PROSPECTS FOR IRANIAN RESISTANCE TO A SOVIET INVASION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000400440003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Prospects for
Iranian Resistance
to a Soviet Invasion
Secret
Secret
NESA 86-10047X
SOV 86-10059X
December 1986
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Directorate of - Secret
Intelligence
Prospects for
Iranian Resistance
to a Soviet Invasion
This paper was prepared byDOffice of
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Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, ~
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Office of Soviet Analysis.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief Persian Gulf Division,
NESA, or the Chief,
~
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European Assessments Division, SOVA, 0
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~ox~i
Secret
NESA 86-10047X
SOV 86-10059X
December 1986
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Prospects for
Iranian Resistance
to a Soviet Invasion
Scope Note This paper assesses Iran's likely responses to a Soviet invasion, assuming
that the Islamic regime continues to rule in Tehran and that Iran and Iraq
continue at war. much of the paper is
speculative and attempts to draw conclusions about how Tehran would
fight the Soviets on the basis of Iran's performance and adaptability in the
Iran-Iraq war.
A Soviet military move into Iran or elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region is
unlikely in the near term. Nonetheless, Moscow has contingency plans for
a range of combat actions against Iran while continuing to work toward es-
tablishing apro-Soviet government in Tehran through nonmilitary means.
This assessment does not consider in detail the conditions under which the
Soviets would invade Iran, nor does it look at a Soviet campaign within the
context of a Soviet-NATO war. Although we believe the Soviets would not
plan to invade Iran without anticipating and preparing for US military
intervention, our discussion is limited to the Iranian opposition the Soviets
would face. This paper also briefly examines the probable Iranian reaction
to US intervention in aSoviet-Iranian war.
Secret
NESA 86-]0047X
SOV 86-10059X
December 1986
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Prospects for
Iranian Resistance
to a Soviet Invasion
Key Judgments A Soviet invasion of Iran appears highly unlikely. Nonetheless, an
Information available examination of such a scenario is prudent because of US interests and
as oJ'3 November /986 security commitments in the Persian Gulf region and because the Soviets
was used in this report.
continue to plan for a range of combat actions against Iran should
circumstances necessitate a military move.
The scale of an Iranian campaign would far surpass anything the Soviets
have attempted since World War II, and the Soviets probably would
require more than a month to fully prepare their forces. A Soviet invasion
force would probably reach the Persian Gulf in as little as three weeks once
combat began. The full deployment and garrisoning of the occupation force
throughout the country, however, might take several months.
In planning for such a campaign, the Soviets would almost certainly
envision considerable risks and problems. These would include fierce
Iranian resistance, the need to commit a large occupation force-probably
300,000 to 500,000 men-to contend with an anticipated Iranian guerrilla
movement, the likely negative political response from other nations,
especially those in the Persian Gulf, and the possibility of a direct military
confrontation with the United States.
The Iranians do not believe a Soviet invasion is likely, and they might
misjudge the seriousness of Soviet preparations to cross the border. If
Moscow's forces were to invade, Tehran probably would have to rely on
decade-old defense plans developed by the Shah's armed forces. Moreover,
the demands of the Iran-Iraq war have almost exclusively driven Tehran's
military planning for the last six years, limiting its capability to conduct
exercises for the defense of Iran's northern border. Even if the war with
Iraq were to end, Iran would still see Baghdad as its major adversary and
would concentrate most of its forces to protect its western border.
Early warning of Soviet intentions to invade would significantly improve
Iran's ability to prepare its defenses:
? Tehran would call up thousands of irregular and reserve forces and would
try to block Soviet routes into the country.
? Iranian forces would prepare choke points to delay the Soviets and would
destroy communications and power facilities, airfields, and, perhaps, oil
installations to prevent Soviet use.
? Tehran would try to move some Army units to the north, but it probably
would rely mostly on its Gendarmerie, Basij militia, and Revolutionary
Guard forces in the area as a first line of defense.
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After defeat of their Army, the Iranians would conduct an extensive
guerrilla campaign. With foreign arms assistance, particularly from the
West, the Iranians might be able to prevent the Soviets from consolidating
their control over Iran for many years. Even without aid, opposition would
continue indefinitely because few Iranians would favor a government under
Soviet domination.
Strong Iranian opposition to a Soviet invasion would slow a Soviet advance
to the Persian Gulf and perhaps cause the Soviets to put off planning for a
push beyond Iran. Tehran probably would accept offers of US military
supplies, and the provision of materiel might strengthen Iranian resistance.
Direct US intervention to assist the Iranians during a Soviet invasion,
however, would be viewed by Tehran as evidence of collusion by the
superpowers to divide Iran. As with the Soviets, the Iranians most likely
would force US troops to fight a war of attrition.
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Key Judgments
v
Soviet Military Planning Considerations
1
Soviet Command and Force Structure Opposite Iran
2
Theater High Command
2
Ground Force Structure and Mobilization
2
Air and Naval Structure and Mobilization
3
Forces in Afghanistan
4
Force Sustainability
4
Soviet Campaign To Invade and Occupy Iran
4
Phase I
6
Phase II
8
Rate of Advance
8
Iranian Plans and Preparations
8
Early Warning Shortcomings
10
Iranian Response to a Surprise Attack
11
Iranian Response With Limited Warning
13
Iranian Air Force Capabilities
13
Ability To Defend the Coast
14
Strategy and Tactics
15
Foreign Assistance
18
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Prospects for
Iranian Resistance
to a Soviet Invasion
The Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war have
significantly altered Iran's capability to resist a Soviet
invasion. Before 1979, Iranian defense planning fo-
cused mostly on the threat of a Soviet rather than an
Iraqi attack. Virtually all of Iran's resources now are
devoted to fighting Iraq, and Tehran probably will
continue to view Baghdad as its primary adversary
even after the war ends. If the Soviets were to invade,
Iran probably would be taken offguard and would rely
initially on pre-Khomeini defense strategies to resist
the attack.
The USSR's long-term objective in Iran is the estab-
lishment oI apro-Soviet government. The Soviets
almost certainly would prefer to achieve this goal
without resorting to arms. We believe Moscow will
continue to focus on ensuring Tehran's continued
anti-US orientation and strive to promote better
Soviet-Iranian relations despite its marked lack of
success in this area.
Soviet Military Planning
Considerations
The Soviets could conduct a variety of military cam-
paigns against Iran. Because Soviet planners leave
little to risk, they are conservative in assessing force
requirements and thorough in planning and preparing
for military operations. For this reason, we judge that
the Soviets assume that Iranian resistance would be
sufficient to prevent an easy victory and would there-
fore plan for an intensive campaign against deter-
mined opposition.
In scope and complexity, a general invasion of Iran
would far surpass anything the Soviets have attempt-
ed since World War II. The forces required would be
quite large~n the order of one or more fronts with
six ground armies totaling between 20 and 25 divi-
sions with associated tactical air support. In addition,
they also would have to consider deploying additional
ships and submarines to the Indian Ocean and moving
strike aircraft to bases in the southern USSR.
Nonetheless, there are circumstances under which the
Soviets would consider military action against Iran.
These circumstances could include:
? The introduction oj" US military forces into Iran or
the perception by Moscow that the United States
was about to do so.
? The rise to power in Iran of a pro-Soviet,faction
that "requested" Soviet assistance to solid#fy or
sustain its rule.
? The eruption oj'civil war in Iranfollowing the death
orjall from power oj'Ayatollah Khomeini, plunging
the country into prolonged political chaos.
? The initiation oj"a Warsaw Pact-NATO or Soviet-
Chinese war and subsequent expansion of military
operations to include Iranian territory.
A sudden event, such as an abrupt end oj'the
Khomeini regime, could prompt the Soviets to inter-
vene in Iran, but we believe any military move would
be preceded by drawn-out deliberations within the
Soviet political and military leadership. We judge
that the Soviets would act militarily only U'they were
convinced that nonmilitary measures had proved
fruitless or were assessed as unlikely to succeed.
We believe that the USSR has sufficient units of its
Ground Forces and tactical elements of its Air Forces
stationed in its Southern Theater of Military Opera-
tions (TMO) to conduct a general offensive into Iran
with the objective of advancing to the Persian Gulf
and occupying the country.' The Soviets almost cer-
tainly would mobilize all units in the Transcaucasus,
North Caucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts
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Table 1
Soviet Ground Forces Equipment Opposite Iran
Tanks
Artillery
APCs/IFVs a
Transcaucasus, North Caucasus, and Turkestan MDs b
5,400
5,200
7,900
Central Asian MD
2,200
2,100
1,800
(MDs). In addition, to ensure the availability of
reinforcements, we believe at least a partial mobiliza-
tion would be conducted in the Central Asian MD
and in the MDs in the central USSR. The logistic
structure of the Southern TMO would have to be
expanded considerably to support frontal operations.
If a decision to move militarily were made by Mos-
cow, detailed plans developed beforehand would be
available to Soviet commanders. During peacetime,
the Soviets continually develop and refine wartime
planning against potential opponents, and we believe
they have fully established plans for a range of
combat actions against Iran involving their Ground
and Air Forces and Navy.
Soviet Command and Force Structure
Opposite Iran
Theater High Command
The Soviets have established a High Command of
Forces for the Southern TMO to direct and coordi-
nate preparations for possible war against Iran. The
command is in daily contact with the forces within the
theater and is responsible for developing war plans
and supervising training and exercises. As a result, it
would operate more efficiently from the outset of war
than if the command structure was activated only
shortly before hostilities began.
Ground Force Structure and
Mobilization
The Soviets have 24 motorized rifle divisions and one
tank division stationed in the Transcaucasus, North
Caucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts as part of
the Southern TMO. One airborne division, one air
assault brigade, and one airmobile brigade also are
available for use in operations against Iran (see
foldout at the end of the report). Support for airborne
and air assault operations would come from the
Soviets' fleet of fixed-wing transport aircraft as well
as the nearly 500 helicopters available in the Southern
TMO. In addition, nondivisional artillery, air defense,
and miscellaneous combat support and service support
units stationed in these MDs probably would partici-
pate in a campaign.
With the exception of units in Afghanistan, compo-
nents of the Soviet Ground Forces opposite Iran are
maintained at low readiness. Most units in the Trans-
caucasus, North Caucasus, and Turkestan districts, as
well as those in adjacent MDs, are manned at one-
fourth or less of war-authorized strength. This low
level of peacetime manning restricts most unit train-
ing to company-level and below.
Before invading Iran, Soviet forces would have to
undergo large-scale mobilization, which would entail
the Gallup of several hundred thousand reservists.
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Table 2
Soviet Aircraft Opposite Iran
Figures denote combat aircraft in operational units. There are no
Air Force units in the North Caucasus Military District.
b These aircraft are intended for the strategic air defense of the
Southern Theater of Military Operations.
Depending on the unit's peacetime readiness, mobili-
zation time for divisions would range from one to two
weeks. All but a small percentage of the equipment
assigned to these units is kept in storage in peacetime
and would require some preparation before becoming
ready for combat. In addition, some of the lowest
strength divisions lack their full complement of com-
bat equipment, and the acquisition of necessary weap-
ons and support equipment could lengthen their mobi-
lization times.
We believe that the amount of time required by the
Ground Forces to complete personnel mobilization,
equipment preparation, and postmobilization refresh-
er training would be approximately one month to six
weeks. Postmobilization training probably would be
directed at developing battalion tactical skills because
Soviet planning is based heavily on the success of
these combat units in carrying out assigned missions.
This training would probably take from three to four
weeks.
Air and Naval Structure and Mobilization
Air support for operations into Iran would come from
tactical air regiments in the Transcaucasus, Turke-
stan, and Central Asian MDs, which have a total of
1,300 combat aircraft. The North Caucasus Military
District contains several military aviation schools, but
it does not have any combat-ready units. The Soviets
have been increasing the number of ground attack
aircraft in the theater since 1980 by creating new
units and converting fighter regiments to ground
attack units. They now have over 560 such aircraft in
the Southern TMO. Two air armies controlled by the
Supreme High Command also could be employed for
deep strikes by the longer range aircraft assigned to
these units.
The Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron would play a
limited role in a general invasion of Iran, and its
operations would be largely restricted to preventing
the delivery of supplies through Iranian ports and
assisting the Soviet Ground Forces in capturing the
port cities. The squadron includes one general purpose
submarine, four or five surface combatants, and 16 to
18 naval auxiliaries. Some augmentation could come
from the Soviet Pacific Fleet, but a substantial en-
largement would strain the logistic system of the
squadron. Access to an Iranian port would alleviate
the logistic burden, but the capture and use of port
facilities could occur only during the latter stages of a
campaign. The Caspian Sea Fleet also could play a
limited role in supplying Soviet forces and staging
small-scale amphibious assaults on Iran's coast.
Soviet air and naval units that would be used in
operations against Iran are kept at a higher state of
combat readiness than those of the Ground Forces in
the Southern TMO. They thus require less mobiliza-
tion and preparation before engaging in offensive
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operations. Redeployment of these units to support a
full invasion of Iran could require up to a week, but
this is well within the time required by the Ground
Forces to prepare for such an operation.
Forces in Afghanistan
The Soviets have major elements of three motorized
rifle divisions and one airborne division, along with
other combat support units, in Afghanistan as part of
the 40th Army. Aviation assets, including helicopter
and fixed-wing aircraft, also are stationed in Afghani-
stan as part of this army. As presently constituted and
positioned, these forces are fully committed to combat
operations in country, although the Soviets could use
Afghanistan as a jumping-off point for operations into
Iranian Baluchistan. It is unclear whether the Soviets
would consider such operations as part of their inva-
sion planning, or whether they would be willing to
divert forces from their primary mission in Afghani-
stan.
Force Sustainability
We judge that the Soviets would require 20 to 25
divisions to undertake a general invasion of Iran. To
ready such a force for operations and support it once
operations commenced, the logistic structure of the
Southern TMO would have to be expanded considera-
bly from its peacetime configuration. We assess that
sufficient stocks of ammunition are available in this
theater to sustain Soviet forces for at least two months
of combat operations. Fuel supplies are not so plenti-
ful, but we believe that a sufficient amount is stored
in the theater to support at least the opening phase of
combat.
The major weakness in the logistic infrastructure is
the lack of adequate lift and transport capability for
moving supplies. Thousands of trucks would have to
be requisitioned from the civilian economy for mili-
tary use. Other facilities and units that are essential to
meet wartime requirements such as medical treat-
ment, vehicle repair, and maintenance of wartime
supply routes are also seriously lacking. Although
land transportation routes in the Southern TMO are
few in number, virtually all supplies would be moved
by the road and rail network.
Soviet Campaign To Invade and
Occupy Iran
To ensure continuous logistic and air support, we
believe that a Soviet general invasion of Iran would be
conducted in phases.Z During the initial phase, units of
the Ground Forces-supported by tactical elements of
the Air Forces operating out of bases in the Soviet
Union and Afghanistan-would attack in order to
seize northwestern, central, and northeastern Iran,
including Tehran. After a short pause to consolidate
their position, resupply units, replenish and move
forward their logistic stocks, and redeploy tactical
aircraft to captured airfields, the Soviets would initi-
ate the second phase of the campaign-a drive to the
Persian Gulf to seize the Khuzestan oilfields and the
Strait of Hormuz.
The amount of time the Soviets would require to
overcome the Iranian military once combat com-
menced would probably range from several weeks to
several months. The length of time would depend on
the intensity, durability, and effectiveness of Iranian
resistance as well as on terrain and weather condi-
tions. The Soviets could seize the border regions of
Iran relatively quickly and, after securing this area,
might attempt to advance on one or two narrow axes
toward ports on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of
Oman. The success of these largely self-sustaining
"flying columns" would depend on their ability to
advance quickly, penetrate Iranian resistance before it
solidified, and capture and hold a port until an
overland linkup with the rest of the Soviet army could
be achieved. The port could be used by the Soviet
Navy to provide assistance, and its seizure would
prevent the Iranians or other nations from using it in
resisting the Soviet attack. The columns would not
attempt to hold ground in the interior of Iran, which
would be the objective of the more broadly based
advance by the bulk of the Soviet forces.
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A complete occupation of Iran could take up to
several months. The difficulties encountered in
achieving this objective would be the rugged terrain,
the lack of adequate north-south and east-west axes of
traverse, the lack of existing garrison facilities to
cover large areas, and the need to secure lengthy and
vulnerable lines of communication to support the
stationing of Soviet forces.
Phase I
The initial attack into northwestern Iran probably
would be made by about 10 divisions organized into
two armies. The constrictive terrain would limit the
number of forces the Soviets could commit to the
opening attack. The main axis of advance probably
would be the cities of Jolfa, Tabriz, and Zanjan, and
it could be supported by airborne and airmobile
operations to seize airfields and mountain passes in
order to facilitate the advance. The Soviets might
attempt small-scale amphibious landings along Iran's
Caspian coast to assist the drive, but their Caspian
Sea Fleet has only a limited capability to undertake
such operations. Once more space was available for
maneuver operations, the Soviets would commit addi-
tional troops to continue the advance.
Another four or five divisions would attack northeast-
ern and eastern Iran from Turkestan and Afghanistan
moving on two axes-one westward toward Tehran
and one southward toward the ports of Bandar-e
Abbas and Bandar Beheshti. These forces would want
to quickly seize the airfields at Zahedan and Kerman
so that they could be used to support air operations
during the subsequent advance to the Persian Gulf.
The use of Afghanistan to stage major axes of
advance into southeastern Iran, however, would pre-
sent the Soviets with considerable logistic problems.
The supply line of a force attacking from Zaranj
would extend from its base in the USSR for almost
2,000 kilometers through hostile Afghan territory. In
addition, the road network such a force would use
between the Iranian-Afghan border and the Persian
Gulf consists of a single road over 1,000 kilometers
long that traverses mountains and desert. Neverthe-
less, Soviet forces at a minimum could stage spoiling
attacks from Afghanistan to divert Iranian forces
Iran's terrain does not javor an invading army.
Nearlyjour-fj'ths oj'the country is mountainous or
covered with rugged hills. In Iran's mountain rim-
land-the Zagros Mountains in the west and the
Elburz Mountains in the northeast-Soviet wheeled
and tracked vehicles would be limited mainly to
travel on narrow valley.floors. Cross-country move-
ment would be easier for Soviet jorces in the plains
and basins in central Iran and along the borders with
fVghanistan and Pakistan. Even so, they would have
to contend with sand dunes, unstable sand, and miry
salt fiats in some areas. A prevailing northwestern
wind also causes dust storms in the south that reduce
visibility and sometimes cause equipment to jail.
Flooding occurs sporadically in the spring and au-
tumn in the area bordering the Caspian Sea and
during the spring in Khuzestan.
Terrain probably would increase the ability of the
Iranians to delay the Soviets by providing them with
defensive advantages during attacks and jacilitating
guerrilla operations. The Iranians would be less
encumbered by heavy equipment than the Soviets and
could move more quickly over difficult ground. Sovi-
et armored vehicles would be restricted mostly to
major roads. Rocky terrain would make airmobile
insertions more dif.~cultlor the Soviets. Lightly
armed Iranian infantry or guerrilla forces in some
areas might be able to use this terrain to conduct
enfilading attacks against columns.
Iran's road network would quickly deteriorate under
sustained use by Soviet armored vehicles. Less than a
quarter ojthe country's 85,000 kilometers ojroads
are hardsurjaced.
even main routes are in poor repair because of Iran's
focus on its war with Iraq. This would hinder the
Soviets' ability to make high-speed advances using
the road network.
from the main axes of advance.
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Figure 2
Terrain Suitability for Cross-Country Movement by Wheeled and Tracked Vehicles
Iraq-Saudi Arabfa
Neutral Zone
Saudi Arabia
Soviet Union
United
no defined boundary
~ 9ountlary representation is
300 MiICS not necessarily eutnoritative.
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Phase II
After Phase I, the Soviets probably would commit the
remainder of their invasion force and continue the
attack to seize the Khuzestan oilfields and ports on
the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. As part of this
phase of their operation, they might conduct an
airborne assault in order to seize certain key oil
facilities in the Gulf region. The Soviets probably
would undertake airborne assaults when they were in
a position to provide air support and could conduct a
quick linkup overland, especially if these assaults were
coordinated with the advance of "flying columns" to
quickly seize important, distant objectives.
Rate of Advance
During afull-scale invasion, problems associated with
moving through rugged terrain would be magnified as
the forces moved deeper into Iran passing through
choke points and further extending lines of communi-
cation. Because of the limited road and rail network in
Iran, the Soviets would have difficulties in supplying a
large invasion force overland, and, until airfields had
been captured, resupply by air would be limited to
what could be accomplished by helicopter and para-
chute drops. The Soviets would use the Caspian ports
for resupply to the maximum extent possible but
would still be confronted with the problem of moving
supplies inland from the coast.
The rate of advance would benefit greatly from the
virtually complete mastery of the air that the Soviets
would hold throughout the campaign. Before the
initiation of the ground attack, the Soviets would
probably conduct alarge-scale air operation to de-
stroy Iranian aircraft on the ground, attack command
installations, and inflict casualties on troop concentra-
tions. The Air Forces would then support the Ground
Forces' advance by providing close air support to units
in combat, attacking Iranian defensive positions, and
preventing Iranian aircraft not destroyed in the initial
air offensive from attacking Soviet forces. Fighters
and fighter-bombers could conduct specific ground
support attacks, while light bombers could undertake
missions deep into Iranian territory.
Limited Invasion Scenario:
A Soviet Attack To Seize Azerbaijan
We believe the Soviets could occupy Azerbaijan in
northwestern Iran within three weeks. Such an inva-
sion probably would initially require only five to
seven divisions. These units could be assembled
entirelylrom forces already present in the Transcau-
casus MD, and the smaller invasion force would
reduce Soviet mobilization and logistic requirements.
Soviet Ground Forces also would be within range of
supporting tactical components of their Air Forces
stationed in the USSR.
Nonetheless, a limited invasion of Iran to seize
Azerbaijan would meet fierce Iranian opposition.
Tehran would mobilize much of its military and
many volunteers, believing that Moscow would be
dissatisfied with taking only a small amount of
territory. We believe that resistance by guerrillas and
conventional armed forces would be su~cient to force
the Soviets to expand their commitment to hold the
territory.
Offers of autonomy and land by Moscow to tribes in
northwestern Iran might induce a few groups to
tacitly support a Soviet invasion. A small number of
Marxist Kurds would probably even cooperate with
the Soviets. We believe that the overwhelming major-
ity of the population in the north, however, would
strongly resist an invasion.
We believe that the Iranians-with history as a
teacher-are wary of a superpower plot to seize
strategic territory.' Nonetheless, the demands of the
Iran-Iraq war have limited Tehran's ability to plan for
and conduct exercises for the protection of the coun-
try's northern borders.
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Figure 3
Limited Soviet Invasion to Seize Iranian Azerba>~jan: Illustrative Campaign
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The initial conventional response of the Iranians
would rely partly on plans developed before the
revolution to defend against a Soviet invasion.' The
Shah's military strategy aimed at delaying a Soviet
advance as long as possible.
(Iranian forces
practiced setting demolition charges to block the main
passes along the Soviet border. Tribal groups and the
Gendarmerie, armed with light weapons and given
limited paramilitary training, were supposed to con-
duct harassing attacks against the Soviets and were
responsible for implementing civil defense plans in the
north,
The Shah's forces believed that they could use choke
points and strongholds-including Kermanshah (now
Bakhtaran), Dezful, Qazvin, and Hamadan, where
some Army units are headquartered, and roads con-
necting the cities-to delay Soviet forces indefinitely.
the Shah's
forces also expected that they would have to defend
airfields against Soviet airborne and special-purpose
forces. The Iranian Navy was prepared to attack Soviet
surface combatants and submarines to prevent them
from closing the Persian Gulf to shipping. Unlike the
? Tehran might decide to retaliate against Moscow by launching
terrorist attacks, even though such actions would not stop an
invasion. Religious zealots would conduct suicide bombings of
Soviet embassies and facilities around the world and assassinate
Soviet diplomats and other important leaders. The Iranians might
also use speedboats filled with explosives to launch suicide attacks
forces could arrive.
current regime, however, the Shah assumed that the
United States would support Iran if the Soviets
invaded. The defense plan called for holding the
Soviets north of the Zagros Mountains until US
We believe that there is abetter-than-even chance
that Tehran would ignore or discount invasion indica-
tors. Political tensions most likely would increase
before a Soviet military move, but Tehran probably
would believe that Moscow would not invade. The
Iranians might view Soviet actions merely as political
brinkmanship and assess military preparations as part
of Soviet exercise activity. Because they would contin-
ue to see Iraq as the greater threat, the Iranians
probably would be reluctant to redeploy Army forces
from the western front even if the war with Iraq had
ended. Tehran quite likely would interpret a warning
from the United States as an attempt to divert Iranian
forces northward in preparation for a US attack from
Even if warned, the Iranians might be surprised by a
Soviet invasion. We judge that the Iranians have a
limited tactical ability to detect Soviet preparations to
cross the border. According to a treaty signed by Iran
and the USSR in the 1920s, their common border,
except for naval facilities along the Caspian Sea, may
not be fortified on the Iranian side within an 80-
kilometer zone. The military authority in the Iranian
zone responsible for protecting and observing the
northern border is the Iranian Gendarmerie-proba-
bly with fewer than 10,000 men-whose detection
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The Basij: Iran's Mass Militia
The Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) is a reserve
force composed mainly of young and illiterate volun-
teers from the lower and rural classes. Basij person-
nel-like members of the Revolutionary Guard,
which recruits and leads them-are thoroughly in-
doctrinated by clerics into believing that they are
jightingfor Islam against theforces of evil. Because
they have been used by the Revolutionary Guard as
shock troops, their greatest contribution to the Iran-
Iraq war has been their eagerness to become religious
martyrs and absorb heavy casualties in place of more
highly trained Iranianlorces. The Basij could be
expected to be as aggressive against the Soviets.
Basij soldiers normally operate in squads armed with
rifles, machineguns, RPGs, and other light weapons.
Basij militiamen are attached to Army as well as
Revolutionary Guard forces. Early in the war, Iraq
reported that Iran used Basij soldiers in "human
waves. "Actually, the Iraqis faced a wave of squads,
each assigned a single objective, such as a machine-
gun nest, on the battlefield. Simple, specific missions
are a reflection of the Basij personnel's low education
level. Once a squad accomplishes its mission, it
capability is limited.6
Iranian early warning radar capabilities also are poor
in the north because radar sites were damaged during
`Technically the treaty has not been abrogated, nor has Iran, which
is much more concerned about deploying its troops to fight Iraq,
violated it by garrisoning regular forces close to the Soviet border.
If Iraq were no longer a threat, however, we judge that Iran would
normally waits at its objective for further orders.
Basij militiamen have been effective against Iraq, and
the Basij militia's organization makes it a good force
for hit-and-run attacks and for infiltration behind
Soviet lines. 0
Initially in the Iran-Iraq war, Basij recruits received
as little as two weeks' basic irEfantry training before
being committed to combat. Since late 1984, however,
Iran has tried to create better disciplined and more
tightly controlled Basij units. More time is spent at
training camps in Iran's interior, and we believe Basij
soldiers receive some unit training in addition to
basic infantry skills. When attached to Army and
Revolutionary Guard units at thefront, Basij person-
nel are given supplemental training, often in special-
ized tasks. Basij militiamen today may not be as
fanatic as their predecessors, but they are still highly
motivated. In 1983, Tehran claimed that over
400,000 volunteers had been trained and had served
in the Iran-Iraq war. In the event of a Soviet invasion,
Iran probably could mobilize 500,000 Basij soldiers
needing only minimal retraining.
Iranian Response to a 25X1
Surprise Attack
With little warning of an invasion, we judge that
Soviet forces could push well beyond the border 25X1
before a substantial Iranian military force could
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the Shah's military planners believed that Soviet 25X1
forces could advance to the Zagros Mountains in
three days if the attack were a complete surprise.
Against fully mobilized Iranian forces, they estimated
that it would take them as long as 10 days to go the
same distance.'
' The Shah's Army totaled some 270,000 men in 1979, considerably
fewer than Tehran currently can muster, counting irregular forces.
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Figure 4. Iranian parade through Tehran's streets in demonstra-
tion o.J~continuing public support for the nation's war against Iraq.
Similarly strong national fervor and even fanaticism would sustain
Iranian regular military units garrisoned in the north
are insufficient to stop the Soviets (see foldout at the
end of the report). If Iran were still fighting Iraq, we
estimate that in the northwest only about two divi-
sions of Army troops with supporting artillery and
several battalions of Qods (regular forces) reservists-
probably atotal of no more than 25,000 to 30,000
troops-would be available within two days. In the
northeast, Iran has less than one Army division to
defend against Soviet troops invading from the direc-
tions of Kizyl-Arvat and Ashkhabad. After the war
with Iraq ends, we believe Tehran will return to
garrisoning no more than three understrength Army
divisions in the Kurdistan and Azerbaijan regions and
Because so few regular units are available in the
north, Iran probably would turn to its irregular
forces-currently the Gendarmerie, the Basij militia,
and the Revolutionary Guard-as a first line of
defense. We believe these forces could use their light
arms to conduct delaying operations against the Sovi-
ets.
the Revolutionary Guard has organized and armed
Basij units in major towns and villages in the north.
Moreover, we believe Tehran could probably count on
a large number of untrained volunteers in the event of
a Soviet attack.
another in the east.a
e Iran had three Army divisions in the northwest and elements of
two more divisions scattered along the eastern border before the
war with Iraq.
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Figure 5. /ranian volunteers assembled at a training garrison
before leavingjor the Iraqi front. U'the Soviets invade, Tehran
would count on facilities like this one that are located throughout
Iranian Response With Limited Warning
Several weeks' warning of Soviet intentions to cross
the border would significantly improve Iran's ability
to prepare. Nationalism and religious fanaticism, as
demonstrated in the Iran-Iraq war, most likely would
aid Tehran's efforts to gather a large defensive force.
In a countrywide appeal, Iran probably could count on
close to 1 million regular, irregular, and reserve forces
to fight the Soviets, assuming that it agreed to a
cease-fire with Iraq. in
1985 Iran had at least 10 million men of military
age-between 15 and 49 years old. The UN projects
that the number will increase to about 12 million by
1990. as of January
1986, the government had some 15,000 Basij registra-
tion points nationwide-including local mosques-to
speed mobilization. Large transportation depots and
logistic bases at Jolfa, Qazvin, Tehran, and Mashhad
would facilitate efforts to supply irregular forces and
volunteers and to move them to the north. Tehran also
would use all available transportation, including com-
mercial trucks, trailers, and civilian vehicles. Iran
probably could transfer several brigade-size units with
light equipment from the central front to the north
within two weeks after receiving warning of an im-
pending Soviet attack. It would be reluctant to move
entire Army divisions from the Iraq border, however,
until Baghdad's intentions were clear.
The Iranian Air Force has only about 50 marginally
operational fighters remaining in its inventory and
would be no match for the Soviets, who would
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Table 3
Manpower of Iranian Forces
Total
At least 990
Regular forces
340-360
Army
235
Air Force
50
Navy
15
Qods (regular reserves)
40-60
Irregular forces
At least 650
Revolutionary Guard
At least 150
Basij
At least 500-1,000
Note: Figures include only manpower
of forces on active duty.
immediately achieve air superiority over Iran. Tehran
probably would try to redeploy surviving aircraft to
airbases in the south. It would then conduct at least
visual reconnaissance flights and perhaps isolated
raids to harass the Soviets as they advanced. Iran
might also consider using volunteers to fly suicide
missions against Soviet troop concentrations and con-
Iranian ground-based air defenses, which have proved
ineffective against Iraqi airstrikes, probably would not
pose a serious threat to Soviet aircraft. Most of Iran's
few radars are positioned to provide overlapping
coverage of the western border and the Gulf coast,
leaving the interior of the country with weak detection
capabilities. Moreover, breakdowns and malfunctions
aggravated by shortages of spare parts and experi-
enced repair personnel frequently cause serious gaps
in coverage
Iran relies on small-to-medium-caliber antiaircraft
artillery to protect its forces, to supplement its missile
air defenses at large installations, and to protect
Table 4
Operational Equipment of
Iranian Forces
Number
Combat aircraft
50
Artillery (over 100 mm)
500-1,000
Armored vehicles
500-700
Antiaircraft artillery
1,000-1,500
smaller facilities throughout the country. These guns
probably would pose the most serious threat to Soviet
aircraft. Iran suffers from a shortage of surface-to-air
missiles, especially for medium-to-high-altitude air
defense. Its HAWK systems, for example, have not 25X1
been a significant threat to Iraqi aircraft, because the
Iranians have too few of the systems and cannot
effectively maintain and use them. The Iranians may
have similar difficulties operating SA-2 systems that
they recently acquired
rom 1 ya an Ina, an the Soviets could adopt
countermeasures that would make the system ineffec-
tive even if the Iranians became proficient in its use.
We believe that, like the Shah's armed forces, the
current Iranian regime has contingency plans for
defending its ports.
the US raid on
Libya has led to increased Iranian planning for
stopping amphibious attacks inside the Persian Gulf.
the Iranian Sea
Coast Command, which is headquartered in Bandar-e
Abbas, is responsible for coastal defense. If the
Soviets were to attempt an amphibious landing, the
Sea Coast Command would be given full control of all
Navy, Air Force, Army, and possibly Revolutionary
Guard forces in the area to repel the attack. We
believe that Iran's ground and marine forces would
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put up fierce resistance. The Iranians might try to use
the coastal defense cruise missiles
they recently acquired from China
against amphibious assault forces. Nonetheless, be-
cause its Navy is small and in poor repair, Tehran
might count on long Soviet lines of support as its
greatest defense.
Iran's forces, as the Shah's Army had planned, proba-
bly would attempt to stall an invasion by blocking
Soviet routes into the country and using choke points
to delay their advance. Although the Iran-USSR
border extends more than 1,600 kilometers, we believe
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that Soviet forces could use fewer than a dozen roads
to enter Iran, including those from Ashkhabad, Kizyl-25X1
Arvat, Yerevan, and Baku. Rugged terrain in north~25X1
ern Iran would prevent or limit most off-road maneu-
vering by Soviet tracked and wheeled vehicles.
Iranian forces could close key passes into the country
by causing landslides and blowing up tunnels and
bridges along Soviet routes. For example, between
Jolfa and Tabriz, the Soviets would have to cross at
least six large bridges. If the Iranians destroyed them,
the Soviets might be delayed for days while they
constructed replacement bridges or brought in addi-
tional crossing equipment.'
' If the invasion occurred during a dry season, the Soviets could use
earthmoving equipment to build up areas to enable their forces to
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We believe that the Iranians would use hundreds of
similar choke points along likely advance routes to
further delay the Soviets. Tehran would rely in part
on its military engineers-they have quickly and
successfully thrown up berms; built roads, bridges,
and canals; and created water barriers in the Iran-
Iraq war-to help construct or use natural obstacles
to impede the Soviet advance.
there are close to 200 medium-to-large-
size choke points-bridges, tunnels, or passes~n
major Iranian roads alone. In some areas the Iranians
probably would try to halt the Soviet advance by
flooding roads. They might, for example, destroy
aqueducts along roads from the Caspian Sea. In
addition, many of the roads that the Soviets would
have to use are only 6 to 7 meters wide with narrow
shoulders. The Iranians would attempt to halt ar-
mored columns by destroying the lead elements,
blocking roads, and forcing the rest of the column to
wait until the damage was cleared. Meanwhile, the
Iranians probably would conduct hit-and-run attacks
against Soviet units stalled between choke points.
Iran also would try to prevent the Soviets from using
the country's 5,000-kilometer rail system by attacking
bridges, yards, and tunnels. Iranian forces might
destroy the rail hub and storage areas near Jolfa,
where the Soviets would have to transload their
cargoes because of differences between the Iranian
and Soviet rail gauges.
The Iranians probably would try to destroy any of the
country's infrastructure the Soviets could use during
or after an invasion. They would expand on defense
plans developed during the Shah's rule that,
called for irregular units to use
scorched earth tactics in some areas. Tehran might
even order its forces to destroy oil, communications,
and power facilities to prevent the Soviets from
capturing them intact. Although Tehran might try to
defend some airfields, it probably would order its
forces to damage or destroy most of them to prevent
the Soviets from using the strips for aerial resupply.10
10 Iran has 127 usable airstrips, paved and dirt, of at least 600
meters. Forty-eight of these have runways of over 2,000 meters, and
about 20 are over 3,000 meters. Ten of Iran's airfields are used
strictly for military purposes, and 10 more are shared jointly
between the military and civilian airlines
Such actions could be carried out quickly by Iranian
regular or irregular forces, especially before an inva-
sion.
The Iranians could not win and would suffer heavy
casualties in sustained conventional operations against
the Soviets." Even so, Tehran might be willing to
accept high losses if it believed its forces could halt 25X1
the Soviets or delay them long enough for units in 2X1
other areas to build up their defenses. For example,
when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, some Iranian Army
units dug in and fought fiercely to prevent the Iraqis
from advancing farther while Tehran mobilized more
men. Because they could not match Soviet firepower
and armor, the Iranians would use tactics that mini-
mized Soviet equipment advantages by fighting in
rough terrain, for example, or at night (the Iranians
have become adept at using darkness during the Iran-
Iraq war). They might also try to circumvent superior
Soviet airpower by attacking in bad weather whenever 25X1
possible. Moreover, we believe that the Iranians would
try to exploit climatic extremes-dust or snowstorms,
for example-as cover for attacks.
Iran probably would attempt to organize alarge-scale
guerrilla campaign behind Soviet lines. Most of Iran's
experience in unconventional warfare has come from
its efforts to conduct counterinsurgency operations
against the Kurds in the north. Tehran, however,
might be able to extrapolate from that experience the
key elements necessary for an effective guerrilla
campaign against the Soviets. Moreover, Iran publicly
announced the formation of a Revolutionary Guard
Corps headquarters for guerrilla warfare this spring;
it will train troops for commando-type operations
against Iraq. If the Soviets invaded, these forces,
supported by civilians, would seek to prevent the
Soviets from consolidating territory. Guerrilla forces
would also try to hinder resupply efforts, conducting
hit-and-run attacks on supply convoys to destroy or
capture supplies and ammunition.
"The Soviets would attempt to use their air and superior ground-
based fire-support weapons to prevent the Iranians from moving or
concentrating troops for massed attacks and from occupying fixed
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Table 5
Estimated Populations of
Iranian Cities
Bakhtaran 406
Khorramabad 150
Khorramshahr 212
Note: Cities are those that Soviet forces may have to overcome or
invest before reaching the Persian Gulf.
1984 figures unless otherwise noted.
b 1986 figure.
The Iranians most likely would fight a war of attri-
tion, forcing the Soviets to take or invest each village,
town, and city to prevent rear and flank attacks.
Given Iran's terrain and the proximity of most vil-
lages to major roads, we believe the Soviets could not
bypass many populated areas. For example, along one
of the probable Soviet march routes-Astara to
Bandar-e Anzali-there are some 65 villages within 5
kilometers of the road. In the area between the border
and the 36th parallel, the Soviets would have to seize
or invest at least six cities of over 200,000 people if
the Irani-
ans would implement civil defense plans that may
include arming civilians and blocking transit routes.
When Iraq took Khorramshahr in 1980, it faced
fierce street fighting and suffered high casualties. We
judge that the Soviets would face similarly stiff
resistance in populated areas along their advance
routes.
We do not believe Soviet forces could easily isolate
Tehran. The Soviets probably would have to deploy
about two divisions to invest the city, and they would
need considerable time and would sustain significant
casualties if they attempted to take Tehran. We
believe the regime would try to close off roads into the
capital and arm some of the city's 8 to 9 million
residents from Army and Revolutionary Guard arse-
nals in the area as part of its civil defense measures.
We believe Iran would have serious difficulty acquir-
ing large amounts of military materiel from foreign
suppliers soon enough to help it during the opening
stages of a Soviet invasion. Moreover, once materiel
reached the country, the Iranians would have difficul-
ty transporting it quickly to where it would be needed.
Iranian units have suffered logistic problems through-
out the Iran-Iraq war, and these would be more
complicated during a Soviet invasion. Soviet air su-
premacy would seriously hinder Iranian aerial resup-
ply. To support the fighting, most military materiel
probably would have to enter by way of the coast or
across the Pakistani border and be moved long dis-
tances at night.12
Under strong Soviet pressure, Tehran would not be
particular in seeking arms assistance, although it
would guard against becoming dependent on a single
1z Even though Iran would have fewer forces stationed along the
Gulf than in the west and north, the Soviets still would have
difficulty closing off all ports quickly. The Soviets, however, could
attempt to damage the ports with airstrikes. The Soviet Navy would
probably plan to fight the US Navy before reaching Iran's ports.
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Iraqi Response to a Soviet Invasion of Iran
The Iraqis would greet a Soviet invasion of Iran with
a mixture of joy and alarm. They would welcome the
development because it would probably force Iran to
end the Iran-Iraq war. The Iraqis, however, would
worry that the Soviets also had designs on Iraq. As
Soviet intentions in Iran became clearer and the
Iraqis experienced relief on the battlefront, concerns
over the Soviets would increase. Iraqi mistrust of the
Soviets is deep and stems from continuing Soviet
support for the Communist Party of Iraq, the inva-
sion of flfghanistan, Soviet activities in Ethiopia and
South Yemen, and Moscow's cutoff of arms to Iraq
during the Kurdish rebellion in the mid-1970s and
from the party and the Arab world in general to take
a strong stand against the Soviet move in the hope of
containing the Soviets in Iran.
Baghdad would avoid military clashes with the Sovi-
ets and would be reluctant to draw down its military
equipment and ammunition stockpiles to aid Tehran.
The war with Iran has been costly-over 400,000
Iraqi casualties-and Iraq would not want to be
drawn into a battle with its principal arms supplier. It
similarly would not allow the movement of foreign
military aid through its territory to Iran but probably
would permit the passage of humanitarian and eco-
nomic relief:
early in the Iran-Iraq war.
jf Iran held out against the Soviets, the Iraqis would
benefit from Iran's preoccupation with defending its
northern borders. Iraq, however, has long worried
that a weakened Iran would fragment and that
political instability would spill across the border,
particularly in the Kurdish regions. If the Soviets
remained in Iran, the Iraqis would be even more
troubled because Baghdad would see the emergence
of aSoviet-dominated Communist state on its flank
as threatening.
Despite Iraq's dependence on the USSR for 90 per-
cent of its arms supplies, Baghdad probably would
publicly condemn the invasion. The ideology of the
ruling Ba `thist Party in Iraq is highly anti-imperial-
ist, and the leadership would feel strong pressure
supplier. Many of its current suppliers have ties to the
Soviets-including Eastern Europe, Libya, and
Syria-and Iran could not count on their support if
the Soviets invaded. It would continue to order sup-
plies from China and North Korea and turn more
toward the West. Tehran would be suspicious of US
offers of arms assistance, but, if desperate enough, it
probably would accept even direct materiel support.
If the Iran-Iraq war were still going on when the
Soviets invaded, Iraq most likely would try to take
advantage of Iran's predicament to press its maxi-
mum demands for a peace settlement. Iraq is eager to
stop the bloodletting and would believe that Iran had
little option but to end the conflict on Iraq's terms.
Among these conditions are recognition of Iraqi
control of the Shatt al Arab, the return of Iraqi
prisoners of war, the withdrawal of Iranian forces
from Iraq, cessation of Iran's claimslor indemnities
and for condemnation of Iraq as the aggressor, and a
signed peace treaty providinglor noninterference in
the internal chairs of Iraq and the other Arab Gulf
states.
We believe that a Soviet invasion force that encoun-
tered only Iranian resistance could achieve its objec-
tive of occupying Iran. We estimate that the Soviets
would need at least three weeks to reach the Persian
Gulf. They also would need to commit 300,000 to
500,000 troops to carry out the campaign and occupy
the country. Nonetheless, we believe that the Iranians
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could prevent Moscow from consolidating its control
over the country for many years by concentrating on
unconventional and urban warfare.
A Soviet invasion might not immediately topple the
Islamic regime and would galvanize Iranian national
resistance against the USSR. Iranians would almost
universally oppose Soviet efforts to establish a Com-
munist regime under Tudeh Party auspices. More-
over, even if the central government eventually fell,
we would not envision any alternative government
favoring Soviet rule. Iranians probably would rally to
the leadership of local clergy and continue their
opposition.
In consolidating their control over the country, the
Soviets would have to contend with a resistance that
would be much larger and probably more effective
than the one they face in Afghanistan. Unlike the
Afghan military, the Iranian armed forces would view
their government as willing to support opposition to
the Soviets and would be loyal to it in a national
emergency. The armed forces also are more numerous
and better armed than the Afghan military or insur-
gents were in 1979, and they have combat experience
earned in the Iran-Iraq war. Nationalism is much
more firmly rooted in Iran than in Afghanistan, and
the "revolutionary" regime has achieved a degree of
institutionalization that Kabul still has not attained.
Moreover, religion appears to be a stronger motivator
in Iran, where hundreds of thousands have eagerly
sought martyrdom
The Iranians could probably continue a guerrilla war
against the Soviets for years with outside arms assis-
tance and a functioning internal supply network.
Without foreign military aid, armed opposition would
probably diminish over time. We believe Tehran has
established small arms caches throughout the coun-
try-for example, at Revolutionary Guard and Basij
training areas and Gendarmerie posts-that it cur-
rently uses to support the war. These supplies could be
tapped during an invasion to arm guerrilla forces. The
Iranians also would try to capture or steal military
supplies from the Soviets.
Implications for the United States
Strong Iranian resistance to a Soviet invasion would
slow a Soviet advance to the Persian Gulf. An attempt
to consolidate control over Iran would require consid-
erable time and perhaps cause the Soviets to put off
planning a push beyond Iran. Moreover, because the
Soviets would have to leave substantial forces in Iran
to maintain control, they would have to reinforce their
troops-a move the United States would probably
detect-to continue an advance against the Gulf
states.
The longer the Iranians delay a Soviet advance, the
greater the chances that the United States would be
able to convince the Gulf states to allow Washington
access to their military facilities. A slow Soviet ad-
vance also would give the United States time to move
more forces and equipment to the region if it decided
to assist the Gulf states.
Iran's needs would be great enough to make it
receptive to US offers of military materiel, but we
believe it would prefer that arms be shipped through
third countries. Even under such circumstances, Teh-
ran probably would remain adamantly opposed to
reconciliation with the United States and would balk
if the United States tried to make arms deliveries
contingent on Iran moderating its political aims.
Most Iranians would oppose US military intervention
during a Soviet invasion. They would interpret such
US involvement in the conflict as evidence of what
Iranian leaders refer to as a "plot by the superpowers
against the Islamic revolution." Even if US forces
delayed entering the country for as long as two to four
weeks after the Soviets, Iran would see US efforts as
an attempt to take advantage of its weakened state
and would try to fight a multifront war.
If the United States intervened, Iran would move
fewer of its troops northward and would try to force
the United States to engage in a war of attrition
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against Iranian resistance. Iranian units would fight
fiercely to defend Persian Gulf ports and, as against
the Soviets in the north, attack the US military along
its route of advance. Moreover, Tehran could count on
many volunteers and civilians in the south to oppose a
landing of US military forces.
If US ground forces were not directly involved and
Washington limited its support to airdropping mili-
tary supplies and blocking Iranian ports to prevent
Soviet amphibious assaults, Tehran would react cau-
tiously. It would welcome US military supplies and a
possible respite from having to undertake a strong
defense of its Persian Gulf ports. Nonetheless, Tehran
would be suspicious of US motives, fearing that
Washington might try to take advantage of Iran's
weakness. Iranian forces might still be ordered to
prepare coastal defenses to oppose a possible landing
of US forces if Tehran interpreted US intentions as
changing to Iran's detriment.
21 Secret
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Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/11 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000400440003-8