ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI INTERVIEWED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100830032-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: April 27, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CFIASE, MAR`(TAND 20015
INC.
PROGRAM Issues & Answers
April 27, 1980 12:00 Noon
Zbigniew Brzezinski Interviewed
WJLA TV
ABC Network
Washington, DC
ANNOUNCER: From the Roosevelt Room in the White House
in Washington, where President Carter meets with his closest ad-
visers, Issues & Answers brings you Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assis-
tant to the President for National Security and Foreign Policy
Affairs. Mr. Brzezinski will be interviewed by ABC News White
House correspondent Sam Donaldson and Issues & Answers chief
correspondent Bob Clark.
BOB CLARK: The situation of Iran appears to have taken
a potentially dangerous new turn, with the removal of the hos-
tages from the embassy to other locations and the threats that
the Americans who died in the rescue mission, their bodies, will
not be returned without concessions from us. Can you tell us
how seriously you view the situation at the moment and just how
much you know about it?
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Let me say first of all that what
the President ordered to be done was morally right and politically
justified. We needed to take this action to help to relieve the
situation. Our countrymen needed help. We had a moral obligation
to do what we could to help them. And we will persist in this
effort.
Politically, the region is stagnating and Iran's poli-
tical situation is deteriorating. It is important to bring this
issue to resolution.
What is now happening in Iran is unclear. We have no
confirmation that the hostages have been removed. .It is not
clear, if they're removed, in whose custody they would be re-
Materfol supplied by Rodo N Reports. Inc. may be gyred for fife and reference purposes only. It rnoy not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonshoted or e)mibited.
STAT
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tained. In any case, we continue to hold the Iranian government
responsible for the safety and well-being of these people.
Insofar as the bodies are concerned, President Bani-
Sadr said, and honorably, that they will be retained -- removed
and returned to us immediately. We hold him to his word, and
we'll see whether the events, literally within the next hours
or days, justify our faith in his words.
CLARK: If the hostages have indeed been removed to
other locations, how seriously would you view this? And is there
anything we can do about it?
BRZEZINSKI: Obviously, there's nothing we can do about
it, because we do not have control over the hostages. Much de-
pends on whose custody they will be retained in.
We will continue our efforts, all efforts, to obtain
their release. And I believe that one of the very important les-
sons to be drawn from the events of the last few days by everyone
concerned is that the United States and the President of the
United States is prepared to do all that is necessary to obtain
their release, and will persist in these efforts -- I repeat,
will persist in these efforts.
SAM DONALDSON: Well, Dr. Brzezinski, he can do all
that is necessary, but what can he do? He's played a card. It
failed. You said it was an honorable card, and I'm not arguing
with that. But it failed.
BRZEZINSKI: First of all, there is the longer-term
track, which involves collective actions designed to bring home
to the Iranians, and particularly to those Iranians who are res-
ponsible for the fate of their country, that the continued poli-
tical paralysis and international isolation of Iran which the
hostage situation is engendering is bringing ruin to Iran itself.
The country is gradually disintegrating.
DONALDSON: Now, you have said that for a long time.
BRZEZINSKI: ...are falling apart.
DONALDSON: Excuse me. You've said that for a long
BRZEZINSKI: Its enemies are gathering force. Respon-
sible Iranians have to contemplate the consequences of this for
Iran. And if a peaceful resolution is to be found, they have to
play their role.
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[Confusion of voices]
DONALDSON: If I may just ask about that. You and the
President and other Administration officials have made that point
for a long time, but it seemed to get us nowhere. Apparently,
you didn't believe enough in that point to let it play out. You
took this action which failed.
BRZEZINSKI: We have made that point for a long time.
But we are playing the situation here that unfolds slowly. We
have adopted certain steps ourselves to bring home to Iran that
Iran's well-being is being adversely affected by what it had done.
More recently, these steps have been strengthened by allied soli-
darity. The fact that Iran is increasingly ostracized in the
world is a psychological, political, and economic situation which
no responsible Iranian can ignore.
[Confusion of voices]
BRZEZINSKI: If you could perhaps agree on which of you
is going to ask questions, it would make it easier for me to an-
swer.
DONALDSON: We have the same question. Are you now
conceding that it is a long-term proposition, that those hostages
will be there a long time?
BRZEZINSKI: We're not conceding anything of the sort.
what I'm saying is that one has to have a long-term strategy for
dealing with a problem which may last a long time or which might
be resolved more rapidly: In addition to that, one has the obli-
gation to consider alternative courses of action which might re-
solve this problem more promptly.
The rescue operation which the President ordered under-
taken was planned, literally, from the first week of the hostage
seizure. We undertook it at a time when we thought it was oppor-
tune. We certainly intend to work peacefully, if possible, to
resolve this problem.
CLARK: But hasn't the failure of that rescue mission
effectively ended any prospect for early release of the hostages?
BRZEZINSKI: I would not draw that conclusion. I hope
that it brings home to Teheran a very important message, which
until a week ago the Iranians were inclined to discount. And
the message is this: Do not scoff at American power. Do not
scoff at American reach. It is in Iran's interest to resolve
this problem peacefully. It is our preference to resolve it
peacefully.
CLARK: Do you think the failure of the rescue mission
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and the angry reaction of the Iranians to that mission increases
or decreases the prospects for use of military power on our part?
BRZEZINSKI: I cannot answer that question because I
do not know exactly how the balance of rationality versus irra-
tionality plays out in Teheran. My hope is that there are enough
Iranian leaders within the revolution, which we recognize now is
a fact, who are concerned about Iran's well-being and realize that
the perpetuation of this situation is likely to produce conditions
for Iran which might be disastrous for its national well-being.
CLARK: Well, you speak of the support we're not recei-
ving from our allies. But hardly anyone believes that economic
sanctions are going to effect early release of the hostages.
Wouldn't you agree with that?
BRZEZINSKI: I'm not sure whether everybody feels that
way. Our sallies have concluded that a somewhat different sequence
of steps than we would have preferred is now to be applied, namely,
political sanctions first, followed by economic sanctions.
Our collective judgment is that this is the best way to
bring home to the Iranians the reality that they live in a very
vulnerable part of the world, to remind them that in the past
they have been subject to foreign domination, particularly Rus-
sian Soviet, and that they are therefore creating conditions which
may end up being very painful to themselves.
DONALDSON: Well, Dr. Brzezinski, are you saying, in all
of what you have said so far, that we are going to attempt another
type of military operation against Iran or -- in an attempt to free
the hostages? And if so, how can we do that?
BRZEZINSKI: I am weighing my words very carefully. I'm
saying that we are pursuing a collective policy designed to bring
home to the Iranian leaders, those who are responsible, the advan-
tages of a peaceful solution, a peaceful resolution to an illegal,
abhorrent act which the entire international community rejects.
We reserve the ourselves the right to pursue every course
of action open to us to redress a situation in which we are the
victims of an illegal, indeed of a belligerent act.
DONALDSON: But to do what? Let me say to you that
Secretary Brown, Defense Secretary Brown, yesterday, in discus-
sing this problem, said one of the reasons why you didn't mine
the harbors or attempt the blockade was because that would inter-
nationalize the problem, perhaps widen it, and perhaps not have
the desired effect.
Has that changed today? Could you go back now to a
blockade strategy?
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BRZEZINSKI: I will not discuss specific options, be-
cause specific options depend, in their utility or disutility,
on the particular circumstances in which they are applied. All
I can say is that the United States has a political and a moral
obligation to do what it can to redress this issue.
We undertook the rescue operation knowing full well
that it was risky. We calculated very precisely its chances of
success. We felt they were sufficiently high to warrant this
activity, because we have a moral obligation to help our people.
We also have a political obligation to try to bring this problem
to an and if the Iranians themselves are not capable of reaching
the requisiste decisions.
DONALDSON: ...Secretary Vance had very grave doubts
about this operation, and Secretary Brown had some also. What
were they?
BRZEZINSKI: Everyone recognized that the operation
was risky. We also know from history that there are moments in
which a certain amount of risk has to be taken. We calculated
very closely what the risks were. We knew that we were under-
taking something which involved risk. We also knew that the
stakes involved were very high.
After a full weighing of this, after many exercises,
after many tests, after weeks of meticulous planning, after ex-
tensive discussions in the National Security Council, in which
all of the President's advisers took part, the President took
the right decision, took the courageous decision.
DONALDSON: Was it just bad luck...
BRZEZINSKI: And I believe that this is a decision
which the American people support.
I will say, for myself, that I am proud to have been
associated with it. I'm proud of what we tried to do. I'm
particularly proud of the American men who volunteered to go
and to do what was necessary to be done.
DONALDSON: Was it just bad luck, then, that it failed?
It was not a question of a bad plan?
BRZEZINSKI: I believe the plan was good. The plan
was extremely complex, because of the difficulties involved, the
enormous distances involved. Some of the precautions taken by
the other side had to be taken into account.
In an operation of this sort, you always have to have
luck on your side, to some extent, to succeed. And bad luck can
abort a situation. This situation was aborted initially without
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any loss of life. The loss of life, unfortunately, took place
during the evacuation process, due to an air collision. These
things happen sometimes. Yesterday's headline...
BRZEZINSKI: ...spoke not only of eight American dead,
but of some 140 Englishmen dead who died in an airplane crash
in the Canary Islands. These things do happen.
CLARK: Dr. Brzezinski, our allies, as you well know,
have been concerned from the start that we would take some sort
of military action that would inflame the situation and escalate
the risk of confrontation, even war, with Iran or the Soviet
Union. They now seem more concerned than ever after this rescue
mission and its failure.
If we do get to the point where we have to take --
feel we have to take military action, would you inform the allies
so there would not be this bad feeling again?
BRZEZINSKI: Let me differentiate, first of all, be-
tween a sustained military operation and a rescue operation,
which is n:cessary.. .
CLARK: I'm thinking of something like the seeding of
mines in Iranian harbors...
BRZEZINSKI: ...an action of a more sustained kind
would be an action which would lend itself to advance consul-
tation.
Insofar as allied reactions are concerned, let me say
this: Our initial judgments are that public opinion abroad un-
derstands the necessity for a rescue operation. And indeed, some
of our allies themselves have undertaken such rescue operations.
The Germans did, the French did.
Secondly, the President has already received a number
of extremely warm personal messages from his associates, the
leaders of our principal allies, indicating their close support
and understanding for the action we took.
CLARK: We want to talk more in a minute or two about
the extreme concern of some of our allies about military esca-
lation in the Persian Gulf area.
SAM DONALDSON: Dr. Brzezinski, you said. that you would
consult our allies in a sustained military operation if that is
something that the President contemplates. I assume you also
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would consult Congress.
BRZEZINSKI: Of course.
DONALDSON: In advance.
BRZEZINSKI: Of course.
DONALDSON: Let me ask you a question about the bodies
that we asked earlier on. It is said now by the Ayatollah Be-
heshti that we have to pay a price, some sort of price to get the
bodies back of our dead. Is that acceptable?
BRZEZINSKI: If that is true, it's another step down
in the moral degradation of a country which has had, actually,
a very impressive, occasionally glorious, tradition. In addi-
tion to trading in hostages, if the Iranian authorities now
begin to trade in bodies, I think it is an indication of the
depth to which they have sunk. And this will further contribute
to their international condemnation and isolation.
DONALDSON: But, in fact, I take it there's nothing we
could do about it. Or would we be willing to do something if
they asked for a price?
BRZEZINSKI: Your questions keep pointing to the fun-
damental dilemma we face -- namely, that a group of terrorists,
apparently with some complicity of the government, are holding
our fellow countrymen. Our efforts over the past few months
have been designed to obtain their release. These efforts will
persist. We'll use whatever is necessary to obtain their re-
lease. I believe we have demonstrated in the last week how de-
termined we are and how far we can reach.
DONALDSON: Well, is the answer to my question no?
BRZEZINSKI: This applies to the bodies. Obviously,
we cannot get the bodies out, any more easily than the hostages.
DONALDSON: Would we pay a price for them?
BRZEZINSKI: We are not in the body-buying business.
We are willing to do what is necessary, through intermediaries
or directly, to obtain a dignified and human resolution of the
body issue, if that is a new issue the Iranians wish to create.
I find it, simply as a human being, from a moral point of view,
degrading to think that anyone would do that. Traditionally,
even enemies return the bodies of warriors.
I hope we don't embark on excessive speculation on
this subject until we know for a fact that this degrading reality
confronts us.
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CLARK: If we can return to the question of our allies'
concern that the situation in the whole Persian Gulf area is get-
ting out of hand and that we may, indeed, be heading toward a
very serious confrontation with the Soviet Union. Is -- will
our decision on whether or not to take any military action, will
it be based on a very careful appraisal of how the Soviets might
react to this?
BRZEZINSKI: I think it's important to look at the
situation in the region in a wider perspective. We're dealing
not only with the hostage issue in Iran, we're dealing with the
progressive disintegration of Iran as a political entity. The
country's polarized and, to some extent, increasingly radicalized.
At the same time, the Soviets are in the process of occupying
Afghanistan.
We are dealing, therefore, with a significant expansion
of Soviet power southward. This does pose, potentially, a signi-
ficant danger to the Persian Gulf, a region of vital interest to
Western Europe and to Japan and to us. This is why there is a
wider dimension, a strategic dimension to this problem.
CLARK: Well, there are many who think it also poses a
very significant danger to us. And even Barry Goldwater this
past week, who has been one of the leading hawks in Congress over
the week -- over the years, has said that he fears we are being
pulled toward a confrontation with Russia and a war for which
we are not prepared.
BRZEZINSKI: I think it's important to remember that
since World War II, there first emerged the central strategic
zone of Western Europe. The second central strategic zone for
us was the Far East. In both cases, we have permanently stationed
American forces. The third central strategic zone is Southwest
Aisa, the Persian Gulf. There are no forces there. Iran, Turkey,
to some extent Pakistan, Afghanistan is a buffer with a protective
shield. That shield has now been pierced.
As a consequence, our friends in the region and our
vital interests in this third central strategic zone are begin-
ning to be threatened. This is why this is becoming a strategic
problem.
CLARK: You say there are no forces today in the Persian
Gulf area. Isn't that the whole nub of the problem, that we may
be moving toward a war for which we simply are not prepared?
BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, it's not true to say
that there are no American forces in the area. We have taken,
under the President's leadership, in the course of the last sev-
eral months, deliberate steps to argument our military presence.
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We now have two aircraft carrier task forces in the area, with
considerable air punch. We are developing a search capability
so that we can inject our forces rapidly. We are intensifying
our political/military consultations with some of the countries
concerned. We're working closely with those who are not directly
involved in our military efforts, but would benefit from them.
For example, Saudi Arabia, who is a staunch friend and
in whose leadership we have high confidence,...
CLARK: But Saudi Arabia is also very concerned about
our taking any military action that might upset...
BRZEZINSKI: You didn't let me complete my thought.
Saudi Arabia, which is a staunch friend and which has
a leadership in whom we have high confidence, has been extremely
helpful to us on international economic issues. We recognize
the need to create an environment which is secure, while res-
pecting the Arab desire to protect their sovereignty, through
the absence of foreign bases on their soil.
DONALDSON: Dr. Brzezinski, some of the American allies
and some of the American public have been saying that President
Carter is really not competent, and that this is another indica-
tion that he's not up to the job. I assume that you do not ac-
cept that. But does that not complicate the problem now of wor-
king with our allies and also of trying to formulate a new policy?
BRZEZINSKI: You know, that's such an absurd statement
that I don't think one should spend too much time refuting it,
but I'll take a minute or two just to remind you that this is
the President who obtained the Panama Canal treaties, against
enormous odds. This is the President who obtained the first
peace treaty ever between Israel and an Arab country. This is
the President which moved us in a position to implement genuine
reconciliation in Southern Africa on the basis of majority rule.
This is the President who bit the bullet on normalization of
relations with China, thereby very greatly improving our geo-
strategic position in the world. This is the President who pro-
vided the leadership to strengthen NATO, through a long-term
development program. This is the President who has taken diffi-
cult decisions to increase the defense budget in peacetime.
It's a pretty good record in three years, much better
than some of our predecessors.
DONALDSON: I did not want to interrupt you because
I thought it was only fair for you to be able to make that case.
But the polls seem to suggest that people are not confident in
this President's ability to handle this particular crisis. That
curve has been going down.
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Let me ask you the auxiliary question. Wasn't one
of the reasons Mr. Carter took the action that you took this
past week because of the political factor, that he saw he had
to do something?
BRZEZINSKI: Absolutely not. We took it because with
the refinement of the rescue plan, at some point we concluded
that the rescue plan was a viable option. Once the negotiating
track had run out of steam, towards the end of March, and once
we had indications from the other side that they were determined
to continue holding the hostages indefinitely, we knew we had a
narrow window left for the rescue option before the nights became
too short and also the temperature too hot for an operation which
included air-breathing machines over long territory.
DONALDSON: Well, you do seem to agree, in what you
have said just then and previously, that the rescue option is
no longer there.
BRZEZINSKI: No, I do not agree that the rescue option
is not -there. I'll not speculate on rescue options.
One particular aspect of that rescue option has obvi-
ously been compromised. But I will not speculate on what can be
done. I will only repeat what I have said many times before.
Let everyone draw an important lesson from this. This President
and this country will do what is necessary, and we have the means
for doing it. And one setback doesn't shape the future.
DONALDSON: We wouldn't go to war with Iran, would we?
BRZEZINSKI: We will take actions which are appropriate.
We prefer to resolve this problem peacefully through collective
pressure. We hope, as I have said many times on this program,
the Iranians will reach the right conclusion. But we are not
going to sit indefinitely and have belligerent acts imposed upon
us.
CLARK: The 15 diplomats who have been held hostage for
the past two months in Bogota, Colombia apparently have been re-
moved from the embassy there this morning and are en route some-
where by plane. Can you tell us what you know about that?
BRZEZINSKI: Yes. We are very hopeful that within
hours there will be a resolution, a positive resolution of this
issue. And we expect to have good news, including our own prin-
cipal representative, very, very shortly.
CLARK: Is this some sort of a compromise that has been
struck with the militants or terrorists who have held them so that
some of their leader -- their imprisoned leaders would be released
from jail?
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BRZEZINSKI: The Colombian government was responsible
for handling these negotiations, and I do not wish to pre-empt
the specific information that will be released at the time when
the good news -- and I trust it will be good news for all of us --
is made public.
CLARK: Do you know whether it is true that some of
the diplomats are being flown to Cuba?
BRZEZINSKI: It may be the case. But I don't want to
go beyond confirming the fact that I think good news will shortly
be released.
DONALDSON: By the way, back to Iran. Iran is claiming
that the government of Iraq has been overthrown and its president
been killed. Do you know anything about that?
BRZEZINSKI: I haven't heard any information to confirm
that. I don't believe that Radio Teheran has an established stan-
dard of accuracy and veracity.
DONALDSON: Another question on the hostages. The
militant terrorists are once again threatening to try them. What
would be our response?
BRZEZINSKI: Our position on this subject has been known
previously. I believe publicly on November 20th of last year. We
stand by that. And the action we undertook last week probably
reinforces the credibility of our position.
CLARK: Thank you very much, Dr. Brzezinski for being
with us on Issues and Answers.
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