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Directorate of
Intelligence
& &e-14 aiz7
for US Forces
Growth and Manipulation
of Antinuclear Sentiment
in East Asia: Consequences
Secret-
EA 86-10034
August 1986
Copy 2 6 0
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Directorate of
Intelligence
for US Forces
Growth and Manipulation
of Antinuclear Sentiment
in East Asia: Consequences
This paper was prepared by the Office of East
Asian Analysis, with contributions from the Office of
Soviet Analysis and the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service.
Secret
EA 86-10034
August 1986
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Growth and Manipulation
of Antinuclear Sentiment
in East Asia: Consequences
for US Forces
Summary A current of antinuclear sentiment exists throughout much of East Asia,
Information available but hotspots are largely confined to Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and
as of 15 July 1986 was the small island countries of the South Pacific. Opponents of nuclear
used in this report.
weaponry and/or nuclear power are also active elsewhere in East Asia, but
as yet their activities have brought them neither a strong public following
nor influence over government policy.
The Soviets, under General Secretary Gorbachev, are paying increased
attention to East Asia and the Pacific and are working especially to fan
antinuclear sentiments in order to drive a wedge between the United States
and its allies. The Soviets, encouraged by antinuclear activism in East
Asia, are espousing interlocking nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific,
North Asia, and Southeast Asia, and are urging countries in the region to
adopt policies that would diminish US influence and military presence in
the Pacific
We believe antinuclear attitudes will remain strong in East Asia, especially
in the South Pacific, and will complicate US defense arrangements and
initiatives in the region. We expect the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone
Treaty to be formally adopted later this year, and we believe that other
Asian countries, including China and the Soviet Union, will support the
treaty and agree to its protocols. We also expect the antinuclear policies of
the Lange government in New Zealand to culminate in legislation that
prohibits port calls by nuclear-powered or nuclear-capable warships. In
addition:
? We believe that a few of the small South Pacific island states will follow
New Zealand's lead and restrict the transit and port access of nuclear
warships, but those states favorably inclined toward the United States
and the Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty (ANZUS) will be
reluctant to ban port calls because it would hurt ANZUS.
? The leaders of Australia's ruling Labor Party are committed to support-
ing ANZUS and should be able to hold the line on US ship visits and the
use of strategically important joint facilities over the next year or two. If
the leftist faction were to become the majority in the Labor Party,
however, it could force the leaders to restrict ship visits and close the joint
facilities.
Secret
EA 86-10034
August 1986
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Secret
? We believe Japan will remain a steadfast ally firmly committed to the
Mutual Security Treaty and to helping the United States maintain a
strong defense posture in the western Pacific opposite the Soviet Union.
We see little likelihood that antinuclear opposition parties will achieve
the consensus to force the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to change its
policies and restrict US military access to Japanese bases or ports.
? In our view, there is relatively little risk to US access to military bases in
South Korea. We expect North Korea to continue its propaganda
condemning the United States for deploying nuclear weapons in South
Korea and urging southerners to demand their removal. Some radical
South Korean students have echoed North Korea's anti-US and antinu-
clear themes, but few southerners support the extremists.
? We believe Chinese sensitivity to nuclear issues will restrict US and
allied warship visits to Chinese ports, although the Chinese have agreed
- after protracted negotiations - to a UK ship visit in July, and they
continue to discuss with US officials the possibility of a US port call. In
neighboring Hong Kong, the nascent antinuclear movement poses little
immediate threat to US port calls, but Hong Kong's policy is likely to be
more restrictive in 1997, when the Chinese assume responsibility for the
territory's defense and foreign policy.
? We see relatively little danger to US interests from antinuclear move-
ments in Southeast Asia. President Aquino has said she will hold a
popular referendum on the US-Philippines agreement before it expires in
1991, and this could result in a public airing of the issues of nuclear war-
ship basing and weapons storage in the Philippines. Aquino sees advan-
tages to the continued US presence and would be reluctant to terminate
the basing arrangements. We see little prospect for a nuclear-free zone in
Southeast Asia soon, although Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) members will continue to explore the possibility of a regional
zone.
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AntinuclearHotspots
1
Australia
Southeast Asia
8
Hong Kong
10
Soviet Manipulation of Antinuclear Issues
11
Soviet Policy in East Asia
12
Australia-New Zealand
12
Japan
13
Consequences for US Forces
16
Most Likely Scenario
16
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Secret
Policymakers and military planners are concerned
about regional antinuclear attitudes because the Pa-
cific Basin has become increasingly important to the
United States in both strategic and economic terms.
Vital sea lanes through the region carry both raw
materials and manufactured goods; commerce be-
tween the United States and Pacific Basin countries
now exceeds that between the United States and
Western Europe. The faster economic growth rate in
this area is likely to widen this trade gap, making
East Asia even more important in the future.
To protect its East Asian interests and balance
growing Soviet military power in the Pacific, the
United States maintains air, ground, and naval forces
at large overseas bases
reaties with Austra ia,
New Zealand, and Thailand provide access to mili-
tary facilities in those countries as well, and US
naval ships frequently make port calls at Singapore,
Hong Kong, and other East Asian ports. US forces
serve as a deterrent and provide a security umbrella
for the United States, its allies, and other friendly
East Asian countries.
Together the bases and ports serve as steppingstones
across the Pacific and provide the logistic support
necessary for the United States to react to crises and
project military power to trouble spots throughout
East Asia, the Pacific Basin, and the Indian Ocean.
The US bases at Subic Bay and Clark in the Philip-
pines serve as the hub of this network, linking bases
in Hawaii, Japan, and Australia as well as the Indian
and Pacific Oceans. Access to the overseas bases and
joint facilities are critical elements in sustaining US
military mobility and deployments in Asia. They
enable the monitoring of Sovi-
et and other potentially hostile forces, and contribute
to the combat effectiveness as well as interoperability
among US and allied forces.
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Growth and Manipulation
of Antinuclear Sentiment
in East Asia: Consequences
for US Forces
East Asian political leaders, concerned about the
continuing superpower arms race and nuclear prolif-
eration, are actively debating measures to reduce the
nuclear danger to their countries and the region.
Politicians in South Pacific and Southeast Asian
countries, for example, are considering the creation of
regional nuclear-free zones as a way of responding to
concerns over nuclear testing, nuclear waste disposal,
the possibility of nuclear accidents, and the stationing
of nuclear weapons in the region.' In addition to these
multilateral arrangements, some politicians are advo-
cating national policies that would prohibit or restrict
the deployment or storage of nuclear weapons and ban
visits by nuclear warships or overflights by aircraft
carrying such weapons
These antinuclear proposals have implications for US
security interests in East Asia. The United States in
the past has opposed the establishment of a nuclear-
free zone in the South Pacific because it could
constrain US naval operations in that region, and the
United States also has resisted a nuclear-free zone for
Southeast Asia because it could adversely affect US
military activities and possibly transit through strate-
gically important sea lanes in the region. Because of
its policy of neither confirming nor denying the
presence of nuclear weapons on its warships, the
United States also opposes other countries' national
policies that would limit US port calls to nonnuclear
warships.
The Soviet Union has shown heightened interest in
East Asia, and we believe it sees the antinuclear
sentiment as an issue it can exploit to reduce US
influence and military presence in the region. The
Soviets support nuclear-free zones in East Asia as a
way of demonstrating their peaceful intentions, while
sowing dissension among Western countries by foster-
ing resentment against the United States for "for-
cing" nuclear weapons on its allies and friends.
Antinuclear sentiment in East Asia has its roots in the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Au-
gust 1945 and has been sustained by US nuclear
testing in the South Pacific from the 1940s to the
1960s, by US and Japanese plans to dump nuclear
wastes in the Pacific, by the continuing US-Soviet
strategic arms race and proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons, and by continuing French nuclear testing in
Polynesia. Support for the antinuclear causes stems
from concern over the potentially harmful effects of
radiation caused by atomic tests or leaked from
nuclear-powered warships. The growth of nuclear
arsenals and the deployment of nuclear weapons in
East Asia also have aroused fears of a nuclear
exchange between the superpowers.
The current of antinuclear sentiment running through
East Asia and the Pacific Basin has hotspots in New
Zealand, Australia, the South Pacific, and Japan. The
approval of a draft treaty for a nuclear-free zone by
the South Pacific Forum last August, New Zealand's
banning of nuclear-armed or -propelled warships from
its ports, and the recent reversal of Japan's decision to
dump nuclear wastes in the Pacific are the clearest
manifestations of the growing sensitivity of political
leaders to antinuclear attitudes.'
2 The South Pacific Forum members include Australia, the Cook
Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New 25X1
Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and West-
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Table 1
New Zealand: Public Opinion
Poll in March 1985 on
Defense and Nuclear Issues
Support ban on nuclear weapons
entering New Zealand
52
41 -
7
Support ban on nuclear-powered
warships visiting New Zealand
ports
77
19
4
Believe United States treating New
Zealand fairly after ban on
US ship visit
38
53
Believe United States would aid
New Zealand if it were attacked
69
17
14
New Zealand
Antinuclear forces are particularly strong in New
Zealand, where sensitivities developed following US
hydrogen bomb tests at Bikini Atoll in the 1950s.
Three out of four parties participating in New Zea-
land's general election of July 1984 ran on platforms
that included antinuclear planks-and won 60 percent
of the vote. The Labor Party, with its strong antinu-
clear bias, was swept into power, and the popularity of
its new Prime Minister, David Lange, surged after he
refused in February 1985 to allow the nuclear-capable
destroyer USS Buchanan to enter New Zealand ports.
Lange and his Cabinet frequently cite election statis-
tics, as well as public opinion polls, to claim that the
Labor Party would lose the next election if it failed to
write into law its policy of denying port access to
warships believed to be carrying nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Warship Ban. We believe the present Labor
government cannot be deterred from passing antinu-
clear legislation that, in its judgment, will be stiff
enough to prevent any ship carrying nuclear weapons
from entering New Zealand ports. Officials have
hinted that New Zealand might allow nuclear-
powered ships to visit, but US Embassy sources
believe the government will not change the legislation
to allow nuclear-powered ships that have received
safety clearances to visit New Zealand. New Zealand
will accept only small "nonnuclear" ships.
In August 1985, at the South Pacific Forum's annual
conference, a majority of the 13 member nations
approved a draft South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone
Treaty that bans nuclear testing, waste dumping, and
weapons stationing in the region but guarantees un-
impeded transit of nuclear powered and nuclear-
armed ships on the high seas and allows individual
countries to decide on the question of port access.
Australian Prime Minister Hawke took the lead in
formulating the draft treaty to preempt more radical
elements from barring nuclear-armed or -powered
warships from all ports in the zone, to fulfill a
campaign pledge, to quiet antinuclear elements in his
Labor. Party, to protect the joint defense facilities in
Australia, and to maintain Australian leadership in
the South Pacific against a more radical treaty.
The New Zealand Government joined Australia in
promoting the treaty in its present form-against the
wishes of the Labor Party left wing and other domes-
tic antinuclear groups that believed the treaty should
prohibit nuclear-armed and -powered ships through-
out the region. The treaty forms a part of New
Zealand's proposed antinuclear legislation, but that
legislation is much more restrictiveV____-]
Several of the smaller island nations-Fiji, the Cook
Islands, and Papua New Guinea-expressed reserva-
tions in August that the treaty might undercut re-
gional security by restricting US and ANZUS activi-
ty in the region. Vanuatu, on the other hand, believes
the treaty does not limit nuclear activities strictly
enough. The treaty goes into effect when eight Forum
members ratify it. To date four have ratified the
treaty, and others are expected to do so later this
year. A Forum delegation recently visited the nuclear
powers-the USSR, China, France, the United King-
dom, and the United States to elicit their support for
the draft treaty and adherence to its protocols. The
USSR and China have expressed agreement with the
treaty.
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Figure 1
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
Limit of South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
Fiji South Pacific Forum member
Indian
Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
,r^^ Japan
New
Zealand
,~~ B P a; CO ~ 4 6
Vuvalu
?ztevn' American
arioa, Samoa a
. (U.S.)
COOKY
Oala td~
Vo rya .' Niue (P.Z.)
Pitcairn
Islands a
a Participation by France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States subject
to their accession to Protocol I of Treaty.
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According to a longtime US Embassy contact, more-
over, the impasse between the United States and New
Zealand over port access is having a psychological
effect on many Labor Party members that is harmful
to US interests: many who have never before ex-
pressed anti-Americanism now see the United States
as their opponent over the nuclear issue, and they may
ultimately join longtime anti-West activists in sup-
porting proposals that New Zealand withdraw from
the Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty
(ANZUS) and become nonaligned
New Government? On the basis of our analysis of
public opinion polls and interviews with New
Zealanders, we believe Lange correctly assesses the
pervasive antinuclear sentiment of his countrymen.
We are, however, less certain about his chances of
reelection. A combination of disgruntlement with the
economy and disaffection for Lange's policies over the
longer term might unseat the Labor Party at the next
election, which must be held by mid-1987. The Labor
Party's popularity has dropped over the past year
largely because of economic difficulties, while the
opposition National Party has gained strength al-
though it still trails Labor in public opinion surveys.
National Party leaders are strong supporters of
ANZUS and have stated that they would repeal
pending New Zealand legislation banning nuclear
ships. The outcome of the 1987 election is likely to
hinge on the state of the economy at the time of the
election. We believe the economy will begin to recover
in mid-1987, but that may not be soon enough to
ensure a Labor Party victory.
Australia
Antinuclear sentiment is nearly as strong in neighbor-
ing Australia, but Australians are more conscious of
their country as part of the world community and less
open to isolationist solutions. Australia's ruling Labor
Party took the lead-in part to fulfill an election
promise but also to preclude more radical initiatives-
in drafting the regional nuclear-free treaty that was
approved by the South Pacific Forum last August.
Australia welcomed the USS Buchanan, refused by
New Zealand, and a sister ship to Sydney and
Brisbane during March 1985, but antinuclear demon-
strators have protested later visits by US warships.
We believe that antinuclearism is gaining strength in
Australia. Reports of fewer participants at antinucle-
ar rallies and protests in Australia against US ship
visits are more than offset by the fact that more rallies
and protests are being staged and more voters are
supporting the single-issue antinuclear parties. Ac-
cording to the US Embassy in Canberra, the propor-
tion of antinuclear voters is increasing, and a recent
USIA survey shows that Australian voter support for
US ship visits and Australian-US joint facilities is
declining in comparison with earlier polls.
Domestic Politics. Labor Party moderates believe
they must appear to respond to the demands of their
left wing while maintaining Australia's defense alli-
ance with the United States. They argue that quali-
fied support for peace movements is a necessity for
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staying in office, not only because it keeps factions
unified, but also because it prevents attrition to the
single-issue antinuclear or peace parties. Labor Party
support for the annual Palm Sunday Peace Marches,
which draw hundreds of thousands, for instance, has
become obligatory.
Foreign Minister Hayden is committed to arms con-
trol and disarmament talks and believes that the
South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty drafted by
Australia is an important step toward halting the
strategic arms race. When speaking with US officials,
however, Hayden always phrases his concerns in
terms of internal Labor politics-that is, unless party
moderates can show the Australian public movement
by the United States in arms control negotiations with
the Soviets, they cannot hope to save the party from
leftist control. Hayden is probably right. In our view
many members of his own center-left faction would
join the socialist-left faction in opposing cooperation
with the United States if they lost faith in US arms
control efforts. Leftists espouse restricting US aircraft
and naval visits, closing the strategically important
joint facilities, and adopting defense policies that
would limit Australia's participation in ANZUS.
South Pacific Island States
Virtually all South Pacific island states have strong
antinuclear constituencies, and nine of the 13 Forum
members approved the draft treaty establishing a
regional nuclear-free zone. Some of the small states
A 11 J1 TAI Ok
WAVA MO
WIN
M-1 411911
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oppose US naval visits while others would welcome
them. Vanuatu has banned all nuclear ship visits, and
Fiji, which is generally friendly toward the United
States, temporarily banned US nuclear ships several
years ago. Papua New Guinea and the Solomons have
no clear policy, approving nuclear warship visits on a
case-by-case basis. Kiribati is receptive to convention-
ally powered ships visits, but might balk at a port call
by a nuclear-powered warship. Although the Cook
Islands have ratified the treaty, Prime Minister Davis
has criticized New Zealand's ship ban policy, claim-
ing that it strips away the security provided by the
ANZUS alliance.
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Table 2
Australia: Public Opinion Survey
in December 1985 on
Defense and Nuclear Issues a
Support visits by nuclear-powered 53 (55) 33 (30) 14(15)
US warships to Australian ports
Believe benefits of joint
Australian-US facilities
outweigh added risks
Support United States over New 27 (35)
Zealand in current ANZUS
dispute
Antinuclear activism is fueled by the University of the
South Pacific in Fiji, where the influence of radical
faculty members, including Australian and New Zea-
land expatriates, is very strong. The university has
long supported antinuclear causes and last October
used its annual Pacific Week Conference as a forum
to criticize both the United States and France for
their nuclear activities in the South Pacific, while
defending the Soviet Union's purported peace and
antinuclear record. Several speakers argued that it is
the United States and not the Soviet Union that poses
a threat to the South Pacific, and that there would be
no danger of a Soviet attack on the region were it not
for US facilities there.
Antinuclear sentiment in the South Pacific is directed
primarily against the French because of their nuclear
weapons tests in Polynesia, but the United States also
gets its share of criticism for failing to condemn the
French tests. Paris's announced plans to conduct
atomic tests through the rest of this century; its
disregard for regional environmental, economic, and
foreign policy concerns; and France's involvement in
the sinking of the Greenpeace protest vessel Rainbow
Warrior in New Zealand last year have sharpened
South Pacific objections to the French nuclear pro-
gram specifically and to nuclear programs in general.
South Pacific islanders argue that if nuclear tests are
in fact harmless, France should conduct them at
home.
Japan
Japanese nuclear sensitivity understandably arises
from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
August 1945. The Japanese have developed an in-
grained antinuclear feeling, although popular support
for antinuclear issues has waxed and waned over the
past 40 years. Unlike the South Pacific islanders, the
Japanese public tends to differentiate between nuclear
weapons and nuclear power. Despite initial public
resistance, Japan is now committed to an ambitious
nuclear power program and has not been deterred by
minor accidents at its nuclear plants.' As for nuclear
weapons, the Japanese Government has always been
careful to accommodate public sentiment by fine-
tuning its nuclear policies and occasionally modifying
its security arrangements with the United States:
? US plans to introduce nuclear-tipped Honest John
tactical missiles into Japan in the mid-1950s led to a
strong antinuclear reaction that forced the govern-
ment to seek a compromise in which the missiles
would be accepted, but only if they carried conven-
tional warheads. The Japanese Government later
revised the Mutual Security Treaty to require the
United States to conduct "prior consultation" with
Japan before making significant changes in the
equipment of US forces in Japan-meaning intro-
ducing nuclear weapons.
? Port calls by nuclear-powered US warships begin-
ning in 1964 helped rally support for antinuclear
elements seeking to harness public opinion and gain
political ground against the ruling Liberal Demo-
cratic Party. This led the conservative government
of Prime Minister Sato to adopt in 1967 its so-called
three nonnuclear principles-that Japan will neither
manufacture, possess, nor permit the entry of nucle-
ar weapons.
' During the past 20 years, the Japanese have- experienced numer-
ous accidents at their nuclear plants. The latest occurred in June
1986, when an American and Japanese inspection team was
exposed to low-level radiation at the Tokaimura nuclear research
center northeast of Tokyo. Tokaimura has had many radiation
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Table 3
Japan: Public Attitudes in
November 1984 on
Nuclear Issues
Support US warship visits and 37 47
possible entry of nuclear weapons
Believe Japanese Government 22 65
abiding by policy prohibiting
entry of nuclear weapons
Believe United States adheres to 19 65 16
Japan's nuclear principles
? Former Ambassador Reischauer's statement in a
1981 press interview that US warships armed with
nuclear weapons had transited Japanese ports for
decades with Tokyo's knowledge and tacit approval
unleashed a political storm in Japan.' Then Prime
Minister Suzuki denied Reischauer's charges and
asserted that "introduction" unquestionably includ-
ed not only the stationing of US nuclear weapons on
Japanese territory but also base visits by US war-
ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, which
would require prior consultations. Suzuki said that
his government would reject any US request for a
nuclear-armed warship to enter a Japanese port-
even in an emergency-and claimed that the US
and Japanese Governments had no differences in
interpretation of these points.
Current Attitudes. We believe antinuclear sentiment
in Japan is waning as reflected by changes in public
opinion polls, the dwindling size of demonstrations
that occur when US naval ships visit Japanese ports,
the tone of ceremonies surrounding the 40th anniver-
sary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and
the discrediting of the peace movement because of the
US forces are granted the use of bases in Japan under the Mutual
Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement. To allay
public concern that the United States might bring nuclear weapons
into Japan, Tokyo insisted that the 1960 treaty revision incorporate
an exchange of notes committing Washington to consult with
Tokyo before introducing nuclear weapons. Neither government
spelled out whether "introduction" referred to transit of US
warships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or only to station-
continuing battle between the Japan Socialist Party
(JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) for
entirely different matters. Tokyo held it could not
reject a port call simply because a ship had the
capability of carrying nuclear weapons, as long as
Washington had not requested prior consultations.
control of Japanese antinuclear organizations.
Socialists and Communists. Opposition parties and
their ancillary organizations, such as leftwing labor
unions, are the primary organizations incorporating in
their platforms antinuclear policies that can be used
to attack the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and
increase their own political power. The JCP has tried
to revive its flagging grassroots support through local
protests against US deployment of Tomahawk cruise
missiles, but has failed to kindle popular interest in
this issue. Anti-Tomahawk protests staged outside the
Yokosuka and Sasebo naval bases each time a US
naval ship or submarine carrying Tomahawks arrives
have turned out few demonstrators and the marches
have been peaceful.
The JSP has remained staunchly antinuclear and has
long supported a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific. The
Socialists want a neutral Japan, lack confidence in
mutual nuclear deterrence, and claim that Japan's
defense alliance with the United States could result in
a Soviet preemptive strike. Disagreements between
the party's right and left wings have, however, hin-
dered the JSP's ability to press antinuclear issues at
home, and the Socialists have fared no better interna-
tionally. A visit by JSP Chairman Ishibashi to New
Zealand and Australia earlier this year to solidify
policies only resulted in highlighting differences be-
tween the Japanese Socialists and their New Zealand
and Australian counterparts.
Port-Call Issue. Faced with criticism in 1984 over the
scheduled deployment of nuclear-capable Tomahawk
cruise missiles to US 7th Fleet ships home ported in
Japan, the Japanese Government argued that the
ability to carry nuclear weapons and the question of
whether nuclear weapons were actually on board were
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Japan's port-call policies were debated anew last year
as a result of New Zealand's nonnuclear policy and its
refusal to permit a US warship to make a port call. To
keep their antinuclear platforms before the public,
both the JCP and the JSP suggested that Japan follow
New Zealand's lead. In an effort in mid-February
1985 to provoke the government to respond in the
Diet, a JSP spokesman asked whether Japan could
legally initiate prior consultations under the Security
Treaty or perhaps use its own data to determine
whether US ships visiting Japanese ports were carry-
ing nuclear weapons.
Tokyo responded by having Foreign Minister Abe and
other senior officials reiterate the government's posi-
tion. They asserted that, in contrast to the ANZUS
pact, the Mutual Security Treaty obligates Washing-
ton to seek prior consultation with Tokyo if nuclear
weapons are introduced into Japan. Moreover, the
treaty requires Japan to permit US ships to visit
Japanese ports, and Japan cannot reject such ship
visits unless they become a subject of prior consulta-
tions. Finally, because Washington has not requested
prior consultation and the security relationship is
based on trust, Tokyo assumes the United States has
not violated its obligation.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The relatively low-key
40th anniversary observances in August 1985 of the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki indicate these
historically important events have lost much of their
significance as rallying points for antinuclear activi-
ties. Although the ceremonies received considerable
attention from international media, they failed to stir
emotions in Japan. The moderate tone of the Hiroshi-
ma ceremony, the decision of major antinuclear
groups to exclude disruptive elements, and the fact
that local Japanese media attention ceased when the
ceremonies moved to Nagasaki indicate the decline in
''iL 1985- 1~
Figure 5. Some of the marchers who took part in
the antinuclear ceremonies at Nagasaki, Japan,
military operations. For example, in Southeast Asia,
where US air and naval bases in the Philippines sit
astride critically important sea lanes passing through
narrow chokepoints, nuclear issues are beginning to
receive greater attention, with several member coun-
tries of ASEAN expressing renewed interest in form-
ing their own nuclear-free zone. A nuclear-free zone
here accompanied by restrictive policies similar to
those of New Zealand would severely limit US capa-
bilities in both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.
importance of these events.
Antinuclear feeling is not nearly so intense or wide-
spread elsewhere in East Asia, but it is becoming a
politically important issue in China, Hong Kong, the
Koreas, and Southeast Asia and could affect US
Southeast Asia
The Philippines. There is little public expression of
antinuclear sentiment in the Philippines, and anti-
nuclear issues are not a pressing problem for the
Aquino government. The Communist Party of the
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Philippines, however, apparently sees the antinuclear
issue as exploitable. In 1985 the Communists orga-
nized a march and demonstration against the Bataan
Nuclear Power Plant that attracted about 20,000
marchers and halted traffic and business activity in
Bataan for several days. The Communists have long
advocated the removal of the US military presence
from the Philippines and may now be focusing atten-
tion on banning US nuclear warships and weapons.
The Communists probably had a hand in organizing
the antinuclear demonstration on 30 June 1986 by
400 protestors outside the Subic Bay naval base. The
marchers, who included disgruntled shipyard workers,
demanded the removal of US bases, nuclear weapons,
and nuclear warships, claiming that they make the
Philippines a target for nuclear attack.
President Aquino has not championed antinuclear
causes and evidently is committed to retaining US
bases.
meeting with New Zealand Prime Minister Lange,
Aquino refused to take a position on the nuclear ship
ban issue, stressing instead the longstanding close ties
between the Philippines and the United States.
Several of Aquino's leftist advisers, however, have
been urging her to take a stronger stand on anti-
nuclear issues. The Aquino government has been
considering halting construction at Bataan because of
economic as well as safety reasons, and press report-
ing indicates it has now decided not to proceed with
the plant in view of the disaster at Chernobyl'. If the
Communists succeed in generating increased public
enthusiasm for barring nuclear power and nuclear
weapons from the Philippines, leftist pressure on
Aquino to adopt antinuclear platforms probably will
increase. Negotiations over US basing rights in the
Philippines could be especially difficult if the Philip-
pine Government chooses to address the question of
weapons storage at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay.
selves to champion nuclear and disarmament issues in
both regional and international-especially Third
World-forums. President Soeharto frequently stress-
es superpower disarmament and nuclear arms control
issues in his speeches, and Foreign Minister Mochtar
has long sought international support for Indonesia's
proposed nuclear-weapons-free zone.
Mochtar is heartened by the South 2 Al
Pacific antinuclear treaty and may redouble his ef-
forts to promote an ASEAN version.
Indonesian leaders recognize, however, that they will
have to build a greater consensus both domestically
and within ASEAN before they can make substantial
gains toward their antinuclear goals. Senior Indone-
sian military officers, for example, oppose the
nuclear-free-zone concept, and authorities in other
ASEAN capitals are similarly skeptical. Indonesian
diplomats and defense officials concede that a region-
al nuclear-weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia is a
long-term objective that would have to accommodate
Thai and Philippine defense ties to the United States
and could not unilaterally restrict passage of nuclear
warships.
Malaysia. Malaysia in 1971 proposed a "zone of
peace, freedom, and neutrality" (ZOPFAN) for
Southeast Asia and has continued to support antiwar
and antinuclear issues as a matter of policy. There is
no organized antinuclear movement in Malaysia, but
Malaysian officials continue to talk about establishing
a regional nuclear-free zone.
=the Malaysians see the South Pacific treaty as a
model that could be used to make Southeast Asia a
nuclear-free zone.
China
China, too, is becoming sensitive to nuclear issues but
has adopted policies on nuclear-free zones and nuclear
warship visits that appear to be deliberately ambigu-
ous. To burnish its international image, Beijing re-
cently announced that it would stop atmospheric
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Secret
testing of nuclear devices. Chinese officials have
taken contradictory positions in public and in private
on the nuclear-free-zone issue-the Chinese seem to
be pursuing the conflicting goals of enhancing their
status with nonaligned states while reassuring the
United States that China wants good relations
the contradictions also
reflect differences within the leadership over policy.
The Chinese have publicly supported the South Pacif-
ic nuclear-free zone. Privately, however, Chinese res-
ervations about provisions in the treaty that ban
nuclear testing and call for nonproliferation were
conveyed by Foreign Ministry official Li Changhe to
the South Pacific Forum delegation that visited
Beijing in January 1986. China tested an unarmed
intercontinental-range ballistic missile in the South
Pacific in 1980, and China sympathizes with France's
desire to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent,
which involves continuing nuclear testing in the South
Pacific.
Ship Visit Policy. Chinese media and officials have
publicly expressed support for New Zealand's ban on
port calls by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed war-
ships. Since Wellington's action, Beijing has adopted
a similar policy, which led to the refusal to allow
French warships to visit Qingdao in January 1986.
During his recent visit to Australia, Vice Foreign
Minister Zhu Qizhen emphasized that China had
arrived at its policy independently and New Zealand's
action had not been a factor.
To assuage the United States, however, other Chinese
officials privately have expressed regrets over the
cancellation of the US port call. Even Vice Foreign
Minister Zhu has indicated that China hoped the
United States could resolve its problems within AN-
ZUS because the Chinese believe only the Soviet
Union stands to benefit from differences between the
United States and its allies. They fear the United
States may be forced to reduce its naval forces in the
region, weakening US ability to counter the Soviet
naval buildup in the Pacific.
States. In meetings with US officials, Chinese mili-
tary officers have expressed concern that Beijing's
decision to demand assurances that visiting US ships
not be nuclear armed could prompt the United States
to restrict China's access to US military technology.
The fact that the Chinese recently allowed a British
naval ship visit indicates that a US naval port call is
not a dead issue. We believe the Chinese military may
press for renewed negotiations on a US ship visit and
will argue for arrangements comparable to those used
with the British.
Hong Kong
Antinuclear activities could become a problem in
Hong Kong. The antinuclear movement in Hong
Kong, aroused by the Chernobyl' disaster, has intensi-
fied its opposition to China's construction of the Daya
Bay nuclear power plant 50 kilometers north of the
territory. Antinuclear demonstrators claim to have
collected 700,000 signatures opposing the project.
Beijing's cautious reaction to the protestors shows its
increased skill in handling local issues and an im-
proved understanding of how it must act to maintain
stability and confidence in Hong Kong.
China asked its supporters
in the colony to reassure Hong Kong residents of the
plant's safety; Beijing acknowledged that public as-
surances from Chinese officials might cause an ad-
verse reaction. The United Kingdom will attempt to
squelch the protests because it is providing the plant's
turbines.
There also is opposition in Hong Kong to nuclear
weapons. Pacifists argue that Hong Kong could be-
come a nuclear target in a conflict involving the
Soviet Union, the United States, China, and the
United Kingdom, and they recommend working for
disarmament and a nuclear-free world while opposing
nuclear warship visits because such visits make Hong
Kong a potential target. We can envision few circum-
stances in which British authorities would stop US
port calls, but, with Hong Kong reverting to Chinese
control in 1997, the question of ship visits could
become part of the larger Chinese sovereignty issue.
The Chinese seek Western military technology to
modernize their forces and they recognize that access
depends on fostering good bilateral ties to the United
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We would expect Hong Kong's policy to be consistent
with the mainland's and therefore probably more
restrictive of future US naval visits.
Korea
There has been little antinuclear activity on the
Korean Peninsula, but South Korean students protest-
ing against the Chun government are increasingly
carrying placards that call for removing nuclear
weapons from the South and making the country a
nuclear-free zone. In our judgment, most South Kore-
ans are more concerned about the North Korean
military threat and believe that US forces based in
South Korea are needed to deter the North.
The North Koreans, however, try to use the issue to
foment domestic opposition in the South and pressure
the United States to reduce its arsenal. North Korea
has long made an issue of US nuclear weapons in
South Korea, portraying the US presence as a danger
to the people of the South. The North routinely
argues that the effects of a nuclear war cannot be
confined to north of the 38th parallel, while intimat-
ing that the use of nuclear weapons based in South
Korea would invite a retaliatory nuclear strike. It
demands the withdrawal of these weapons and has for
many years called for the Korean Peninsula to be
made a nuclear-free zone. The North Korean propa-
ganda appears to have hit a responsive chord with
radical students in the South. According to the US
Embassy in Seoul, student extremists are using anti-
US and antinuclear themes that bear a close resem-
blance to North Korean propaganda.
Pyongyang-Moscow Ties. In the past year or so, the
nuclear question has also provided a convenient means
for P'yongyang both to strengthen its ties to Moscow
and to signal its broader foreign policy realignment
toward the Soviet Union. North Korea has publicly
supported Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals. Fol-
lowing the US-Soviet Geneva summit last year,
P'yongyang suggested that US policy on Korea would
be one indication of Washington's intentions to follow
through on principles agreed on at the summit. North
Korea even hinted that future US-Soviet summit talks
might directly discuss the Korean issue. Moscow, in
turn, has noted that the North Korean approach is
complementary to its own. In a joint communique
issued after Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to
P'yongyang in January 1986 and in a TASS state-
ment in early February, the Soviet Union asserted
that implementation of North Korean proposals for
the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons and troops
from Korea and for turning the Korean Peninsula into
a nuclear-free zone would be in the spirit of the
accords reached in Geneva last year.
Political Trade-Off. We believe P'yongyang has used
its support for Soviet nuclear initiatives to attract help
from Moscow for its nuclear power industry. The
Soviets have agreed to provide at least one nuclear
power plant. But North Korea has had to pay a price
for this support-last December it signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at Moscow's behest.
P'yongyang's reluctance to accede to the NPT is
evidenced by its failure to acknowledge this develop-
ment publicly. Its decision to do so reflects its increas-
ing dependence on Soviet economic and military
support, providing Moscow with a public relations
windfall of having convinced a recalcitrant Asian
power to join the nonproliferation regime.
Soviet Manipulation of
Antinuclear Issues
Moscow is working hard to fan antinuclear sentiment
in East Asia in order to drive a wedge between the
United States and its allies. The Soviets are employ-
ing propaganda and traditional means of influence
peddling, such as giving favorable media treatment to
regional calls for nuclear-free zones and cultivating
local labor unions through the Soviet-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In addi-
tion, the Soviets, under General Secretary Gorbachev,
have attached greater importance to projecting a
more favorable image in the region.
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Soviet Policy in East Asia
Gorbachev launched his new diplomatic offensive last
May when he called for the convening of an all-Asian
security forum.' In this he is pursuing two objectives:
obtaining recognition of the USSR as a major politi-
cal player as well as a military power in East Asia,
and limiting the influence of the United States.6
Topics suggested for discussion at the forum include
major themes the Soviets are promoting in their
antinuclear campaign:
? Withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and the
establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean
Peninsula.
? Reduction of US naval activity in the Indian and
Pacific Oceans.
? Establishment of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia.
? Establishment of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone.
? Fuller exploitation of antiwar and antinuclear senti-
ment.
Vietnam and Laos have dutifully promoted Gorba-
chev's security proposal, but non-Communist coun-
tries have given it a lukewarm response. Nonetheless,
the Soviets have reason to be encouraged by the
growing antinuclear movement in New Zealand, Aus-
tralia, and the South Pacific. Moscow is in an espe-
cially good position to capitalize on pacifist sentiments
because of its longstanding support of leftists and
Communists in the New Zealand and Australian
labor unions. Soviet efforts are also helped by the fact
that the Soviet military buildup and modernization
have not extended to the South Pacific. Consequently,
many South Pacific islanders do not view the Soviets
as militarily threatening.
The Soviets are carefully nurturing antinuclear senti-
ment in Australia and New Zealand through propa-
ganda, all-expenses-paid trips to the Soviet Union for
trade union members, and sponsorship of antinuclear
'Gorbachev's proposal is the fifth in a series of similar Soviet-
sponsored initiatives going back to Brezhnev's call in 1969 for the
"creation of a system of collective security in Asia."E:::::::::::
seminars and conferences by their front groups. Ac-
cording to Embassy reporting, the Soviets work pri-
marily through indigenous Communist groups. Al-
though total party membership in Australia and New
Zealand is small, the Communists have considerable
clout in the trade unions, and with Moscow's assis-
tance have been active in promoting causes that
parallel Soviet lines. The Soviets have longstanding
ties to well-placed political radicals who can substan-
tially affect labor's nuclear policy.
Front Connections. The Soviets use their Communist
contacts to arrange for Australian and New Zealand
socialists to travel to the USSR. Embassy reporting
indicates Moscow has been especially successful in
using this technique to cultivate high-level members
of New Zealand's Federation of Labor, including
Secretary-Treasurer Kenneth Douglas, Vice President
Sonja Davies, and President James Knox. Although
professing to be anti-Communist, Knox has long been
affiliated with the WFTU and, over the past year, he
has worked hard to promote Soviet positions on
nuclear issues.
Another Soviet front group-the World Peace Coun-
cil-tries to promote antinuclear sentiment in Austra-
lia. Last October it sponsored the International Peace
Conference for the Pacific and Asia Region in Syd-
ney. The conference represented a well-orchestrated
attack on US foreign and defense policies. Several
speakers alleged that the US nuclear bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not necessary because
Japan was already on the verge of surrendering and
US intelligence knew it. These forums allow Moscow
to promote political initiatives such as antinuclear and
anti-American concerns while providing Soviet front
leaders an opportunity to travel to the area.
The Soviets have limited access to the South Pacific
island states but are stepping up their efforts to
establish a political as well as a commercial presence
in the region. Changing circumstances, especially
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economic problems in the region, have provided Mos-
cow with a better chance for expanded influence than
at any other time since the island states gained
independence in the mid-1970s. The Soviets have a
fishing agreement with Kiribati, and recent Embassy
reporting suggests there is a good chance that current
talks will result in similar Soviet agreements with
Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and Fiji. South Pacific islanders, in
need of economic assistance and piqued over US tuna
fishing practices, are more receptive to Soviet offers
for fishing agreements.
The controversy over New Zealand's port call decision
and its continuing disagreement with the United
States over ANZUS obligations have provided Mos-
cow an incentive to encourage the growth of local
antinuclear sentiment in the South Pacific. The Sovi-
ets repeatedly have provided both diplomatic and
media support for the South Pacific Nuclear-Free
Zone and have indicated that they will formally
endorse the treaty. In early February, a South Pacific
Forum delegation visited Moscow to explain the draft
treaty approved in August 1985 and to seek Soviet
adherence to its protocols. According to reporting
from the US Embassy in Moscow, Soviet officials
expressed concern that individual states were allowed
to make their own decisions about port access of ships,
nuclear or not. Moscow's objective is to persuade all
the Pacific island states to adopt the much tougher
position of the Lange government on banning port
calls
Moscow sees Japan as the cornerstone of US strategic
policy in Asia and is especially eager to disrupt the
US-Japanese security relationship, which has grown
stronger in recent years, largely in response to the
Soviet military buildup in the Far East. In its leader-
ship statements and media reporting, Moscow has
attempted to focus the attention of Japanese antinu-
clear groups on the presence of US military bases in
Japan and US naval operations in the Pacific. Soviet
propaganda frequently notes the arrival of US
nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable warships at
Japanese ports and urges the Japanese to enforce their
existing antinuclear principles and deny them access.
Figure 6. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Abe in
Under Gorbachev, the Soviets are not only continuing
their efforts to develop closer links to antinuclear
advocates in Japan, but are also trying to project a
better image in Asia and Japan in particular. Gorba-
chev is attempting a conciliatory style of diplomacy
toward Japan in hopes of both reinforcing the neutral-
ist tendencies in Japanese public opinion and appeal-
ing to the Japanese sense of independence.
Shevardnadze's Visit. The most important demonstra-
tion of the "new style" in Soviet policy toward Japan
was Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's four-day visit in
January 1986, the first in a decade by a Soviet foreign
minister. The visit gave Shevardnadze the opportunity
to ask the Japanese not to participate in the US
strategic defense initiative, criticize the presence of
US military forces in East Asia, and urge support for
Gorbachev's proposal for eliminating nuclear weap-.
ons. Embassy reporting from Tokyo indicates that the
Japanese turned aside these requests but viewed
Shevardnadze's sophisticated approach as a relief
from the heavyhanded tactics that characterized Gro-
myko's policies toward Japan.
Influence Peddling. The Soviets are trying to improve
their ties to leftist opposition parties, organized labor,
and peace groups to broaden their access to the
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Secret
disarmament movement in Japan. The Soviets have
paid particular attention to the JCP and JSP, which
are actively involved in organizing antinuclear rallies.'
Moscow has encouraged these activities, and in a
move to enhance relations hosted representatives from
each of the rival parties at its recent party congress in
Moscow. JCP and JSP leaders alike applauded Soviet
disarmament initiatives, but both parties have been
careful to emphasize areas of disagreement. The two
parties, competing for leadership of the Japanese left,
have moderated their rhetoric in recent years and
have not hesitated to deviate from Moscow to main-
tain their Japanese identity.
The Soviets have developed contacts with representa-
tives of the General Council of Trade Unions-
Japan's largest and most militant union-and have
tried to influence the smaller, more moderate Japa-
nese Confederation of Labor by establishing contacts
with its leaders and promoting Soviet antinuclear
policies. Moscow has had little success in establishing
the WFTU in Japan because Japanese leftists and
unionists are wary of being "used" by the Soviets.
The Soviets are also actively supporting antinuclear
activities in Southeast Asia. Moscow has long sup-
ported Malaysia's proposal for a Southeast Asian
"zone of peace" and has stepped up its diplomatic and
media support for a nuclear-free zone in the region.
But Moscow has had trouble convincing ASEAN of
its peaceful intentions. The cornerstone of Moscow's
policy toward the region is its alliance with Vietnam,
and this has led to a steady expansion of Soviet
military presence in Indochina, upsetting ASEAN
leaders and increasing their suspicion of Soviet inten-
tions.
Propaganda. The Soviets are using their propaganda
apparatus to encourage domestic support for antinu-
clear issues in Southeast Asia. According to the US
Embassy in Bangkok, immediately after Gorbachev's
proposal in January 1986 to eliminate nuclear weap-
ons by the year 2000, the Soviet Embassy began
issuing news bulletins lauding the nuclear-weapons-
free zone concept for Southeast Asia. The bulletins
quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa as welcom-
ing the ASEAN states' intention to make the region
nuclear free, and they applauded the progress of the
South Pacific states in fashioning a nuclear-free zone
while stressing the importance of banning ships carry-
ing nuclear weapons.
Labor Ties. The Soviets have had difficulty establish-
ing links to labor unions in the ASEAN countries, and
this has denied them one of their primary means of
promoting antinuclear sentiment. According to Em-
bassy reporting, Moscow has made no headway in
influencing leftists in Indonesia, Malaysia, or Singa-
pore, where the governments maintain tight control
over labor movements. Moscow's only success in
cultivating labor movements in the region is in the
Philippines. WFTU officials travel frequently to Ma-
nila to meet with labor leaders and Communist
officials and are currently attempting to lay the
groundwork for a WFTU-sponsored conference there.
Moscow is using other front organizations to play
upon antinuclear sentiment. In late 1985 the Soviet-
controlled World Peace Council cosponsored a peace
conference at the prestigious University of the Philip-
pines. The conference, the first of its kind in the
Philippines, warned against the dangers of nuclear
war in Asia. Embassy reporting indicates the Soviets
are actively trying to cultivate newspaper correspon-
dents, leftist intellectuals, and academics, who are all
in positions to influence Philippine public opinion and
are possibly willing to fan dissatisfaction with the US
military presence in the Philippines. We see little
prospect of Soviet success because most Filipinos
favor keeping the US bases.
The Soviets face obstacles in generating antibase and
antinuclear sentiment in the Philippines. The vast
majority of Filipinos are favorably disposed to the
United States, especially since US support was instru-
mental in a peaceful transition of power from Marcos
to Aquino. Moscow, nevertheless, probably has reason
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to consider the Philippines its most promising target
among the non-Communist Southeast Asian nations.
With US bases present, the stakes are the highest and
it is the most vulnerable ASEAN country politically
and economically. Despite the current widespread
popularity of Aquino, she is an untested leader facing
enormous problems. We expect Moscow to look for
opportunities that it can exploit in seeking the remov-
al of US military bases.
increasing their military power in the Far East,
including the militarization of the Northern Territo-
ries claimed by Japan.' Moscow is unlikely to make
concessions on the disputed islands because that could
weaken its military position
tudes in this region.
In Australia and New Zealand, as well as in much of
the South Pacific, the Soviets are not perceived as a
direct military threat, and Moscow has been able to
cultivate leftists who are actively promoting anti-
nuclear sentiment in their own countries and in the
neighboring region. We believe the Soviets will
achieve some success in influencing antinuclear atti-
tion in the Far East
In our judgment the Soviets will be less successful in
the other areas of East Asia, where they are consid-
ered a military threat. Prime Minister Nakasone
could have been speaking for the rest of East Asia
when he told the Soviets last year that no Asian
country was prepared to consider an Asian security
conference seriously as long as Soviet military forces
posed a threat.' This response sums up the dilemma
that hinders the Soviets' efforts to promote their
antinuclear campaign in East Asia, namely that the
Soviets attach a higher priority to military moderniza-
Despite Gorbachev's "smile offensive" vis-a-vis To-
kyo, Soviet media play on antinuclear and anti-US
themes, cultivation of the leftist parties and labor
unions, and other influence peddling measures, the
Soviets have had trouble capitalizing on the strong
neutralist and antinuclear sentiment in Japan. The
problem for the Soviets is simply that their political
objective is subordinate to the military objective of
The Soviet buildup of SS-20s, their growing military power in the
Far East and naval power in the Pacific, their invasion of Afghani-
stan, and their growing presence at Cam Ranh Bay and support of
Vietnamese operations in Cambodia undermine Moscow's efforts to
We believe antinuclear feeling will remain strong,
especially in the South Pacific. We expect the South
Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty to be formally
adopted later this year and believe that other Asian
countries, including nuclear weapons states China and
the Soviet Union, will support the treaty and agree to
its protocols. We also expect the antinuclear policies
of the Lange government in New Zealand to culmi-
nate in legislation that prohibits port calls by nuclear-
powered or nuclear-capable warships.
In our judgment at least a few of the small South
Pacific island states will follow New Zealand's lead
and restrict the transit and port access of nuclear
warships. Island states favorably inclined toward the
United States and ANZUS will be reluctant to ban
port calls because it would hurt ANZUS. On the
other hand, the antinuclear issue is one of the few that
the small states can use to challenge US policies, and
several may use port access to register unhappiness
with the United States or as leverage for obtaining
economic assistance.
The leaders of Australia's ruling Labor Party are
committed to supporting ANZUS and Australia's
role in that alliance. Therefore, despite the party's
vocal antinuclear element, we believe the government
will be able to hold the line on US ship visits and use
of strategically important joint facilities over the next
year or two. We are less sanguine for the longer term,
however. Our analysis of public opinion polls shows
that antinuclear sentiments are spreading and that a
'The Northern Territories are the four small Japanese islands near
Hokkaido that were seized by Soviet troops at the end of World
War II and on which the Soviets have been deploying troops since
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clear majority of voters under age 30 hold antinuclear
and antialliance views." These voters constitute a
growing percentage of the electorate. If antinuclear
elements were to become the majority within the
Labor Party, they would be able to force party leaders
likely to be more restrictive after 1997, when the
Chinese take over and assume responsibility for Hong
Kong's defense and foreign policy.
to restrict ship visits and close joint facilities.
In Japan, we see little likelihood that the antinuclear
opposition parties would achieve the consensus to
force the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to change
its policies and restrict US military access to Japanese
bases or ports. Moreover, we believe the Japanese are
firmly committed to the Mutual Security Treaty and
see the advantage of helping the United States main-
tain a strong defensive posture in the western Pacific
opposite the Soviet Union. Barring a major shift in
Soviet military posture in the Far East or a major
nuclear accident in or very near Japan, we doubt the
Japanese will change their policies.
In North Korea, we expect P'yongyang to continue its
antinuclear propaganda condemning the United
States for deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea
and urging southerners to demand their removal. The
North Korean propaganda appears to be encouraging
some radical students to demonstrate against nuclear
weapons and the US military presence in South
Korea. According to the US Embassy in Seoul,
radical students are carrying placards and banners
with slogans that are similar to North Korean propa-
ganda themes. Opposition leaders have condemned
the student extremists, and we doubt that P'yon-
gyang's efforts will affect large segments of the
public.
Although the Chinese have recently allowed UK ships
to visit and continue to discuss with US officials the
possibility of a US port call, we believe Chinese
sensitivity to nuclear issues will continue to restrict
access by US and allied nuclear warships to Chinese
ports. In neighboring Hong Kong, the nascent anti-
nuclear movement poses little immediate threat to US
port calls. Hong Kong's ship-visit policy is, however,
In Southeast Asia, the antinuclear movement poses
little or no threat to US basing rights in the Philip-
pines, but President Aquino has said she will hold a
popular referendum on the US-Philippine agreement
before it expires in 1991. This could result in a public
airing of nuclear warship basing and weapons storage
at both Subic Bay and Clark. We believe Aquino sees
economic as well as geopolitical advantages to the
continued US presence and she would be reluctant to
terminate the basing arrangements.
We see little prospect for a nuclear-free zone in
Southeast Asia any time soon, although members of
ASEAN will doubtless explore the possibility of a
regional zone. We believe ASEAN concerns about the
Soviet air and naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay as
well as Soviet support of Vietnamese operations in
Cambodia will preclude any action by ASEAN that
could hamstring US military capabilities
Because of the pervasiveness of the antinuclear move-
ment in the South Pacific, we believe that the coun-
tries in that area are more likely than others in East
Asia to restrict access to bases and ports and other-
wise impose policies that could damage US security
interests. Aside from the nettlesome problem with
New Zealand over port calls and its role in ANZUS,
we see relatively little impact on US military capabi-
lities as a result of the regional nuclear-free zone in
the South Pacific, provided transit remains unimped-
ed. The key to US mobility in the region is Australia.
As long as Australia holds the line on ship and
aircraft visits, US forces will be able to operate
effectively in the southwestern Pacific.
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A far more damaging scenario would result if Austra-
lia restricted US access to its bases, ports, and joint
facilities. That could happen if antinuclear factions of
the Labor Party gained power. Moreover, the Austra-
lians would probably restrict access only as part of a
broader defense policy shift that would result in
Australia's leaving ANZUS. Australia is a critical
link in the US defense posture in the South Pacific
and Indian Oceans, and such actions on its part would
severely damage US capabilities in both regions.
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