AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH HORST TELTSCHIK: DEBRIEF ON GROMYKO'S VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001202720024-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: January 19, 1983
• Content Type: CABLE

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INCOMING
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PAGE 001
TOR: 192146Z JAN 83
00 RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
STU1511
00 RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #1473/01 0191841
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 191837Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2859
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 8490
BT
S E C R E T
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, UR, GE
SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH HORST TELTSCHIK: DEBRIEF
ON GROMYKO'S VISIT.
2. SUMMARY: ON JAN 18, CHANCELLOR KOHL'S ASSISTANT.
HORST TELTSCHIK, BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON KOHL'S
MEETING WITH GROMYKO EARLIER IN THE DAY. TELTSCHIK SAID
THAT GROMYKO HAD COME ACROSS AS CAUTIOUS AND NON-AGGRESSIVE,
BUT PROBED THE FRG HARD FOR DIFFERENCES IN POLICY WITH THE
U.S. ON INF AND THE NATO DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION. GROMYKO
GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING
A GOOD DIALOGUE WITH THE KOHL GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS
REFLECTING A SOVIET BELIEF THAT THE CDU WILL PREVAIL IN THE
COMING ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH GROMYKO SPENT A LOT OF TIME
ATTACKING U.S. POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, HE WAS UNABLE TO
SEPARATE THE KOHL GOVERNMENT FROM FIRM SUPPORT FOR U.S.
AND ALLIANCE POLICY. THE KOHL GOVERNMENT IS CONVINCED
THAT GROMYKO WILL LEAVE BONN WITH NO MISAPPREHENSIONS
ABOUT FRG RESOLVE. END SUMMARY.
3. AT CHANCELLOR KOHL'S PERSONAL REQUEST, HORST TELTSCHIK.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, CALLED ON
THE AMBASSADOR, TUESDAY EVENING, JANUARY 18, TC GIVE SOME
INITIAL IMPRESSIONS OF CHANCELLCR KOHL'S THREE-HOUR
MEETING WITH SOVIET FCREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO EARLIER
IN THE DAY. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT CONTRARY TO HIS FORMER
VISIT TO BONN IN THE FALL OF 1979, GROMYKO HAD BEEN
UNEXPECTEDLY UNAGGRESSIVE AND CAUTIOUS IN HIS PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SESSIONS IN BONN. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE
CHANCELLOR HAD THE DISTINCT-IMPRESSION THAT GROMYKO WAS
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PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN TESTING THE NEW FRG GOVERNMENT,
PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO ITS RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON.
HE SAID THAT GROMYKO SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME PROBING
KOHL TO SEE IF THERE WERE ANY DISCERNIBLE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON ON INF AND THE NATO DOUBLE-
TRACK DECISION. ALTHOUGH GROMYKO TOLD THE CHANCELLOR
THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S FIRM SUPPORT
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ALLIANCE. HE DID NOT TRY TO
THREATEN OR PRESSURE KOHL TO ALTER HIS POSITIONS.
TELTSCHIK SAID THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT GROMYKO NOW FULLY
UNDERSTANDS FRG POLICY.
4. THE AMBASSADOR SAID IT WAS GOOD FOR GROMYKO TO KNOW OF
THE CHANCELLOR'S FIRMNESS BUT SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS
WOULD NOW ONLY WORK HARDER ON VOGEL AND BAHR TO MOVE THE
SPD FURTHER AWAY FROM ALLIANCE SECURITY POLICY DURING
THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. TELTSCHIK AGREED THAT THAT WAS
LIKELY.
3. TELTSCHIK REPEATED THAT GROMYKO'S GENERALLY RESERVED
PUBLIC BEHAVIOR HAD TAKEN A NUMBER OF PEOPLE BY SURPRISE.
ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN A BIT AGGRESSIVE DURING HIS DINNER
TOAST THE FIRST EVENING (SEE BONN 1370). GROMYKO
MODERATED HIS APPROACH CONSIDERABLY THEREAFTER. TELTSCHIK
SAID THAT INDEED A NUMBER OF FRG JOURNALISTS HAD
EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT OVER GROMYKO'S CALM AND CAUTIOUS
PERFORMANCE DURING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE (BONN 1369),
SAYING THEY WOULD HAVE MUCH PREFERRED A HARD-HITTING
ATTACK WHICH MADE BETTER COPY.
S. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GROMYKO ALSO LEFT THE CLEAR
IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS LOOKED FORWARD TO CONTINUING
THE DIALOGUE WITH THE KOHL GOVERNMENT, ACKNOWLEDGING THE
AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATION THAT THAT REPRESENTED A GOOD
"INSURANCE POLICY." TELTSCHIK SAID HE ALSO ASSUMED
BY GROMYKO'S BEHAVIOR THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECT -THE CDU TO
WIN THE COMING ELECTION AND REMAIN IN GOVERNMENT. HE SAID
THAT GROMYKO EMPHASIZED THAT DESPITE SOVIET DISAGREEMENTS
WITH THE FRG OVER EAST-WEST ISSUES. THERE WAS A LOT OF
ROOM FOR AGREEMENTS OF A BILATERAL NATURE. TELTSCHIK
FOUND IT PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THAT GROMYKO AT NO
TIME THREATENED TO CURTAIL RELATIONS WITH THE KOHL
GOVERNMENT TO PUNISH IT FOR ITS PRO-AMERICAN POLICIES.
7. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED TELTSCHIK IF HE WERE INFORMED
ABOUT GROMYKO'S MEETINGS WITH GENSCHER THE PREVIOUS
DAY (JAN 17). TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD TOLD
THE CHANCELLOR THAT GROMYKO HAD CONCENTRATED PRIMARILY
ON INF. TRYING TO CONVINCE THE WEST GERMANS THAT"THE
U.S. POLICY WAS DIRECTLY THREATENING THE SOVIET UNION.
REPORTEDLY GROMYKO HAD SHOWN GENSCHER A DETAILED MAP
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, UR, GE
SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH HORST TELTSCHIK: DEBRIEF
SHOWING PRECISELY HOW THE UNITED STATE'S MILITARY HAD
ENCIRCLED THE SOVIET UNION. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THERE
WAS NOTHING NEW OR UNEXPECTED IN GROMYKO'S PRESENTATION
AND THAT HE HAD AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE THE FRG THAT THE
U.S. HELD A ONE AND ONE-HALF LEVEL OF SUPERIORITY OVER THE
SOVIET UNION IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS.
8. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE FOUND THAT POSITION RATHER
DISINGENUOUS IN THAT ANDROPOV HAD IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED
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A SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN HIS INF PROPOSALS. TELTSCHIK
SAID THAT GROMYKO CONSISTENTLY TOLD THE FRG THAT THE
SOVIET UNION WAS INTERESTED IN AN AGREEMENT BASED ON
"APPROXIMATE" BALANCE. NOT ONE NECESSARILY REFLECTING
"ABSOLUTE" BALANCE. HE SAID THAT GROMYKO AGAIN
CHARACTERIZED THE PROJECTED PERSHING II DEPLOYMENTS AS
STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN THAT THEY COULD STRIKE THE SOVIET
UNION. GROMYKO ALSO CLAIMED THAT WESTERN INF DEPLOYMENTS
WOULD GIVE THE U.S. A "THREE-FOLD" WARHEAD SUPERIORITY
OVER THE SOVIETS.
9. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GROMYKO CLAIMED TO BE PARTICULARLY
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS AT GENEVA,
CLAIMING THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS WHATSOEVER AND
WOULD BE NONE UNLESS THE U.S. INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO
BE FLEXIBLE AND COMPROMISE. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE NATO
DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION AND THE ZERO OPTION WAS A CLEAR
EFFORT BY THE U.S. TO PUT THE SOVIETS IN AN IMPOSSIBLE
POSITION FOR IF THERE WERE NO PROGRESS IN THE TALKS THE
AMERICANS WOULD, OF COURSE. PORTRAY THE SOVIETS AS THE
GUILTY PARTY. HE IMPLIED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH
REPRESENTED UNFAIR TACTICS.
10. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD ASKED THE FRG TO
RECONSIDER CAREFULLY AND FAVORABLY THE RECENT WARSAW
PACT DECLARATION ISSUED IN PRAGUE. AFTER REPEATING THE
ADVANTAGES HE SAW IN A TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION, GROMYKO
SAID THAT THE SIGNAL GIVEN ON NON-FIRST-USE OF ARMS WAS
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT THE WEST
HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-FIRST-USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR NOT MENTIONING SOVIET CONVENTIONAL
FORCES AND NOW THE WEST WAS ATTACKING THE SOVIETS FOR
ADDING CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO THEIR EARLIER EQUATION.
THEN GROMYKO DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT
BETWEEN ANDROPOV AND REAGAN, WITH KOHL FAVORING SUCH
A MEETING IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MIGHT WELL INSTILL
SOME IMPORTANT MOVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
11. TELTSCHIK THEN RETURNED TO GROMYKO'S EFFORTS TO
PORTRAY THE UNITED STATES AS AN AGGRESSIVE POWER BENT ON
PRESSURING THE SOVIET UNION. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED
TELTSCHIK IF IT WAS THE FRG VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS WERE
SERIOUS IN MAKING SUCH A CLAIM. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT IT
WAS HIS (TELTSCHIK'S )PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS
FEAR THE U.S. MILITARY BUILD-UP PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT WILL
GIVE THE U.S. THE ABILITY TO INTERVENE IN THOSE AREAS
WHERE THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO EXPAND THEIR
INFLUENCE. TO THAT EXTENT, THE SOVIETS SEE U.S. MILITARY
POLICY AS DIMINISHING SOVIET MANEUVERABILITY. TELTSCHIK
SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS
TO AVOID A SOLIDIFICATION OF U.S. POWER AND INFLUENCE
IN EUROPE FOR THAT WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE SOVIET
EFFORTS TO INCREASE SOVIET LEVERAGE IN WESTERN EUROPE. IN
ADDITION, TELTSCHIK THOUGHT THAT A SUCCESSFUL U.S. EFFORT
TO BLUNT SOVIET AMBITIONS IN THIS REGARD WOULD CAUSE THE
SOVIETS SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AT ALL LEVELS - ECONOMIC,
TECHNOLOGICAL, MILITARY AND POLITICAL.
12. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT GROMYKO
HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE CHANCELLOR'S STRENGTH AND RESOLVE.
TELTSCHIK AGREED SAYING THAT KOHL HAD GIVEN GROMYKO
AN UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR PICTURE OF FRG POLICY AND THAT
WAS OBVIOUSLY USEFUL. HE SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR
HAD ALSO ADMONISHED GROMYKO AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
AGAINST LOOSE TALK ABOUT WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE,
POINTING OUT THAT WESTERN EUROPE WAS CLEARLY NON-MILITANT
IN ITS BEHAVIOR AND INTENTIQNS AND THAT SUCH TALK ONLY
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INCREASED SKEPTICISM OVER SOVIET MOTIVES. GROMYKO IN
RESPONSE AGAIN ASKED KOHL WHAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT WOULD
00 IF NO AGREEMENT WERE REACHED IN GENEVA. KOHL SAID
THAT ALL OF THE PARTIES IN THE BUNDESTAG HAD AGREED WITH
PREVIOUS CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AS TO WHAT MUST BE DONE IN
THAT EVENT AND THAT WAS THE POLICY THE KOHL GOVERNMENT
sso
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TOR: 1921462 JAN 83
NC 0314889
E.O. 12356: OECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL. MNUC, UR, GE
SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH HORST TELTSCHIK: DEBRIEF
WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE. GROMYKO SAID THAT THAT DID NOT
RESPOND SPECIFICALLY TO HIS QUESTION. THE CHANCELLOR
SAID THAT IT WAS HIS ANSWER ANYWAY. TELTSCHIK SAID
THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT IN GROMYKO'S MIND THAT THE FRG
WOULD HONOR THE NATO DECISION TO DEPLOY IF THERE WERE
NO RESULTS IN GENEVA.
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