IC INFORMATION REQUEST- AGENCY UNIQUENESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00530R000300540001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved ForRelease2012/08/13 : CIA-RDP90-00530R000300540001:4 1,A
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IAPER-CP
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND .
ARLINGTON HALL STATION
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22212
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
SUBJECT: IC Information Request - Agency Uniqueness
1 June 1988
In the passage of Public Law 95-454, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the
Congress deemed it appropriate to exclude several Federal organizations from
coverage of the Federal Labor Relations statute, Chapter 71, Title 5 of the
U.S. Code. Two of these excluded organizations were the CIA and the NSA.
Subsequent to the CSRA of 1978, President Carter issued EO 12171, dated Nov 19,
1979, Exclusions from the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program. This EO
excluded specific Executive Branch organizations from coverage under the Federal
Labor Relations provisions. Included in this listing are the DOD Military
Intelligence organizations now being covered by the DOD Civilian Intelligence
Personnel Management System authorized by PL 99-569 - Intelligence Authorization
Act of 1987. Rationale for the LMR exclusion centers around the agency mission,
purpose and function. Those organizations determined to have as a primary
function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative or national security
work are specifically excluded.
In addition to the obvious concern of protecting the national security, the
President in his EO and the Congress in the CSRA LMR exclusion believed that
there is no room for compromise in the areas of intelligence, CI and investiga-
tive work. The very nature of labor relations through the collective bargain-
ing process connotes a spirit of give and take. This environment of exchange
or trade-off cannot be accepted nor tolerated in the intelligence field.
The sensitivity of intelligence work was also acknowledged by the Office of
Personnel Management (formerly U.S. Civil Service Commission) in the granting
to Federal agencies the Schedule A, Excepted appointing authority. Schedule A
provides for appointing (hiring) applicants without OPM certification, special
exams or regard to special employment programs for regular competetive service
personnel.
Passage of PL 99-569, The 1987 Intelligence Authorization Act acknowledged the
need to bridge the gap in intelligence personnel systems between the CIA, NSA,
DIA and the military service intelligence organizations. This authority will
begin to provide for the DOD Military Intelligence work force the kind of per-
sonnel system that is needed to stay at a level equal to the other national
intelligence organizations.
Another facet of uniqueness is the up front cost for a security clearance that
we in the intelligence community must put forth to determine the potential
employability and desirability of our candidates. Once that cost for clearance
is expended it becomes increasingly important to retain the employees. Reten-
tion is complicated by the fact that the clearance granted to the individual is
transferable to other employment both outside government and to other Federal
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90-00530R000300540001-4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90-00530R000300540001-4
IAPER-CP
SUBJECT: IC Information Request - Agency Uniqueness
organizations. When someone does leave the employment process begins anew.
The timeframe between having cleared employees causes major gaps in efficient
mission accomplishment and provides for no job continuity or transition from
one employee to another.
Besides more stringent conditions of employment associated with national security
there are a number of adverse working conditions. Many of our employees work
in secure areas without windows, easy access to outside, and in securely guarded s/
buildings with special entrance requirements. In addition, our employees are
not able to discuss their work with their families, relatives, friends and
neighbors.
Another aspect of intelligence work is the very nature of what our people do.
They do not work a typical eight hour, fixed schedule day. There is much
uncontrolled overtime work and little reaction time to emergency situations.
In the field, particularly overseas there are situations that affiliation with
the U. S. Government and the military service is inappropriate. Thus, our
employees who normally would have access to facilities, benefits and privileges
are denied them.
ALION C. RESSLER
ASSISTANT DCSPER
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90-00530R000300540001-4