USSR/IAEA - PROBLEMS WITH NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS REPORTING ON INDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000500700022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 4, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP 5 Feb 82
TO:
SA/NPI
ROOM NO.
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HQS
REMARKS:
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FROM: D/OGI
ROOM NO.
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FOFEB RM NO' 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 (47)
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4. FEb 1982
MEMORANDUM'FOR: (See Addressee List)
Director of Global Issues
SUBJECT USSR/IAEA - Problems with Nuclear Safeguards
Reporting on India
The attached memorandum concerning Soviet implementation of
IAEA safeguards procedures in India was prepared to focus
attention on yet another way the credibility of the regime
undermined.
. 25X1
7
can be
Attachments:
1. USSR/IAEA - Problems with Nuclear Safe u.ards
Reporting on India, G M 82-10041, February 1982
2. Addressees List
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SUBJECT: USSR/IAEA - Problems with Nuclear Safeguards
Reporting on India.
Michael Guhin
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Eugene V. Rostow
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Richard Kennedy
Under Secretary for Management
Department of State
Dr. Paul Wolfowitz
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
James L. Malone
Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
Richard Burt
Director
Bureau of Politico-Military.Aff airs
Department of State
The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
John Labarre
Senior Intelligence Officer
Department of Energy
Harold Bengelsdorf
Office of International Affairs
Department of Energy
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SUBJECT: USSR/IAEA - Problems with Nuclear Safeguards
Reporting on India
OGI/IID/WP
(2 Feb 82)
Distribution: (Attachment with each copy)
Original - Each Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Ex Dir
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - SA/NPI
1 - D/OGI
1 - Ch/IID/OGI
1 - Ch/WP/IID/OGI
1 - File/WP/IID/OGI
8 - OGI/PS
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 .r,F.CRF.T
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Central Intelligence Agerxy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 February 1981
USSR/IAEA - PROBLEMS WITH NUCLEAR
SAFEGUARDS REPORTING ON INDIA
SUMMMARY
IAEA Soviet inspectors have caused--through ineptitude--a
serious mistake to occur regarding safeguards inspections in
India
Mechanical and procedural errors in implementing safeguards
at the Indian PREFRE reprocessing plant prevent effective IAEA
coverage of stored spent reactor fuel.
In February 1981, Soviet inspectors improperly positioned
two surveillance cameras in the spent fuel storage pond. It was
This memorandum was prepared byl (Weapons 25X1
Proliferation Branch, International Issues Division, Office of
Global Issues. It was coordinated with the Office of Near East
and South Asia, the Office of Soviet Analysis, the Office of
Scientific and Weapons Research of the DDI, and the Special
Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. This analysis
is based on information available as of 4 February 1982.
Comments and queries are welcome and.may be addressed 25X1
a n Branch
25X1
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not until after a ten month delay in processing the film that it
was learned the glare on the pond's surface from overhead spot-
lights made the photographs useless. In addition, the Soviet
inspectors inadequately monitored the spent fuel transfers from
containers shipped from the power reactor (RAPPI) to PREFRE.
Soviet inspectors were present only for the removal of IAEA seals
from the shipping casks at the beginning of the transfer but did
not stay for the entire three-to-four days it takes to complete
the operation. As a result of those procedures the IAEA is
unable to properly account for spent fuel awaiting reprocessing
at PREFRE.
There is no evidence of Indian involvement with the Soviets
in the procedures that led to the anomaly
We doubt that a diversion has occurred. India has other
sources of unsafeguarded spent fuel and would not need to take
the political risks involved in violating safeguards. Moreover,
India traditionally has been forthcoming in meeting its
safeguards obligations. New Delhi could be expected to cooperate
fully with the IAEA to rectify the problem and to remove the
potential for a politically embarrassing situation.
Mistakes in implementing verification procedures by Soviet
inspectors threaten to undercut toe broader Soviet policy to
control IAEA operations in India. This long-standing Soviet
effort has been designed to keep New Delhi's safeguarded nuclear
program above suspicion in order to deny Pakistan any justifi-
cation for pursuing a nuclear weapons option.
Over the years, the Soviet Union has consolidated its role as
the administrator of all IAEA safeguards in its Eastern European
nuclear client states. Successful in manipulating the IAEA to
attain a special role in the Bloc, Moscow appears to be taking a
similar approach in India.
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