CAMEROON: CHALLENGES TO BIYA'S LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000300120003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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ALA 84-10120
December 1984
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Cameroon: Challenges
to Biya's Leadership
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 Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cameroon: Challenges
to Biya's Leadership
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by I Of the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions fro of the Office of
Central Reference-. Ft was coordinated with the
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
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ALA 84-10120
December 1984
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Secret
Cameroon: Challenges
to Biya's Leadership 25X1
Key Judgments We believe the political climate in moderate, pro-Western Cameroon
Information available during the next two years will be unsettled. President Paul Biya faces the
as of 16 November 1984 difficult test of reestablishing his credibility as a leader in the wake of a
was used in this report.
coup attempt last April that was confined to members of his Presidential
Guard. In our judgment, Biya stands at least an even chance of hanging on,
but Cameroon's military-now a potent political force after coming to the
President's rescue in April-is likely to keep close watch on his perform-
ance. Despite Cameroon's uncertain outlook, we do not believe the country
is on the verge of widespread political instability or economic decline that
characterizes many west and central African states.
As Biya strives to build a new political consensus, he faces the challenge of
juggling the interests of competing ethnic, religious, and regional groups.
Biya must pay particularly close attention to the concerns of northern
Muslims and English-speaking west Cameroonians as well as his fellow
French-speaking southerners. Moreover, we believe the President will face
growing demands from younger Cameroonians for more rapid political
liberalization, which he will be unable to satisfy without alienating older,
still powerful political and economic barons. Finally, Biya must retain the
loyalty of the military as he moves to reinforce the principle of civilian con-
trol of the armed forces.
In our judgment, Biya's problems, though serious, are still manageable,
although we have reservations about his ability to provide the firm
leadership characteristic of his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo, during the
first President's 22 years of rule. Biya, however, has managed since the
coup to keep ethnic and personal rivalries in check and to resist any
temptations to lash out against the north. Biya's position is further
strengthened by the lack of an organized opposition, a relatively healthy
economy, and administrative institutions that continue to function more or
less effectively.
We do not discount the possibility that sharp economic decline or foreign
meddling could contribute to political instability in Cameroon. These
potential dangers, however, present a significantly lesser threat to Biya in
the near term than does the domestic political arena. Despite slowed
growth, Cameroon's economy is one of the healthiest in black Africa, and
Biya is continuing the judicious fiscal policies of his predecessor.
Secret
ALA 84-10120
December 1984
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While the Soviet Union and Libya could seek to capitalize on political
uncertainty in one of the region's most steadfastly moderate, pro-Western
governments, we see little likelihood that either Moscow or Tripoli will
make Cameroon a focus of attention in the near term. Tripoli is preoccu-
pied with Chad, and Moscow will be more concerned with events in
southern Africa and the Horn. If Biya were to move beyond unofficial ties
to diplomatic relations with Israel-from whom he is seeking security
assistance-Tripoli could be tempted to stir up trouble among Cameroon's
northern Muslims already apprehensive over their diminished role in the
post-Ahidjo era.
Close ties to France will probably be the linchpin of Cameroon's foreign
policy, despite Biya's cooling of relations because of dubious suspicions of
French Government support for last April's failed coup attempt. Both Paris
and Yaounde no doubt recognize that the depth and breadth of economic,
political, military, and cultural ties far outweigh any temporary differ-
ences. Nevertheless, Biya probably sees closer ties to Washington-
particularly in areas of military assistance and foreign investment-as a
means of asserting some greater independence from France while remain-
ing within the orbit of the West.
Should Biya falter, we believe the most likely scenario would involve senior
officers' taking power in the name of restoring order and preserving
national unity. We would expect few changes in domestic or foreign policy.
Although senior officers probably would promise a quick return to civilian
rule, we believe they ultimately could fall prey to factionalism and
squabbling. At this stage of Cameroon's political evolution, however, we
judge that a coup by potentially radical junior officers is a possible
although much less likely alternative. In this regard, we believe it is
significant that the regular military, both officers and enlisted men, loyally
crushed the attempted April coup.
We believe the unsuccessful April coup in Cameroon highlights the
transition difficulties that face other moderate African states with a legacy
of strong leadership and highly personalized political systems. In our
judgment, the success or failure of the Biya presidency could be a
harbinger of political trends to come in the region. Other moderate African
presidents, second-generation leaders, and potential successors probably
are paying close heed to Cameroon's evolution under Biya to see whether
gradual reform is possible and whether the military can remain outside the
political arena in times of uncertainty.
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a
Political Stirrings After Ahidjo
Biya's Mixed Beginning 1
Impact of the April Coup Attempt
Building a New Political Consensus 4
Reinforcing Civilian Control Over the Military 5
Radical Younger Officers Take Charge 7
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B. Keeping Friends and Fending Off Threats
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Cameroon: Challenges
to Biya's Leadership F
Introduction
Cameroon is in the throes of a difficult transition
from one political generation to another. President
Paul Biya is struggling to fill the shoes of the retired
Ahmadou Ahidjo, the country's first president and
strongman for 22 years. At issue is whether the
United States can continue to count on Cameroon as a
pro-Western bastion of political stability and econom-
ic development in the troubled region of central
Africa. So far, Cameroon has been a successful
example of persistent moderation in the troubled
region of central Africa.
In our judgment, the coup attempt in April 1984 by
northern elements of the elite Presidential Guard has
tarnished Biya's image and raised questions about his
leadership. We believe continued stability in Came-
roon will rest in large measure on Biya's ability to
regain leadership credibility and lost momentum. His
is an especially personal and political challenge be-
cause Cameroon, unlike many other black African
states, is not beset by violent tribal conflict, economic
decline, or active Soviet and Libyan subversion.
In our view, the failed April coup highlights the
transition difficulties that face moderate African
states having a legacy of strong leadership and highly
personalized political systems.
Political Stirrings After Ahidjo
Ahmadou Ahidjo-a strong-willed Muslim Fulani
from northern Cameroon-governed Cameroon until
November 1982. By all accounts, he ruled with an
iron hand, keeping close watch on potential rivals and
brooking little open challenge to his rule. Ahidjo's
sudden decision-ostensibly because of ill health,
according to most US Embassy sources-to resign the
presidency in favor of his constitutional successor,
Paul Biya, caught most Cameroonians ill prepared for
the difficult transition to the post-Ahidjo era. His
resignation unleashed long-dormant political stirrings,
according to Embassy reporting, by raising the spec-
ter of political liberalization and caused concern
among heretofore confident Cameroonians about the
political stability of the country. We believe most
Cameroonians probably felt reassured by Ahidjo's
retention-after giving up the presidency-of his post
as head of the country's sole political party, the
Cameroon National Union. At the time, most West-
ern and Cameroonian observers saw Ahidjo's move as
an honest effort to lend support to the new President 25X1
and to ease the apprehensions of his politically long-
dominant northern supporters (see appendix A).
Biya's Mixed Beginning. Biya's initial moves upon
succeeding Ahidjo won him early popularity. US
Embassy reporting indicated that early in his presi-
dency Biya displayed a more open and accessible
style-in clear contrast to Ahidjo's taciturn manner-
which helped elevate him from his predecessor's shad-
ow. In his first six months, the Embassy noted, Biya
further honed his political skills by touring all of
Cameroon's provinces, hosting a visit by French Presi-
dent Mitterrand, convening a new National Assem- 25X1
bly, and playing a well-publicized role at the 1983
OAU summit in Addis Ababa.
At the same time, the US Embassy pointed out, Biya
quickly dispelled any notion that he was a "caretaker"
carrying out Ahidjo's bidding, and asserted his presi-
dential prerogatives by making decisions without con-
sulting Ahidjo. The President also made several early
Cabinet changes, which eliminated a number of
Ahidjo loyalists, and then turned his attention to
gaining control of the party and the military. In
addition, Biya initiated several administrative re-
forms, including the division of the north-Ahidjo's
stronghold-into three provinces.
As Biya's political confidence grew, we believe he felt
better able to distance himself from the tone, if not
the substance, of his predecessor's policies. The US
Embassy reported that Biya increasingly called for
anticorruption drives, the gradual liberalization of the
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Difficult Transition:
Succeeding a Political Legend
Cameroon's image as one of black Africa's most
politically stable and economically prosperous na-
tions obscures underlying ethnic, regional, and lin-
guistic divisions, and a turbulent beginning as a state.
Political and economic decisions must take into
account the interests of some 200 tribes, 24 language
groups, northern Muslims, southern Christians, and
large numbers of animists. In addition, Cameroonian
leaders must wrestle with the legacy of two colonial
traditions; about 80 percent of the population inhab-
its French-speaking east Cameroon, while the re-
mainder lives in English-speaking west Cameroon.F_
Cameroon's political history from independence in
1960 until November 1982 was intertwined with the
thought and actions of its first president, Ahmadou
Ahidjo. A Muslim Fulani from the north, he rose
above modest origins to national leadership without
benefit of a higher education. Firm, self-assured, and
instinctively comfortable with power and its manipu-
lation, Ahidjo displayed an exceptional ability to
represent and balance Cameroon's diverse ethnic,
religious, and linguistic interests. He effectively dis-
tributed economic and political patronage to erect a
strong presidential state, using force when necessary
to quell opposition. During 22 years of paternalistic
rule, Ahidjo oversaw the crushing of a seven-year-
long Communist insurrection, the consolidation of
opposition parties into the Cameroon National Union
as the only political party, and the formal unification
of east and west Cameroon in 1972. Ahidjo's cautious
economic policies particularly his emphasis on
political system, and a renewal of the national spirit.
In our view, these public statements were part of a
larger campaign to place in power a new generation of
younger, better educated technocrats loyal to the new
President.
In our judgment, Biya's growing emphasis on the need
for change sowed the seeds of the rift between the new
President and his former mentor. The US Embassy
noted that many Cameroonians interpreted Biya's
pronouncements and actions as not so thinly veiled
agriculture and the judicious spending of Cameroon's
oil revenues-also are credited with making Came-
roon one of Africa's few economic success stories. F_
President Paul Biya's background and temperament
are quite different from those of Ahidjo, reinforcing
the challenge that succession represents to the new
leader. Biya is the consummate urbane, well-educat-
ed, and self-effacing technocrat whose instincts-
and talents-forfirm leadership and tough deci-
sionmaking remain in doubt. In many respects, Biya
typifies the sort of second-generation Cameroonian
that he hopes will form the backbone of the new
leadership. A southern Christian and member of the
Boulou tribe of east Cameroon, the 51-year-old Biya
received his law degree from the University of Paris
in 1960 and later received diplomas in France from
the Institute of Political Studies and the Internation-
al Institute of Public Administration. On returning to
Cameroon in 1962, he worked in the Office of the
President, was named Secretary General of the Presi-
dency-with cabinet rank-in 1968, and two years
later was upgraded to Minister of State.
Biya's long apprenticeship under Ahidjo continued
when he was appointed Prime Minister in 1975. In
this position, Biya was seen as an efficient, honest,
and intelligent administrator, capable of handling
people and adept at managing Cameroon's increasing-
ly complex bureaucracy. Biya viewed himself as the
government's chief technocrat and avoided the ap-
pearance of competing politically with Ahidjo.
criticism of Ahidjo and the northern old guard. Not
surprisingly, powerful northern interests who provided
the backbone of Ahidjo's support grew increasingly
apprehensive as they saw the prospect of a further
erosion of their political and economic prerogatives
under an "independent" Biya presidency.
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US Embassy reporting amply documents that
Ahidjo's strong early support for Biya gradually
began to give way to apprehension and then opposi-
tion, particularly as the balance of political power
tilted in favor of Biya. Ahidjo first attempted to
outmaneuver Biya by weakening the power of the
presidency. The Embassy reported that Ahidjo, for
example, demanded that northerners in the govern-
ment-including the Prime Minister-resign their
positions, and that he sought to amend the Constitu-
tion to strengthen his power as the party leader
The balance of US Embassy reporting suggests that
the question of how to deal with Ahidjo became
increasingly difficult for Biya in late 1983 and early
1984 as what had been a largely behind-the-scenes
jockeying for position turned into a bitter public
confrontation. In August 1983, Biya replaced Ahidjo
in the top party post as questions of Ahidjo's loyalty
and motives grew. In early 1984, Ahidjo-by then in
self-imposed exile in France-was publicly accused of
plotting against the government, tried in absentia,
sentenced to death, and later officially pardoned by
Biya
Impact of the April Coup Attempt. The April 1984
coup attempt came against the backdrop of growing
political tension between northerners and southerners.
The US Embassy reports that the coup was triggered
by Biya's decision to transfer many members of the
predominantly northern Presidential Guard out of
Yaounde and to recast this elite unit that had been
created by Ahidjo. Embassy and US defense attache
reporting indicates that it took loyalist troops drawn
from as far away as Douala several days to crush the
insurrection, which left Biya and the country shaken
and uncertain of how to proceed. Moreover, Came-
roon's important relationship with Paris cooled
because of Ahidjo's presence in France and Came-
roonian suspicions-still unconfirmed-that the
French Government may have had a hand in the
attempted coup. The Mitterrand government, for its
part, has been careful since the abortive April coup to
continue a "business as usual" approach to Cameroon
and to be supportive of Biya.
While Biya's moves in the wake of the coup attempt
are open to interpretation, we believe his failure to
quickly seize the political initiative seriously damaged
his political standing and undermined much of his
hard-won credibility. The US Embassy reports, for
example, that Biya-in contrast to his early, more.
open and accessible style-remained isolated in the
presidential palace for the first six months after the
coup attempt, making few public statements and
fewer public appearances. Biya's behavior, according
to the Embassy, reflected acute concern for his safety
in the wake of the crushed coup that left the Presiden-
tial Guard shattered and the country awash with
rumors of impending attacks by mercenaries allegedly
hired by Ahidjo. Moreover, in our view, the govern-
ment's secretive handling of the trials and executions
of coup participants fueled rumors and added to the
political uncertainty.
Less open to interpretation, in our judgment, is
Ahidjo's future political role. Whatever part-if
any-Ahidjo played in the plot, we believe the wide-
spread public assumption of his involvement has
damaged the former President's credibility beyond
immediate repair, and has crushed any hope he may
have had of returning to power. Moreover, on the
basis of US Embassy reporting, we expect the Biya
administration will continue for some time to find
Ahidjo a convenient scapegoat. As a consequence, we
envision Ahidjo relegated to the role of an embittered
malcontent, sniping ineffectually at his successor from
political exile.
Biya's Challenges
We, along with many Cameroonians and foreign
observers, still doubt Biya's ability to establish his
credibility as a leader and reshape the country's
political institutions. In Biya's favor, we believe Cam-
eroon's favorable economy and the absence of signifi-
cant foreign meddling will help the President concen-
trate on consolidating his political power. In our
judgment, Cameroon's economy-still one of the
healthiest in black Africa-would have to deteriorate
considerably before becoming a destabilizing factor.'
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Likewise, in our estimation, Cameroon will remain on
the periphery of Soviet and Libyan interests in central
Africa, barring a dramatic increase in internal un-
rest.2
Biya thus is not without assets in his quest to fill
Ahidjo's shoes, and we concur with US Embassy
assessments that he has shown some good political
instincts. He has managed since the coup attempt to
keep ethnic and personal rivalries in check, in part by
continuing to balance political and administrative
appointments. Moreover, he has so far resisted temp-
tations to lash out against the north. We also believe
that the lack of a well-organized opposition works in
Biya's favor. Finally, the US Embassy reports that
administrative institutions at Biya's disposal continue
to function more or less effectively.
Nevertheless, it is also our judgment that Biya has
displayed signs of weakness. Despite Biya's assur-
ances that the military has "returned to the bar-
racks," we believe he has yet to cast aside the image
of being beholden to the armed forces. Moreover,
although Biya established a strong public image early
in his presidency, most observers indicate that he
remains a private person who, by all accounts, is
uncomfortable in the limelight. In addition, in our
view, his long seclusion after the coup has created an
aura of indecision that Biya has yet to dispel, and
which represents perhaps his greatest failing.
In our judgment, Biya cannot afford to be seen as
simply presiding over the status quo and shuffling
personnel to secure his position. In his public pro-
nouncements before the coup, Biya raised expecta-
tions of changes; we conclude that he must be seen as
seizing the political initiative and controlling the pace
of change rather than merely reacting to events. In
particular, we believe Biya must:
? Build a new political consensus that will help keep
Cameroon's potentially destabilizing ethnic rivalries
in check. Biya must also adapt and mold political
institutions, such as the Cameroon National Union,
to serve his political needs.
? Reinforce civilian control over the military by
revamping his personal security apparatus and cre-
ating a stable network of alliances within the armed
forces.
resist reform efforts.
Building a New Political Consensus. Our analysis
suggests that Biya faces the challenge of projecting a
more dynamic image to win wider public backing and
to achieve a stronger position to pursue political
reform and institution building. In particular, we
believe that Biya must lay out the political ground
rules for his presidency if he is to distinguish his
tenure from that of his authoritarian predecessor. We
expect Biya also will face pressure to continue making
progress on efforts to curb corruption, improve gov-
ernment efficiency, better living standards, and loosen
the grip of vested economic interests that are sure to
In our view, Biya faces a delicate task in trying to
strike a balance between the demands for political
change he loosed after over two decades of authoritar-
ian rule with his desire to assert unchallenged control
over Cameroon's political institutions. Biya's dilemma
in part is typified by Cameroon's restive media, which
are eager to break loose from former restrictions but
are unsure of the new limits of open expression. We
believe Biya probably sincerely favors a more open
press but is unwilling at present to allow unbridled
criticism of himself and his government.
Probably more politically troubling in the longer
term, in our judgment, are demands from the younger
generation of Cameroonians who want Biya to move
more rapidly to dismantle Ahidjo's authoritarian ma-
chinery and to allow more open political competition.
Biya must juggle the demands of the younger genera-
tion waiting in the wings-his natural constituency
and one to which he has appealed-with the still
powerful older political elite bent on protecting its
economic and political prerogatives. In our judgment,
failure to achieve a workable balance and consensus
over the pace and extent of change could alienate both
sides and seriously narrow Biya's base of support.
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Uncertainties surrounding the role of the Cameroon
National Union in the Biya presidency may make it
even more difficult for the President to strengthen his
personal grip and to deal with the issue of political
liberalization. The US Embassy reports that party
officials continue to proclaim that the "party is not
dead," but also admit that its grassroots structures
were unable to rally support for Biya during and after
the April coup attempt. Nor has Biya yet declared
what role he sees for the party under his leadership, or
whether a "one party" structure is compatible with
his promises of political liberalization. We believe, for
example, that the issue of permitting party members
to compete for office within the party could be one of
the first contentious issues to surface, perhaps even as
early as the next party congress scheduled for Febru-
ary
In our view, Biya will be under pressure to win the
trust and cooperation of potentially restive northern-
ers and English-speaking west Cameroonians in build-
ing a new political consensus. Biya's overtures, howev-
er, will be closely watched by fellow French speakers
from east Cameroon, the faction that currently holds
the balance of political and military power in Camer-
oon. The April coup attempt notwithstanding, Biya at
present does not have to contend with ethnic divisions
as serious as those Ahidjo faced two decades ago with
a southern-based insurgency
Biya's fence-mending with the north and the west and
his goal of grooming new regional leaders capable of
representing their respective ethnic and linguistic
strongholds probably will take time and considerable
effort. However, we see no strong northern leader on
the scene capable of rallying the ethnically and
religiously diverse north to Biya's side.' Consequently,
Biya probably has little choice but to rely on support
from younger northerners with technocratic rather
than established family backgrounds, as well as repre-
sentatives of northern minority groups, many of whom
are not Muslim and who received few benefits under
'Although often pictured as an ethnic and religious whole, the
north is made up of widely differing ethnic groups. Demographic
estimates suggest that about 15 percent of Cameroon's population
is Muslim, 49 percent Christian, and about 36 percent animist.
Demographic estimates also suggest that in the northern region-
Ahidjo. While Biya has increased spending in west
Cameroon and has even made some speeches in
English, the US Embassy reports that these moves
appear to have only partially allayed complaints
among Cameroon's English-speaking minority about
their "second class" status. In the past year, for
example, English-speaking apprehensions have been
fanned by the highly publicized arrest and trial of two
anglophone doctors, a controversial education reform
bill that appeared to tilt in favor of French speakers,
and a clampdown on the English-speaking press after
the publication of articles critical of Biya. Although
discontent probably will continue, we believe west
Cameroonians recognize that their minority status
limits their political options and leverage.
Reinforcing Civilian Control Over the Military. Biya
also confronts difficult near-term problems in rein-
forcing his control over Cameroon's armed forces-
now a potent political force after the April coup
attempt-and rebuilding his shattered personal secu-
rity apparatus. Although the US defense attache
reports that Cameroon's military establishment, in-
cluding the uniformed Gendarmerie, is more profes-
sional than many in Africa and has traditionally
remained on the political sidelines, we believe the
longstanding principle of civilian control over the
armed forces was weakened by the military's role in
aborting the coup attempt, and that senior officers are
now in a position to influence a broad range of
policies
In our view, Biya faces a dual test: on the one hand,
he must retain the loyalty of senior officers, and, on
the other, he must reestablish the strict division
between military and civilian authority. At present,
we see Gen. Pierre Semengue-the Chief of General
Staff who is related to Biya by tribal origin and
marriage-as the President's critical link to the mili-
tary. On the positive side, US defense attache report-
ing indicates that Semengue is loyal to Biya and now
appears to be firmly in charge of the armed forces.
Other attache reporting, however, suggests that the
chiefs of both the Army and Air Force staffs may
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During his tenure, former President Ahidjo main-
tained strict civilian control over the 6,500-man
regular Army, and the 6,500- to 7,000-man Gendar-
merie-including a now disbanded 2,000-man Presi-
dential Guard. Ahidjo kept the armed forces isolated,
splintered, and decentralized in an effort to keep the
military out of politics. The most senior uniformed
officer had no control over any military unit and
served directly under the Minister of Armed Forces, a
northern civilian. Ahidjo also relied heavily on the
French willingness and ability to provide needed
security
Upon becoming President, Biya gradually began to
place his mark on the military, moving to centralize
the command structure, granting greater decision-
making authority to trusted senior officers, and
raising several officers to the rank of general. Biya
providedfor a more centralized command structure,
and after the April 1984 coup attempt reversed
former policy and gave the chiefs of staff operational
control over their units. Biya also created a southern-
dominated National Permanent Defense Council to
advise the president on all matters affecting security.
US defense attache reporting suggests that this coun-
cil is emerging as a strong influence in deciding
security issues.
The regime must deal with a number of issues that
are likely to keep the military under strain for some
time. Reducing ethnic distrust between southerners
and northerners is a priority, especially since the
officer corps is now southern dominated while the
ranks of the Army are almost 40 percent northern.
The government needs to reinforce the principle of
civilian control of the armed forces, for officers
remain who feel the military ought to have more say
in running the country following its rescue of Biya
from last April's attemped coup. Senior commanders
also need to reemphasize a professional and apoliti-
cal orientation to guard against the possibility of
future coups and the gradual politicization of the
military over such issues as corruption and the
distribution of power and spoils.
have political ambitions of their own and have clashed
with Semengue. In our view, should Semengue falter
or lose the confidence of other officers, Biya's position
relative to the military could be seriously weakened.
The lack of an effective intelligence gathering and
reporting apparatus adds to Biya's governing burdens.
Although Biya has taken steps to reform his security
apparatus we be-
lieve the restaffing and training of security forces will
take sometime. In our view, frequent security alerts
and recurrent rumors in the capital of impending coup
attempts stem in part from the government's inability
to sort out wild speculation from fact.
Outlook
Overall, we expect Cameroonian politics will remain
unsettled over the next two years as Biya strives to
project greater personal leadership. Despite Came-
roon's uncertain outlook, however, its political and
bureaucratic institutions remain stronger than most in
Africa, and we do not believe the country is on the
verge of a debilitating cycle of political unrest and
coups that will undermine its hard-won unity and
economic development. Events in other African states
suggest that such a cycle usually is preceded by years
of ethnic strife and economic mismanagement. There-
fore, we judge the advent of a military regime led by
young radicals to be a less probable development.
Biya Holds On. In our view, Biya probably stands at
least an even chance of holding on over the next two
years. His problems, though serious, are still within
manageable bounds. At this point, key political and
military figures seem inclined to give Biya the benefit
of the doubt and more time to regain the political
initiative. In our judgment, the military is not eager
for power, and the majority of Cameroonians-irre-
spective of their feelings toward Biya-apparently do
not want to see the country's hard-won legacy of
stability, economic development, and civilian rule
swept away by violent change and to resort to radical
politics. Our analysis suggests, however, that the
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military will be keeping close watch on Biya's
performance, and could-despite its traditional
apolitical role-assume power if the President appears
to be faltering or does not measure up to another crisis
on the order of last April's coup attempt.
Senior Officers Step In. If the military intervenes, the
most likely scenario, in our view, would involve senior
officers' taking power as "caretakers," pledging to
ensure order, to protect national unity, and to get the
country moving again. We expect such a takeover
would be motivated by a growing belief that a civilian
leadership vacuum existed and that the senior officer
corps needed to act before junior military elements
did. As a warning indicator, we would look for
evidence of growing debate and conflict among senior
officers over the country's state of affairs and the
proper role of the military. More specifically, Semen-
gue's decline or fall could signal a tilt in favor of the
senior officers perhaps not as loyal to the President.
Likewise, Biya's sudden departure from the political
scene-through resignation or assassination-almost
certainly would draw the military into a more active
political role. In our judgment, the military would be
reluctant to tolerate a prolonged struggle for power
among contending civilians, none of whom probably
could claim a nationwide following. While Biya's
constitutionally designated civilian successor-the
President of the National Assembly'-could perhaps
hold the government together during an interim, we
do not believe he would have the political support or
strength to govern in a long-term capacity.
We envision few major policy changes under a regime
dominated by senior officers. On the basis of prece-
dents elsewhere when senior military leaders have
taken power in French-speaking Africa, we believe
senior Cameroonian officers probably would attempt
to craft an ethnic, regional, and linguistic balance
capable of maintaining stability, ensuring economic
growth, and reassuring traditional allies. In our judg-
ment, such a government would emphasize unity and
'Assembly President Solomon Muna is a nearly 80-year-old west
Cameroonian who, according to many US Embassy sources, lacks
the respect of the younger generation of Cameroonians and who has
order and rely heavily on civilian advisers and bureau-
crats, perhaps even establishing a mixed military-
civilian government.
Over the longer term, however, we believe Came-
roon's senior military establishment could fall prey to
the same sorts of problems that have plagued most
other African military regimes. With the passage of
time, we would expect such a military regime to
become vulnerable to growing factionalism and politi-
cal paralysis as the process of engineering a return to
civilian rule was found to be more difficult than first
envisioned.
Radical Younger Officers Take Charge. Although we
deem this scenario less likely, we do not discount the
possibility that younger officers could seize power and
attempt to push Cameroon in a more radical direc-
tion. We believe, however, that the military's relative
lack of exposure to leftist ideologies and the country's
general economic prosperity militates against a take-
over by radical junior officers at this time. Moreover,
although these ranks are not immune to grumbling
over pay, promotions, and tribal favoritism, there is no
evidence to suggest discontent has reached a level that
directly threatens the authority of senior officers or
the civilian government.
In our view, a radical coup is more likely after a
period of unsuccessful rule by senior officers or a
prolonged period of ethnic and regional turmoil and
economic decline. Under such circumstances, we be-
lieve deteriorating military discipline, coupled with
the weakened authority of a more politicized officer
corps, could act as an incentive for junior officers to
move.
If radical young officers seized power in the next two
years, we would expect, on the basis of past practice
throughout Africa, that they would steer Cameroon
on a more nationalistic and populist course. This
would include a more confrontational approach to
relations with traditional allies-such as France and
the United States-and a willingness to diversify
relations to include closer ties with Libya and the
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Soviets. While we believe Cameroon's economic de-
pendence on the West could work to temper more
radical impulses over the longer run, Cameroon's
political and social institutions would be put to a
severe test.
Implications for the United States
In our judgment, the success or failure of the Biya
presidency may be seen as a harbinger of political
trends to come elsewhere in the region. In our judg-
ment, other moderate African presidents, second-
generation leaders, and potential successors probably
are watching to see whether gradual reform is possible
and whether the military can remain outside the
political arena in times of uncertainty. Moreover,
African moderates will be looking closely to see how
much Western support they could expect to receive. A
military takeover, particularly by radicals, in one of
Africa's heretofore most politically stable and eco-
nomically prosperous nations would do little to en-
courage other Western-oriented leaders to take risky
political and economic moves that could ensure order-
ly change and political stability down the road.
Barring an unexpected takeover by radical officers,
we do not expect a sharp about-face in either the tone
or substance of Cameroonian-US relations during the
next two years. Cameroon is likely to continue to
provide quiet, behind-the-scenes support for most
Western positions and to keep differences within
diplomatic channels. Even if senior officers replace
Biya, we do not expect his successors would seek
support by launching an anti-Western crusade or
laying Cameroon's troubles at the West's doorstep.
We believe Cameroon, under either Biya or a senior
military leadership, is likely to continue to see im-
proved ties with Washington as a means of reducing
what many Cameroonians now see as excessive
dependence on France. The US Department of Com-
merce lists 50 US resident firms operating in Camer-
oon, and estimates direct US investment at over $500
million-mostly in the petroleum sector. We expect
that Cameroon will continue to look to the United
States to increase its economic stake there by provid-
ing greater security assistance and encouraging fur-
ther private investment
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Appendix A
Sustaining Economic Growth
Cameroon has weathered the world recession better
than most other black African states, according to US
Embassy and open source reporting. Despite some
shortages of basic commodities, higher consumer
prices, and slower overall growth, the economy is in
reasonably good shape. The country does not have
crushing debt burdens, and the economy continues to
expand modestly, supported by oil earnings, continued
strong agricultural production, and conservative fiscal
management. Cameroon's balance-of-payments posi-
tion is relatively good, and its debt service ratio is
quite manageable.
Cameroon owes its good economic fortunes to policies
initiated by former President Ahidjo. During his first
15 years in office, Cameroon enjoyed moderate,
broad-based economic expansion, with real growth
averaging about 4.6 percent annually. Ahidjo's favor-
able agricultural pricing policies helped double the
production of coffee and cocoa, then the major export
earners. This export expansion was accomplished
without sacrificing food production, and, in good
years, Cameroon was a net food exporter.
Moderate economic growth gave way to rapid growth
when Cameroon began pumping oil in the late 1970s.
US oil industry sources report that oil-export earnings
rose from $25 million in 1978 to over $700 million in
1980. The development of an oil industry, coupled
with political stability, made Cameroon attractive to
foreign bankers just when international financial mar-
kets were overflowing with recycled OPEC money.
Although Cameroon's external debt-largely to
France and the United States-climbed to over $2
billion, the debt service remained a manageable 12
percent of export earnings.
In our judgment, Cameroon has proved more success-
ful in managing its oil windfall than most other
African oil producers. US Embassy reporting indi-
cates the government has used oil money and other
financial resources to build up other sectors of the
economy, particularly agriculture, which still employs
about 70 percent of the work force and contributes
about 25 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. By
the end of 1981-less than a year before Ahidjo's
resignation-economic growth had topped 6 percent
for the third year in a row, and oil production had
increased by more than 25 percent, to 88,000 barrels
per day. Cameroon also could cite increased agricul-
tural output and a strong industrial performance, led
by food-processing activities.
Despite its strong past showing, Cameroon's economy
is not without its problems, some of which are beyond
the government's control. Recent drought conditions,
although not as severe as in many African countries,
have hurt both farmers and processing industries that
depend on agricultural raw materials. Nigeria's deci-
sion to close its land borders last April, as well as
constant turmoil in Chad, has wreaked havoc with
regional trade-both legal and illegal. In addition,
generally lower world prices for cocoa, coffee, and oil,
as well as higher interest rates on external loans, have
slowed economic growth
Other economic problems can be traced to Ahidjo's
choice of priorities. He expanded the state-sponsored
economic sector throughout his tenure to provide
employment and patronage, and spur industrializa-
tion. Today, the woefully inefficient parastatals are a
serious drain on government finances. One French
economic journal reports that the 60 or so enterprises
grouped under the Societe Nationale d'Investissement
had total losses in fiscal year 1981 of $107 million.
Cameroon also suffers from an inadequately devel-
oped infrastructure in many areas. Roads between the
political and administrative capital in Yaounde and
the financial and port center in Douala, for example,
fall far short of what is needed. Finally, liberal credit
policies in the latter part of the Ahidjo regime allowed
many loans-particularly to northern businessmen
and other cronies of the President-that are unlikely
ever to be repaid.
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Cameroon: Selected Financial Indicators
Million US $
Exports (f.o.b.)
1,848
1,901
1,917
1,904
Oil
666
943
1,080
1,197
Agricultural exports
658
484
379
361
Other
525
473
458
347
Imports (f.o.b.)
-1,538
-1,403
-1,192
-1,100
Trade balance
310
498
724
804
Services and transfers
-164
-144
99
217
Current account balance
147
354
824
1,021
Foreign exchange reserves
189
85
67
159
Total external debt
2,360
2,380
2,470
2,510
Over the longer run, Cameroon will face some tough
choices as it confronts the prospect of adjusting to
dwindling oil income and slower economic growth.'
Most estimates suggest that oil production is fast
approaching its peak of 150,000 to 160,000 barrels
per day and that it will level off in the late 1980s.
Failure to cut back what is now substantial develop-
ment spending, in our judgment, would force Yaoun-
de to run up Cameroon's debt and to turn to the IMF
and foreign creditors for recurrent balance-of-
payments assistance and debt rescheduling, actions
that would entail politically painful economic adjust-
ments.
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Appendix B
Keeping Friends
and Fending Off Threats
Biya has not significantly altered the general outlines
of Cameroonian foreign policy that had served Ahidjo
so well. He continues to emphasize Cameroon's non-
alignment and independence to avoid being drawn
into East-West confrontations, even as Yaounde tilts
toward the West, which provides the bulk of the
country's economic aid, investment, and arms. Biya
also maintains a low profile in the region to ward off
potential external threats to stability. US Embassy
reporting indicates that Cameroon's principal regional
concern is to keep its borders secure, primarily against
a militarily stronger Nigeria, and to prevent any
spillover of the Chad conflict into northern Cameroon.
Cameroon's important relationship with France has
cooled under Biya because of Ahidjo's exile in France
and lingering Cameroonian suspicions-as yet uncon-
firmed-of a French hand in the April 1984 coup
attempt. Biya is using the current tempest to reaffirm
Cameroon's "independence" from Paris as well as to
establish closer relations with Washington. While
back-channel grumbling against the Mitterrand gov-
ernment will continue from Yaounde, we believe a
prolonged deterioration of relations is unlikely. In our
view, both sides recognize that their larger mutual
economic and security interests are best served by
keeping the current dispute within manageable
bounds. Indeed, the Mitterrand government has been
careful since the aborted April coup to continue a
"business as usual" approach to Cameroon, to consult
closely with Biya, and to reassure him of continued
French support.
Over the longer run, close ties and extensive consulta-
tion with France will remain the linchpins of Came-
roonian foreign policy. Numerous accords signed with
Paris at independence in 1960 remain in effect. In
addition, the US Embassy reports that some 18,000
French citizens reside in Cameroon and that the
French presence is pervasive throughout the military
and the economy, as well as the administrative,
judicial, and educational systems.
Biya's potentially controversial opening to Israel bears
watching. US Embassy reporting indicates that Biya
has allowed Israel to open an "interests section" in
Yaounde and that he is looking to Tel Aviv to train
and arm a new Presidential Guard. While we do not
discount the possibility that Biya may eventually
restore full diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, such a
move would carry considerable risk, in our judgment.
The US Embassy in Riyadh, for example, reports that
Saudi Arabia would react to the establishment of
diplomatic ties by canceling development assistance
loans totaling about $60 million. On the continent,
Cameroon would find itself criticized by radical Afri-
can states for breaking ranks with the OAU majority
that eschews relations with Tel Aviv. At home, Cam-
eroonian Muslims could interpret diplomatic ties with
Israel as another example of the government's insensi-
tivity to northern interests and add it to their list of
grievances.
Biya harbors no illusions concerning Libyan and
Soviet intentions in West and central Africa. Came-
roon maintains only nominal ties with Tripoli, and in
the past has expressed quiet but firm support for
Western efforts to curb Libyan activity in the region.
In addition, the US Embassy reports that Biya has
expressed concern that Cameroon's porous borders
with Chad and Nigeria could offer Libya relatively
easy access to northern Cameroon's Muslim popula-
tion.
Cameroon also has kept the Soviet Union and its allies
at arms length, with relations remaining correct but
limited. Cameroon has no military or economic agree-
ments with Moscow. The US Embassy reports that
trade with Communist countries in 1983 accounted
for only about 1 percent of Cameroon's trade
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Barring dramatic political and economic deteriora-
tion, we do not believe Cameroon is likely to become a
major target for either Libya or the Soviet Union in
the near term. Tripoli is preoccupied with Chad, and
Moscow will be more concerned with events in south-
ern Africa and the Horn. Nevertheless, we believe
Tripoli and Moscow will keep an eye on the evolution
of Cameroon's domestic situation and continue to
gauge opportunities for gaining greater influence. If
Yaounde were to renew diplomatic relations with
Israel, however, we believe Qadhafi could be inspired
to stir up resentment among Muslims in northern
Cameroon against Biya.
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