PAKISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR THE JUNEJO GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000300390001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Junejo Government
Pakistan: Prospects for the
mir-
NESA 86-10041
November 1986
316
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Junejo Government
Pakistan: Prospects for the
This paper was prepared byl I Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution by Office of
Leadership Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, South
Asia Division, NES
Reverse Blank Secret
NESA 86-10041
November 1986
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Pakistan: Prospects for the
Junejo Government
Key Judgments The government of Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo has a good
Information available chance of staving off the challenge from the opposition, dominated by
as 0114 October 1986 Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. Domestic political turmoil,
was used in this report.
however, will reinforce Junejo's preference for keeping visible distance
from the United States. His preoccupation with the domestic challenge will
hinder Washington's efforts to persuade Islamabad to expand overt
cooperation in support of the Afghan resistance, do more to assist US
forces in the area, and take a tougher stance on narcotics.
Junejo and President Zia both have a stake in seeing the new civilian
political system succeed. Although Zia almost certainly retains ultimate
power, Junejo has taken over the day-to-day business of governing.
Junejo and Zia have substantial assets that give them an edge in dealing
with the opposition. Control of the legislature and the bureaucracy allows
them to dispense patronage to induce individuals and interest groups to
support the Pakistan Muslim League, the government's fledgling political
party. The government's numerous negative levers-including threats to
collect old debts, investigate local wrongdoings, or deny access to vital
government services-can be used to keep local landlords and other
traditional power brokers in line. Junejo has already demonstrated that he
is willing to use such constitutional tools as preventive detention to nip
opposition activities in the bud. Finally, important segments of the
Pakistani public have prospered since Zia took power nine years ago, and
they appear to have misgivings about a return to the Bhutto era.
Benazir Bhutto is a formidable and determined opponent, however, and her
efforts to wrest power will test the government's ingenuity and cause
substantial unrest. She most likely will continue to seek to demonstrate the
strength of her support by organizing mass meetings without giving the
government legal excuses to act against her. Bhutto will also try to rebuild
her party apparatus in the wake of the failed protest campaign in mid-
August, particularly by allowing moderates a greater voice in party
strategy.
Punjab Province holds the key to Pakistan's political future. Widespread
political violence there would result in Junejo's ouster, either through a
parliamentary vote of no confidence stimulated by Zia or by pressure from
the Army for both Zia and Junejo to step down. Senior Army officers
would quickly reimpose martial law if they calculated that the politicians
Secret
NESA 86-10041
November 1986
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Secret
could not restore calm. The Army would allow Benazir to take power only
if it calculated that its troops would not obey orders to use force to quell
unrest among fellow Punjabis.
The Pakistani public's willingness to support Junejo and his party will be
determined by how well he copes with several real or potential problems. A
serious economic downturn, perhaps induced by a drought or by a dramatic
reduction in remittances caused by an unexpected mass return of Pakistani
workers from the Gulf, would be especially dangerous and would severely
test the government's efforts to project an aura of economic well-being
while avoiding long-postponed but necessary reforms. Junejo must also
show that he can deal with increasing banditry in some parts of the
countryside, sectarian violence, and sporadic but serious military and
political pressures from the Soviet Union for an early settlement of the
Afghan problem.
Zia could replace Junejo without resorting to a general election should the
Prime Minister falter or open friction develop between the two. Zia,
however, would probably resist such a move because it would damage the
credibility of the civilian political system and give force to the opposition's
demand for an election.
The Army's role as the ultimate power broker would set the limits of policy
options for any successor government, especially on national security
affairs. The need for access to US military and economic support would
limit foreign policy initiatives, but the new government would probably
seek more forthrightly a settlement in Afghanistan, perhaps through direct
talks with Kabul. Any Pakistani government would be unlikely to respond
to US pressures to halt Islamabad's strategically important nuclear
weapons program.
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Key Judgments
The Prime Minister: Carving Out a Role
Building a Power Base
A Renewed Party
2
The Challenge: Benazir Bhutto and the People's Party
6
The Other Opposition: Splitting Over Strategy
6
The Government's Strategy: Giving Bhutto Enough Rope
9
Forestalling Demonstrations
9
Passing Restrictive Legislation
9
Pressing Bhutto's Bankrollers
9
Promoting Opposition Rivalry
10
Pushing Prosperity
10
The Military: Watching From the Barracks
10
Implications for the United States
11
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Figure 1
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Pakistan: Prospects for the
Junejo Government
President Zia's lifting of martial law on 30 December
1985 was the final step in a long process that demon-
strated his control of political change in Pakistan:
? In December 1984, Zia held a special referendum
designed to grant him both a five-year term as
president and an endorsement of his Islamization
program. He proclaimed the results of the referen-
dum a popular mandate, even though knowledge-
able observers estimated voter turnout at closer to
30 percent than the official estimate of more than
60 percent.
? Nonparty elections in February 1985 for the
National Assembly and provincial legislatures-the
first since the coup of 1977 in which Zia ousted
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto-fulfilled Zia's
goal of obtaining a genuine popular endorsement of
his program for a transition to civilian rule. Accord-
ing to US diplomats and the Pakistani press, official
claims of a voter turnout higher than 50 percent are
accurate.
? Last fall Zia put the last building blocks in place by
pushing through legislation that validates his acts as
Chief Martial Law Administrator and protects him
from prosecution for these acts as well as provides
for a strong presidency under civilian rule.'
? Zia has chosen to retain his military commission as
Army Chief of Staff-traditionally the most power-
ful position in Pakistani politics-for an indefinite
period.
The transition to civilian rule went smoothly at first.
Restrictions on the press were lifted, martial law
courts disbanded-their cases turned over to the
Figure 2. Prime Minister
Mohammed Khan Junejo
civilian judiciary-and most political prisoners re-
leased. Many political observers were surprised that
martial law was lifted without an immediate declara-
tion of a state of emergency.
week period, mainly in Karachi and rural Sind.
Since the return from exile in early April 1986 of
Benazir Bhutto, chairman of the Pakistan People's
Party (PPP) and the Zia regime's principal opponent,
however, the Junejo government has been under
pressure from her and her followers to call a party-
based election. Junejo and Zia have rejected this
demand, asserting that the current government has a
popular mandate and will serve until the regular
general election scheduled for 1990. Junejo adopted a
policy of toleration of peaceful rallies by Bhutto and
other opposition leaders. In the face of threats of
violence on 14 August to mark Independence Day,
however, provincial authorities-backed by Junejo-
banned public rallies. When opposition organizers
defied the ban, security officials in Sind and Punjab
Provinces rounded up thousands of opposition politi-
cians including Bhutto, according to press and diplo-
matic reporting. The sweep triggered violent demon-
strations that resulted in about 30 deaths over a two-
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Junejo's Key Advisers
On 28 January 1986, Prime Minister Junejo appointed a Cabinet composed primarily of political cronies who
come from conservative rural elite backgrounds and are members of his Pakistan Muslim League, according
to US Embassy reporting. Junejo's inner circle includes:
Pir Pagaro
Former President, Pakistan Muslim League
Not a Cabinet member, but Embassy reporting suggests part of Pagaro's
considerable influence stems from his role as spiritual leader (pir) of the Hurs (a
sect centered in northern Sind to which Junejo belongs) ... promoted Junejo's
candidacy .. retains strong
personal following and has ambition to resume party leadership, according to
diplomatic reporting ... holds Senate seat, has two sons in Sind provincial
assembly.
Iqbal AHMAD KHAN
Minister of Religious Fairs and Minorities
Member, Defense Cabinet Council ... a lawyer who is highly respected by
colleagues for his integrity, according to Embassy reporting ... from upper-
middle-class Lahore family ... in September moved from previous Justice and
Parliamentary Affairs post, in part to permit more attention to party duties,
according to Embassy reporting.
Chaudry Shuja't HUSSAIN
Minister of Information and Broadcasting
Prominent businessman from wealthy industrialist family in Lahore, who man-
ages several of family s extensive flour, textile, and soft drink holdings ...
Muslim League politician committed to improving rural welfare, according to
Embassy reporting ... belongs to minority Jat (Sikh) caste and, according to
Embassy, maintains extensive ties to international Sikh community.
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Malik Noor Hayat NOON
Minister of Communications
Sits on Defense Cabinet Council ... from influential Rajput industrialist family
in Sargodha District ... holdings include Noon Sugar Mills ... has supported
Muslim League since his expulsion from Pakistan People's Party in February
1985 for participating in national election ... well disposed toward Washington,
according to Embassy reporting.
Zain NOORANI
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Businessman from prominent Karachi Shia family ... savvy politician first and
diplomat second, say US officials ... political star likely to continue rising,
according to Embassy ... supports phased-in aid to Afghan resistance.
Mian Mohammed Yasin Khan WATTOO
Minister of Finance
Sits on Defense Cabinet Council ... lawyer from middle-class landed family ...
Muslim League activist ... neophyte in economic matters and widely regarded in
Pakistani business community as one of weakest Cabinet members, according to
Embassy reporting ... not an initiator or doer, but more a listener and apologist
for "official" line, say US diplomats ... well disposed toward United States.
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The Prime Minister:
Carving Out a Role
Although Zia remains the ultimate power, Prime
Minister Junejo-with Zia's acquiescence-is emerg-
ing as the most visible government personality. The
constitutional amendments passed in the fall of 1985
provide for only a limited role for the prime minister,
but Junejo appears to be in effective day-to-day
control of the government. Reporting from the US
Embassy in Islamabad indicates that Junejo directs
the government's social and economic policies. He is
also gradually assuming a prominent role in foreign
affairs. In discussions with US diplomats, Zia has left
no doubt that questions on specific foreign policy
issues should be referred to the Prime Minister for
decision. Embassy reporting indicates that in July
Junejo even exerted his authority over sensitive for-
eign affairs issues by pushing through a decision to
reopen a southern rail link to India, almost certainly
overruling security officials who feared the link could
A New Cabinet
We believe that Junejo places a priority on creating
his own power base independent of Zia's patronage.
He began by quickly forming a new Cabinet after the
lifting of martial law, retaining only two members of
Zia's Cabinet-Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan and
Mahbubul Haq, whom Junejo demoted from Finance
Minister to the less prestigious post of Planning
Minister. Junejo's Cabinet consists primarily of politi-
cal cronies-not technocrats-drawn from the rural
elite. Junejo appears to have chosen these officials
because they represent important regions and minor-
ities, such as Shias.
A Renewed Party
Junejo has sought to revitalize the Pakistan Muslim
League (PML), the party credited with the creation of
Pakistan in 1947, as his political base.
serve as an invasion route.
Junejo chairs the Defense
Cabinet Council (DCC), the top policymaking body
that decides all defense and internal security issues,
presumably including policy toward Afghanistan.=
the DCC consists of the three
service chiefs, the Ministers of Interior and Foreign
Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the director of Inter-Services Intelligence. Zia sits
on the DCC in his capacity as Army Chief, not as
President.
We believe both Zia and Junejo have refrained from
any appearance of friction that might undermine the
credibility of the civilian system. Zia has publicly and
forcefully denied rumors of a rift with Junejo over
sharing power.
~Junejo persuaded
the overwhelming majority of parliamentary delegates
to join the PML shortly after its rebirth in January
1986, guaranteeing him a majority in the National
Assembly until the 1990 election. Delegates lose their
seats if they change party affiliation. Junejo is the
party's elected head.
Pir Pagaro, the Muslim League's former
leader and Junejo's spiritual mentor, retains consider-
able influence.
Pakistan People's Party.
Junejo is trying to overcome the PML's image prob-
lem-since at least the early 1950s it has been
discredited by factionalism-by updating its plat-
form. The party's new manifesto, announced in July,
includes domestic planks that are, we believe, intend-
ed to undercut the appeal of the socialism of the
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The rebirth of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in
January 1986 signals the latest effort to build a
cohesive government party out of the original Muslim
League that spearheaded the creation of Pakistan.
The Muslim League was founded in India in 1906 by
Western-oriented professionals who favored a Mus-
lim party as a counterweight to the Hindu-dominated
Congress Party. During the 1930s the tacit coopera-
tion between the two parties to end British imperial-
ism broke down because the Muslims resented the
perceived Hindu domination of the independence
movement.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a League member since
1913, became the Muslim League's head in 1934 and
advocated a separate state for India's Muslim minor-
ity. When Pakistan was created in 1947, the PML
became the ruling party, and Jinnah became head of
state.
The Muslim League remained the ruling party
through the mid-1950s, but scholarly studies indicate
that it gradually lost public support because its main
base-urban professionals and intellectuals-was too
narrow. It could not win over Islamic fundamental-
ists-who considered the League too secular-or
promoters of provincial autonomy who believed the
League was controlled by the majority Punjabi ethnic
group. The League lost heavily in the 1954 provincial
elections and was forced into coalition with other
parties. The League was formally dissolved-along
with all other political parties-after Gen. Ayub
Khan's coup in 1958.
Ayub Khan resurrected the League in 1962 and made
it the official government party. Party dissidents split
off, forming a faction called the Councillor Muslim
League. Ayub Khan dubbed his party the Convention-
ist Muslim League and continued to head the ruling
party until he was replaced by another martial law
regime in 1969. During Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's govern-
ment (1971-77) and President Zia's martial law
regime (1977-85), the Muslim League fell further into
disarray, splitting into three distinct factions.
After martial law was lifted, Prime Minister Junejo
reconstituted the Muslim League with himself as its
head. The nucleus of the new formation was the Pir
Pagaro faction of the PML, which had supported the
martial law regime. A majority of National Assem-
bly members (170 of 237) and senators (50 of 87)
joined the new PML.
Junejo aims to transform the PML into a populist,
grassroots party to rival the image of Benazir Bhut-
to's PPP as the party of the have-nots. The PML's
domestic priorities, outlined in its manifesto of July
1986, include:
? Making Pakistan a modern Islamic state.
? Eradicating corruption.
? Promoting the parliamentary system.
? Decentralizing government.
? Bringing electricity to 90 percent of the rural areas
by 1990.
? Building a nationwide network of farm-to-market
roads.
? Solving the urban housing problem.
? Generating jobs.
? Improving the judicial system.
? Ensuring protection and freedom for minorities.
? Promoting women's rights.
Despite the advantage the PML enjoys as the ruling
party, we believe it will experience difficulties in
expanding its popular support as it prepares for the
September 1987 local elections. In our view, it will
have difficulty fulfilling many of its welfare promises
because of budget problems. Its inability to surmount
continuing social problems such as illiteracy, corrup-
tion, and crime could also hurt the PML's credibility.
The PML will have to work hard to increase its
popularity outside Punjab in order to change its
traditional image as the vehicle for Punjabi domina-
tion of Pakistan. US diplomatic reporting indicates
that only in Punjab-where 60 percent of Pakistanis
live-has the PML been able to establish a firm
organization.
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Junejo has also sought to overcome organizational
weaknesses in the PML. Early on,
the party's senior leaders-
many of them Cabinet ministers-decided to open
offices in most major cities, establish a standing
committee to examine national problems, and orga-
nize an industrial commission to woo the labor con-
stituency. Senior party officials recently told US
diplomats that current efforts focus on developing a
grassroots organization and claimed that a recent
registration drive netted more than 5 million new
members for the PML.
The Challenge: Benazir Bhutto
and the People's Party
In our view, the Junejo government's main challenge
is from Pakistan People's Party Chairman Benazir
Bhutto. She clearly is widely popular, with her most
ardent supporters predominantly under 35, according
to Embassy reporting.
Upon her return to Pakistan in early April, Bhutto set
out to demonstrate her popularity, thereby eroding
public confidence in the government, in order to force
a party-based election in the near future. She told US
diplomats that her nationwide speaking tour was the
first phase of her effort to force an election. Accord-
ing to Embassy reporting, Benazir told a US journal-
ist that she planned to confront the government by
having her followers block roads and close factories in
Punjab. She believes the government would call in the
Army, but the Army would refuse to fire on Punjabis
and would instead remove Zia and hold new elections.
Bhutto's strategy so far has not brought her closer to
power. Her decision to defy the government ban and
to organize demonstrations in Punjab in August al-
lowed Junejo to demonstrate his resolve by detaining
her, using provisions in the law. Her party's failure to
turn out impressive crowds-particularly in Punjab-
to protest her arrest indicates she has yet to expand
her following beyond the lower urban and rural
classes in Sind that were the base of support for her
father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Moreover, we believe the
political violence in southern Sind Province has turned
against Bhutto the large share of the Pakistani elec-
torate that was not enthusiastic about the government
but was suspicious of the PPP, according to Pakistani
opinion polls.
The Other Opposition: Splitting
Over Strategy
Bhutto's return has further strained the five-year-old
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD),
the loose coalition of opposition parties dominated by
the People's Party, which has been faltering since the
failure of its effort in the fall of 1983 to oust Zia
through a civil disobedience campaign. Public state-
ments by the leaders of several opposition parties
indicate that many of the PPP's erstwhile allies fear
that Bhutto is eclipsing them, and they are angry that
she has-not acknowledged their sacrifices during Zia's
martial law administration. Some have publicly ques-
tioned Bhutto's reluctance to criticize US-Pakistani
ties. US diplomatic reporting indicates that other
opposition leaders became even more concerned by
Bhutto's assertion in May that the PPP backs the
MRD in demanding an election but will not join in a
coalition when an election is held. US diplomatic
reporting indicates that most of the smaller parties
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Pakistan: Attitudes Toward Benazir Bhutto
and an Election
National Assembly
PML Majority
Many delegates may have joined PML reluctantly,
but majority do not want to go through expense of
another election any time soon ... no public
defectors to Bhutto's camp.
Independent Parliamentary Group
Formal group of about 15 delegates condemns
government's recent crackdown ... calls for a
national dialogue between government and all
parties, but stops short of endorsing call for an
election, according to Embassy reporting.
Bureaucracy
Permitted a powerful voice in policymaking under
Zia, heavily infiltrated by retired military person-
nel ... many senior bureaucrats probably have
bitter memories of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime
... despite Benazir Bhutto's claims, no apparent
groundswell of support for her campaign.
Religious Parties
Mainstream Sunni parties generally suspicious of
Benazir because she is a woman, a secularist, and
Zulfikar's daughter ... influential Jamaat-i-
Islami, whose shock troops led street fighting that
preceded 1977 coup, asserts that current govern-
ment has the right to serve until 1990.. .
Shia
organizations welcome Benazir Bhutto, but appar-
ently have not played a role in recent
demonstrations.
Rural Elite
Landlords as a group probably split ... in
southern Sind, apparently predominantly and sol-
idly pro-Bhutto, according to diplomatic reporting,
but government party making inroads among
Punjabi landlords ... many landlords probably
attracted to more moderate opposition led by
Jatoi.
Industrialists
Diplomatic reporting suggests some disappoint-
ment that current government has not been more
effective in promoting expansion of private sector,
but probably not enough to endorse an election
... Prospect of nationalization under Benazir a
concern, although she has ruled this out ... some
industrial leaders probably would back a moder-
ate opposition approach and, according to diplo-
matic reporting, favor new National People's
Party.
Labor
Organized labor did not challenge martial law
regime, and recent US diplomatic soundings of
labor leaders suggest little backing for Bhutto's
confrontational approach, primarily because PPP
could not provide adequate funds for strike of any
duration ... Bhutto's labor policies have aroused
little interest ... Benazir'sfailure to support right
to strike and collective bargaining probably re-
minds labor of oppressive PPP industrial policies
of 1970s.
Urban and Rural Poor
Core of Zulflkar Ali Bhutto's electoral support,
apparently still committed to Bhuttoism ...
supplied majority of participants in recent clashes
with police.
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Major Players in Government-Opposition Confrontation
Pakistan Muslim League (PML)
Prime Minister Mohammed
Khan Junejo
Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy (MRD)
Khawaja Khairuddin, General
Secretary
Loose umbrella organization of 10 parties ... People's Party
largest ... demands Zia's resignation and new election.
Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
Benazir Bhutto
Largest opposition party ... secular, left of center.
Pakistan National Party
Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo
Dominant in Baluchistan ... not full member of MRD, but
often participates in MRD activities.
Advocates greater autonomy for Pushtun-speaking Paki-
stanis ... little voter appeal, but plays brokering role within
MRD.
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam
Maulana Obaidullah Fazlur
Rahman
Only religious party in MRD ... weakened by factionalism
... often at odds with PPP.
Awami National Party
Sardar Shaukat Ali, Rasul Bux
Palijo, and Abdul Wali Khan
New leftist coalition formed in July from several small,
mainly ethnic nationalist groups ... supports direct talks
between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Moderate ... has often threatened to leave MRD ...
criticizes Bhutto for being autocratic and leftist parties for
being anti-Pakistan.
Aims at becoming moderate alternative to PML and PPP
... trying to garner significant support beyond its base of
disaffected PPP moderates.
realize they have no future without Bhutto's national
base and apparently are willing to join with the PPP
in renewed protests.
In our view, the most serious opponent of the Bhutto-
led coalition is Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, de facto PPP
chairman during Bhutto's self-exile and PPP presi-
dent for Sind until Bhutto deposed him in April. At
the end of August, Jatoi formed the National People's
Party, a broad-based coalition of right and center
parties forged around a nucleus of disaffected PPP
politicians-an attempt, we believe, to contrast with
Bhutto's autocratic style. He claims to have already
gained the support of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Pakistan, a conservative religious party with strong
support in Sind. In our view, Jatoi needs the partner-
ship of Mustafa Khar-a former governor of Punjab
under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who re-
cently returned to Pakistan and was arrested on
earlier charges of plotting against Zia-to have a
credible nationwide power base.
moderates.
Embassy reporting indicates
that Jatoi has courted independent parliamentary
delegates and consulted closely with other opposition
We believe only the minority Shia organizations are
likely to welcome Benazir-as they did her father-in
the hope that her secular orientation would counter
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Sunni-driven Islamization efforts. US diplomatic re-
porting indicates that the religious parties-particu-
larly the Jamaat-i-Islami-would strongly reject
PPP-inspired agitation against the government. The
Islamic middle class united against Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto and his policies in 1977. The key elements in
this group-the bazaar merchants, small industrial
and trading groups, and their allies in the Sunni
clergy-have grown stronger under Zia's Islamic
policies and have benefited from the relative prosperi-
ty of the martial law period. Even the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-i-Islami-the sole religious party in the
MRD-has grown disenchanted with Benazir Bhutto,
according to Embassy reporting.
The Government's Strategy:
Giving Bhutto Enough Rope
In our view, Junejo and Zia are seeking to maintain
their support among the Pakistani public while using
inducements and coercion to split and intimidate the
opposition.
Forestalling Demonstrations
We believe the Junejo government set out to allow
Bhutto and the People's Party free rein as long as
their activities-which it could have challenged be-
cause the party has not registered-remained peace-
ful.
~Junejo, however, made good
his promise to restrict political activity, if rallies
threatened to turn violent, by detaining Bhutto and
rounding up opposition activists for defying a ban on
public meetings in Punjab and Sind during Indepen-
dence Day observances in August.
The government has a substantial arsenal of constitu-
tional measures besides its ability to detain potential
troublemakers for 30 days before having to explain
itself to the courts. The civil code, for example, allows
district-level authorities to forbid public meetings that
Figure 4. Zia has tried to discredit Bhutto by
accusing her of receiving Indian backing. F_
threaten the peace. In addition, local authorities can
ban demonstrations that could snarl traffic-as
Bhutto's motorcades generally do.
Passing Restrictive Legislation
The government can relatively easily pass legislation
to hamper opposition parties. We believe Junejo will
follow through on hints that he will tighten legislation
on political parties to make activity by unregistered
groups explicitly illegal.
Pressing Bhutto's Bankrollers
The government almost certainly is working behind
the scenes to intimidate large landowners and busi-
nessmen from financing PPP activities.
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Promoting Opposition Rivalry
We suspect that both Zia and Junejo are trying to co-
opt senior opposition politicians to siphon off support
A Jatoi supporter in parliament re-
cently told US diplomats that he believed Zia had
agreed to detain Jatoi's potential partner, Mustafa
Khar, for only a token period if the pair would then
actively campaign against Bhutto.
Pushing Prosperity
The government is emphasizing increased economic
prosperity and avoiding tackling needed reforms. To
beat Benazir at her own populist game, Prime Minis-
ter Junejo has announced a program of land reform,
giving ownership to many urban squatters, and boost-
ing the minimum wage. A $120 million "National
Employment Fund" has been established to reduce
the jobless rate by funding housing and highway
construction, expanding polytechnic schools, and cre-
ating centers to advise entrepreneurs on establishing
viable businesses. Missing from the government's
rhetoric is the need to revamp the tax system-
particularly applying taxes to income from agricul-
ture-cut subsidies, sell inefficient government-owned
companies, and reduce imports.
The Military: Watching
From the Barracks
We believe the Army-the ultimate power in Paki-
stani politics-played a major role in Zia's decision to
lift martial law and is willing to let the democratiza-
tion process unfold.
the military remains generally
skeptical about politicians. In our view, however, the
military is satisfied that it has an adequate role in
policy formation through its domination of the
Defense Cabinet Council. Since the lifting of martial
law, the Army has helped to contain violence three
times-quelling ethnic riots and enforcing a curfew in
Karachi in the spring, reinforcing police in rural Sind
in August, and stopping sectarian violence in Lahore
in September-but so far it appears to be allowing the
government to control events.
We believe that the Junejo government has a good
chance of resisting opposition pressures for an early
election. If Junejo falters in handling the unrest,
however, or if open friction develops between Zia
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Warning Indicators for the
Junejo Government
In our view, indications that the Junejo government is
in serious trouble would include:
? Continued cooperation between Benazir Bhutto and
the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in
the campaign to force an election.
? Defections of Muslim League delegates in the
National Assembly to the People's Party or
National People's Party.
? A sharp economic deterioration or rise in unem-
ployment, particularly among returning overseas
workers, that creates a groundswell of support for
Bhutto's socialist policies.
? Sharply increased Soviet-Afghan military pressure
along the border that causes loss of popular support
for Islamabad's policy toward Afghanistan.
? Collapse of UN-brokered peace talks without an
alternative negotiating framework for a peace
settlement.
? Continuing political violence through the fall, even
if confined to Sind, that feeds perceptions of
Junejo's inability to maintain control.
? Loss of confidence in Junejo among senior military
commanders.
? Spread of political violence to Punjab, forcing the
government to turn to the Army for assistance or
prompting the Army to step in to restore order.
Unless Zia and Junejo make serious errors of political
judgment, we doubt that Bhutto can develop a power
base in Punjab or reduce the regime's support in the
National Assembly, the bureaucracy, and the Army.
Any signs of weakness or uncertainty on Bhutto's part
will only increase the chances that other opposition
politicians will conspire against her and will provide
opportunities for her younger advisers to urge vio-
lence, which would almost certainly be self-defeating.
We believe the Army would intervene only if it
appeared that unrest was about to get out of hand in
Punjab. In that event, the senior commanders proba-
bly would press Zia to resign. We believe they would
quickly reimpose martial law in response to such
violence.
Efforts to build a power base notwithstanding, Junejo
remains a man of parochial views who values loyalty
above ability in his advisers. Embassy reporting sug-
gests Junejo will not focus effectively on the range of
problems facing the government. Zia could decide to
replace Junejo rather than face the embarrassment of
a government loss in the September 1987 local elec-
tions. We believe these elections will be viewed as an
important measure of the government's legitimacy.
and Junejo, Zia may call for a parliamentary vote of
no confidence. He could then appoint a new prime
minister-perhaps Jatoi-without resorting to a gen-
eral election.
Junejo might compromise on an early election-or be
forced out by Zia-if the government's Pakistan
Muslim League makes a poor showing in the local
contests.
In our judgment, the government will crack down
again if the opposition demonstrations appear threat-
ening. Nonetheless, the prompt release of opposition
activists, the lifting of restrictions on political activity,
and the quick return of the Army to its barracks in
southern Sind indicate that Junejo wants to return to
a policy that tolerates peaceful political competition.
In our view, he wants to avoid giving credibility to
opposition claims that he is afraid of an election.
Implications for the United States
We believe the interests of the current political lead-
ership in Pakistan are likely to remain close to those
of the United States on some key issues-Afghani-
stan, maintenance of nonhostile relations with India,
stability in the Gulf, and, because of its own rapidly
growing domestic addiction problem, curtailment of
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Junejo and Afghanistan
Publicly, Prime Minister Junejo supports the current
policy of providing sajfehaven for Afghan refugees and
resistance, fighters, but we believe he sees Afghanistan
as a potential political liability.
We believe Junejo is increasingly concerned about the
continuing Soviet-inspired campaign to destabilize
the border regions, especially through terrorist bomb-
ings, which caused more than 500 casualties in some
40 incidents during the first half of 1986. He almost
certainly is worried that public opinion will turn
against the approximately 3 million Afghan refugees,
who, according to reporting from the US Consulate in
Peshawar, are seen as both the source and target of
We believe Junejo's principal worry regarding Afghan
policy is that the US role will politicize the issue and
make it an easy target for the opposition. Embassy
reporting suggests Junejo has not sought to change
current policy
Embassy reporting suggests Junejo agreed only reluc-
tantly to such programs as the media project de-
signed to publicize the Afghan resistance's cause and
the provision of humanitarian assistance.
narcotics production and trafficking. We believe
Junejo has come to agree generally with President
Zia-who set Pakistan's positions on these issues and
shaped the current US-Pakistani relationship
Junejo's preoccupation with the challenge from the
opposition, however, will reinforce his preference for
keeping a greater distance from the United States.
Washington's efforts to persuade Pakistan to expand
overt cooperation in support of the Afghan resistance
and take a tougher stand against narcotics production
and trafficking are likely to make little headway.
Figure 5. Junefo came to Washington last July
looking for recognition as Pakistan's legitimate
Continued unrest in Sind could trigger Pakistani
charges of Indian meddling and further hinder the
improvement in relations with New Delhi that Wash-
ington has sought to foster.
We do not expect the civilian government to change
its fundamental position on issues about which Wash-
ington and Islamabad strongly disagree. Islamabad is
unlikely to make more than tactical concessions in
response to US concerns about Pakistan's nuclear
program, because most sophisticated Pakistanis be-
lieve such weapons are imperative to counter India.'
The government is unlikely to push US-promoted
economic reforms out of concern both that it will be
seen as bowing to US pressure and that the public will
react negatively to austerity measures.
Although Bhutto has openly courted Washington to
champion her cause, we believe she will quickly return
to the PPP's past anti-US rhetoric if she believes that
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Washington has betrayed her. Reporting from US
missions in Pakistan indicates that Bhutto's reluc-
tance to criticize Washington has damaged her stand-
ing with the PPP's leftists. We also believe Bhutto
might tap anti-US sentiment-which many Pakistani
observers say is running high-to mobilize support for
the PPP. Benazir recently has reiterated old PPP
charges that Washington engineered her father's
downfall and that neither superpower is a friend of
Pakistan.
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Appendix A
Potential Pitfalls for the
Junejo Government
Junejo must cope with a number of problems that
offer the opposition ammunition to use against him.
The Economy. Longstanding structural problems and
the shrinking overseas market for Pakistani workers
point to foreign payments problems before the end of
the decade.' A recent opinion poll indicates that. most
Pakistanis consider the economy to be the country's
major problem, although even Zia's critics agree that
most fared well under the martial law regime. As
economic problems grow, the appeal of the PPP's
promised welfare program is likely to increase.
Law and Order. Quite apart from political unrest,
lawlessness has risen sharply everywhere except in
Punjab Province, according to the Pakistani media
and US diplomatic reporting. In the North-West
Frontier Province and Baluchistan, the problem is
caused by Kabul's sabotage campaign. In Sind, the
US Consulate in Karachi reports that the chronic
problem of banditry rose to "embarrassing" levels
before Islamabad deployed paramilitary forces there
in June 1986. In our view, public confidence in the
government could weaken seriously if Islambad is
seen to be unable to fill minimum security needs.
Provincial Pressures. Reporting from US missions in
Pakistan suggests that regional grievances, particular-
ly on resource allocation, may become more promi-
nent under civilian rule. Separatist movements-
especially among Sindhis who, according to diplomat-
ic reporting, feel betrayed by the failure of opposition
to Junejo to catch on in the other provinces-could
become an important factor. If the newly formed
Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front succeeds in wooing sup-
port from the traditional opposition parties, it could
generate pressure in the National Assembly and the
Afghan Refugees. The government's policy of shelter-
ing Afghan refugees and providing safehaven for
Afghan insurgents would become a more serious
national issue in the event of a serious economic
downturn or sharply increased Soviet military pres-
sure. Reporting from the US Consulate in Peshawar
indicates that the Soviet-inspired sabotage campaign
in the border areas could be a key factor in undermin-
ing public support for Islamabad's Afghan policy.
Narcotics. The Junejo government says it intends to
eradicate opium poppy cultivation and drug traffick-
ing-activities it believes undermine law and order in
the traditionally volatile North-West Frontier Prov-
ince and Federally Administered Tribal Areas and
contribute to a growing domestic drug abuse problem.
But the use of paramilitary forces in March 1986 to
eradicate a crop ready for harvest resulted in blood-
shed and a public outcry. We believe local landowners
and officials, who have benefited from the lucrative
narcotics business, may withdraw their political sup-
port if Islamabad persists in its antidrug campaign.
Islamization and Sectarian Tensions. Parliamentary
consideration of religious legislation threatens to re-
kindle religious tension between Sunnis and the Shia
minority that believes the imposition of Sunni juris-
prudence would institutionalize the Shias' second-
class status. US Embassy reporting indicates the
government is sensitive to the dangers of Islamiza-
tion-particularly its potential for undermining the
authority and credibility of parliament if Islamic
courts rule supreme-but at the same time it fears
charges that it is not serious about promoting Islam.
provincial legislatures for greater autonomy.
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Relations With India. The normalization Zia and
Gandhi tried to set in motion last December has
increasingly fallen hostage to domestic developments
in both countries. Tensions are again mounting over
Indian allegations regarding Pakistan's nuclear pro-
gram and support for Sikh extremists, while Pakistani
officials suspect India of fomenting unrest in Sind.
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Appendix B
The Pakistan People's Party
The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was founded in 1967 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
who appealed to nationalism and popular sentiment in a pledge of political and
economic equality. According to academic analyses and diplomatic reporting,
Bhutto built a loose coalition of peasants, rural tenants, urban migrants, industrial
workers, professionals, wealthy landlords, and some industrialists. While in power
(1971-77), however, Bhutto alienated key groups-the military, bureaucracy,
urban middle class, bazaar merchants, religious conservatives, and labor unions-
which exploited election fraud during the 1977 National Assembly election by
uniting with centrists and Islamic parties to topple him.
Academic and diplomatic analyses indicate that, in power, the PPP satisfied best
its poorest and least articulate constituents-peasants, tenant farmers, and urban
laborers-who form the loyal core that most observers believe would support the
PPP if an open election were held today. The party most successfully transcended
economic class lines in Sind, where Bhutto persuaded his fellow Sindhis that he
could protect their interests against the Punjabi majority.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regarded the PPP as his private vehicle for gaining and
holding power. He neither encouraged strong party leaders nor built a grassroots
political structure. Instead, he relied on charismatic appeal and ties to local leaders
and landlords who were loyal to him, but not to each other or to the party as an in-
stitution.
since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's death in
1979, these structural weaknesses have encouraged fragmentation of the party
along personal and ideological lines. Diplomatic reporting indicates that the most
serious divisions in the PPP concern Benazir Bhutto's leadership role and the
party's tactics for unseating President Zia. According to Embassy reporting, those
who support Bhutto as party chief tend to be young, leftwing activists who favor
confrontational tactics. Those who disagree with Bhutto's stewardship tend to be
older-many of them her father's colleagues-conservative, and from the rural
elite. Moderates promote a less confrontational approach-including preparing the
party for next year's local elections as an intermediate step toward the 1990
national election.
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Benazir BHUTTO
Chairman, PPP
herited father's arrogance as well as his charisma.
Eldest daughter of late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ... 33 ... educated at
Radcliffe and Oxford ... returned to Pakistan in April 1986 after nearly three
years of self-imposed exile in London ... untested in political arena, popular
appeal derives almost exclusively from father's legacy ... critics charge she has in-
Jehangir BADR
PPP President for Punjab Province
About 35 ... member of PPP militant left wing and ardent supporter of Bhutto
family, according to diplomatic reporting ... began political career in 1968 with
student protests against then President Mohammed Ayub Khan ... later
participated in demonstrations against imprisonment of Prime Minister Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto and was arrested ... appointment to current post in April 1985 caused
widespread dissatisfaction among party moderates, who consider him naive,
inexperienced, and unqualified, according to US diplomats ... activist and
effective "street organizer," but poor leader and bureaucrat, say US diplomats ...
claims to be well disposed toward United States, but US diplomats cannot
Gen. (Ret.) TIKKA Khan
PPP Secretary General
an incompetent "yes-man," according to diplomatic reporting.
Zia's predecessor as Army Chief of Staff ... 71 ... longtime Bhutto loyalist ...
highly critical of Zia's martial law policies, arrested and imprisoned during
1983-84 ... received current post from Benazir in August 1984... disliked in
many PPP circles, particularly in Punjab Province, where he is widely considered
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Key Dissidents
Mumtaz BHUTTO
Founder-leader of separatist
Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front (SBPF)
Early fifties ... first cousin of late Prime Minister Bhutto but has personal and po-
litical differences with Zulfikar's widow, Nusrat, and Benazir according to
Embassy reporting ... former Sind Province chief minister (mid-1970s) ...
prominent advocate of Sindhi separatism, favors confederation of the four
administrative provinces ... arrested, imprisoned several times by martial law
authorities, most recently house arrest (August 1983-November 1984) ... self-
imposed exile in London ... expelled from PPP in early 1986 for founding
SBPF ... persistent rumors of poor health.
Ghulam Mustafa JATOI
Head and founder of National People's Party
Headed moderate-conservative wing of People's Party ... 55 ... number two in
PPP before ouster as Sind party chief ... has strong personal, political differences
with Benazir Bhutto's young cronies, according to diplomatic reporting ...
removal alienated many conservative rural elite party members, particularly in
Sind and Punjab, according to diplomatic reporting ... rumors persist that he
would be tapped should Zia decide to remove Junejo ... well disposed toward
Washington, according to Embassy reporting.
Ghulam Mustafa KHAR
Former PPP President for Punjab Province
About 50 ... influential landlord who belongs to PPP moderate-conservative
faction ... close friend and protege of late Prime Minister Bhutto ... self-imposed
exile in London (1977-86), where he proselytized expatriate Pakistanis ...
opponent of Zia's martial law policies, convicted and sentenced in absentia,
arrested upon return to Pakistan in August, faces 14-year prison term ... critical
of Benazir and young activist cronies, according to Embassy reporting ... ousted
by Benazir as Punjab party chief in April 1985 ... generally teamed with Jatoi in
political rumor mill.
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