AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100420001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 20, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100420001-2
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Africa Review
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ALA AR 85-021
20 September 1985
Copy 356
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The Mengistu government has suspended the resettlement of
peasants from the war-torn and drought-stricken north, but the US
Embassy reports that the delay probably is temporary. We believe
Addis Ababa remains steadfast in its conviction that only
resettlement will break peasant resistance in the north and end the
cycle of drought and famine that has plagued northern Ethiopia.
Despite a strong economic performance and relative political calm,
President Biya's three-year-old regime is struggling with
bureaucratic corruption and mismanagement unior officer
grumbling, and chronic tribal rivalries.
Angola: The NAM Ministerial
Ivory Coast: Preelection Tensions Increase
Mali: Heightened Libyan Profile~
Togo: Followup on Bombings F_~
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
i Secret
ALA AR 85-021
20 September 1985
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Ethiopia: Pause in the
Resettlement Program
The Mengistu government recently suspended the
resettlement of peasants from Ethiopia's war-torn and
drought-striken north, but the US Embassy reports
that the suspension probably is temporary. We believe
that Addis Ababa remains steadfast in its conviction
that only resettlement will break peasant resistance in
the north and end the cycle of drought and famine
that has plagued northern Ethiopia. Western donors
expressed concern over the coercive tactics used in
resettlement and human rights abuses in camps in the
south. In our judgment, logistic and infrastructure
problems-and possibly Western donor accusations of
human rights abuses-have influenced the
government to delay its resettlement timetable. Addis
Ababa, however, probably calculates that, if faced
with a fait accompli, Western donors will be forced to
provide at least humanitarian assistance to the
residents of the camps.
Regime Goals
The resettlement program, which was begun in
October 1984, has both economic and political
motivations. Moving the peasants is seen by Addis
Ababa as a solution to the problem of endemic
drought and famine in northern Ethiopia, an area
burdened with overpopulation and infertile farmland.
We believe, however, that the primary factor is the
regime's desire to undermine northern resistance to
central rule and collectivized farming.
Collectivization, in the eyes of Addis Ababa, is
intended to increase agricultural productivity while
extending political and onomic control over the
peasants. The US Em assy reports that, apart from
small family plots, all resettled peasants are being
placed on collectivized farms.
The movement of peasants from the northern province
of Tigray to the lightly populated and richer areas of
the south and southwest may undercut the base of
support for insurgents, who depend on local peasants
for food, and logistic support. A recent US Embassy
report, however, indicates that of the total of 500,000
peasants resettled since October 1984, more than
400,000 were from Welo and Shewa Provinces and
that fewer than 100,000 have come from Tigray.
Therefore, while the movement of peasants from the
Tigray Province may disrupt insurgency supply lines,
we do not believe it will cripple the insurgents.
Moreover, the high rate of population growth in the
north and the gradual return of Tigrean refugees from
Sudan will buttress the already existing local support
for the insurgency, in our judgment.F___1
Current Status
Western observers agree that the resettlement
program has been hastily planned and implemented.
US Embassy sources have reported cases of
involuntary uprooting and forced separation of
families, noting that the government has given the
ruling Workers Party of Ethiopia, the implementing
arm of the program in the field, quotas for resettling
the peasants. Until recently, the regime had pledged
to resettle 1.2 million peasants by the end of the year,
but the logistic difficulties, government-rebel clashes,
and delays in the development of roads and housing
have reportedly forced the government to put the
resettlement program on hold. In addition, Western
donors' charges of human rights abuses may have
influenced the regime's decision. The US Embassy
reports the government has delayed its deadline for
resettling the 1.2 million people to the end of next
year.
The government's effort to develop infrastructure for
the camps includes sending work groups, comprised of
university faculty and students, to the resettlement
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ALA AR 85-021
20 September 1985
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areas. Some 22,000 workers were ordered to isolated
sites in the south and southwest in June to build
dwellings in preparation for the influx of settlers from
the north. Reports from US Embassy sources touring
these areas indicate the campaign has been a total
failure. Heavy rains, lack of roads, and low morale led
to the breakdown.
noted the inappropriateness of
settling peasants in an area incompatible with their
agrarian experience, and on land where apart from
rice-a grain foreign to the Ethiopian diet-the range
of potential crops is limited.
reported abysmal living conditions,
inhabitants in poor physical health, and virtually
nonexistent services. reported less
austere conditions.
Prospects
Despite the ability of the regime to resettle 500,000
peasants to date, we believe that the obstacles to
successful functioning of the resettlement camps are
formidable. Inadequate medical care, food, and farm
equipment will severely impede efforts to establish
even subsistence-level productivity. The low morale of
resettled peasants and lackluster support by students
and faculty are serious roadblocks. Nevertheless, in
our estimation, the Mengistu regime is wedded to
resettlement for political reasons and is unlikely to do
more than slow it down.
Although concern in the donor community about
resettlement is widespread, we believe, if the regime
continues to move peasants south, Western donors
may contribute at least humanitarian assistance. The
Catholic Church has already offered medical
assistance, and there are indications that Australia
and West Germany will provide aid. In fact, the US
Embassy believes that, apart from the British, the
United States may be alone in its strong opposition to
resettlement.
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on Biya
Despite Cameroon's strong economic performance
and relative political calm, bureaucratic corruption
and mismanagement, junior officer grumbling, and
chronic tribal rivalries are placing strains on President
Biya's three-year-old regime. A coup attempt in April
1984 by elements of the elite, Presidential Guard, and
some 15 military officers
were arrested in July for coup plotting, are the most
telling examples of mounting frustrations. Although
we believe that external opposition groups-based
primarily in Paris-lack the financial strength and
size to challenge Biya's grip, the Embassy reports that
Biya fears that former President Ahidjo, who now
resides in southern France, and his supporters in the
current government may try to move against him.
Ethnic tensions persist in the military as well. The US
Embassy reports the officers corps is southern
dominated, while the ranks of the Army are almost 40
percent northern. Earlier this year, Bamileke
complained that military assignments and promotions
favor Beti officers and enlisted men.
Military Frustration
Evidence suggests that unhappiness with Biya's rule
may be building in the 10,000-man military.
some 15 officers and
NCOs were arrested in July for coup plotting.
Moreover, junior officers have been carefully
monitoring Biya's efforts to make good his promises to
end corruption among senior officers, the US
Tribal Frictions
Ethnic suspicions permeate the government and
military Anglophones-
who form some 10 percent of the 9.7 million
population-fear their gradual assimilation into the
dominant francophone community. The English-
speaking leaders criticized Biya in recent months for
ignoring their interests, alleging poor educational
opportunities at the secondary level, a discriminatory
policy regarding bilingualism at the universities, and
underrepresentation in government, according to US
Embassy reporting. Dissatisfaction also has grown
this year among the Bamileke, Cameroon's largest
tribe, which dominates the agricultural and
commercial sectors.
the Bamileke-who inhabit the western highlands-
charged earlier this year that Biya favors his fellow
tribesmen, and a recent government crackdown on
corruption is designed to undercut their influential
economic role, according to Embassy reports. The
Embassy also notes Biya has sought to allay their
concerns by appointing a prominent Bamileke
businessman to his inner circle of advisers.)
Embassy reports.
last February a group of lieutenants and captains met
with Biya to express their unhappiness and complain
that senior officers receive too many privileges.
According to the Embassy, Biya is seeking to ease
their dissatisfaction by furnishing them with
inexpensive cars.
Economic Concerns
Although Cameroon has averaged real growth rates
of about 6 percent in 1984 and 1985, the country
faces economic challenges that may hamper reform
and slow growth. According to US Embassy
reporting, some of the 100 US firms in the country
are in conflict with the government over tax rates, and
should Yaounde seek greater returns, American
investors probably will look elsewhere. The Embassy
also notes Cameroon has a $12. million loan
outstanding to Chase Bank, and that Yaounde is not
making payment deadlines. Moreover, Western
observers are mixed in their views of Cameroon's
ability to develop alternate foreign exchange earnings
to compensate for the decline in oil revenues.
Secret
ALA AR 85-021
20 September 1985
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Government-owned enterprises are losing money and
will continue to be a drain on the economy. Moreover,
rapid urbanization, underemployment and
unemployment, and dim prospects for new jobseekers
may eventually cause unrest. The population
countrywide is growing at 2.7 percent a year, while
the cities are increasing by 8 percent a year.
Corruption, an inadequate infrastructure, and an
inefficient bureaucracy also hamper economic
policies.
Potential for Libyan Meddling
The US Embassy reports that Biya increasingly
regards Libya as a subversive threat. Although Biya
hopes to forestall Libyan subversion by maintaining
polite ties to Tripoli, the US Embassy reports that
Libya may be training a small number of
Cameroonian dissidents. Moreover
Tripoli has been providing
arms and ammunition to a previously unknown
group-the Cameroon Liberation Movement
Libya may attempt to exploit Cameroon's warming
relationship with Israel, which maintains a small
interests section in Yaounde. An Israeli mission trains
and equips the 700-man Presidential Guard, and
provides a small amount of military aid to the Army,
according to the US Embassy. In the unlikely event
that Biya would decide to establish diplomatic
relations with Tel Aviv, Cameroon's moderate
Muslims, which make up about 30 percent of the
population-possibly with Libyan encouragement-
could interpret this as an example of the
predominately Christian government's insensitivity to
their interests. The US Embassy also believes some of
former President Ahidjo's fellow Muslim supporters
may be willing to accept Qadhafi's assistance.
Strains in Relations With France
Although ties to Paris have improved in the past year,
US Embassy reporting indicates that suspicions of
French intentions linger. The US Embassy reports
that mid- and low-level government employees believe
Paris supports former President Ahidjo, and
government officials suspect French complicity in the
Presidential Guard revolt in 1984. Other irritants
include Cameroon's trade deficit with Paris, France's
diminishing role in Africa, and Paris's warming ties to
Nigeria-Cameroon's more powerful neighbor who
some Cameroonians fear could pose a military threat.
Nonetheless, France continues to be Cameroon's most
important economic and military ally. It is
Cameroon's largest trading partner, taking 35 percent
of its exports and providing 48 percent of Cameroon's
imports last year. French commercial interests in
Cameroon are substantial, and the US Embassy
reports some 17,000 French citizens reside in
Cameroon. The French presence is pervasive
throughout the country's administration, economy,
and educational and military structures. According to
the Embassy, France provides some $18 million a year
in military aid and 75 military advisers in the country.
employment opportunities.
Outlook
Although the US Embassy indicates that Biya's
position is secure for the short term, we believe his
hold on power over the medium to long term may
erode. Because the country remains a collection of
disparate tribes with little sense of a "Cameroonian"
identity, Biya will have to contend with persistent
ethnic and regional pressures. While Cameroon has
proved more successful in managing its oil windfall
than most other African producers, economic
problems may diminish Biya's popular support. The
woefully inefficient government-owned companies,
generally low producer prices for commodity exports,
and high interest rates on external loans, may slow
economic growth and prove a serious drain on
government resources. At the same time Biya will
have to contend with a rapidly growing and urbanized
population of well-educated youth pressing for greater
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Africa
Briefs
Angola The NAM Ministerial
Angola probably is well satisfied with its successful staging of the Nonaligned
Ministerial meeting in Luanda from 2 to 8 September. The meeting took place
without incident, despite UNITA's claims that it would bring the Angolan civil
war into the capital and disrupt the gathering. Thanks to Cuba's behind-the-scenes
activity, participants sustained a decidedly anti-US tone and strongly supported
Angola's stand in the US-sponsored regional negotiations. Cuba successfully
championed the selection of Zimbabwe to host the next NAM summit-a move
that will allow Havana a venue to push the Movement further in an anti-US
direction.
Moscow was rarely criticized by name, although the Iranian Foreign Minister did
specifically attack the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The US Embassy in Harare
believes, and we agree, that, judging from its performance as the African
representative in the 1983-84 UN Security Council, Zimbabwe will take a fairly
radical stand as host of the eighth NAM summit. The Zimbabwean Foreign
Ministry, the Embassy asserts, is not up to coping with the NAM chairmanship,
either logistically or substantively.
repatriation program for some 10,000 Ghanians living in Ivory Coast.
The Democratic Party of Ivory Coast, the country's sole political party, quickly
curbed violence earlier this month directed against some 2 million foreign African
residents. Party leaders evidently feared that the unrest could escalate and disrupt
party elections scheduled for 9 October. Press reports indicate that some 2,000
Ghanaians were injured and an unknown number killed in rioting provoked by the
deaths of two Ivorians in crowd violence following a soccer match between the two
countries. The party's Political Bureau, the country's most powerful political
organization, publicly condemned the violence and threatened to prosecute any
Ivorians involved in civil disturbances. Ghana responded by instituting a
The potential for additional social unrest is increasing on the eve of national
elections scheduled for later this year, in our view. Ivory Coast in the past has had
one of Africa's best records for employment opportunities, access to consumer
goods, and provision of public services. It has attracted foreign workers, who make
up about 20 percent of the country's population of more than 10 million and 50
percent of the population in the capital, Abidjan. The economy, however, declined
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20 September 1985
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IMF-sponsored adjustment program.
for the third straight year in 1984, and, with unemployment on the rise, the
government has increased taxes and reduced food and housing subsidies under an
press reports indicate that earlier this month a Libyan envoy presented Bamako
with a check for $1 million as Libya's contribution to a food self-sufficiency fund.
In recent months Libya has increased its activities in predominantly Muslim Mali,
where some 11 Libyans work in the People's Bureau, three manage a Libyan Arab
Bank, and two run a Libyan Cultural Center, according to the US Embassy. Local
this year.
have asked that Radio Mali-the main source of news in Mali and parts of some
neighboring states-broadcast in Arabic, and they have hinted that Tripoli may
beam radio programs in the appropriate languages into northern Mali. The US
Embassy reports that Libya also is financing an Islamic Center in Bamako that
includes a mosque, school, and medical center; it is scheduled for completion later
Bamako maintains outwardly friendly, though cautious, relations with Tripoli.
Malian President Traore, who took power in 1968, believes that Colonel Qadhafi 25X1
has territorial designs on his country. Traore suspects Libya of recruiting
disaffected students, exiled dissidents, and nomadic Muslim Tauregs, who hold no
allegiance to the central government, according to the US EmbassyF____1
the hardships of their drought-ridden homeland.
ITraore, however, is unlikely to take a public stand that could
jeopardize continued Libyan assistance. The US Embassy in Bamako estimates
that some 9,400 Malians still work in Libya, despite recent expulsions, to escape
bombings has yet to produce any conclusive results
and hotels. Although several arrests have been made, an investigation of the
In the wake of six bombings in Lome last month, President Eyadema has increased
security in the capital and recruited 300 additional people for Togo's 1,600-man
intelligence and Gendarmerie forces, According to
the US Embassy, the police and Gendarmes now carry loaded weapons, make
frequent checks of vehicles and pedestrians, and are stationed at public buildings
Eyadema believes that Togolese dissidents
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with Ghana as a result. The President privately told US Embassy officials that
Libyan- and Cuban-trained relatives of former President Olympio, who was killed
in a military coup in 1963, are attempting to infiltrate Lome. The Olympios, a
wealthy family of southern Ewe tribesmen, have long opposed Eyadema's northern
regime, and hold Eyadema responsible for the former president's death. The
Ewes-predominant in southern Togo and southeastern Ghana-make up
approximately 40 percent of Togo's population and the armed forces. Eyadema has
long believed that Ghanaian President Rawlings, an Ewe, lends support to
Togolese dissidents.
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