POLAND: NEXT STEPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000500620007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 13, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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pY pp
No. ER-1934/3-83
COPY 1
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DATE NAME DATE NAME
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SECRET SENSITIVE
SYSTEM II
~ 90395
May 13, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Poland: Next Steps (S)
The President has approved the strategy paper, "Next Steps on
Poland" with several amendments. A copy (with changes and
additions) is attached for your information. (S)
Additionally, the President has instructed that:
This strategy be conveyed to the Allies in its entirety
with clear references to the continuity between our
previous policy and the steps we are now interested in
undertaking. (S)
The Poles not be apprised of each step in detail, only the
parameters. Step 1 should be explained explicitly and Step
4 should only be referred to (e.g., there can be no further
normalization until the workers' rights to form free labor
unions has been restored). The other steps (2/3) should
not be mentioned unless circumstances warrant some general
discussion of them.
The initiative be raised (circumstances permitting) in the
May 11 Political Directors meeting.
As this is a "step-by-step approach," appropriate inter-
agency clearances should be sought for all related talking
points and instructions.
There is a need for interagency consideration of how and
when we present debt rescheduling and our other steps to
the public. The continuity of this initiative with our
past policy should be clearly indicated. (S)
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~ ~V ~ ~. ~ SYSTEM II
SECRET SENSITIVE 90395
Next Steps on Poland (S)
This paper sets forth an illustrative scenario, linking
movement on our part on debt rescheduling with measured, continual
improvement in the human rights/political situation in Poland.
This scenario reflects the desire of the NSC Planning Group for
the United States to regain control of this negotiating situation,
to reconstitute Allied solidarity on the question of Polish debt
rescheduling, and to develop a balanced approach to this question,
bearing in mind our numerous other interests which will be
affected by an approach to the Polish debt question. The paper
also proposes that multilateral movement on debt rescheduling be
complemented with unilateral carrots (fisheries, etc.). (S)
This proposed strategy is two-phased: Short-term --
Steps 1 - 3 (debt rescheduling, fisheries, etc.); Long-term --
Step 4 (economic normalization). Assuming that each of the
first three steps proposed have been successfully implemented,
only then will we consider moving into the second, long-term
phase. That is, the more long-term proposal (Step 4) would not
be im lemented unless the Polish Government meets the required
human rights political conditions. Step 4 recommends that if
the Polish Government restores the workers' rights to form free
labor unions, the USG will engage in economic normalization with
the Poles (e.g., MFN, new credits, etc.). Contingent upon
economic/political circumstances at the time Step 4 is being
considered, economic normalization may include these examples
and/or others. (S)
At the Paris Club meeting on April 12, the U.S. agreed to a
British proposal that a members' working group be constituted
and tasked with preparing an evaluation of Poland's performance
of its financial obligations under the 1981 rescheduling agreements.
The working group is to report to the next Paris Club meeting in
mid-May. We have, meanwhile, told the Allies that our review of
the situation in Poland is nearing completion. (S)
If you approve the scenario outlined in this paper, we will
plan to begin consultations with the Allies on May 9 and seek
their agreement in time for the next Paris Club meeting of
Poland's creditors (May 13-18). Specifically, in these discussions
before the U.S. agrees to rescheduling, we will insist that our'
Allies join us in ensuring that the proposed human rights and
political conditions are met. Assuming there is Allied agreement
on the proposed strategy, we will approach the Poles at the end
of May. (S)
The key elements of the rescheduling scenario are:
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~.~ ~ {~. ~
.'SECRET SENSITIVE -2-
-- A step-by-step approach: We will not proceed from one
step to the next until the preceding step has been fully
implemented to our satisfaction. ..
-- Flexibility: The steps are tailored so that they may
be altered to adapt to change. Specifically, parts of steps may
be combined to accelerate the process in the event that human
rights/political change proceeds at a pace more rapidly than we
,envisaged, or steps may be stretched out to allow more time for
economic/human rights conditionality to be fully implemented.
-- Fail-safe points: The process is conceived so as to
,.allow a unilateral or multilateral cessation of the process
.should events so warrant (tank clause). (S) ,
Steps for Debt Rescheduling Human Rights/Political
!(Note: Rescheduling (Steps conditionality
~1 - 3) will not entail any
'new credits by the USG.) (S)
1. Assuming Allied agreement,
tell the Poles that the Paris
.Club agrees to meet with Poles
,after July 1 to evaluate
,compliance with 1981 re-
scheduling agreement; reach
,agreement on payment schedule
for 1981 debt not rescheduled
(principal and interest) and
interest on the rescheduled
,debt. Indicate to Poles at
.that time willingness to
discuss 1982 rescheduling
provided Poles have agreed to
;the above repayment schedules. (S
Finally, make it clear to
the Poles and Allies that the
outcome of the talks will be
,governed by Polish performance
on the political conditions in
column 2. * (S) ,
Peaceful, successful
completion of Pope's visit
(e.g., travel and statements
are not thwarted by regime);
release of the vast majority
of political prisoners
(includes top Solidarity
leadership, detainees, those
arrested under martial law
provisions, those conscripted
unfairly into military
internment camps) . (S)
Bilateral step: Inform the
,Poles that following a peaceful,
,successful Papal visit and the
,release of the vast majority of
,political prisoners, we would be
prepared to grant Poland a modest
fishing allocation in U.S. waters. (S)
* Treasury believes the, Europeans will insist on rescheduling
even if the vast majority of political prisoners are not
',released. Such a U.S. precondition might, however, delay the
,date for such a rescheduling. (S)
SECRET
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a.,s ems.. v ~ ? ~ ~
v ? ??; 4 SECRET SENSITIVE ~ -3-
2. Activate Polish Creditors
Group to obtain necessary
economic information prior to
entering into debt rescheduling
talks and, when they have
completed their work, begin
1982 debt rescheduling
negotiations, provided principal
and interest on 1981 debt not
rescheduled is paid in full
and a down payment is received
on interest pursuant to 1981
rescheduling. (S)
Cease harassment of Walesa;
cessation of harassment and
the reemployment of released
political prisoners; progress
on mutually agreed package o~
economic reform (for example,
establishment of workers'
councils, guaranteed support
by the GOP for private sector
agriculture) . (S)
3. Begin discussions on 1983 Continued human rights and
rescheduling conditioned on economic reform progress. (S)
adherence to 1981 and 1982 .
agreement. (S)
4. Engage in economic Restore workers' rights to
normalization with the Poles form free labor unions. (S)
(e.g., MFN, new credits, etc.).
(S)
Implementation
Plan to begin consultations with our Allies on May 9 and,
assuming they agree, tell the Poles that we agree to a Paris
Club meeting with them after July 1 on debt rescheduling. (S)
At some point, the question of Poland's pending application
for membership in the IMF may arise. While we will need to deal
with this issue at some future time in the context of our
overall approach to Poland, a Presidential decision is not
necessary at this time. (S)
Footnote: OSD believes "We should make clear to the
Europeans that the U.S. believes that any new credits will be,
in fact, Western grants and that we foresee no likelihood that
the U.S. would grant new credits to the Jaruzelski regime." (S)
SECRET
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET ~ ~ ~ / 7 U _ ~/
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Poland : Next Steps Lr~~ ~ _ ~ c~ ~ ~ ~
FROM:
Stanley M. Moskowitz
No.
NIO/USSR-EE
DATE
29 April 1983
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1 ? ER
~ 1983
2~ ~~
2. DDCI ~T
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A
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3.
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4.
~~Gl ~?
s.
2
a.
Attachment # 2 LDX'd to
Mr. Clark, 1815, 29 Apr 83.
~.
Distribution/entire package
DCI
B.
DDCI
9.
DDI
NIO/USSR-EE
l o.
NIO/ECON
t 1.
SA/ IA
Executive Registry
12.
13.
14.
15.
DCI
EXEC
REG
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
x ~ ~ ~~ ~~
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SECRET
National Intelligence Council
NIC ~~3170-83
29 April 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Stanley M. Moskowitz
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT Memorandum from William P. Clark, dated 28 April 1983
Subject: Poland: Next Steps
1. Background. I believe that the NSC Memorandum faithfully responds
to the President's directive given at the NSPG meeting which you attended on
8 April. We have discussed it with the NSC staff which informed us that:
They are planning to add one condition on Page 2: "Cease
harrassment of Walesa."
They envisage that, if the Paris club agrees to the US
approach, it dispatch an emissary to deliver the message to
the Poles.
I recommend that you support the NSC memorandum with one change outlined
in Para 4 below and spelled out in Att. 1.
2. Analysis of Situation. We are caught in a dilemma. Jaruzelski's
top priority is control and he will not do anything -- particularly
liberalization -- to endanger it. He agreed to the Papal visit in order to
keep Glemp happy and to make it appear that only the US is opposed to
normalization of relations. If the administration wants to use the Pope's
visit as a way of keeping ahead of the Allies on rescheduling, fine.
However, adding a caveat on Walesa may prove to be more troublesome. We can
hardly move toward normalization with Jaruzelski's twisting Walesa's arm on
the front page of the Washington Post. But Jaruzelski can hardly let Walesa
more or less openly foment trouble for the regime without retribution. So,
we may never get beyond the first step.
SEC
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5 Recommendation. That we concur in the basic NSC approach but with
the following suggestion:
Be less specific in the way we lay down some of our conditions so
that it is harder for the Poles to reject them outright as
violating Polish sovereignty (e.g. mutually agreed package of
economic reform)or, conversely, to conform to the letter of the
conditions while violating their spirit (e.g. by claiming that they
already have Workers' Councils). Thus, on top of page three modify
section after semicolon to read:
Progress on economic reform, to include legitimate workers' rights
and improving the functioning of private agriculture.
6. The attachment incorporates this suggestion in a form which can be
LDXd to NSC.
~~G(2ET
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SECR
Proposed CIA Comments on NSC Paper
(Poland: Next Steps)
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Q
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ER-1934/2/83
Cy 2
NO. 90526
COPY #6 (czA)
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The attached document contains classified National Security Council
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NAME DATE
NAME
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J", ~ ~-::,.ACTION ~ ,. ;`"..INFO.,~w::DATE. ~ ~..INITIAI
NIO _liSS
~ 13 U/EEO ~,-~, %~ :w ~~
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tl~n Fo og our ZII-1'~ p
I' ' , ~ ~ . ~ s..~-iudin9 ~ some
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in to norselise relations with wrrsaw.
reek ranks an$~.be9 _..
s
t+
J 1 si:ea? On the or?
~~
~e situ?tion within Poland is verb
a= aw ;4ove,rna~ent has taken a nu?bet of negative
hand. ~ the `i ~ ,
{ ham been outlawed, former trade union
s~epa~ Solid,~rity litical
~'~' ~ stn are being harassed, more that a thousand po
a acti ~ ~ ;
{ ., . _: to ink behind bars, and m nu~'tier of tepresaiVe iaw?
~;pyis~nets ~# ~ alaost all of the
~tiave !barn pss~/rd:? On the poriti;ve side. .. ... .
~ en released, rte infl~~epCe of the Ct,utcll hdr
inte~nees havs De
~ ~ d and the xegim~ has demApst=ated some roderstion
been euatain, ,
I nded sentence far` .
=cent cot~frt cases. i.e., sn~-pe
.in ~ ~ t of Solid~,titY aitb Walees.
t owic _.. a cofounde ~
Male~ntyn ~~ ..
i~
it focused on th?
. At ptes,prnt. attention within po1~~
~ ~'s visit in June
~ ~; sing Papal wit .June 16-2?. Li3t}~ the Pope
upc thin
f Boliaatity}.
le e0 a key tole 3n the Criss o
197 (which p Y -
ot aturning Fplnt ~- with a rssur~eACr
b m oosething .
o
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or
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'.~ ; .. =e~onciliatioa ana s ~ ~ both by
' ' " ' which Bisection Poland tutus
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't:..l ~ and by indicating the ki~ad of po
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~: ' ~ eurtainin9 ;pressure .
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~,., ~ .:, be#netite MbieA cae+ flow fto~s 1 be
~~_ .
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~, ,
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i s a apectcuta of options for dealing with
e
1
~es
he O lions ? Z
i ~ Lion _~ irow roost amDitiqus economic carrots
he Pdlieh situ~~.
s awbitious ecoroeio
to sowew?~at les
o[ 10~ximuw llpsso?-~-- ; Lurthet at this
~ 1~~ralisigiS~ P
. t ' Carr E to doing aot1~ a9
rog
:tia~?;
I I.
tshsll Fund spproac?r
I ?big carrots, ~r
i
;,
~: .
~;
1 1
s ;.
' Diecusai ~n. 'Ph
. ~,an se9selnts wi~hio the polish-7~lticsn
~ woul~ be suPpN~tsd by Y .
the ~Darsaw goverAaottt
~ lace. ~naximvw Pressure orb ~. _. ..
'co>:w~nity and P ~ o It would. give ~aeaninq.
I hte pexio=wa?~~p _
to ibapsove its h"pDSn rig e~ when he stated. ?IL
' to t~h~ Presi~lent' o Decewbet 2~? 19d1 spa
i asita~e>eato i t has wads to
' ~ w+~tnwent will honor the 410
the polioh ~t ~ ill do our share to help
~,:
Ir~._ Das~.c huesn ~~igrts ... we in Aiae~tica ~ . .
~ . ? do~~e~ret, deaPite its
~ pol i sYe eeono~y ~ ?, ?
~ they s1-attet+p~
it hair two iapo=tant.~rawbacks. First, it
9 ~
atthracti~en,e?? ? ,
ii ~ ~ o;~ out Allies to cone vp
co ld b? d i ~L l~cult to co?viaca sawY __
wa do pot see how we could
~~ ~ poney ? ? stfecoad,
:with the net;a~sarY ~~ ~ rind of tight
.: ands ons>aelves ~in a ps
pte~vide the necessary .~ .seen as an esPtY
~.
cal stti~tgencY? 'Therefore it could be
' lic purthermiote.
?i f
I
serious po
p=opaganda,,ge~ture rather .than a
s . sa out of touch witls realities in Poland as to
~: iti' Wight egta
a !past incongsuous. ?
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2. Agree with our Allies tv.approach the Poles are
expre~eing a willingness to begin rescheduling talDcs end be
oeitioned to respond to a Polish request for Western ,
supp;~t for ZMF membership in return for Warsaw's aqr?ement
to_~~osaplete a successful Papal visit, release the vast
ma ority of political prisoners ~ ensure a worker's right to
work~~(Cease harassment,~freciue~t layoffs and reinstate ,
thoaer ir~ed for_political reasoJps) ,~ secure a private eom~ait=
went :that eventually a w~rker's right to form free trad?
-~~ ,. r
unions be restored and a~.meani~~ful economic reform be
Discussion. Advantage. o~ this option is that it
poeit~.ons us to respond to a Po.~ish request for Western
auppo~~t for IMF membership that could be the necessary
positive incentive to achieve.oJ,-r political, human rights.
objecl~ives. Agreement to reschedule the debt offers the
Poli~p regime very little and bid itself may not elicit
~.
,. .
suffi,~ient concessions on the pert of the Poles. :IMF
membe~~ahip would enable the Pol~.sh regime to.acquire som?
necee1Pary financial management and.assistance and could also
Speed liberalizing reformB-with positive human rights
spill~wers.,.The IMF can impose economic conditionality
,.
which the Poles would not be willing to accept from Western
goverjnments. If the Poles do dot request Western support
for IMF membership, then we would.be prepared to accept more
modest political, human rights concessions from the Poles
commensurate,with simple rescheduling. Finally, if the
Poles reject .our
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inai demsrche ~t!l will have achieved in advance Allies
unified policy toMacd Poland.
ga*eeo~ent to ma,~ntsin s
tential dxaabacks. Pirst, ous
?ption 2 ,,however, has Po
rounds that it aaount? to
' llie+~ oaY oppose it on the g
~ in the Il4F. ~n t?-e oth~t
o me~abership
iit~cising t1~~ right t
_ _, .. _ ~..,~.. that IHt' se~ebssahip has
~ WAssaw
~p~rtance, an~~' lettfng
~
e JwruzelAk#
~~ t
legitimising , jP
,~ t
r 3 ~~-are~ ~ thr our
Papal visit 1
iri ,return fora release of moat
o! h~rass~+e ~,~
>litieal psisonets. cessation
those alread resleased, econoeic re.fors- e.e
d i refit au ,~,~~ for the
.r~ir.~o=ce fre
s. sad Y.OT (polish
-
r___-~--- )charter fli its . to carr polish-Americans to
irlini
rivets fans
ith permanent
join
regias.
syaebolic
cou~,d ]~e interp=eted as
to teschedul~. n .talks abut not. IPA'
aims to
doa# of travel and
toss and suc~~esaful '
Chvscbl- also
papal stisit, by askin~Po
mid ive us~ i f s+e rmi tree
wbat~ theme
a
.for the po ' ? visit this susses.
i
Poland
V
~ leseo it could De
' Hy aski~ig leas as~aell a? pzoasiving
The probe on
eas er to st~~rt the p=ocess of liDiralisation. .
. the p,o ?s, visit has tao advantages:
U~.SI and LOT charters for ~'
' recisel~ what they Mould do, the regiaia ha?
aithout specitying p
' se red to take a poa;itive step it ~we
tol+p u? they. Mould be p Pa
~ Olasoaski's coBeent to visiting American
madl ~ such a Bove ( .
i ~ .
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I~ holar~t it cq~uld also help to halt the cutback ,in our contact
!~~
Sri th nhe Pol i s~~ people ?
i i
? disad~{anteges of this approach a=e that it offers a0
litical steps
eic carrot for the ?igni~icant P?
neat.?kero econl? ~
! = itse; f will not be vietred by
we ark sequeeting {rescheduling by }
though it,wouldpE of political
the regime a~ helpful,
~~ a first step) ? 111so
aigni~f icance ~,nd the poles would ~ saae i~ as .
- ~ charteica could De intetpteted Dy oae
the ~ro~s ot1 ~, ? S ? .and LOT
!on' of relations I- though tying it to the
as "~ormalisa~; -
ilute ouch. bf tbi, coacetn? .
popaly visit ~~hould ?
' IDo nothi~ now: Tell out Xllies
4. ~ ,......----;
.~-w ovezneent has not taken~sufgioient ste s to restate the
? tiaX
aoves+~ent on
nd the poles that the
~ .
Discuae on. Z'hie aPptoach leas tlse eesit of clarity aaa
i ~~ b those.' worsied that we want to abaYSdon
would be well received y .
e that we would run the sink
t
ff
ag
tiona? .~It hae the disadvan
~~
'.amp .,
others tv define the ageada and forcing u? to .
::, ~of ~srnoittin9
' t ad hoc rather than control ttse ptocess? 7t'Ris is tsue
res~ .,_, ____
- our .relations with our )1.llie~ s~ our ability to
-- bot~ for . ,
the situation within Polaaid. It also ignored the
'influence -
'" ~ ~ leadeze>hip in exile that we b~cose
zec~est of the Solidarity -
~._... five ? ain and mpe~ifically that we offs inducaee~tt tb
~oos;e ac 9 ~. .
?-hula 't i ht? .. of the pol ieh eo le.. Lo warrant an
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~qet z~lesse o! political prisoners and cessation of ha~rasssent
of thbss altea~~y teleased? -
.,
The Dpmestie ! c~ toz
`.
~ ' xoach the V, takes it will be
J ~egatdlers of 'which app ~
I~
criticised do~gestically. The ii~et opt,~on will 2>e criticised
;.'.
i~x moea Sustt4rir? ss too as+bi tious _ in a, ~~eriod o! econos~io
one will be viRwad ae too pasaiv in
the last
hi
~
:
~,e
eks, w
evtb
th? ~ae? of A lied and polish aeeelop~neRts..
~~
?1~Thile options two an8 thtesi.cleazly link human sights
:: ; ~ ' .
,~ ptog~?ss to A`~lied and V.S. actions. tt~~ey ase likel~t,, to b*
~' i ~ ~ ~ w
. ; ; .oppod~ by eo~~s i n the Pol i a1~-Aa~t ican :co~eunity and
;: ?loe.l~e=e. ~~ieh criticis+~ appears asn~fgeuble. howeves.
.4 ~ ~ .assu ing P+ollifb.av~.hozitiea begiA to a~~va --.even it a2oa11!
... ~ in aEpo?ieive dizection. (a ai,n! ~g ~ nc~n for either optioas~
~~~ ~ ~~ ~~publ a ~suppoit for the~o it likely to ba~ildo _ -
,Under bgth options 2 and 3, s tno~-tier approach .could be
~~ado dad for ~a+ples-entinq such a st=ategy. Pisst, a sp+cial
P.
e~ais~saty eou~el bar ,sent to elimcuss the mattes ~oith out ~-lli??.
:, ~
.
_ ~
i d oncurzence this individual could thou.
~i nq All e c o _a . _ . _ .. ... _ .,; ..
approach the poles privately ~oa s multilateral.basi? to pass on
tt-e ~3etsils o! the option oeleet~.
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,.
..
SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NIC ~~2629-83
7 April 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Stanley M. Moskowitz
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT NSPG Meeting on Poland
1. NSC/State paper on the issues to be addressed is. forthcoming but
we may not receive it until tomorrow morning. We have been told that it
will contain several options on US policy toward Poland, and on rescheduling
the Polish debt. Apparently someone realized at the last minute that our
representatives to Paris club meeting were leaving on Saturday and needed
instructions.
2. The paper will probably deal with the advisability of the USG
making some positive gestures toward Poland, i.e., lifting at least some of
the sanctions imposed on December 1981. At that time the US and NATO stated
that the sanctions would not be lifted until Jaruzelski had 1) released
political prisoners; 2) lifted martial law, 3) reopened a dialogue with
"society" (US) or Solidarity (NATO). Since then~Jaruzelski has 1) released
most of those interned in December 1981 but jailed others for alleged
violations of martial law; 2) suspended',martial law but kept in force those
provisions he needs to continue ruling by`':fiat; 3) has flatly refused to
reopen the dialogue with Solidarity but has tried to create the appearance
of a dialogue with society (new trade unions, discussions with groups
alleged to represent society). Beyond this, on the positive side he has
agreed to the Papal visit in June, evidently in the hope that it will gain
him legitimacy and pave the way for the lifting of Western sanctions; on the
negative side he has just restructured the government in a way which points
not towards "liberalization" but to a more conservative policy (He.dismissed
an agricultural minister supposedly committed to private agriculture and
appointed a trade union minister distrusted by Solidarity and the majority
of the workers). Overall then, he has not come close.,to fulfilling the
Western conditions.
This Memorandum Is DELL BY SIGNER
Classified SECRET KEVW ON 7 APR 89
DERIVED OADR
SECRET
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a
3. Where does all this leave us? Our sanctions have made life a bit
tougher for Jaruzelski but has not made him change course; further, a number
of Europeans and the State Department as well would favor lifting some
sanctions for the sake of having a more activist US policy (OSD and Treasury
will probably be opposed). For their part, over the last few months, the
Poles have decreased their demands on us. At one time they wanted all
sanctions lifted. Recently they scaled this back to a demand that a direct
airlink between the US and Poland be reinstituted. In this situation it may
be possible to make that gesture, but only if Poland agreed to accept our
Ambassador -- nominee (Jack Scanlan has been waiting for months for
agreement.)
4. The fact is that we have played out our sanctions with Poland and
Jaruzelski is going to do what he has to do to keep control -- sanctions or
not. Earlier this year Jaruzelski made it clear that he also can play the
pressure game (We don't like the idea of the Poles cutting down on USIA
activities in Poland, etc., etc.) I think there are few illusions left
about how much we can achieve by sanctions and pressure will build for
easing a bit.
5. Attached: Talking points prepared by EURA.
Stanley M. M~kowitz
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