STALIN'S UNRULY GHOST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400010003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 15, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400010003-5
STALIN'S UNRULY GHOST
USSR since early 1965. Such gains are noticeable in the cultural,
political, economic, and military spheres, as well as in the distinctly
less unfavorable press treatment of Stalin and his era. Evidence of a
trend towards reviving Stalinism, as well as of opposition against this
trend, is discussed below and is given in greater detail in the attached
survey.
Whereas the consistency of the evidence is convincing that there has
been a step back towards Stalinism by the power establishment, it is dif-
ficult to measure the extent of such a reversion. Similarly, there is
evidence of determined resistance to Stalinism by a broad range of intel-
lectuals but its strength cannot be easily measured. Nor can popular re-
actions be gauged. But it is.not the purpose to strike 50X1 -HU M
the balance between the forces for and against Stalinism. Rather, it is
to provide the background of an issue that now Plagues the leaders of the
USSR**, and is expected to continue to cast a long shadow over the future
of the Soviet society.
*We call STALINISM the degenerated form of the "dictatorship of the prole-
tariat" wherein the power of the class, or of the party, is replaced by
one-man rule and wherein the other dignitaries of party and government,
even in the top echelon, are reduced to mere yes-men and tools of the dic-
tator. The decision-making processes that result from the whims of one-
man rule are incompatible with the original teachings of Marx and Lenin
and are devastating not simply in the expenditure of human life but, even
more important for the whole society, politically and historically.
"Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin has made a meaningful statement of policy
concerning Stalinism; however, as will be pointed out, there is clear evi-
dence that Brezhnev at least has considered Stalinism to be a major prob-
lem.
Some forms of Stalinism* have regained ground
50X1-HUM
SECRET Cont.)
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Khrushchev's downfall was presumably largely due to the fact that
he endangered the status of the privileged new class (D,jilas!) -- not
physically but in terms of political power; and, at the same time, he
failed to satisfy the needs of a modern industrial society and the
aspirations of the young generation. The current struggle between De-
Khrushchevization and Re-Stalininzation reflects these insoluble con-
tradictions in Soviet society today: the beneficiaries of Stalinism
refuse to abandon their privileged position; and vicious Chicom criti-
cism makes it even more difficult to abandon the dictatorship even in
words (the Chicoms have intensely criticized the passage in the new
CPSU program promising "rule of the entire people").
Literary affairs have provided the fiercest and most overt battle-
ground of Stalinism. The first sign of a reversal of the Khrushchev
regime's literary climate was seen in the report of a writers' congress
in early March 1965. he most force- 50X1-HUM
ful reflection of Stalinism. is the inyavs y- anie -ca-se[ which
pointed up -- but did not equate with -- a host of reminders of Stalin's
worst excesses. The role of the KGB in this trial connotes its con-
tinued importance in the CPSU bureaucracy and recalls the security
police past of some of today's leaders. While reactionary Soviet critics
have been increasingly aggressive, they have not shown that they now domi-
nate. The battle over?Stalinism may well attain serious proportions at
the USSR Writers' Congress which was postponed from June until probably
late fall of this year -- possibly at behest of these reactionaries.
In the political sphere the most open manifestation of Stalinism
appeared in the widely reported efforts by Brezhnev to gain acceptance
at the 23rd Part Con ress of a "balanced" historical Stalin's
30- ear reign.
When this move was resisted,
Brezhnev toned down his treatment of Stalin. Subsequently, however,
Brezhnev has appeared to be practicing Stalin-style politics, as demon-
strated by his heavy-handed strategy at the special May Plenum of the
Central Committee of the CPSU.
CPSU politics have generally shifted from Khrushchev's relatively
open, live atmosphere to the present inscrutable dullness. Reading be-
tween the lines of the CPSU press, some analysts are speculating that
intra-Party relationships may be subject to re-examination and change
subsequent to the 2-3 August meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Trends are
believed to represent a turn backwards toward Stalinism, and to help to
consolidate the strength of Brezhnev and/or Kosygin, both of whom rose
to their first positions of prominence during the purges of the 1930's.
A possible long-term beneficiary would be Politburo member A.N. Shelepin,
one of Stalin's last appointees (as chief of the Komsomol in 1952).
In the Soviet economy's much-needed and long-overdue reform, con-
servatives whose orientation reflects their training in economic admin-
istration during Stalin's time are obviously dragging their feet. The
SECRET Cont.) 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400010003-5
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conservatives, who also qualify as bureaucrats, evidently believe that
a serious economic reform, including meaningful price revision and di-
rect commercial relationships between managers of supplying and manu-
facturing organizations, as well as retail outlets, would reduce their
role in running the economy from Moscow.
The grandiose irriga-
hard by Brezhnev --
a striking resemblance
to Stalin's Great Projects for the Building of Communism.
tion and drainage program being pushed especially
and of questionable economic justification, bears
cut down on military outlays have been reversed.
The new leaders' economic policies have shown a trend which is
reminiscent of Stalin's era. The early indications t to
supply more consumer goods and 50X1-HUM
Soviet military leaders have apparently succeeded in getting satis-
factory budgetary and supplementary allocations and in having won sup-
port for the programs they consider necessary, an achievement which is
in line with Stalin's persistent goal of fostering the development of
the armed forces. The opinions of some top leaders on recent non-
military issues reflect the group's conservatism -- which probably re-
flects their age, averaging over 60, and the fact that they survived
Stalin's purges.
A survey of the press indicates that de-Stalinization has come to
a crashing halt. Only twice since March 1965 have Stalin's policies
been attacked in the press. And allusions to Stalin have virtually dis-
appeared from press rehabilitations of Stalin's victims, which are also
less evident in the central press even though they continue in expurgated
form in the provincial press. So far the regime has not been able to
rehabilitate Stalin and/or his era in any straightforward manner.
Objections to the present regime's suspected return to Stalinism
have been registered from all over the world. Free World criticism
focused on the Stalinist aspects of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case. Sixteen
non-Bloc CP's also criticized the Sinyavsky-Daniel case'and the PC of
Italy went so far as to declare in its newspaper just before the 23rd
Party Congress that it could not accept a re-evaluation of Stalin's
role if the Congress should make such a decision. Novotny is also
widely reported in the Western press to have objected to Brezhnev's
intention to refurbish Stalin's image at the Congress. Furthermore,
writers in Czechoslovakia, Hungary,