Tromso and surroundings
were basically sympathetic to the Russians who had liberated them
at the end of the war and that they were, therefore, more
susceptible to present-day Soviet propaganda.
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In a meeting with Foreign Office diplomats, the mood was also
pessimistic. Leif Mevik, Ambassador to CSCE and Acting Political
Director, did not accept the Ambassador's thesis that anti-
Americanism was growing rapidly. He said Norwegian public opinion
often differed with American policy on specific issues, but it was
not an endemic problem. Nuclear issues and whaling were two points
where the GON felt we were insensitive to its points of view.
Concerning the INF, Mevik stressed that there be "continued
evidence of American credibility" and a display of American good-
will. Particularly, Mevik observed it was essential that there be
complete frankness in the SCG meetings. This was a crucial moment
for public opinion and the image of the Alliance to the outside
world must be one of unity. Furthermore, it was important to
Norwegians that the US continue to be sensitive to European public
opinion and not to let the Soviets take the initiative.
Like the Swedes, Mevik and his colleagues felt strongly that
the new CDE conference in Stockholm would provide the venue for
serious proposals leading to greater stability. They stressed the
need for greater attention being given to CBM's at the CDE con-
ference, hoping that the Alliance would come up with a "tough but
credible package." Furthermore, Mevik thought NATO members should
not automatically reject proposals by the NNA countries, as it was
important to keep the neutrals on our side. The Norwegians believe
the Soviets will table unreasonable proposals when the CDE con-
ference opens, but that they will adjust to the realities and back
down, if faced by a solid front of NATO and NNA countries.
In discussing bilateral relations with the Soviets, the
Norwegian diplomats observed that until the late 70's there had
been few problems. Since that time, however, Soviet aggressive-
ness in relation to Svalbard had become most evident and was harder
to deal with than before. Furthermore, the Soviets continued to
ignore the Norwegian 12-mile limit, violating the sea frontier at
will and probing with their submarines. Nevertheless, the
Norwegian viewpoint was that Soviet build-up on the Kola Peninsula
was not aimed at the Norwegians but was rather part of Soviet
global strategy.
In dealing with this new Soviet boldness, the Norwegians,
however, did not believe in confrontation. On the contrary, they
thought that the more trade, commerce and cultural exchange which
could take place, the better. Increased relationships would tend
to undercut Soviet hegemony and prevent them from over-aggression.
Later I discussed Norway's position with Bernt Bull, Foreign
Affairs specialist in the Labor Party and formerly Friedland's
Special Assistant. Bull said Labor has been divided on the 1979
NATO decision but more recently had decided to oppose the two-
track decision and fight against deployment. He cited Egon Bahr's
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reasons for opposing the Allied position. Bull was particularly
vehement when speaking of the Conservatives, now in the government,
whom he said had violated the traditional Foreign Policy consensus,
He observed that Labor had opposed entry into the EC but would now
favor such an entry if only to counter-balance those in the EC
who supported closer relations with the US. This contrasted with
the Foreign office officials who regretted Norway's absence from
the EC on political not economic grounds. In other words, they
felt that many decisions were being made in the EC under the head
of political consultation which directly concerned Norway. Con-
sequently, they would prefer all security questions to be handled
in NATO where their voice could be heard.
Finally, a discussion with John Ausland, retired FSO and
former DCM in Oslo, brought out the point that many Norwegians
indulged in an ostrich-like attitude, refusing to face up to the
Soviet menace. This was particularly true in the North where they
were keeping a very low profile and were loath to do anything 25X1
(maneuvers, pre-positioning, etc.) which would in any way agitate
the Soviets. Ausland's new book in Norwegian on the Soviet menac
and the need for greater Norwegian defense expenditures has create
quite a furor and some ruffled feathers. He also mentioned the
break-down of the traditional post-war policy consensus. His
conclusion, however, was that any attempt to regain the consensus
would weaken Norway and would be a victory for Labor's appeasement
approach.
Denmark
Returning to Denmark after a five-year absence was a stimulating
experience. Little had changed on the surface--the same key
diplomats were in the Foreign Office, Peter Dyvig and Eigel
Jorgensen; the Prime Minister's chief advisor, Henning Gottlieb,
was still there and so was the Chief of Defense, Gen. Knut Jorgensen.
They were all fFank with me in trying to interpret present-day
Danish policy and thinking. Though they did not obviously speak
with one voice, their enthusiasm for the present Conservative
government as compared to the Social Democrats was almost unrestrain-
ed. They felt that finally Denmark was returning to sanity on
economic policy and that brakes were at last being applied to the
welfare state.
The foreign policy picture was cloudier. The traditional
center majority consensus of Social Democrats, Liberals and Con-
servatives, which had always backed NATO, was beginning to unravel.
Former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen, in the eyes of my Danish
friends, had gone off the deep end and lost all sense of responsi-
bility. Anker was well-aware of the delicate balance in Danish
politics; yet he was not averse to attacking the government for
trying to meet its NATO commitments.
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These diplomats felt that if Denmark were forced to go to NATO
advocating some sort of compromise formula on INF, this would
greatly weaken Denmark's credibility in the eyes of its partners.
This is exactly what has since happened to the chagrin of most
Danish diplomats. Anticipating that such might be the case, the
argument was advanced that even a waffly-conservative government
would be far preferable to another round of Social Democracy. The
Conservative coalition, weak as it may be, can at least be counted
on to maintain Denmark's present NATO commitments and not to retreat
to a posture of ostrich-like neutralism.
One diplomat, speaking quite frankly, said that the Soviets
were well-aware of the Danish coalition and were working relent-
lessly to stir up the peace movement, to entice the Social Democrats
not only to oppose INF but also NATO, and to agitate the leftist
youth against the US. Soviet diplomats, fluent in Danish, were
once again active all over town after a couple of years of keeping
a low profile. According to my friends, the Foreign Office was
divided on the question as to whether the Minister, Uffe Elleman-
Jensen, should move ahead with his plans for a Moscow trip. The
rationale for going was to preempt the limelight from the Social
Democrats who had considered such a trip and could have been
unwitting dupes for Soviet propaganda.
In any case, Uffe subsequently went to Moscow, seemed to
resent Soviet blandishments, and gave us a full read-out on what
had happened. One further point of note in Danish-Soviet relations
was a recent Soviet request to open a consulate in Greenland.
We were told that the request was refused on the grounds that no
foreign representation was permitted in Greenland, inasmuch as
all of Greenland's external relations were handled in Copenhagen--
a rather facile explanation but one which apparently the Soviets
had to swallow.
Apart from,4he officials I saw, my old Danish friends were
generally pessimistic. They felt that despite an improved economy
and a conservative regime for the first time since 1902, the mood
was neutralist, anti-American, and one ready to concede anything
to the Soviets, provided that Denmark be left alone in any future
confrontation. The younger generation, which far outnumber those
who remember the liberation and the Marshall Plan, is very wont
to equalize the two super-powers in a "pox on both"-like attitude.
These friends had no very concrete ideas to suggest except that we
should step up our USIS program, stressing that we were contin-
uously trying to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table.
Danish attitudes are unlikely to change. We will continue to
benefit from a very close intelligence relationship with the Danes
which will permit us to share Soviet submarine movements, etc.
The Danish military is equally tuned to a pro-American, pro-NATO
role, but the constitutional pluralism provided for in the
Folketing is such that strong positions taken by any party can
quickly be knocked down by the others.
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The Danes believe they are heading for an election, but each
of the two factions hesitates to go to the voters for opposing
reasons. The Social Democrats think that the revival of the
economy will work in favor of the Conservatives, while the Con-
servative coalition believes that the INF issue would help the
Social Democrats.. Maneuvering, therefore, has focussed on
blaming the other side.for the crisis. If the Schlueter government
fails for economic reasons; for example, if the opposition brings
it down on a budget cut proposal, Schlueter believes the voters
would support him at the polls. If Schlueter has to win on a
pro-NATO, pro-INF platform, however, it could become dicier, and
we could see Anker back at the helm. Therefore, our Danish
friends hope we will bear with them and allow them to meet the
election threat in their own way. With the mood of the country
becoming more pacifist and neutralist, the present leaders are
afraid to stick their necks too far out for fear of losing them
altogether.
Netherlands
Moving south from Scandinavia, one finds a greater degree of
realism. While the Netherlands are divided on support of INF, the
present government seems determined to stick by its commitment.
Nevertheless, hopes were strong among the Dutch that the dual-track
approach in Geneva could lead to a compromise which would not
require GLCM deployment in the Netherlands.
Former Prime Minister Van Agt, whom I met at a dinner given by
Amb. Bremer, was quite optimistic that the Netherlands would go along
with the deployment question. Former Amb. Geri Joseph pushed him
hard on questions about the Dutch commitment, but he was convinced
that the Liberals and a great majority of the CDA would stand .fast..
Other leading Dutch figures at the dinner like former Prime Minister
Zijlstra agreed but appeared to be more sensitive to the public
relations aspects of the planned demonstrations.
Unlike many other countries, the demonstrations in Holland had
the solid backing of the churches and seemed to be free of the
lunatic fringe element, so prevalent elsewhere. Peace organizers
were expected to aim their propaganda at MP's rather than at the
public at large. This is in fact what happened when the large
demonstrations were held on October 29. There were estimated to
be 500,000 participants, but they were peaceful, benefited from
good weather and excellent organization, and appeared to enjoy the
country-fair atmosphere.
The Embassy predicted (it turned out correctly) that the peace
movement fervor would decline after the October 29 demonstrations.
Polls have shown that, contrary to public perceptions that the
demonstrations represented a-cross-section o-f--Dutch-opi-ni-on, 92%--
of the demonstrators supported the Labor-Party or parties even
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further to the left. Half of the demonstrators were from parties
which only picked up 6% of the vote in the latest elections.
Nevertheless, the Dutch government is being careful to handle the
peace movement gingerly and to avoid any type of violence which
would create sympathy for demonstrators.
Amembassy Hague is active in public diplomacy and its officers
use every occasion they can find to explain the US position on arms
control, either publicly or privately. This seems to have paid off.
Dutch leaders naturally hoped that there would be some encouraging
sign from the Soviets on the two-track dialogue, which would have
offered the occasion for some delay. When this did not happen,
however, Prime Minister Lubbers defended the government's position
in Parliament and held the line on INF. In a conversation with
Political Director Adrian Jacobovitz, an old friend from Nairobi,
I was told that the MFR was nervous about the debate and the effects
of the peace movement on a number of MP's. Given the results, it
seems that Jacobovitz was unduly worried. Nevertheless, the danger
remains in the future that another debate--perhaps tied to the
publishing of-the Dutch White Paper on nuclear strategy--could see
some serious slippage. This would most likely come about through
a split in the CDA, some members of which are seeking new ways of
compromise and have suggested holding up deployment until further
negotiations take place.
A conclusion on the state of the Netherlands, however, is
positive. Signs of increased reserves of North Sea gas, liberali-
zation of petroleum sales, and a trend towards a freer enterprise
system have given impetus to the Dutch economy. The center-right
coalition has weathered the INF debate and seems ready to stick
by the deployment decision. Fears that violent demonstrations
would deflect Dutch determination seem overdrawn. There is still
the dichotomy between a large majority for NATO and a smaller
majority against INF, but this seems manageable, especially if the
West will contiWue to negotiate seriously.
Belgium
The Belgian situation continues to be confused by the linguistic
fracas. The Socialists, based principally in Flemish-speaking
Antwerp, are most vocal in their opposition to INF deployment.
Congen Gewecke explained that many Flemish Socialists tended to
equate the US and the Soviets, that they supporter' the nuclear freeze,
a no-first use declaration, and a 300--km security zone. The
Antwerp-based Flemish tend to empathize more with their Dutch anti-
nuclear neighbors in the Netherlands Labor Party than with
Francophone Socialists in Wallonia.
A contrast in strategy was offered by Pierre Galand, President
of CNAPD (National Action Committee for Peace and Development),
with whom I had breakfast. This relatively moderate Francophone
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organization had hoped to provide the umbrella for the entire
country's demonstrations. As it turned out, Galand was able to
stir up some enthusiasm among francophones but did not have much
luck with the more radical Flemish. Galand's game plan was to
convince mayors and communal leaders of the need to accept de-
militarized.zones in their respective towns. In theory these
local officials would then put pressure on their respective MP's,
who in turn would have influence on cabinet decisions, thereby
forcing Prime Minister Martens and Foreign Minister Tindemans to
shy away from deployment or seek to postpone it.
On 23 October, a massive demonstration took place with an
estimated 300,000 participants. Despite the demonstrators' demands
that nuclear weapons be dismantled in Europe, including the SS-20's,
and that the two superpowers freeze their stocks, it seems clear
that the demonstrations did not deflect the GOB from moving ahead
with plans for GLCM deployment in Florennes. Nevertheless, the fact
that the demonstrations were serious and not frivolous and were
backed by so many different groups may well be a factor in future
elections.
Social effects resulting from the poor economic situation may
be more serious than the political over the long run. Belgium has
close to 15% unemployment, using the same criteria as we do, but
this is not so severely felt since unemployment benefits cover
almost the same amount. Education, medical benefits, pension, etc.
are still lavish by our standards and not even the center-right
government has dared to monkey with the welfare state. Fractional
divisions within Belgium, not only linguistic but regional and
social, have meant that recent Belgian governments have not had the
flexibility to break out of the mold, to innovate, or to come up
with any new ideas. Our Embassy believes we may encourage the
Belgians along these lines, but that their suspicion of our motives,
both political and economic, will not make them listen easily or
react creatively.
Brussels, of course, is not only the Belgian capital but the
home of NATO and the EC. Amb. Vest shared some thoughts on Europe's
future and its relations with the US. Internal discussions,
rivalries between the Commission and the European Parliament, and
competition with the US are all factors which must be closely
watched. On the latter subject, one must deal with specialty steel,
fats and oils, and high technology transfer. All these are subjects
which are emotive and tend to blind both sides from the more
fundamental US-European relationship. Some problems seem intract-
able and cannot be blamed on European intransigeance alone; others
will eventually be resolved if there is goodwill on both sides.
The political consultation dimension of the EC is growing, not
always in a way which suits US interests. The Irish are embarrassed
to have to take positions on security issues which should rightfully
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not be set before them. Conversely, the Norwegians find that many
issues important to them are handled in an EC context instead of
a NATO one. The French, straddling the NATO consultation system,
are happier with the EC format. EPC, as it is known, is undergoing
some traumas now in the Greek presidency; obviously Spanish and
Portuguese adhesion will make this even more complicated. But our
officers in USEC do not see the clock turning back. Europe's
future integration, at whatever pace, will not necessarily be at
our expense, but it will still cause us enormous headaches.
The other leg of the Brussels triad--NATO--offers a different
optique. Our NATO mission remains reasonably optimistic. The
European NATO allies have stood firm on INF deployment, they have
appreciated the constant and careful briefings in the SCG and by our
arms negotiators, and there is no danger of alliance "decoupling."
However, those countries which advocate an increase in conventional
forces do not seem to face realistically the costs involved to
meet SACEUR's 4% goal. USNATO's new approach is to improve arms
cooperation, expand the "two-way street," and stimulate new
research in the arms field which would foster improved high-tech
potential among European allies. This approach is still in its
infancy and will have to contend with protectionist sentiments both
here and in Europe.
It would be presumptuous after a brief visit to Bonn to come
up with many profound impressions. The FRG and its mood in 1983
have been well-covered by excellent Embassy reporting, and the
roles of the various Bundestag factions are well-documented.
Nevertheless, what strikes a new visitor to Germany is not so much
the current debate on INF, though this is extremely important,
but rather the uncertain mood of so many Germans, especially the
youth. Discussions with Embassy officers and several old German
friends brought out this feeling.
Several deliberations on this mood may be worthy of note.
There is a need to establish identity which premeates the thinking
of perhaps all of the body politic except the Conservatives over
50 years old who hold fast to the American alliance as the basis
of their thinking. The question "What is a German anyhow?" seems
to be at the root of this "angst." In seeking to establish a feel-
ing of patriotism, the FRG authorities are at a loss as to where to
turn. Obviously, inner-German relations complicate the issue.
It is still anathema to West Germans to write off the East or to
give up the idea of reunification, even though most will tell you
realistically that there is no chance for it within the foreseeable
future.
The younger generation suffers from a romanticism about the
past, which results in an anti-modern approach to life. This
manifests itself in sentiments which go all the way from dislike
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of autobahns because they hurt the environment to an antipathy for
both Soviets and Americans who have complicated their lives by
involving them in East-West rivalry. This feeling of equating
the two superpowers is damaging, as those who believe they are
equally malevolent tend to forget the material and security
advantages from which the FRG has benefited in the post-war years
as a member of NATO.
The generation gap in Germany seem more evident than else-
where in Western Europe or even here. One senior Foreign office
diplomat, Bill Haas, told me that his four children supported the
four parties--three sons, the CDU, the SPD, and the FDP, and the
daughter, the Greens. Haas was philosophical about this but made
the observation to prove the point that German youths would no
longer take political guidance from their elders. Nevertheless,
he stressed that today's youth no longer carry feelings of guilt
for the Nazi era and should not indulge in self-pity. Still self-
pity plays a significant role; the young German has not found himself
and he tends to blame others--his elders, Americans and sometimes
Soviets--for all his ills. Added to this is a sense of cultural
pessimism which takes the form of a surfeit of emotionalism and a
longing for a Hegelian order of yesteryear.
This identity crisis serves as a backdrop for the INF debate
which has. so gripped the FRG this fall. As Egon Bahr has observed
on numerous occasions, this year marks the first time that a
majority of the population does not support the traditional tenets
of the German-American relationship. One could add, of course,
that Egon Bahr is one of those guilty of breaking up the foreign
affairs consensus. Bahr and others in the SPD who favor a conven-
tional build-up, as opposed to INF deployment, have not faced up to
the economic consequences or bothered to explain to their SPD
followers the cost factor.
One oft-not=ed aspect of the INF debate was the way in which
the Soviets had overplayed their hand. Less obvious was the fact
that before the Bundestag debate Soviet dignitaries streamed
through the FRG denouncing INF deployment. Kohl reacted to this
Soviet overkill and thereby enhanced his own image with the
voters. Nevertheless, some Germans were seduced by Soviet
suggestions that West Berlin could be incorporated in the FRG
if Pershings were excluded, but thousands of ethnic Germans could
be released from the Soviet Union, and that even reunification
could be considered absent American missiles. These seductive
offers, while not taken seriously by the Bonn government, were
still music to the ears of many Germans and tantalizing to some
younger generation listeners.
Fortunately, the numerous October demonstrations took place
with a minimum of violence. Germans are sensitive, given their
history, about being charged with police brutality, and sometimes
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bend over backward to avoid confrontation. Troubles not only
with INF protestors but with terrorists, criminals, some Turkish
gastarbeiters, and even with Greens in Parliament have left the
government open to cries of weakness on one side and inhumanity
on the other. If.the Kohl regime had made the INF debate more
of an issue appearing to serve German interests rather than one
perceived as focussed on the Americans, support might have been
stronger.
Finally, a number of observers, who were rightfully convinced
that the Bundestag would oppose deployment, made the point that
the next round will be more difficult. At the beginning of 1984,
Kohl will have to offer up something new and in order to do this
will be pressing for greater American flexibility, either at CDE
or in the arms control fora, should they reopen.
A weekend wedding in the English countryside and a day or two
in London are not designed to make one an overnight expert on the
UK. Nevertheless, discussions with British friends, particularly
an all-day session at FCO arranged by the Intelligence Liaison
Office in the British. Embassy in Washington, did provide some use-
ful insights. Meetings were arranged by Robert Flower, of the
FCO Permanent Under Secretary's office, with members of the planning
staff involved in assessments and intelligence-gathering, including
Peter Hall, Richard Bone, and Steven Boys-Smith, the Irish expert.
Additional meetings were held with Harry Burke and Robin O'Neill,
the latter being Sir Anthony Duff's intelligence coordinator.
Finally, Soviet experts Chris Hill and David Miller and Cyprus
expert Normam Hodnett took time to brief me, as did Simon Fuller
and Rob Young, NATO and WE experts respectively in the FCO proper.
Comments on the UK itself were made by a number of these
officials, even though much of the conversation concentrated on
peripheral problems--Falklands, Ireland, Argentina, Cyprus and the
UK's European role. Several British FSO's commented that for the
first time in their careers they had been asked to go out to the
hustings and explain INF to the British citizens. They had found
this rather trying after dealing with staid diplomats all their
lives; they certainly did not relish debates with some of the
Greenham Common ladies.
In analyzing the peace movement in the UK, these officials
thought it had peaked and that only a lunatic fringe would continue
to demonstrate. Nevertheless, they admitted that even without the
punks and crazies, the UK peace movement had deep roots which no
government could ignore. They felt that the UK elections had taken
the sting out of the peace movement before it could mount a campaign
similar to the one in the FRG. The early Gteenham Common rallies,
in the eyes of these officials, had discredited the peace movement.
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There was a lack of seriousness, a "rent-a-crowd" psychology which
many British citizens resented.
A major propaganda effort has been made by the FCO to show that
deployment of GLCM's is in the British interest, not just because
the Americans want them there. A brief Ministry of Defense "white
paper," now being widely disseminated, summarizes the historical
reasons for having US forces in the UK. It lists the various bases
on which Americans are stationed, including Greenham Common, where
"USAF B-47 nuclear bombers have always been under the same arrange-
ments now prvoided for the cruise missiles." The paper goes on to
argue that for deterrence to succeed, the USSR should be in no doubt
that the US will defend Western Europe. The deployment of American
forces in the UK is the most visible proof of the US' readiness to
regard the security of their allies as inseparable."
A number of the officials made the point that the UK had
avoided a full defense debate for over 15 years, so that all the
accumulated support for nuclear modernization, both by the UK itself
and by US forces, as well as antipathy towards it, had been swept
under the carpet. A combination of secrecy and apathy meant that
the British public was not psychologically ready for arrival of the
GLCM's. These officials felt that, while HMG has prepared itself
well in Parliament, a great deal more missionary work needed to be
done to explain, as the White Paper tries to do, that cruise missiles
are needed for the defense of Britain and not just to benefit the
United States.
Turning to the peace movements in other basing countries, my
Foreign Office friends were nervous about German steadfastness.
Conceding that the CDU could win the deployment issue in the
Bundestag, the British officials still felt that a sugar-coated
Soviet offer coming early in 1984 could wreak havoc with the next
deployment round unless it could be shown that the Soviets refused
to negotiate again. These officials were more sanguine about
Italian resolve, believing that the peace movement has been dis-
credited in Italy, since it was led by the PCI.
In discussing the EC and the future of economic Europe, the
British diplomats were far more pessimistic. Rob Young, who handles
Western Europe in FCO, said "this is one of most trying periods
in decades for Europe." Agricultural arguments with the French,
debates over the budget, and expansion of the EC had the British
wringing their hands. Given the recent debate in Athens, their
pessimism seems justified.
Leaving Europe proper, my Foreign Office friends turned to
the peripheral areas. They made it clear that US military sales
to Argentina were of great importance to them, and that the more
bellicose Argentina became, the more resources the UK would have
to commit to the Falklands. These officials tried to point out the
irony of withdrawing British resources from NATO in order to bolster
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the Falklands against an Argentina supported by US arms sales.
This discussion took place before the Argentine election, which
hopefully will put British-Argentine relations on a new plane, but
at the time, and this was substantiated by our Embassy, every
British official speaking to an American one took the opportunity
of stressing the danger, of US arms sales to Argentina.
If the British seemed intransigeant on Argentina, they seemed
more far-sighted and flexible on Gibralter. Robin O'Neill said
that the UK would like Spain to go back to the Lisbon Agreement,
at least as a starting point. The British were at least ready to
make changes with mirrors, if not substantively. These could
include putting up all the NATO flags, naming a low-ranking British
naval officer to serve under a Spanish admiral, and sitting on the
locals whose anti-Spanish rhetoric has not been helpful. HMG has
even been trying to take some perks away from Prime Minister Hassan
and his friends in order to make them more tractable and less
pro-British. In short, the British position is that keeping Spain
in NATO is more important than maintaining the Union Jack over the
Rock, so perhaps there are signs of British flexibility.
One interesting sidelight was mentioned. An Argentine hit-team
of frog men had been picked up by Spanish police before they managed
to get into Gibralter to attach bombs to frigates. The Spanish
covered up the arrest of the Argentines and shipped them back home.
The British thoughts on Cyprus are outdated because of the
subsequent UDI. However, their expert thought this likely, despite
the fact that Turkish Cypriot Communists opposed the idea, inasmuch
as the Soviets suspected that UDI would result in another NATO base.
The British are very worried that under UDI, the Greek Cypriots
will feel free to tear up their arrangements with the UK and demand
British withdrawal. This would, of course, mean closing the
SIGINT facility, which is so important to NSA. When the Italians
asked if they could use the British base for logistical support
to their MNF contingent, the British were afraid that such a use
would have drawn undue attention to the facility and almost refused.
However, British overall policy required helping the Italians;
fortunately, what went on at the base was not questioned either by
the Italians or the Cypriots, and the problem did not arise.
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