SOVIET CONCERN OVER FALLING BIRTH RATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010074-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: September 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Soviet Concern over Falling Birth Rate
Confidential
ER IM 68-124
September 1968
Copy No.
6`I
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WARNING
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Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviet Concern over Falling Birth Rate
Summary
At a time when most of the world is worried
about the population explosion, Soviet demographers
increasingly are expressing concern over the de-
clining birth rate in the USSR. After changing
relatively little in the 1950's, the birth rate in
the USSR fell sharply from 24.9 pex thousand per-
sons in 1960 to 17.4 per thousand in 1967. In 1960
the Soviet birth rate exceeded that of the United
States and was substantially higher than the aver-
age for 25 European countries.* By 1966, however,
both the Soviet and US birth rates had fallen sub-
stantially, and the Soviet rate was below the US
level and only slightly above the European average.
The decline in birth rate in the USSR was caused
both by the decrease in the number of women in the
prime child-bearing ages (20 to 34 years) and by
the decrease in the average number of children per
family. These trends are likely to continue, so
that no reversal in the declining birth rate is
likely in the near future. In the United States,
however, the number of women in the prime child-
bearing ages will rise sharply during the coming
decade, tending to increase the birth rate. The
downward trend in the Soviet Union is reinforced by
a number of interrelated factors such as urbaniza-
tion, the high participation rate of women in the
Including 19 Western European countries and 6
Eastern European countries (including Yugoslavia)
but excluding the USSR.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was pre;?ared by the Office of Economic Research.
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labor force, the housing shortage, and more generally
the shortage of consume:c goods. The government's
population policy, moreover, although it advocates
population growth, freely permits abortions at state
clinics, and a divorce is now quite easy to obtain.
The downward trend in the birth rate provides
the Soviet Union with some short-term economic gains
but portends long-run difficulties if it continues.
A declining proportion of children in the popula-
tion means less strain on child-care and educational
facilities and less pressure on the notoriously inad-
equate housing facilities. After 1976, however, the
number of persons reaching working age will tend to
decrease each year. Moreover, entries into the man-
power supply will be increasingly offset by persons
reaching retirement age, causing a marked slowdown
after 1980 in the annual net increases in the number
of persons of working age. Thus an increasing share
of the population will be outside the working ages,
raising the prospect of a potential manpower pinch.
However, the USSR had an even more serious man-
power problem in the early 1960's, when there was
an absolute reduction in the number of persons of
working age. At that time the Soviet Union aug-
mented the supply of persons available for work by
reducing the size of the armed forces, reducing the
number of work-age youths attending full-time schools,
and inducing housewives to take jobs. Although the
Soviet Union might find it difficult to use these
means in t'Ae future, there are still opportunities
to transfer part of the large pool of rural manpower
to nonagricultural jobs by expanding investments in
lal;or-saving devices on the farm. If the decline
in the birth rate continues, a comprehensive review
of policies affecting marriage, birth control, and
the employment of women may ensue.
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Trend in the Birth Rate
1. At a time when most of the world is worried
about the population explosion, Soviet demographers
increasingly are expressing concern over the de-
clining birth rate of the USSR. The Soviet birth
rate fell by almost one-thiru during 1961-67. This
sharp decline, combined with a small increase in
the death rate, led to the lowest rate of natural
increase of the total population recorded in the
post-World War. II period (see Table 1). After
remaining more or less stable during the 1950's, the
birth rate fell sharply from 24.9 per thousand per-
sons in 1960 to 17.4 per thousand in 1967. In the
mid-1960's the Soviet birth rate was slightly lower
than the rate in the United States and slightly
higher than the average rate for 25 European coun-
tries, but was falling faster than the rates in
either the United States or Europe (see the chart).
BIRTHS PER THOUSAND PERSONS
1960 and 1966
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USSR: Indicators of Population Growth
1950 and 1960-67
1950
1960
1961
1962 1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
Per Thousand Persons
Birth rate
26.7
24.9
23.8
22.4 21.2
19.6
18.4
18.2
17.4
Death rate
9.7
7.1
7.2
7.5 7.2
6.9.
7.3
7.3
7.6
Rate of natural
increase
17.0
17.8
16.6
14.9 14.0
12.7
11.1
10.9
9.8
Daughters Born per 100 Women in the Reproductive Ages a/
Maternal gross 139 135 131 127
reproduction
rate
124 118 116 N.A. N.A.
Million Persons b/
Women 20 to 34 25.1 30.2 30.0 29.3 28.3 27.2 26.4 26.0 25.9
years of age
a. Ages 15 to 49 years.
b. Midyear estimates.
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2. The sharp drop in the Soviet birth rate
since 1960 is due in part to an absolute decline
in the number of women in the prime child-bearing
ages (20 to 34 years) as a result of the low birth
rates during World War II. The number of women in
this group declined from 30.2 million in 1960 to
25.9 million in 1967. The most important factor,
however, in explaining the decline in the birth
rate is the pronounced trend toward fewer children
per family. As a consequence, between 1960 and
1965 the number of daughters born per hundred women
in the reproductive ages declined from 135 to
116* -- that is, at current rates, each woman has
on the average 1.16 daughters when child bearing
is completed. This trend is atti4butab le to several
inter-related factors, including uzbani zation,
greater employment among women, shortage of social
amenities (particularly housing and child-care
facilities), and a permissive attitude by society
and government toward birth control. Since 1960
the urban population has grown by one-quarter, while
the rural population has declined slightly. Urban
birth rates are about 80 percent of rural rates,
reflecting the influence of the chronic shortage of
housing in the cities and the greater participation
of urban women in the labor force.
3. The Soviet Union has always relied heavily
on the use of women in the labor force. In recent
years, moreover, efforts to facilitate female em-
ployment have been intensified, and the proportion
of women who work has been rising. Wages in the
service sector, where women workers predominate,
have been raised substantially, part-time jobs for
women have been authorized, and child-care facilities
have been, expanded. As a result, during 1957-67
the share of women in the labor force rose from 45
to 50 percent. In urban areas, moreover, about 90
percent of women of working age (16 to 54 years)
currently are either employed or attending full-
time school. This contrasts with about 50 percent
in the United States. The trend toward greater
* This measure, called the maternal gross repro-
duction rate, indicates the replacement potential
of the population in the reproductive ages. In the
United States the rate is 139, or about 20 percent
higher than the rate in the USSR.
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employment of women in the USSR has tended to de-
press the birth rate.
the birth rate is approximately 14 percent lower
for working women than for nonworkers and that the
abortion rate for working women is more than twice
that of nonworking women.
4. Rapid urbanization and low rates of invest-
ment in new housing have combined to create a chronic
housing shortage and, thereby, to depress the birth
rate. At the end of 1967, per capita living space
in the USSR was about 7 square meters (about 75
square feet) -- far less than the off '.cially desig-
nated minimum norm of 9 square meters and less than
half the available space per capita in Austria or
West Germany. Soviet couples often share one or two
room apartments with their children and relatives
and frequently must use communal kitchens and bath-
rooms. In the late 1950's a survey conducted among
Soviet women requesting abortion revealed that 14
percent of the respondents living in urban areas
listed inadequate housing as the reason for request-
ing the abortion.
5. The preference of many couples for small
families is supported by Soviet abortion and divorce
policies. Even though the government advocates pop-
ulation growth and provides free medical service,
child-care facilities, paid maternity leave, and
family allowance payments, its policy with respect
to abortion is liberal, and a divorce is relatively
easy to obtain. Any woman may have an abortion
performed at a state clinic for a nominal charge.
the number of abortions 25X1
in the USSR may even exceed the number of live births.
Soviet divorce law was liberalized in December 1965.
Provisions of the old law required petitioners for
divorce to publish their intentions, appear before
a people's court, undergo a "cooling off" period,
pay three separate fees, and finally appear before
a higher court for adjudication. The procedure was
not only lengthy but also costly and hampered by
bureaucratic delays. The 1965 amendment vested power
in the lower courts to dissolve marriages at their
own discretion, fees were reduced, and the time
involved in proceedings was cut to a few weeks. The
effect of the new law was a sharp increase in the
divorce rate -- from 1.6 per thousand persons in
1965 to 2.8 per thousand in 1966.
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6. No reversal in the downward trend of the
Soviet birth rate is expected in the near future.
Until the mid-1970's the number of women in the
prime child-bearing ages will remain at about the
current level but will become a smaller share of
the total population. Thus a reversal of the trend
in the birth rate would require a sharp increase in
fertility. Yet the influences that have caused
fertility to decline -- urbanization, a desire for
a higher standard of living, a housing shortage,
and a high rate of employment among women -- are
likely to continue and perhaps even to intensify
in the near future. For example, Soviet economists
currently believe that a nationwide labor shortage
exists and that a further expansion in the use of
women in the labor force will be required.
7. In contrast, the United States should ex-
perience a reversal in the downward trend of the
birth rate in the near future. In the United States
the number of women in the prime child-bearing ages
will increase by almost 40 percent by the mid-1970's
and will become an increasing share of total popu-
lation. Even if fertility declines, the very rapid
growth in the number of young women is likely to
cause the birth rate to increase.
Expressions of Concern
8. The first recent expression of public con-
cern over the falling birth rate came in 1966 when
V. Perevedentsev, a leading Soviet demographer,
stated that the birth rate was below optimum and
called for a program of demographic research.
Since then a number of other demographers have in-
dicated concern about the impact of the decline in
birth rate on the future supply of manpower and
about the decrease in the Soviet Union's share in
world population.
9. As yet, however, publicly expressed concern
over the sharp decline in the birth rate has been
confined to professionals. Indeed, other writers
have recently reemphasized the regime's policy of
permitting easy means of restricting family size.
For example, in an article opposing Pope Paul's
encyclical on birth control, a Soviet journalist
stated that "to deprive the present-day fam-Lly of
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the right to determine its size means encroaching
on the most important prerogatives." Moreover, the
Soviet Union has begun clinical testing of birth-
control pills of Soviet manufacture, suggesting
that the regime will continue to make means of birth
control available.
10. The failure to pay attention to the demog-
raphers is the latest example of the low opinion
of demography held by the Soviet government. The
problem, according to Perevedentsev, is that offi-
cials regard questions of population as "simpler
than a stewed turnip." Demography fell into dis-
favor in the Soviet Union in the late 1930's and,
following the unpublished population census of 1937,
most demographic institutes were closed. All formal
research and training of demographers was halted
in 1953 with the abolition of the last of the demo-
graphic institutes. The 1959 population census
represents the only effort since 1939 to gather
nationwide demographic data. Moreover, officials
refused to include in the 1959 census the questions
related to fertility that had been requested by
demographers in order to improve their population
forecasts.
11. Subsequently, official overestimation of
population growth dramatized the need for better
demographic data, and a small effort has been made
to improve the data base. In 1960 the Central
Statistical Administration estimated that the Soviet
population would be 250 million in 1970 and 280
million in 1980, whereas the population actually
will be about 8 million below the estimate for 1970
and perhaps 15 million below that for 1980. Although
the Central Statistical Administration later reduced
the 1980 estimate by 8 million, Perevedentsev con-
siders this to be only "current repairs, to be fol-
lowed by a major overhaul." To that end, the Central
Statistical Administration has recently conducted
"fertility surveys" to collect information concern-
ing child bearing (such as age of mother at birth
of each child), employment, income, and housing.
One such survey covered 250,000 urban families in
September 1967, and another covered 26,000 farm
families in March 1968. One Soviet demographer,
however, claims that a survey among two and one-half
to three million women is required to get adequate
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data on fertility. Nevertheless, these steps may
indicate the beginning of official concern over the
birth rate and portend a more respected position
for demography in the USSR.
Economic Implications
12. The decline in the birth rate provides the
Soviet Union with some short-term gains but also
suggests long-run problems. To the degree that
children constitute a smaller share of the total
population, demands on the nation's resources for
child-care facilities, schools, and some consumer
goods are lessened. In 1965, persons under 16 years
of age made up 33 percent of the population. By
1970 the share of youths will fall to 30 percent,
and even if the current level of fertility is main-
tained, the share will decline to 25 percent by
1980. Fewer children also mean less strain on the
supply of housing and facilitate the regime's efforts
to get women into the labor force.
13. In the long run, however, the declining birth
rate means that fewer persons will be coming of age
for work and for military service. Until 1976, when
those born in 1960 reach the legal minimum working
age of 16, the number of persons reaching working
age will increase somewhat each year. After 1976,
however, the number will drop until at least 1985,
causing a marked slowdown after 1980 in the annual
net increase in the number of persons of working
age (see Table 2). If the present fertility rate
(116) continues, the decline eventually will be
replaced by a slow upward trend.
14. Thus the declining birth rates of recent
years may portend some difficulties in meeting
civilian and military requirements for manpower.
In particular, the Soviet Union will likely find
it more difficult to carry out its current program
of rapidly expanding the consumer services sector
(retail trade, public dining, repair centers, and
the like), which are labor-intensive operations
with few opportunities for labor saving innovations.
However, the USSR had a much worse manpower problem
in the late 1950's and early 1960's when the smaller
numbers of persons born during World War II were
reaching working age. At that time the Soviet Union
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Table 2
Comparison of Soviet and US Labor Supply a/
;lected Years, 1960-85
Million Persons
1960 1965 1970
1975
1980
1985
New entrants b/
USSR 1.9 4.1 4.7
4.9
4.5
3.9
United States 2.8 3.5 3.9
Total population
of working age
4.2
4.1
3.9
USSR c/ 119.4 124.3 133.8
146.3
157.5
161.0
United States d/ 105.2 113.1 122.1
Average annual
change during
preceding 5-
year period
132.5
142.3
151.3
USSR .. 1.0 1.9
2.5
2.2
0.7
United States .. 1.6 1.8
2.1
2.0
1.8
a. -Midyear estimates.
b. Persons 16 years of age.
c. Males 16 to 59 years of age, females
d. Persons 16 to 65 years of age.
16 to
54.
augmented the supply of persons available for work
by reducing the size of the armed forces through a
series of demobilizations that freed military per-
sonnel for work in the civilian sector of the econ-
omy and reduced the military draft of youths; the
USSR also decreased the number of work-age youths
attending full-time schools and, via enforcement of
"anti-parasite" laws, induced more housewives to
take jobs. Today, with a smaller army, increased
emphasis on education, and a higher proportion of
women already employed, the Soviet Union would find
it more costly to mobilize supplementary sources of
manpower for the labor force. However, the supply
of agricultural population, traditionally a ready
source of manpower for industry and other urban
needs, is still great -- and it could be tapped in
the future if investment in labor saving devices on
the farm is stepped up.
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