UGANDA UNDER A MUSEVENI REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000100080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
Uganda Under a
Museveni Regime
Secret
ALA 86-10008
February 1986
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Secret
ALA 86-10008
February 1986
Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Uganda Under a
Museveni Regime
This paper was prepared by
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALAO 25X1
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Uganda Under a
Museveni Regime) 25X1
Scope Note National Resistance Army insurgents led by Yoweri Museveni ousted Gen.
Tito Okello from power on 24 January 1986. This assessment speculates,
on the policies and 25X1
characteristics that a Museveni government is likely to have and on their
implications for US interests in the region.F---] 25X1
Secret
ALA 86-10008
February 1986
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Uganda Under a
Museveni, Regime
Key Judgments Yoweri Museveni is an assertive nationalist who, in our view, is likely to
Information available pursue an activist, nonaligned, and opportunistic foreign policy. At least
as of 29 January 1986 initially, he will be willing to maintain dialogue with and accept assistance
was used in this report.
from almost any source, and he will sustain his thus far successful regional
diplomacy, which already has generated support from Kenya, Tanzania,
Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi. Museveni will actively court donors to
finance a program of economic and social reconstruction and development,
but, given his concern about subservience to outside influences, we believe
he will strive to avoid dependence on any external source of assistance.
In our judgment, Museveni's government ultimately will be largely civilian
and Bantu-Uganda's largest ethnic grouping. Museveni himself is an
Ankole, a Bantu tribe that comprises about 8 percent of the population. We
believe that Museveni probably will be more responsible than his predeces-
sors, but that ethnic hatreds and economic disarray will greatly complicate
Museveni's central objectives of an ethnically integrated and disciplined
Army and an extensive, effective social service system. Museveni has made
it plain that elections are not a top priority, and it is unlikely that they will
be held for several years, in our view.
Museveni almost certainly will try to make good on his pledge to punish
those guilty of human rights violations under the governments of former
Presidents Idi Amin, Milton Obote, and General Okello. We believe that,
while he will work to reduce similar abuses under his administration, it is
nearly certain the country will continue to be troubled by serious human
rights problems, given Uganda's long and embittered history.
Museveni will be hard pressed to avoid a de facto partition of the country
between the Nilotic tribes in the north and the ethnically Bantu south.
Indeed, the stage is set for civil war between his predominantly southern
forces and northern Ugandans who have dominated the country since
independence. In our view, Museveni is likely to face attacks from
remnants of Okello's forces, and some of Museveni's advisers probably will
urge him to strike quickly against the north to settle old tribal scores and
achieve total military victory.
We also believe that the several thousand former Idi Amin soldiers from
the West Nile region whom Okello recruited into his army in late 1985 will
be even more ill disposed toward Museveni's government than Okello's
v Secret
ALA 86-10008
February 1986
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fellow Acholi tribesmen. Hundreds of the West Nilers deserted in disgust
and returned home with their weapons when Okello signed a short-lived
December 1985 peace accord with Museveni. The West Nilers had borne
the brunt of the fight against Museveni's National Resistance Army
(NRA), and many felt they had been sold out, according to the US
Embassy.
We believe, nonetheless, that Museveni will not seek immediate control of
the north. His slow, steady consolidation of power in the rebel-held
southwest since June 1985, his often-stated intent to rehabilitate war-
ravaged areas, and his army's small size all suggest that the insurgent
leader's first priority is to consolidate his control over the Bantu south,
where the seat of government and most of Uganda's natural resources,
infrastructure, and population lie.
In our judgment, Museveni's movement has superior leadership, better
troops, and much more popular support than did Okello's regime. We
believe that Museveni is unlikely to be displaced by Okello or any other
northern leader in the near term. Although Museveni is sensitive to
Uganda's ethnic diversity, the country's tribal and regional cleavages run
deep, and he will have difficulty balancing special interests and insuring
that his policies are implemented.
If Museveni begins to feel trapped by the pressures of a northern rebellion
and economic collapse, we believe there is a possibility he might veer
quickly toward radical states and authoritarian behavior. The survivability
of his government would take precedence over all other considerations and
make Museveni susceptible to potential offers of Libyan or Soviet military
assistance. Virtually all of his predecessors have toyed with this option, and
Museveni himself has sought Libyan assistance when Western countries
refused aid.
A Museveni government, in our view, will affect US interests primarily in
the areas of human rights, in the continuing opportunities that exist for
meddling by the Libyans and the Soviets, and in the possibility that a
spillover of civil war in Uganda would harm US friends in the region.
Qadhafi has longstanding contacts with both Museveni's movement and
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leaders of the West Nile faction. Either side could be tempted to grant Lib-
ya significant influence in exchange for military and financial assistance. A
full-scale civil war also would generate large numbers of refugees who
would pour into neighboring states with close ties to the United States such
as Kenya, Zaire, and Sudan. This, in turn, would place additional strains
on these governments and prompt requests for more US aid.
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Secret
Museveni's Foreign Policy
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Uganda Under a
Museveni Regime
Introduction
The peace agreement between the National Resis-
tance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni and
the government of Gen. Tito Okello reached in
Nairobi on 17 December 1985 collapsed on 24 Janu-
ary as Museveni's forces attacked Kampala, and
Okello's undisciplined troops fled the capital after
fierce fighting. The mainstay of Okello's brutal and
disorganized army, which continued to rape and
pillage during its return to the north, is his fellow
Acholi tribesmen. Many of these troops are now in
their northern tribal homeland, where Okello had
been stockpiling arms and ammunition since Novem-
ber.
In sharp contrast to previous Ugandan governments,
both Museveni and his armed forces consistently
exhibited respect for human rights and the rule of law
during the insurgency's five-year existence, and their
conduct since taking power has remained responsible
and humane. This paper assesses the likely direction
Museveni's fledgling government will take
A Museveni Government
Museveni will move quickly to establish a predomi-
nantly Bantu government, in our view. The NRM is
composed overwhelmingly of Bantus, and Museveni is
an ethnic Ankole, one of Uganda's 16 Bantu tribes
that comprise nearly two-thirds of the population.
although most of
Museveni's troops are Baganda-Uganda's largest
ethnic group comprising about 18 percent of the
population-only a few of his senior military officials
are from that Bantu tribe. We expect Museveni to
attempt to redress this imbalance in structuring his
new government to reduce grumbling within his
armed forces and to solidify his credentials in
Baganda areas that have recently come under his
Museveni's central political objective is to break the
repressive rule of northern ethnic groups that has
characterized all Ugandan governments since inde-
pendence in 1962. NRM negotiators at the Nairobi
peace talks consistently stated that the government
We believe that, unlike the situation that prevailed in
General Okello's government, most senior officials in
a Museveni administration will be civilians. Indeed,
most officials in Museveni's interim southwest admin-
istration and the first persons named to his Cabinet in
Kampala are civilians, according to the US Embassy
in Kampala. Museveni has long publicly stressed the
need to curb the role and size of the military in
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Museveni, however, is unlikely to sanction elections 25X1
for several years, in our view. He has referred publicly
on numerous occasions to the rigged elections of
December 1980 when Milton Obote was elected
President and Obote's Ugandan People's Congress
(UPC) obtained a parliamentary majority with Tanza-
nian backing.' In a letter addressed to a senior US 25X1
official in September 1984 in which Museveni sought
support for the NRM and outlined his objectives for a
post-Obote government, Museveni made no mention
of future elections. Museveni's book, Selected Articles
on the Uganda Resistance War, published in late
1985, makes only a glancing reference to the desir-
ability of national elections after he takes power.
control.
Most officials of Museveni's interim administration
for areas under his control in the southwest are
Bantus, and
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ALA 86-10008
February 1986
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Secret
Figure 1
Ethnic Groups in Uganda
Nilo-Hamitic
Iteso
Karamojong
Kumam
Kakwa
Sebei
Suk
Labwor
Tepeth
Uganda is inhabited by some 40 different tribes,
each with its own language, customs, and values.
The country also is divided geographically between
two of the continent's major ethnolinguistic groups-
the Bantus and the Nilotics. Christians make up the
majority of religious adherents, though traditional
tribal religions remain strong. Muslims, who enjoyed
a privileged position under Amin make up less than
10 percent of the population. 7-1
Bantu
Nilotic
Nilo-Hamitic
Sudanic
0 100 Miles
Percent of Population
Sudanic
Lugbara
Madi
3.7
1.3
Achoh 4.4
Alur 1.9
Lango 5.6
Other
2.0
LCIIUU V.
8.1
2.0
1.0
0.6 5.1
0.6
0.3
0.2
0.1 12.9
Nilotic
14.5
Bantu
Baganda
16.2
Banyankole
8.1
Basoga
7.8
Bakiga
7.1
Banyaruanda
5.9
Bagisu
5.1
Batoro
3.2
Banyoro
2.9
Rundi
2.2
Bagwere
1.7
Bakonjo
1.7
Banyuli
1.4
Sarnia
0.7
Bagwe
0.6
Baamba
0.5
Bakenyi
0.4
65.5
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Moreover, as an indication of Museveni's priorities,
the NRM position paper at the Nairobi negotiations
listed the holding of "a free and fair election under
the new constitution" as the 13th among 21 points to
be negotiated with the Okello government,
We believe Museveni is far more likely to institute a
single-party government based on the NRM and his
former Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), which
ran in the fraudulent 1980 elections, than he is to
favor the establishment of a genuine multiparty de-
mocracy. His book makes no mention of political
parties, and the NRM's position paper was silent on
the question of political parties.
has publicly criticized Uganda's established political
parties for cooperating with the Okello government.
forums for local and national issues.
Museveni, in our view, will purge the national Army
and security forces of former Amin, Obote, and
Okello backers, as well as place his supporters in
important positions outside Kampala. Museveni has
publicly stated he will verify the loyalty of Ugandan
civil servants, and we believe that he will appoint
many new district officers, rural development offi-
cials, postal employees, and customs officials. The
rebel leader also has announced his intention to
strengthen local administrative control by creating
"people's committees" to administer justice, combat
corruption, and "above all" to serve as political
The US Embassy in Kampala
manders.
ble defending it to some of his senior military com-
difficulty persuading senior officers of his own Na-
tional Resistance Army (NRA) to continue the peace
negotiations in Nairobi, as some of them initially
insisted that the war be pursued. A senior official in
the Okello government told the US Embassy that,
after the accord was signed, Museveni still had trou-
reported that Museveni had
Museveni may have had some difficulty persuading
his commanders that the agreement was in the NRA's
interest, although the assault on Kampala on 24
January suggests that Museveni may simply have
floated stories of internal NRA dissension to disguise
troop movements and other preparations for the at-
tack on the capital. We believe it likely that some of
his hardline adherents are urging him to begin imme-
diately to subjugate Uganda's northern Nilotic tribes,
which are widely resented for their roughshod treat-
ment of the Bantu south for the past 20 years.
We believe that, despite the pressure to move quickly
against the north, Museveni will strive first to consoli-
date control over the south, devoting some months to
this task. We expect that the following factors will
make Museveni cautious:
only about 3,500,
? The NRA totals no more than 6,000 trained sol-
diers, according to a senior US official in Kampala,
and NRA soldiers with combat experience number
The remnants of Okello's army
of northerners probably number in the thousands,
and, though undisciplined and ill trained, would be
fighting in home tribal areas.
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? Unlike Okello, Obote, and Amin-each of whom
was a northerner trying to exercise control over a
country whose natural resources, population centers,
and seat of government lie in the south-Museveni
and the vast majority of his followers are southern- 25X1
ers, and they do not have to subdue hostile tribal
territory to seize national political and economic 25X1
power.
? Museveni's leadership of his five-year-old insurgen-
cy suggests to us that he understands the political
and military benefits of patience. He moved slowly
and deliberately to expand and consolidate his sway
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The National Resistance Army (NRA) is the military
wing of the National Resistance Movement (NRM)
led by former Defense Minister Museveni. Composed
largely of the southern Bantu Ankole and Baganda
ethnic groups, the NRA has established the first
southern-dominated regime in Kampala since Ugan-
da's independence in 1962.
The NRA began guerrilla warfare in February 1981
and successfully used hit-and-run tactics to inflict
high casualties on and capture arms from the govern-
ment. The NRA has approximately 3,500 hardened
veterans, but its ranks have swollen by several thou-
sand new recruits since the July 1985 coup that
toppled President Obote; the total number of trained
NRA soldiers is probably 5,000 to 6,000, according
to US officials in Kampala. New recruits have come
primarily from rebel-held areas of southwestern
Uganda and consist of young volunteers, deserters
from Okello's army, and returning refugees from
Rwanda and Zaire
The NRA is armed primarily wit cap-
tured small arms, mortars, artillery pieces, antiair-
craft guns, and military vehicles.
The NRA's main strengths are its leadership, disci-
pline, and popularity among the population under its
control Its
morale is high. In sharp contrast to Okello's troops,
who routinely murder, loot, and rape, the NRA has
consistently avoided brutalizing the population and
generally has apologized and compensated civilians
for losses suffered during insurgent operations.
over areas under NRA control in regions of Uganda
that were friendly to him. He is unlikely to change
his risk-avoidance behavior in areas known to be
hostile to him.
? Museveni's public program of priorities designates
the "rehabilitation of war-ravaged areas" as one of
his prime concerns. The large majority of such areas
are in Museveni's Bantu south and in Obote's Langi
tribal homeland in north-central Uganda
In sum, we believe that Uganda is in practice likely to
become a partitioned state, and that Museveni's con-
trol over much of the north is apt to be nominal at
best.
Eventually, however, we believe Museveni will move
to assert his authority over the entire country, trigger-
ing major violence and perhaps a full-scale civil war.
In our view, northern attacks on southern installations
or northern efforts to court foreign assistance would
impel Museveni to accelerate his campaign against
the north.
Museveni's Domestic Program
Aside from consolidating power, we believe Musev-
eni's top domestic priority will be economic recon-
struction and development. In a letter to a senior US
official in September 1984, Museveni stressed the
need to achieve an economic base to finance a pro-
gram to eliminate disease, malnourishment, and illit-
eracy; Museveni's book and his public pronounce-
ments since taking power echo these themes. He
claimed publicly last November that he was establish-
ing an interim administration in the southwest in
order to provide essential social services
Museveni's administra-
Museveni, however, has inherited an economy in
shambles, according to US Embassy reporting. In
December 1985, the Okello government had less than
a month's worth of foreign exchange reserves, the
unofficial exchange rate of approximately 2,400
Ugandan shillings to the dollar was almost three times
the official rate, and both imports and exports were at
a standstill. Donor assistance had come to a halt as
public disorder and lawlessness-much of it commit-
ted by Okello's army against the civilian population-
stopped foreign aid deliveries and prompted most
foreign technical advisers to leave. We believe it will
take several years before Museveni can restore even
basic social services to much of the country. Given
Uganda's dire economic straits, Museveni probably
will seek economic assistance from almost any outside
source.
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In our judgment, Museveni is likely to be generally
pragmatic in dealing with Uganda's serious economic
problems. Though formerly an ardent advocate of
Marxism as a student at the University of Dar es
Salaam in Tanzania in the late 1960s, Museveni has
moderated his rhetoric and views over the years, and
has not publicly identified the NRM with any ideolo-
gy. Museveni advocates a "mixed economy" for
Uganda, and stresses in his book the importance of
the country's becoming economically self-sufficient,
saying "we ought not to care whether this is done by
capitalist or socialist means, as long as it is done."
Museveni adds that Uganda's economy should be
tilted toward the private sector, however, because
"nationalized projects have a tendency toward ineffi-
ciency," noting that some so-called African socialist
countries had made many errors in this regard.
Despite this emphasis on private enterprise, Musev-
eni's book notes that his government will take part in
"selected fulcrum-like sectors" such as import-export
licensing, banking, and in the ownership of basic
industries in order to guide the economy as a whole.
Museveni has reiterated these points publicly on
any ideo- 25X1
logical pattern in the political inclinations of NRA
soldiers in the field.
In the political arena, we believe Museveni probably
will try to make good on his repeated pledge to punish
those guilty of human rights violations. He and his
taking power.
Although Museveni appears open to Western econom-
ic and political models, his rhetoric is still sprinkled
with the socialist jargon he acquired in his student
days. For example, Museveni gave both Marxist-
sounding titles-national political commissar-and
more Western designators-administrator-to mem-
bers of his interim administration in the southwest.
While many senior NRM officials are westward
leaning a broader
political spectrum may exist at lower levels. The US
Embassy in Kampala commented that Museveni's
interim southwest administration consists of a curious
blend of the traditional and the radical. Some of its
officials clearly have Marxist credentials while others
are avowedly pro-Western, including a few members
of Uganda's old tribal monarchies. The same mix of
political orientations characterizes senior NRM offi-
cialdom outside the southwest. The US Embassy has
expressed some concern that NRA soldiers may be
more "statist" and prone to leftist ideology than the
NRM's civilian politicians, but we cannot yet discern
associates have long been adamant
that guilty individuals from the Amin and 25X1
Obote eras as well as from the Okello government
should pay for their crimes.
Museveni's NRA has consistently
displayed discipline and restraint compared to Okel- 25X1
lo's army, which has routinely preyed on the popula-
tion. According to the US Embassy in Kampala, the
responsible conduct of Museveni's forces has in-
creased their popularity in areas under NRA control.
Museveni also probably believes that his emphasis on
human rights will boost his standing with donor
countries, making economic assistance more likely.
Even with the best of intentions, however, significant
human rights abuses probably will continue, especial-
ly in the settling of old tribal scores. Uganda's history
of tribal enmity is deeply rooted, and, because the 25X1
NRA's control of the country is limited, many in-
stances of tribal retribution will take place, in our
judgment. We believe, nevertheless, that Museveni is
making genuine efforts to curb and prosecute human
rights abuses, and that his government is more sensi-
tive and responsive to the views of the international
community than the Okello regime. We believe he 25X1
will work to strengthen the rule of law and to control
internal security authorities.
Museveni's Foreign Policy
Museveni probably will pursue an activist foreign
policy that is nonaligned and opportunistic, in our
view. We believe that, at least initially, he will be
open to a dialogue with almost any state in the hope of
eliciting assistance for his fledgling government.
Museveni explicitly states in his book that "we should
always maintain an independent line in economics,
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Biographic Sketches of Senior
NRM Personalities a
Eriya Kategaya
Museveni's second in command ... often point of
contact for Western officials and journalists ... a
lawyer with moderate political beliefs ... like
Museveni, an Ankole.
Haji Musa Kigongo
Chief administrator of NRM's interim southwest
administration ... a Muganda Muslim ... unsuc-
cessful parliamentary candidate for Museveni's
Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) in 1980 elections
... loyalty unquestioned.
Dr. Samson Kisekka
A Muganda in his seventies, who became NRM
Interim Coordinator (Museveni's main adviser on
political affairs) in January 1985... medical doctor.
.. served in first Obote government as Health and
Works Minister from 1964 to 1966.
Matthew Rukikaire
Politically active since early 1960s when he was
forced out of Obote's Ugandan People's Congress
because of clashes with the party's radical youth wing
. chairman of NRM's Nairobi-based foreign rela-
tions committee from 1982 to 1986... articulateC
Bantu interlocutor.
Ali Kirunda-Kivijinja
Finance Commissioner in Museveni's interim south-
west administration ... longstanding radical leftist
with known Soviet and Chinese ties ... unsuccessful
UPM parliamentary candidate in 1980... a Musoga
Muslim.
John Kazzora
Able lawyer and wealthy businessman related to
Museveni by marriage ... NRM political adviser for
years ... pro-West ... spent most of the 1970s in
Nairobi and London ... an Ankole.
politics, culture, and foreign relations. We should
judge friend or foe according to how they relate to our
own interests irrespective of the social systems obtain-
ing in the various countries." The only countries with
which Museveni has stated he will not deal are South
Africa and Israel.
Museveni is apt to be especially active in regional
affairs. During the latter half of 1985, he zealously
cultivated relations with Uganda's neighbors, Kenya,
Tanzania, Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi,
Museveni does not appear to have close ties to any
Western state, except perhaps Sweden, where he sent
his wife and children in 1984 for security reasons. His
relations with the British have been particularly poor,
The US Embassy reports that, m is
first meeting with a senior British diplomat after
taking power, Museveni was sharply critical of the
United Kingdom's silence about human rights viola-
tions of previous Ugandan governments.
more as a donor than as a friend.
Since mid-1984, Museveni has made modest efforts to
build bridges to the United States. In addition to the
conciliatory letter that he wrote to a senior US official
in 1984, Museveni dispatched an emissary to the US
Embassy in Nairobi in August 1985 to seek military
and economic assistance, and senior NRM officials
have sought appointments with US officials. The
emissary maintained that Museveni wanted to forge
close relations with the United States, and we believe
other NRM representatives probably will echo this
theme in discussions with US officials. Museveni's
initial meeting with the US Ambassador in Kampala
after taking power was friendly and productive, but
we have no clear or sustained evidence that Museveni
wants close relations with the United States, and we
believe it likely that Museveni views the United States
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Figure 2
Pepe 'Masindi
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ERN
u
jm BUSO
Lake
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Fort
0Portal
Namasagali
I k
Tororo
batia
hengen
AND Lac
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igal1
Lake Victoria
ukoba
T A N Z A N I A
Ukerewe
Island
International
boundary
- - Province boundary
* National capital
0 Province capital
-~- Railroad
Road
Uganda
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
S U D A N
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Similarly, however, we have no recent evidence to
suggest that Museveni is predisposed toward close
relations with the Soviet Union, or that he tried to
obtain Soviet backing against the Okello government.
Indeed, the absence of reporting on attempts by
Museveni to court the Soviet Bloc is particularly
noteworthy because Museveni has approached almost
everyone else on the geopolitical spectrum, ranging
from Libya to the United States and the United
Kingdom. We judge, nonetheless, that Museveni
probably would accept Soviet economic and military
assistance if offered-and that he would actively seek
it if he felt it necessary to safeguard the viability of
his regime.
US Ambassador in Kampala that he had met with
Qadhafi and sought aid, but only because he was
"propelled by our circumstances."
NRA has received at least nominal Libyan military
assistance despite the frequent, public, and categori-
cal denials of NRM officials, including Museveni
himself.
In our judgment, Museveni probably regards Libyan
assistance as a temporary expedient. Museveni is
wary of Libya's connections with Uganda's Muslim
north and the followers of former President Amin,
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Qadhafi
Museveni) had at least
sporadic contact with the Libyans for at least the last
five years. In 1981, he unsuccessfully approached the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Kenya for
military assistance, according to a senior US official.
He then turned to Libya and received modest military
assistance through 1982, when the Libyans suspended
aid, perhaps after deciding that Museveni was not
making enough progress.
The Libyans apparently renewed assistance to Musev-
suspended aid to the NRA.
provided substantial assistance to Amm s government,
and, in our view, Museveni probably distrusts the
Libyan leader who supported a brutal dictatorship
that abused Museveni's Bantu south, and who once
Outlook
Museveni's government is beset by numerous intrac-
table problems: an economy on its knees after years of
civil strife, corruption, and mismanagement; a society
torn by longstanding ethnic hatreds and atrocities;
and a fragile internal security situation complicated
by widespread availability of weapons and ammuni-
tion. In our judgment, Museveni's elevation to power
has set the stage for a civil war between his predomi-
nantly southern forces and the disparate northern
factions that have dominated the country since inde-
pendence.
Some embittered Acholi military leaders who have
retreated to their tribal homeland probably have
already begun plotting a return to power.
prior to Okello's
ouster, the Acholi shipped substantial quantities of
weapons, ammunition, and fuel to their tribal capital
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Museveni's Critical Challenge: How To Deal
With the North-Signs To Watch
Several developments will indicate, in our view, the
extent to which Museveni strives to reach accommo-
dation instead of confrontation with the northern
tribes:
? Formation of an ethnically balanced national gov-
ernment and army.
? Governmental appointments that reflect regional
and ethnic interests.
? Evenhanded and judicial prosecution of human
rights violators.
? Minimal national-that is, southern-governmen-
tal presence in the north.
? Fair distribution of donor aid and development
projects among regions.
? National conference of regional leaders to draft new
constitution and economic development plan for the
country as a whole.
If Museveni pursues these policies of reconciliation,
we believe the chances of regional, ethnic violence
disintegrating into civil war will decrease.
of Gulu in northern Uganda, probably for use in a
protracted war with the NRA or as protection against
former Amin soldiers from the West Nile region.
West Nile tribesmen recruited into Okello's army
seem even less likely to accept Museveni's government
peacefully. We believe many of them also will be
hostile to the Acholi, whom they regard as having sold
out to the NRM in concluding the 17 December peace
accord, according to the US Embassy
In the second half of 1985, the West Nilers
carried the brunt of fighting against the NRA, and
the US Embassy in Kampala reported that many of
them, on learning that a peace agreement had been
concluded, returned home with their weapons.
In sum, we believe that Uganda's ethnic and regional
divisions have become sharper, and Museveni is not
likely to be able to narrow these deep fissures. A civil
war-perhaps even a three-sided one-is likely, in our
view.
The extent and timing of violence will depend in large
measure on the manner in which Museveni tries to
exercise control over the north and the degree to
which northerners force Museveni's hand by attack-
ing southern targets. In the near term, Museveni's
military pragmatism, his demonstrated patience in the
pursuit of political objectives, and the major task of
economic rehabilitation that confronts his regime in
the south indicate that he probably will not make an
all-out immediate effort to subdue the north. We
believe that consolidation of his rule in the south will
be Museveni's major objective for some months.
Ultimately, however, we judge that he will move to
assert his control over the entire country, despite the
strong prospect of considerable violent opposition
from the northern tribes.
In our judgment, the probable upcoming civil war will
undermine Museveni's plans for economic develop-
ment, drain his support in the war-weary south, and
make him increasingly open to radical domestic solu-
tions and susceptible to overtures of military assis-
tance from Libya or the Soviet Union, if they are
offered. We believe that over time Museveni will be
hard pressed to make good on his pledges of economic
reconstruction and respect for human rights, as prose-
cuting the war against the north becomes the focus of
his attention. In sum, a Museveni government may
herald the end of northern domination, but it is
unlikely to bring peace to Uganda.
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Implications for the United States and the West
A full-scale civil war in Uganda would have several
negative consequences for friends of the United States
in neighboring states. Ugandan refugees probably 25X1
would pour into Kenya, Zaire, and Sudan, placing
additional economic and political strains on these
countries and generating substantial aid requests from
them to the United States and other friendly donors.
Diplomatic representatives in Kampala from Kenya,
Zaire, Sudan, and Egypt have already approached the
US Ambassador there to express their profound con-
cern about Uganda's instability and their fears that
Libyan, Soviet, or Ethiopian influence will take root if
Uganda fails to achieve internal peace. We believe
that in a close struggle either the NRA or the West
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Nile troops could be tempted to grant Libya signifi-
cant influence in Uganda in exchange for support on
the battlefield. Such a Libyan presence could be
exploited by Qadhafi to increase his harassment of
Zairian President Mobutu and to pressure Kenyan
President Moi and smaller regional states like
Burundi and Rwanda. In our view, Soviet or Ethiopi-
an meddling is less likely, but either country could be
tempted to use Uganda as a platform from which to
undermine the stability of Zaire or Kenya.
We believe Museveni will try to convince the United
States and other Western countries that his govern-
ment represents a distinct improvement over the
abysmal human rights record of his predecessors. His
failure to achieve and demonstrate such improvement
not only would undermine his administration from
within, but would also almost certainly endanger
Western assistance, virtually all of which has been
suspended in the wake of Uganda's unsettled security
situation and its pattern of flagrant human rights
violations. If Museveni judges that the West is not
being responsive to his efforts, we believe he will not
hesitate to court additional Libyan, Soviet, or other
radical support for his government
We believe Museveni would respond to any approach
that combined intellectual appeals with respect for his
personal integrity, past achievements, and power. He
would have to be convinced that offers of help are not
based on the assumption that he can be bought.
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