POLAND: CHANGES IN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS AHEAD?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00295R000500600002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ~~
Relations Ahead
Poland: Changes in,, Church-State
EUR 87-10020
May 1987
??y 3 2 S
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Relations Ahead ?
Poland: Changes in Church-State
An Intelligence Assessment
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This paper was prepared by
Office 25X1
of European Analysis, with contributions by
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Office of Soviet Analysis, and 25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be 25X1
directed to the Chief, East European Division, EURA,
Secret
EUR 87-10020
May 1987
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Poland: Changes in Church-State
Relations Ahead?
Key Judgments The prospect for an agreement that would legalize the Catholic Church's
Informations available status in Poland has increased considerably. At a Vatican meeting in
as of 1 S May 1987 January between the Pope and General Jaruzelski, both leaders agreed to
was used in this report.
pursue more cooperative relations and to seriously explore possibilities for
an accord and an exchan a of am
Signature of an accord would have important near- and long-term
implications for Communist rule in Poland and for Polish political
developments. By signing, the regime would rescind its ideological claim to
rule alone and would burden itself with a moral commitment to satisfy the
Church's view of acceptable behavior, with new penalties to pay if it did
not. In return for ensuring the Church's help to maintain stability, both
Warsaw and Moscow would openly consent to tolerate a more independent
and assertive Church and to accept a further loss of the party's prestige
and its authority to govern unaided. The Church, moreover, would have
every interest in expanding further whatever new stature and role it
obtained.
An accord would bring gains for the regime and the Church. The regime
would hope to achieve:
? Additional legitimacy at home and abroad.
? Church advice to society urging calm and cooperation with the regime, as
the latter pursues economic renewal including economic austerity.
? Isolation of the radical opposition through Church endorsement of its
declared moderate and gradual approach to reform.
The Church would:
? Gain valuable legal protection for its strong de facto status, particularly
security for its tax and property rights and educational mission.
? Enhance its status as Poland's leading moral authority and independent
institution as it seeks to minimize the effects of stagnation in Poland such
as family breakdown, alcoholism, and youth alienation.
An accord still faces major obstacles, however
Jaruzelski is most likely encountering strong opposition from
party members averse to, in their view, the dangerous precedent of
officially recognizing and thereby further strengthening a powerful poten-
tial adversary.
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Even without an accord, however, Church-state relations are likely to
improve, at least in the short-to-mid-term.
? Jaruzelski needs the Church to promote stability as he tackles Poland's
economic and social woes.
? He wants formal relations with the Vatican to boost his standing in the
West as he pursues credits and debt relief.
? Many Church leaders who see Solidarity on the decline believe the
Church must work within the system to keep pressure on the regime to
experiment with reform.
? Both the Pope and Cardinal Glemp believe Jaruzelski is sufficiently
flexible to accept pragmatic, productive Church-state ties.
If the Church and state develop a more cooperative relationship, the
opposition and other dissident groups will have to adjust to a more assertive
Church seeking workable compromises with the regime. If the Church
believes strongly that the regime is seriously pursuing reform-a judgment
it has probably not yet made-it will most likely press moderate opposi-
tionists to cooperate, or at least to remain neutral, to give the regime's re-
forms achance.
Gorbachev's pragmatic and flexible politics have apparently led both
Jaruzelski and Church officials to believe Moscow will adopt ahands-off
policy on the issue, at least within limits. Gorbachev realizes Jaruzelski
needs domestic stability and is anxious to see economic renewal in Poland.
Furthermore, an accord would play well in Western Europe as an example
of the Gorbachevian "enlightened socialism," which is tolerant and flexible
in meeting new challenges. However, neither Gorbachev nor Jaruzelski
would equate legalization of the Church with power sharing with nonparty
forces and would insist that the Church operate within the limits of single
party rule.
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Better Church-state relations, and an accord if it is reached, would benefit
US interests.
? Pressure would mount on the United States to accept the regime and to
grant economic concessions, but the Church would gain maneuvering
room for the opposition and encourage regime moderation.
? As the arbiter of the regime's reform progress, the Church would be in a
strong position to bring heavy pressure on the regime to respect human
rights, open a dialogue with the populace, and bring nonparty people into
government.
? In signing an accord, the regime would sanction a major Church role in
ca..*p+
Polish affiars, both current and future, in calm and crisis, in some ways
predictable but in other ways not, which would be costly to withdraw.
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Contents
Key Judgments
A Troubled Past
1
Growing Regime-Church Dialogue
1
The Regime
Selling an Accord to Moscow
The View From Moscow
~
Outlook and Implications
Implications of An Agreement
Implications of No Agreement
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Poland: Changes in Church-State
Relations Ahead?
A Troubled Past
Polish Church-state relations have alternated in the
postwar era between implacable hostility and limited
cooperation. The key variable has been the extent of
the government's need for either the Church's tacit or
its open support to guarantee domestic stability. Peri-
ods of crisis in 1956, 1970, and 1980-81 saw signifi-
cant Church gains as the government sought a "part-
with the broader question of more cooperative
Church-state relations in Poland, was reportedly dis-
cussed candidly in a series of meetings between
General Jaruzelski, the Pope, and Vatican and Polish
Church officials in January of this year.
nership of necessity" with the Church.
The late Cardinal Wyszynski and Cardinal Glemp
successfully manipulated swings in regime policy to
acquire benefits such as: permission to build new
churches; rights to conduct religious education; and
inclusion of Church facilities and chaplains in major
state enterprises, hospitals, and the army. The govern-
ment, when it became stronger, has always attempted
to retrieve what it had surrendered in its weakness,
but these efforts have been only partially successful.
The Church has never secured legal guarantees for its
de facto status because the regime, backed by
Moscow, has been fearful of granting juridical stature
to an adversary so independent and powerful as the
Catholic Church. Moreover, the government has often
sought to undercut the Polish Catholic Church by
dealing directly with "outside" Church authorities in
the Vatican. Because the interests of the Polish
Church and the Vatican have not always been identi-
cal, Polish authorities have tried to play the Polish
Episcopate against the Vatican. This tactic has been
ineffective with the current Polish Pope, who is well
aware of the government's game.
Growing Regime-Church Dialogue
the public record suggest that
t e mayor p ayers-t a regime, the Polish Church,
and the Vatican-believe it is now worthwhile to
explore again the possibility for an historic agreement
granting the Church legal status. The issue, along
At the least,
the meeting between Jaruzelski and the
Pope, which John Paul II labeled historic, laid the
groundwork for a substantial easing of Church-state
Recently, both regime and Church spokesmen have
publicly stated that negotiations on a diplomatic
exchange between Warsaw and the Vatican are well
advanced, implying that progress is also occurring on
the legal status negotiations, which
is linked to a diplomatic exchange. At the
same time, official regime publications have empha-
sized that on many issues-peace, environment, anti-
alcoholism, national rebirth-the Church and state
share common interests, perhaps preparing the public
for more profound Church-state cooperation.
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Status of The Roman Catholic Church in Poland
The Roman Catholic Church in Poland is unique in
Eastern Europe. It is the most powerful nongovern-
mental institution in Poland. Ol a total population of
37.7 million Poles, 34.5 million are Roman Catholic,
with 75 percent practicing their religion regularly,
and some observers claim that a majority of party
members are believers.
The Roman Catholic Church in Poland is organized
into seven archdioceses, 21 dioceses, and 8,040
parishes. Its hierarchery includes jive cardinals; three
archbishops; 81 bishops; 20,311 priests; 7,517 semi-
narians; 1,334 brothers; and 24,850 sisters. This
hierarchy operates over 10,000 churches; more than
30 seminaries; the Catholic University of Lublin; and
the Academy ctf Catholic Theology in Warsaw.
Poland has the highest annual percentage increase in
the number ctfPriests among European countries and
in 1985, accounted for 30 percent of all newly or-
dained priests on the continent.
Poland alone among the Warsaw Pact nation allows
the Church to teach religion in state schools. As
recently as September 1986, religious knowledge in
schools was also introduced in most secondary
schools, some vocational schools, and technical
secondary schools. The Church also publishes over
90 periodicals and newspapers.
In addition to spiritual and educational tasks, the
Church has assumed a number of social and charit-
able responsibilities that include special services ,for
workers, farmers, and artists. The Church's rural
pastoral communities have become irtKuential seU-
aid organizations for farmers. The Church's support
of independent artists and intellectuals has resulted
in a massive influx into the Church of people of all
intellectual casts. After the declaration of martial
law in December 1981, the Church provided meeting
placeslor supporters of the banned Solidarity trade
union; aided families oj'political prisoners; and sup-
plied artistic outlets jor writers, actors, and musi-
cians who boycotted the government-run media. It
condemned martial law; demanded reinstatement of
the Solidarity agreements; and appealed for the
release of imprisoned Solidarity leaders.
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While the details of an agreement remain shrouded,
the Church's educational prerogatives and its guaran-
teed access to the media and communications proba-
bly figure prominently in the talks. The regime
recently legalized an influential underground newspa-
per published by a prominent Catholic lay editor, and
a Church spokesman commented on easing press
censorship, perhaps showing the regime's earnestness
on the latter issue. The regime may also make
concessions to the Church on access to building
materials, its tax exempt status, and its right to
visit.
While working on a draft accord, the Polish Church,
the regime, and the Vatican have at the same time
worked relatively smoothly together to create an
atmosphere emphasizing national pride and social
calm for the Papal visit in June. Negotiations on the
visit between the Church and state also have proceed-
ed well, demonstrating the utility of practical, busi-
ness-like relations, which some churchmen have cited
as a model for an era of improved relations after the
middle ground in Polish politics.
Perspective on Accord
An agreement between the Church and state in
Poland on legal status would be a major development
and would be preceded by a complex calculation of
risks and benefits by each party, as well as by
Moscow. Each side would try to pay the smallest price
possible. If an agreement were reached, each would
then attempt to manipulate it to its advantage. Soli-
darity and the opposition would be directly affected
by an agreement that pledged the Church-the pro-
tector of the opposition-to seek with the regime a
The Regime. Jaruzelski's apparent willingness to seri-
ously consider granting the Church legal status para-
doxically exhibits both the regime's failure to gain the
popular support it needs to govern and Jaruzelski's
growing personal stature, which may allow him-now
that Solidarity is contained-to gamble on working
more closely with the Church. He apparently views
the Church as a relatively predictable, "safe" institu-
tion that enjoys tremendous prestige and is committed
to finding practical solutions rather than to open
confrontation. Moreover, in ruling out any dealings
with Solidarity, Jaruzelski made the Church his only
potential partner.
collect, control, and disburse charitable funds.
Through better relations with the Church, the regime
hopes to gain
? Additional legitimacy at home and abroad and
increased prospects for domestic stability.
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? The isolation of Solidarity's radical elements
through Church efforts to convince respected Cath-
olic activists and some in the moderate opposition to
work with the government.
? Church acceptance of responsibility for pushing
reform-for example, by openly endorsing and par-
ticipating in the Social Consultative Council or,
failing that, at least by using its powerful voice to
caution patience and understanding on behalf of the
government's intended and painful economic re-
forms, including austerity measures.
? An improved prospect for establishing formal diplo-
matic relations with the Vatican. The regime proba-
bly calculates that diplomatic relations would
bolster its standing in the West, thereby enhancing
its prospects for credits and economic ties.
The regime would run significant risks by granting
the Church legal status. Hardliners in the party, who
already view Jaruzelski and his military contingent
with distaste, would see him as too eager to placate
the Church and would suspect his Marxist creden-
tials. Both the previous Minister of Religious Affairs
and his recent replacement are known hardliners who
are probably resisting the accord.
To maintain the Church's conditional support for his
regime, Jaruzelski would also have to satisfy Church
expectations for gradual political and economic re-
form. Though he may be willing to placate the
Church on its religious and some of its educational
objectives, he would face stiff opposition on meeting
its political objectives if they did not coincide with
those of the regime. Such dependence would only
further enhance the Church's role as the monitor of
the regime's progress and would reinforce its position
as the only respected mediator between the regime
and the populace. Thus, in order to strengthen his
regime, Jaruzelski must, paradoxically, further
strengthen the Church. This would make the task of
"rolling back" the Church in the future all the more
difficult. Moreover, a Church with legal status might
feel less vulnerable and less inclined to "toe the line,"
and a Church able to monitor and approve the
regime's political performance could, in fact, demand
a kind of de facto power sharing in return for helping
to stabilize Poland. A future government would be
particularly vulnerable to such pressure in periods of
crisis
The general may also face skepticism, if not outright
hostility, from the other East European regimes if he
signs an accord with the Church.
to show how, by signing an agreement, his regime
gained more than it gave. Consideration for this
"demonstration effect" could toughen the general's
bargaining stance.
The Church. Most Church leaders in Poland want
legal status as a bulwark for maintaining the
Church's central position in Polish society. While
some powerful voices have cautioned that the govern-
ment would use any agreement to hem in the Church,
proagreement leaders probably calculate that legal
status would:
? Confer the security of de jure recognition on the
Church's hard-won de facto status and allow
churchmen to deal directly with government minis-
tries on issues of interest.
? Provide a more predictable legal framework for
settling chronically difficult problems such as the
Church's role in private school education and its
property rights.
? Reinforce the Church's status as Poland's leading
moral and independent political force as it seeks to
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influence both the faithful and the government to
work together in solving Poland's problems.
The Church, too, runs risks by appearing overly
cooperative with Jaruzelski and by accepting legal
status. The faithful, as Cardinal Glemp has noted,
will not follow a collaborationist Church hierarchy.
The Church thus crosses thin ice in trying to bridge
the gap between the regime and the populace, and it
risks failing to satisfy the expectations of both.
If an agreement is reached, Church leaders will try to
avoid collaborationist charges by reassuring the faith-
ful of their reform sympathies, and some in the
Church hierarchy may push the regime to carry out
promised reforms more aggressively than the regime
had anticipated. This could put the Church on a
collision course with the regime, which expects the
Church to moderate the opposition's reform demands.
As in the past, the Church will also try to deflect
regime attempts to involve it directly in some reforms,
lest it be blamed if it fails or be tainted for making a
cynical compromise with the regime.
Proagreement forces in the hierarchy also risk alienat-
ing the younger members of the lower clergy who tend
to reflect the public activism of the Solidarity era-
exemplified in the extreme by the murdered Father
Popieluszko-and who are less prone to cooperate
with the authorities. Thus Glemp could face a leader-
ship challenge in his own Church if he appears too
eager to deal with the government, although, in such a
highly disciplined organization, Glemp's views would
prevail. Others in the Church will seriously doubt the
wisdom of compromising now, when the Church is
growing stronger at the expense of the regime.
The Church also faces the danger that, even if
granted legal status, a more hostile future regime
could undermine its value by a restrictive intervreta-
The Opposition. Though not a party to any formal
agreements or tacit understandings between Church
and state, the secular political opposition will be
affected by the outcome. The Church continues to
provide safehaven for opposition activities and materi-
al aid for opposition members and their families, 25X1
although the level of support and the Church's toler-
ance for the more radical opposition varies with
bishop and location. Despite its obvious proreform
sympathies, however, the Church by no means en-
dorses the entire political agenda of the opposition and
has often criticized the radicals for their unrealistic
reform expectations. For example:
? While the Church supports trade union pluralism, it
has called for unions to be nonpolitical and to
respect the realities and practical limits of their
larger political settings, apparently a veiled warning
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to Moscow. This self-inhibiting injunction means
that the Polish Church tends to stigmatize as too
disruptive many "direct action" tactics such as
strikes and lockouts often used by trade unions in
the industrial West.
? The Church has called on the government to permit
the formation of Catholic artisan and professional
associations in local dioceses, suggesting a prefer-
ence for traditionally more docile Catholic unions
and civic associations closely adhering to Church
social doctrine over secular trade unions associated
with Solidarity.
? While the Church endorses greater scope for private
enterprise and capital, it has called for private
economic interests to be morally responsive to the
common good. This communal outlook tends to
restrain the free play of competitive market forces
advocated by some in the secular opposition.
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? Although the Church strongly supports the rights
and dignity of individuals, it-like the regime-
above all abhors anarchy. Cardinal Glemp has
hinted that Poland is not yet ready for some aspects
of Western democracy with its emphasis on compet-
itive, potentially divisive, interest group politics,
thus suggesting his willingness to restrain political
experimentation that may prove too disruptive.
? The Church publicly stresses the moral rather than
the political reform of society and, with its perspec-
tive across the centuries, will accept a slower pace of
political reform than the secular opposition prefers.
In the role of "honest broker" between the regime and
the populace, the Church may also become more
selective in its support for the opposition.
With or without an agreement on legal status, the
opposition will most likely have to adjust to a more
politically active Church, even if much of this activity
involves "cloakroom" mediation between moderate
regime forces and Church-endorsed nonparty ele-
ments. Moderates, such as Walesa, may have to defer
increasingly to Church interpretations of Polish politi-
cal developments and may feel pressure to subordin-
ate their reform agendas to the Church's. If the
Church believes strongly that the regime is seriously
pursuing reform-a judgment it has probably not yet
made-it will most likely press moderate opposition-
ists to cooperate, or at least to remain neutral, to give
the regime's reforms a chance. Should the Church
more vigorously pursue its own programs, it could
precipitate a rancorous split in the opposition by those
For the time being the Church will most likely
maintain its pressure on the government to adopt
political and economic reforms as its condition for
bringing the believers and the regime closer together,
thereby creating maneuvering room for the opposi-
tion. The Church has put Jaruzelski on notice that it
expects stronger efforts to decentralize the economy,
develop mechanisms for a freer exchange of ideas
with nonparty elements, and respect individual legal
rights. While many in the Church still doubt the
regime's sincerity, the government's recent promotion
of Aleksander Legatowicz, an independent Catholic
layman well regarded in Poland and the Vatican, to
the Council of State probably reflects the kind of
movement the Church will accept as a sign of regime
earnestness and as a token that the Church can point
to in advising the moderate opposition to give the
regime the benefit of the doubt.
Bloc.
Selling an Accord to Moscow. Both Jaruzelski and
Soviet party leader Gorbachev recognize that a legal
accord with the Polish Church would set a precedent
with implications for Soviet-style "socialism" and the
primacy of atheistic party rule. In proceeding with
negotiations, Jaruzelski believes he has a conditional
green light from Moscow based on Gorbachev's prag-
matism and his desire to see Poland become a stable,
economically self-sufficient member of the Soviet
Jaruzelski will put any accord he reaches with the
Church in the best possible light when reporting to
Moscow. We believe that he will:
? Stress the better image in the West and domestic-
ally of modern socialism in accepting the place of
the Church in society and will emphasize the domi-
nant position of the regime in granting the Church
such status.
? Note that the Church in Poland has proved itself a
predictable force, which in several past crises has
come to the rescue of the regime by counseling
social calm; and that, in any case, the regime cannot
gain the social peace needed to renew Polish social-
ism without a constructive Church-state
relationship.
unwilling to yield to the Church.
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? Argue that the Church, compared with the opposi-
tion, is willing to work within the system rather than
try to overthrow it. He may remind Gorbachev that
the Church itself is not a democratic organization
and that its traditional values of discipline, obedi-
ence, and communal outlook make it a reliable
institution with which to deal.
? Note that, while a legal accord probably cannot be
annulled, a renewed party at some time in the future
could still hope to take the initiative from the
Church and narrowly interpret the accord.
? Tell Gorbachev that the Church in Poland is
uniquely strong and, therefore, the concessions it
receives in Poland would not be necessary elsewhere
in Eastern Europe, let alone in the Soviet Union.
Jaruzelski will also point out the value of the Church's
de facto endorsement of the current government,
which he will probably claim the signing of an accord
signifies. The Church will have accepted, in this view,
the sovereignty of a socialist state-an important
precedent given the bitterly anti-Communist crusades
of the Catholic Church in the 1950s and 1960s.
The View From Moscow. Gorbachev's speeches
indicate that he is seriously concerned
over the ongoing upsurge in religiosity in the USSR
and is therefore likely to give careful consideration to
Jaruzelski's attempt at accommodation with the
Catholic Church. We judge that the Kremlin views
the renewed vitality of Christianity in the Soviet
Union with deep concern, perceiving that religious
values present a serious ideological challenge to its
own legitimacy. The leadership also probably sees the
election of a Slavic pope as encouraging Roman
Catholic activism in the USSR and as intensifying the
potential political threat of nationalism in such bor-
derland areas as the Baltic republics and the Ukraine.
Gorbachev's views will be further influenced by dis-
agreements that we judge exist in leadership circles
over the extent to which a Communist system should
accommodate the persistent pressure-and even
growth-~f believers and religious organizations with-
in an atheistic state, and how much modification of
expression toward them can be safely allowed. There
are some signs that other prominent Soviet leaders,
such as Yegor Ligachev, take a harsher approach
toward these questions than does Gorbachev.'
the public record indicate that
the Soviet leadership does not fully understand the
differences between the role the Polish Church plays
and the role that various churches in the Soviet Union
play. This lack of understanding, compounded by
Gorbachev's evident lack of intention of making any
domestic revisions of law or administration that are of
a systematic nature, might prevent Gorbachev from
appreciating the need for such a change in Poland.
Gorbachev's policies in the Soviet Union and his
approach to Eastern Europe suggest that the Soviets 25X1
would see a number of gains from an accord. They
would:
? See an accord as a tangible example of the normal-
ization of the situation in Poland. Gorbachev could
point to it as an example of his seriousness in
promoting a democratization of the Communist
system, and-within overall guidelines set by the 25X1
Soviet Union-granting freedom of maneuver for
the East Europeans.
? Believe an accord could enable the Polish regime to
include law-abiding religious believers within the
bounds of the loyal citizenry of a socialist state,
while isolating and discrediting religious activists
who challenge the Communist system itself.
Gorbachev has been making this distinction in the
Soviet Union.
? Expect that accommodation between the state and
the Church in Poland could lead to a greater
stability in the country, which might result in
' Ligachev's speeches about religion are usually more combative; he
recently implicitly equated religious belief with subversion of the
Soviet state. He has underscored the regime's concern over the
volatile connection between faith and nationalism by specifically
attacking the reactionary clerical elements of the Islamic, Uniate,
and Roman Catholic religions, which have strong constituencies in
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improved Polish economic performance at a time
when the USSR wants greater economic support
from the East Europeans for the modernization of
the Soviet economy.
On the negative side, Gorbachev will have to consider
the following:
? The size and influence of the Polish Catholic
Church make accommodations with it more risky
than any similar accord in another East European
country or in the Soviet Union itself. On the other
hand, in his recent Prague speech, Gorbachev
seemed willing to let the East Europeans seek their
own domestic accommodations on their paths to
socialism.
? The accord, even if subsequently not adhered to,
would be a precedent for Church-state relations
elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the USSR. In
addition, it could fuel religious and nationalistic
ferment in the western Soviet Union.
? The accord might give the Church a greater and
"legal" role in the upbringing of youth and in
providing alternative moral guidance to the popu-
lace. Gorbachev has repeatedly called for more
sophisticated atheistic propaganda in order to better
counter the appeal of religion, and does not appear
to have any tolerance for such a church role in a
socialist state.
? One of the basic levels of Marxist-Leninist thinking
is the undisputed leadership of the Communist
Party. Thus any real power sharing with another
entity within a socialist state would not be enthusi-
astically embraced by Gorbachev and the Politburo.
In evaluating the acceptability of a revision of the
Church's role in Poland, Gorbachev might be caught
in a highly ambivalent situation, as he appears to be
when dealing with the churches at home. In our
judgment, he is content to stand on the sidelines for
the present and leave his options open. Moscow's
endorsement of church legalization would depend on
Jaruzelski's ability to persuade Gorbachev that the
accord would ultimately be more profitable for the
Polish regime than for the Church and that it would
not necessarily signal unacceptable liberalization.
Since the initiative in Poland-and the more tentative
ones in the Soviet Union at accommodation with the
churches-would probably attract conservative oppo-
sition, both Gorbachev and Jaruzelski would have to
monitor closely Church-state relations in order to
make the requisite adjustments to their policy. A
serious domestic backlash or excessive demands from
the Polish Church would force them to make a
tactical retreat.
Outlook and Implications
As the issues of Church legalization and diplomatic
exchange have moved to the forefront of the Church-
state agenda, strong arguments for and against the
measures have emerged. Decades of mistrust, more-
over, have left open questions on each side about what
each could expect from the other after signing an
accord. Nonetheless, the Church and state have infor-
mally recognized each other and have profitably
exploited their complex and ambivalent relations.
Moreover, new considerations have emerged that have
significantly improved prospects for an accord:
? Regime efforts to gain popular support have failed,
and it is now desperately trying to overcome
Poland's economic and social stagnation.
? The Church finds itself in a particularly strong
position vis-a-vis the regime and the weakened
opposition in its efforts to extract concessions.
? Approval or benign detachment seem probable in
the Vatican and Moscow.
A highly successful Papal visit in June could generate
the good will and political determination to push
chances for an accord-which were virtually non-
existent only last year-to perhaps slightly better
than even by early summer.
while the Church and the state are
discussing a range of issues, the experience of working
out simpler matters such as the Papal visit could
create the necessary trust to tackle the thornier
problem of the normalization of the Church's status.
However, if the talks are still occurring in late
summer, after the good will of the Papal visit has
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dissipated, Church officials will come to believe the
regime is once again stalling and doubt the regime's
willingness to push through enabling legislation. C
some senior Church
o cia s a rea y suspect t o regime of playing such a
Ineplicatioas q/'An Agreement. Juridical recognition
of the Church would reflect the regime's acknowled-
gement of growing social pluralism in Poland, would
be unprecedented in the Bloc, and would signal a
significant evolution in the East European totalitarian
experience. Both Warsaw and Moscow would thereby
openly consent to tolerate a more independent and
assertive Church, with further loss of the party's
prestige and its authority to govern unaided in return
for ensuring the Church's help to maintain stability.
By granting the Church legal status, Jaruzelski could
considerably burnish his image as a reformer and a
nationalist. He would benefit at home from an up-
surge of favorable Church commentary praising his
daring step. However, any improvement in his person-
al standing would probably not automatically redound
to the benefit of the party or to the Communist system
of rule. Rather, he would need to translate his popu-
larity-perhaps with encouragement from the West-
into amovement to create a genuine dialogue within
society to achieve the full benefits of legalization. His
willingness to do so is questionable, however, because
he does not equate legalization with power sharing.
Yet he will have to make sufficient concessions-
perhaps adopting as his own some opposition poli-
cies-to convince the Church that he struck a bargain
Abroad, the regime would aggressively seek to exploit
its image of toleration and innovativeness that would
follow the signing of an accord to persuade Western
governments to grant Poland new credits and debt
relief. The regime would trumpet the accord as proof
of Poland's irreversible commitment to renewal and
would claim that Western economic aid would help
guarantee the necessary social stability to fully carry
Jaruzelski would also use his prestige in the West to
point to Poland as an example of Gorbachev's vision
of enlightened socialism reforming itself to meet the
challenges of the next century. He would also capital-
ize on his favorable image to push Soviet arms control
and peace initiatives, particularly in the Catholic
countries of Western Europe.
Some in the Vatican would make a strong case that
the time had come, following the Polish model, to
normalize the Catholic Church's status elsewhere in
Eastern Europe. Jaruzelski would hope to allay con-
cerns about the implications of an accord by pointing
to the Church's unique role in Polish history and by
noting that his accommodation was part of Poland's
national road to socialism. The Church's position
elsewhere in Eastern Europe is not as strong as in
Poland and prospects for formal accords and diplo-
matic relations are more problematic. Nevertheless,
several Bloc countries might welcome full diplomatic
relations with the Vatican-for the same reason as
Poland-to enhance their images in the West in hopes
of economic and political gain. None, though, would
be likely to grant their domestic churches any of the
priviledges that the Polish Church enjoys, nor would
they relinquish rights to approve episcopal selection,
pay clerical salaries, or control educational and media
access. Thus, hard bargaining would lie ahead before
the Polish model could bear fruit.
An accord would dramatically move the Church into
the forefront of political discussions with the regime
and might result in an apparent decrease in the role of
the opposition. The Church might even proscribe
some radicals as outside the political pale. Though the
Church has a key role to play in both stabilizing and
changing Poland, we expect the opposition to remain
strong and diverse. The Church might not entirely
reflect such diversity, but it remains a source of
alternate policy proposals and protests that reflect the
aspirations of millions of Poles.
We believe more cooperative Church-state relations,
especially if they culminate in an accord, would
benefit Western and US interests. Pressure would
probably increase on the United States to accept the
regime, or at least grant it the benefit of the doubt,
and to give more economic support. However, the
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Church would be better able to keep pressure on the
regime to experiment with reform and to avoid stag-
nation. It may not expect the government to share
power, but it probably hopes that Jaruzelski, taking
his cue from Gorbachev, would open more govern-
ment positions to nonparty "men of talent"-especial-
ly lay Catholics. Such men may ultimately bring new
thinking and more moderate policies. In the long run
this should create more maneuvering room for both
the Church and the secular opposition. From the
regime's point of view, Church mediation could also
help break the dangerous pattern of sullen unrest,
leading to crisis and crackdown so dangerous to
overall East-West relations. A more powerful Church,
meanwhile, could also restrain the hand of repression
in periods of crisis and force compromise rather than
confrontation.
With or without an accord, the West can expect that
the Church will try to unite a badly fractured society.
It will use its moral influence to urge all parties to
develop a sense of shared responsibility for Poland's
fate, justifying sacrifices on that part of the popula-
tion and willingness to experiment with new policies
on the part of the regime. This could create a more
moderate and tolerant society in the heart of Eastern
Europe that is more congenial to Western values and
is an example to its neighbors of a more pluralistic
and open socialist state.
Implications al'NoAgreement. The effects of a
breakdown of negotiations would primarily depend on
how the talks failed. Negotiations that broke down
quietly, with minimal recrimination, and left in their
wake agreement on a considerable number of details
of an accord would not adversely affect the prospect
for an enduring period of eased relations. After some
initial disappointment, both sides would most likely
see a residue of practical benefits deriving from the
intense negotiations, justifying limited cooperation in
some areas and a truce in others. The Church already
has done well on matters dear to it:
? Jaruzelski acceded to all the Pope's requests for the
coming visit.
? The Church has apparently had better access to the
media in the past few months.
? Open channels of dialogue have been durable
enough to reportedly survive even sharp differences
of opinion between the Church and the regime.
Moreover, the state has once again taken up the
Church's call for moral rebirth, openly joining and, in
some cases, commending it in campaigns against
crime, high divorce rates, alcoholism, pollution, and
the arms race.
The state, for its part, has benefited from:
? The Church's mild criticism of its economic poli-
cies-particularly the March price hikes.
? Its cautious endorsement of some political reforms.
? Harsh words by the Church for some in the more
radical political opposition.
? Conditional public approval of Jaruzelski.
Thus the Church and the state might tacitly agree to
continue the current era of better feelings despite the
fate of legalization. We would then expect the two to
work behind the scenes, using established channels to
emphasize areas of mutual interest and to contain the
potentially disruptive conflicts that will continue to
separate them.
We believe that any return to deeply hostile Church-
state relations would more likely be the result of a
drastic change in the regime's domestic policy than in
any failure of present talks on legalization. The
Church has clearly put Jaruzelski on notice that his
regime must respect individual rights and civil liber-
ties. Many churchmen view the regime's tolerance for
much of the ostensibly illegal underground activity in
Poland as a bellwether of the regime's willingness to
permit a more pluralistic Poland to emerge.
The circumspection of both sides, as the negotiations
on legal status have proceeded, suggests an effort to
avoid any bitter, open breakdown of the talks. In any
event, such a breakdown almost certainly would not
occur before the Papal visit or in its immediate
aftermath. However, if this does occur, and particu-
larly if it were accompanied by mutual cynical evalua-
tions of the other party's sincerity, it would revive
more tense Church-state relations:
? An acrimonious break would strengthen the hand of
anti-Church party members and antiregime clerics.
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? Both Jaruzelski and Glemp would be forced to
disavow their declared optimism that they could
work together constructively to solve Poland's prob-
lems, although both leaders probably would leave
the mudslinging to their subordinates.
? Most, if not all, formal and informal Church-state
contacts would be temporarily suspended. The
Church would no longer balance its criticism of the
regime with cautious praise for reform initiatives,
and the state would step up its anti-Church, anti-
clerical propaganda; harass the Church on tax and
educational issues; and probably curb the Church
press.
In such a scenario, both sides would suffer from the
mutual goring; but the regime, which more desperate-
ly needs the Church than the reverse, probably would
make quiet overtures for a more practical modus
vivendi after a decent interval.
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