POSSIBLE DISCUSSION ITEM FOR YOUR MEETINGS WITH NSC OFFICIALS ON US-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000802820002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 26, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000802820002-9
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council NIC NO. 01569-86
26 March 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Possible Discussion Item for Your Meetings with
NSC Officials on US-Portuguese Relations in the
Aftermath of the Portuguese Presidential Election
1. The election of the pro-US Mario Soares as President of Portugal
should-not divert our attention from other trends that continue to pose
potential threats to US interests.
As impressive as Soares' victory was, it could not resolve
the institutional difficulties that Portugal is
experiencing.
Under the division of powers written into the Constitution,
the President and the Prime Minister both have important
roles to play. Yet the country continues to be ruled by a
minority government headed by a political foe of the
President. In a way this resembles the Eanes-Soares
rivalry when they were respectively President and Prime
Minister. The big difference is that Soares headed a
majority government resting on a strong Socialist party
that dominated the other three main parties.
Now there are five parties. Although the recently founded
Democratic Renewal Party suffered reverses in both the
Presidential balloting and the December communal elections,
Eanes is still intent on establishing it as a new force in
Portuguese politics. The other parties are the Communists,
the Socialists who must find a new leader to replace
Soares, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva's Social Democrats, and
the right-wing Social Democratic Center Party--the party of
defeated Presidential candidate and Silva ally Freitas do
Amaral.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DERV MULTIPLE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000802820002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000802820002-9
SECIRET/IVOFORN
-- In the first round of the Presidential election, the
strength of the five major parties mirrored their current
alignment in Parliament, with each party controlling
between 15 and 25 percent of the vote. If this situation
continues, it will remain difficult to form stable
governing alliances and Portugal might continue to be ruled
by minority governments.
-- Soares' powers as President, moreover, are constitutionally
limited, and he does not enjoy the "above-the-fray" image
of former President Eanes. Moreover, the personal
animosity that exists between Soares and Prime Minister
Cavaco Silva is likely to lead to conflicts that could
spill over into the foreign policy arena.
2. The fragmentation of parties and the continuation of
institutional rivalries described above could well have a negative impact
on US interests. The Portuguese are already dragging their feet on
issues of special concern to the US and are becoming more demanding in
other areas as well.
Geodss (Ground Electro-Optic Deep Space Surveillance). The
Portuguese are using questions about the tax exempt status
of the program to continue to stall on construction of a
Geodss satellite tracking station. Cavaco Silva recently
sounded an even more ominous note when he told our
Ambassador that the US and Portugal are "far apart" on the
issue and that Geodss--as he understood it--was never a
part of the Lajes base agreement.
Security Assistance. Part of the government's recent
oof g ing on issues of concern to the US are a result of
Lisbon's pique over cuts in US security assistance to
Portugal. Government officials have been emphatic in their
view that promises of a "best effort" under the Lajes base
agreement committed the US to a rising trend in security
assistance levels, and that the US has failed to honor this
commitment. They have been broadly hinting that the extent
of future military cooperation with the US will depend on
the level of US security assistance.
Textiles. The Portuguese have been pressing vigorously for
an exemption from US import restrictions on textiles (i.e.,
by including Portugal in the US-EC Gentleman's Agreement),
and they have let it be known that they will consider the
US response on the issue as a "litmus test" of
US-Portuguese friendship. The issue has not yet spilled
over into areas of strategic concern to the US, but it
could well affect Portugal's disposition toward US requests
and become a bone of contention in future base negotiations
(as in the case of Turkey).
SECRET/NOFORN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000802820002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000802820002-9
SECRET/4OFORN
The Frigate Program. The on again, off again frigate
program now appears to be moving forward, but the
government has underscored its reservations about the cost
and made clear that it considers the program a significant
sacrifice on its part to larger NATO interests. The
Portuguese are scheduled to work out the final details on
the German shipbuilding contract by the end of March;
however, they are still pressing for supply and/or
financing of the equipment by the Dutch.
-- It will be especially important, for example, for the US to
avoid giving the impression that it would prefer dealing
with Soares rather than the government on key foreign
policy issues.
George Kolt
SECRET/NOFORN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000802820002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000802820002-9
SECRET/NOFORN
NIC NO. 01569-86
25 March 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Possible Discussion Item for Your Meetings with
NSC Officials on US-Portuguese Relations in the
Aftermath of the Portuguese Presidential Election
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
3 - SA/DCI/IAD
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC/Ford
1 - VC/NIC/Fuller
1 - D/EURA
1 - EURA/WE
1 - EURA/WE
1 - A/NIO/EUR
1 - NIO/EUR chrono
1 - NIO/EUR 1.13
NIO/EUR/GKOLT/sblF___~5MARCH86
SECRET/NOFORN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000802820002-9