MOSCOW'S POST-REYKJAVIK POSTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000100110004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 31, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central intelligence Agency
31 October 1986
SUBJECT: Moscow's Post-Reykjavik Posture
While blaming the US position on SDI for the failure of Reykjavik to
reach an arms control agreement, Gorbachev, other Soviet officials, and Soviet
media commentaries have accentuated the positive aspects of the meeting,
asserting that it brought the sides substantially closer on key issues and
opened up new opportunities for reaching future accords. They have portrayed
the meeting as the first stage of a new dialogue and have called on the United
States to build upon what was achieved at Reykjavik. Gorbachev and others
also have asserted that a "qualitatively new" situation has emerged and that
the sides can "no longer act as they did before." This latter statement
implies that US arms control positions need to be changed further, and the
Soviets have made clear they regard the Soviet proposals put forward at
Reykjavik as the proper basis for discussions.
-- In his first national address on Reykjavik, Gorbachev on 14 October
characterized the meeting as a major event that "prepared a possible
step forward," adding that the work accomplished there "would not go to
waste."
-- In a speech at the United Nations given on the same day, Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy described the meeting as the "most
important event of international life...and a milestone in US-Soviet
relations."
-- The Politburo report of the meeting, published in Pravda on 15 October,
asserted that "contacts and negotiations must contin- ue...on the basis
of the platform put forward by the Soviet side" and that it would be a
"fatal" mistake to miss this "historic chance" to reach "cardinal
solutions" on arms control issues."
The Soviets have implied that they do not regard the initial US response
to their Reykjavik proposals as final. By portraying themselves as eager to
follow through with the Reykjavik proposals and by calling for the United
States to reconsider its response, the Soviets probably hope to encourage US
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allies and domestic constituencies to bring pressure on Washington to modify
its stance on SDI. They also hope to blame Washington if agreements are not
realized in the course of subsequent negotiations. Their insistence that a
new situation has been created probably is an effort to pocket what they
perceive to have been US movement at Reykjavik on such issues as limiting
long-range cruise missiles and counting bomber weapons in the aggregate weapon
coi l i
ng
Dampening Expectations
In his second national address on Reykjavik, given on 22 October in the
wake of the mutual diplomatic explusions, Gorbachev delivered a more downbeat
and rambling assessment. Appearing frustrated and at times bitter, he
professed concern that some in Washington were trying to subvert the
accomplishments of the Iceland talks. He openly voiced uncertainty about the
course of Administration policy, asking rhetorically if it sought to "destroy
everything" that could serve as a basis for progress and to thwart a
"normalization" of relations. Gorbachev's lengthy presentation may have been
intended primarily as a detailed explanation to his domestic audience of why
hi
s US policy was not yet showing results.
Setting the Record Straight
The Soviets have charged that Washington has been distorting Moscow's
positions. Gorbachev on 22 October claimed publicly that the US public was
If-truths" about Reykjavik, and Soviet officials have publicly
disputed specific US statements as to what was agreed upon.
-- They have asserted that the USSR did not ask the United States to give
up SDI but rather proposed that all the provisions of the ABM Treaty
-- They have maintained that agreement was reached to freeze short-range
INF missiles at each sides' existing levels, and have denied that they
had agreed to permit the United States to build up its force to current
Soviet levels--an assertion they attribute to US officials.
On 25 October, Moscow staged a press conference for Soviet and foreign
journalists in which Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh scored the US "mass
media of right-wing persuasion" for allegedly distorting the events of
Reykjavik. Using alleged quotes from the President, Bessmertnykh claimed that
the United States had agreed to eliminate all nuclear arms by the end of a
ten-year period. He charged that people in Washington who did not like the
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accords reached in Reykjavik were trying to "cast a shadow over the
President." By attributing the distortions to Presidential advisers and
others, the Soviets seemed to be avoiding direct criticism of the President
d th
an
us holding out the possibility of a Washington summit.
In a press briefing in Budapest the next day, Georgiy Arbatov suggested
that Moscow might make public the Soviet minutes of the Reykjavik meeting to
challenge US versions of what happened there. Saying, "I think something has
to be published," Arbatov then wavered by adding that "minutes are a very
delicate thing because usually you don't publish them" and "that would be a
violation of the rules." Unless Washington publishes a transcript of the
meeting, the Soviets probably are more likely to continue making random quotes
from the minutes as Bessmertnykh did rather than publish a transcript of the
di Alnmio
Linkage
In his 22 October speech, Gorbachev reaffirmed that the Soviet proposals
were a package. He probably intended to dispel any confusion in the Western
media that had resulted from remarks made the previous week by Ambassador
Karpov in London and Bonn that a separate agreement on INF was still
possible. Karpov's remarks contradicted those of other Soviet envoys who were
also briefing West European leaders on Reykjavik. Karpov reversed himself
upon his return to Moscow by clarifying that, while separate agreements could
be worked out, they would have to be considered as a "total package." 25X1
This initial ambiguity on linkage may have been due to a desire on
Moscow's part to keep its options open on this question while gauging US and
European reactions. The Soviets may have calculated that maintaining complete
linkage was the best way to encourage European pressure on the United States
to modify its position on SDI. They may also have recognized, however, that a
rigid, maximalist position could discourage the very kind of political
pressure they were trying to stimulate. Eventually, the Soviets may retable
an interim INF proposal based on previous Soviet positions well short of the
so-called Reykjkavik proposals (100/100 in Europe vice 0/0, freeze in Asia
vice reduction to 100) and allow an agreement to be reached separately from
the other two areas. 25X1
SDI and the ABM Treaty
Soviet commentators have attempted to give a detailed public rebuttal of
the Administration's current position on the ABM Treaty and the permissibility
of SDI development and testing.
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-- They have argued that article V of the treaty prohibits the
development, testing and deployment of all space-based ABM systems.
-- They have maintained that agreed statement D of the treaty, which
allows development and testing of systems using exotic technologies,
applies only to fixed, ground-based ABM systems.
The Soviets are attempting to cast doubt on the credibility of the US position
on SDI and generate Congressional and Allied concerns that US SDI activities
are not consistent with the ABM Treaty. They may hope such a tack will help
undercut Western criticism that Soviet obstinacy on SDI led to the impasse in
F_ I
Re
k
ik
y
jav
.
Although Soviet officials have indicated their opposition to the testing
-of space-based systems outside the laboratory is firm, they have suggested
that their position on SDI is not well understood in the West. Soviet Foreign
Ministry press spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov acknowledged in a 21 October press
conference that Soviet experts had not established a clear definition of what
constituted laboratory research and testing for SDI.
-- In an interview that appeared in a Hungarian newspaper on 22 October,
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh allowed that the ABM Treaty
permitted testina out ide the laboratory of fixed, ground-based ABM
systems.
Summit
Gorbachev indicated in his Iceland press conference on 12 October that a
US summit was still possible but said that both sides shared an
"understanding" that such a meeting must be "successful" in achieving results
on nuclear arms control. He made no reference to a future summit in his
speech on 22 October, however and other Soviet officials have said there are
no prospects for one in the immediate future, suggesting Moscow has ruled it
out for this year.
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Prior to e Reykjavik meeting, Vitaliy Zhurkin, deputy director
of the Institute of the USA and Canada, said that if no summit were held in
the United States in late 1986 or early 1987, there would likely be no more
i
summ
t meetings for the remainder of the Reagan Administration.
In any case, the Soviets probably will continue to play hard to get on
the summit issue in the hope that this will provide some leverage on arms
control issues.
Prospects
Moscow probably will try to keep international attention focused on
Reykjavik while at the same time downplaying expectations of a breakthrough.
The Soviets probably will maintain that it is up to the United States to
modify its position, and their rhetoric may become increasingly bitter,
claiming that the United States has retreated from Reykjavik and failed to
grasp the opportunities for concluding broad agreements.
25X1
25X1
25X1
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