CAMBODIA: VIETNAMESE STRATEGY AND THE NEW REALITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R001001040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

a "`~ Director of Secret
h Central
~~~? Intelligence
Cambodia: Vietnamese Strategy
and the New Realities
` Secret
NIE 143-83
October 1983
~opY 415
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 CAMBODIA: VIETNAMESE STRATEGY
AND THE NEW REALITIES
Information available as of 10 October 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved on that date by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board.
 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and The intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
Vietnam's Incentive To Solve the Cambodian Problem ................ 5
Goals and Obiectives of the Cambodian Resistance and
Its Supporters: Wishful Thinking? .............................................. 5
Vietnamese StrategY ......................................................................... 7
Fighting ... ................................................................................. 7
...and Talking ............................................................................. 7
Probing ASEAN ................................................................................ 7
Communist Versus Communist ....................................................... 8
Heng Samrin's PRK: Nurturing a Puppet ...................................... 8
The US Factor ................................................................................... 9
Seducing Sihanouk ............................................................................ 9
The Sino-Soviet Calculus .................................................................. 9
Can the Resistance Reverse the Tide? ............................................ 10
Outlook .............................................................................................. 11
Vietnam in the Driver's Seat ... ............................................... 11
...but Without a Seatbelt ........................................................... 11
Implications of aVietnamese-Controlled Cambodia ..................... 12
Implications for the United States ................................................... 13
Annex A: The Capabilities and Order of Battle of
Vietnamese Forces in Cambodia .................................................
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Vietnam's successful 1984-85 dry-season campaign along the Thai-
Cambodian border, resulting conditions on both sides of that border,
and subsequent diplomatic statements and maneuvers by Hanoi,
ASEAN, and China are all indicators of new realities in Indochina. This
Estimate examines these conditions and maneuvers, the probable course
of events, as well as less likely alternatives.
A recently completed Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, The
Capabilities and Order of Battle of Vietnamese Forces tin Cambodia, is
a companion to this Estimate. The Key Judgments of that IIM have
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Vietnam is determined that the situation in Cambodia be resolved
on its own terms. Before significantly reducing its troop strength in
Cambodia, Hanoi will insist that both Cambodia and Laos heed its
direction and leadership under the rubric of "special relationship." We
believe that it will not hesitate to wield a heavy hand if either smaller
country demonstrates too much independence, especially in foreign
affairs.
Hanoi believes a cohesive Indochina under its domination is a
geopolitical imperative if it is to avoid being swallowed by what it views
as a historically expansionist China.
If Hanoi achieves its objectives in Cambodia, one potential casualty
would be the current congruence of Chinese and US interests opposing
Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina; this could adversely affect the
broader aspects of US-Chinese relations.
Vietnam has said that the Cambodian problem will be solved and
its troops withdrawn within the next five years. Hanoi appears confi-
dent that the destruction of the resistance forces' bases in the last two
years has laid the groundwork for the demise of the resistance. For
Hanoi this is a serious timetable, not merely propaganda or wishful
thinking.
There is little chance, however, that Heng Samrin's People's
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime will be able to fend for itself any
time soon. Morale remains fragile, political reliability is often suspect,
and technical and tactical proficiency are low.
Accordingly, our iudgment, based on present trends, is that Hanoi
has a better than even chance of achieving a de facto solution of the
Cambodian problem by 1990. Significant Vietnamese force reduction
would be possible, although a substantial military presence will still be
required for joint anti-insurgent operations and a large contingent of
civilian advisers will be used to oversee the Heng Samrin apparatchiks.
We believe that the resistance forces will not resolve either their in-
ternal leadership problems or their difficult relations with each other.
The resistance and its supporters are united only in the goal of
bringing about a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. On other
aspects of the issue, motivations differ and often collide:
- The non-Communist KPNLF and ANS are concerned lest
Cambodia lose its identity.
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- The Communist Khmer Rouge agree, but are focused more on
regaining exclusive power in Cambodia.
- ASEAN, too, seeks Vietnam's withdrawal; however, Indonesia
sees Indochina as Vietnam's natural sphere of influence, while
Thailand, Singapore, and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia take a
hard line that aims at making the KPNLF and ANS forces
competitive with the Khmer Rouge for control of a postoccupa-
tion Cambodia.
-China opposes Vietnam's hegemony in Indochina (seen, in part,
as a plan by the Soviets to encircle China) and supports the
Khmer Rouge as the best means of forcing Vietnam to compro-
mise on Cambodia.
We believe there is an even chance that over the next five years a
falling out with the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
(CGDK), a particularly tempting offer from Phnom Penh, or merely
recognition of his own mortality could lead Prince Sihanouk to make se-
rious contact with his Vietnamese-backed adversaries in an effort to
engineer a rapid compromise solution.
In our judgment, China, while it will continue to support the
resistance forces and apply military pressure on Vietnam itself, will not
chance the extreme degree of direct offensive action against the
Vietnamese that would compel them to alter their Cambodia strategv
The Soviets will continue to provide military and economic support
to Vietnam in order to sustain the alliance and assure continued access
to Cam Ranh Bay, and as a means of applying pressure on the Chinese
regardless of changes in the atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relations.
Furthermore, we believe that Vietnam is more determined and
steadfast over the long run than Thailand and its ASEAN partners. Most
important in its calculation is the assumption that the resolve of its
ASEAN opponents, especially Thailand, will weaken over time and with
the introduction of new leaders who lack a stake in current policy.
While we do not anticipate outright rupture of the ASEAN front on
Cambodia, consensus will be more difficult to maintain.
A settlement that left Communist administration in Phnom Penh,
in our judgment, could lead a significant proportion of the 230,000
displaced Khmer now in encampments inside Thailand to elect not to
return to their country.
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1. Vietnam is determined that the situation in
Cambodia be resolved on its own terms. Its fundamen-
tal objective in Cambodia is to have a government
responsive to its direction and free of any other
significant external influence, particularly from China
or Thailand. Hanoi believes a cohesive Indochina
under its domination is a geopolitical imperative if it is
to avoid being swallowed by what it views as a
historically expansionist China.
2. Hanoi has made a huge investment in Cambodia,
and we believe that before it is willing to consider
compromise seriously it will have to be assured that its
investment is protected. In general terms this means
essential control over Cambodia (and Laos) with mini-
mum practicable visibility. We believe that before
significantly reducing its troop strength in Cambodia
Hanoi will insist that both Cambodia and Laos heed its
direction and leadership under the rubric of "special
relationship." In our judgment, it will not hesitate to
wield a heavy hand if either smaller country demon-
strates too much independence, especially in foreign
Vietnam's Incentive To Solve the
Cambodian Problem
3. By Vietnamese lights it is necessary to solve the
Cambodian problem in order to achieve the related
obiectives o6
-Stabilizing Cambodia under Hanoi's hegemony.
-Attaining progress in economic development.
-Relieving military pressure from China.
- Restoring Cambodia's position in the UN and in
Third World forums.
-Ending economic and diplomatic isolation from
the West.
- Normalizing relations with the United States.
4. Hanoi appears confident that the destruction of
the resistance forces' bases in the last two years has
laid the groundwork for the demise of the resistance in
the coming years. Hanoi has set 1987 as the date for
victory, although it points to 1990 as the date for
Glossary
ANS - Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne -the military
arm of Prince Sihanouk's anti-Vietnamese resistance
faction
ASEAN -Association of Southeast Asian Nations:
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philip-
vines, and Brunei.
ASEAN Three - Malaysia, Singapore, and Thai-
land-the primary supporters of the non-Communist
resistance.
CGDK -Coalition Government of Democratic Kam-
puchea, comprising the ANS, DK, and KPNLF.
DK -Democratic Kampuchea-the Khmer Rouge.
KPNLF -Khmer People's National Liberation Front,
led by Son Sann. Along with the ANS, makes up the
non-Communist resistance.
PRK -People's Republic of Kampuchea, the Viet-
namese-controlled regime in Phnom Penh under the
nominal control of Heng Samrin.
In this paper "Khmer" and "Cambodian" are used
int~ ngeably to refer to the people of Cambodia.
completing its military pullout. It has issued what
amounts to an ultimatum to ASEAN and China that,
unless they agree to negotiate a political settlement by
1987, the situation will "take care of itself." In either
case, Hanoi clearly anticipates an outcome largely on
its own terms.
5. Whether the Vietnamese will meet their timeta-
ble depends on a number of Factors, such as ASEAN
resolve and cohesion, and the ability of the Cambodi-
an resistance to survive and to expand operations.
Even if Hanoi's schedule for withdrawal proves unre-
alistic, we see little prospect that Vietnam will com-
Goals and Objectives of The Cambodian Resist-
ance and Its Supporters: Wishful Thinking?
6. The three Cambodian resistance groups and their
external supporters-primarily ASEAN and China-
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are in fundamental agreement on the goal of bringing
about a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. But
each party has motivations that at times collide with
one or more of the others'.
7. The non-Communist reststance groups under
Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk are concerned about
the prospect that Cambodia will soon lose its identity
as a nation. Neither believes an outright military
victory over Vietnam is realistic, but both believe that
increasing military pressure must be applied in order
to convince Hanoi of the need to compromise. They
believe they have potentially widespread popularsup-
port throughout Cambodia, but must receive increased
and sustained external support in order to exploit it.
Both groups are deeply concerned about their ability
to compete with the Khmer Rouge and agree on the
need to prevent its return to power in the event of a
Vietnamese withdrawal.
8. The Khmer Rouge has the same fundamental
goal as its non-Communist counterparts of preventing
the "Vietnamization" of Cambodia. But while it nomi-
nally cooperates with the non-Communist groups in
the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea,
and has made a series of efforts to present a more
moderate image, we believe the Khmer Rouge still
envisions a return to exclusive power. This would be
accomplished, not by military victory over Vietnam,
but by a power struggle among Cambodian factions
following a Vietnamese pullout. In the meantime, the
Khmer Rouge iealously safeguards its "liberated areas"
from competitive non-Communist guerrilla efforts to
Government hold similar views and apparently could
reconcile themselves to Vietnamese domination over
Cambodia provided Hanoi pulled its troops out. Ap-
preciation of Thailand's security concerns and the
political benefits ASEAN derives from its united front
would, however, probably rule out an open split on the
11. The ASEAN Three have taken a harder line on
Cambodia. Since late 1982, they have cooperated in
efforts to increase military pressure on Vietnam by
12. Thailand is the ASEAN' country most directly
affected by Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, con-
sidering itself to be ASEAN's "frontline state." Bang-
kok not only is concerned about the immediate threat
of hostile actions from Vietnamese forces on Thai-
land's borders, but is deeply worried about the long-
term orosnects for subversive action if Hanoi is al-
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expand influence in the Cambodian interior.
9. ASEAN's goal is to secure Vietnamese withdraw-
al Erom Cambodia and the holding of popular elec-
tions under international auspices. It has relied pri-
marily on diplomatic pressure through yearly
resolutions passed by overwhelming margins by the
UN General Assembly in efforts to isolate Hanoi.
ASEAN opposition has also thwarted Hanoi's efforts to
unseat the CGDK at the UN. In June 1982, ASEAN
prevailed on the three resistance groups to form a loose
coalition in order to attract and sustain international
backing for anti-Vietnamese Forces.
10. While ASEAN has been successful in sustaining
a broad consensus against Vietnam's Cambodia policy,
differing perspectives within its ranks have frequently
served to undermine its effectiveness. A "soft line"
faction led by Indonesia essentially assumes that Indo-
china is Vietnam's natural sphere of influence and, in
fact, serves as a useful buffer against a potentially
greater threat from China. Elements in the Malaysian
13. China itself remains steadfast in its opposition
to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. Beijing not only
opposes a rival power center that a united Indochina
would represent, but also seeks to blunt Moscow's use
of Vietnam in its purported strategy of encirclement
of China. Beiiing is the largest single material support-
er of all three resistance groups, but has aroused
suspicion within ASEAN by providing the bulk of its
aid to the Khmer Rouge. Beiiing has sought to counter-
act these perceptions through public expressions of
support for a future non-Communist Cambodia and
by asserting that the imbalance in aid to the resistance
parties is predicated solely on the greater effectiveness
of the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese. Never-
theless, China's continued heavy support of the Khmer
Rouge has to some extent undermined ASEAN efforts
to improve the relative capabilities of the non-Com-
munist resistance.0
14. China also applies continuous military pressure
on Vietnam's northern border. By limiting its opera-
tions mostly to a single, isolated salient, however,
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mounted as a means of restricting guerrilla access to
the interior. The PRK government at the same time
intensified psychological warfare operations to entice
resistance supporters to the government's side
16. A "national defense campaign" in which thou-
sands of Cambodian civilians were conscripted to
build roads and border defense fortifications was also
advantages afforded by the heavy rains.
Vietnamese Strategy
Fighting .. .
15. Hanoi has employed a mix of military intimida-
tion and diplomatic guile since 1979 in attempting to
gain acceptance of its control over Cambodia. But
since early 1989 it has mounted the most determined
and coherent combination yet of its "fight, fight, talk,
talk" strategy to bring about a favorable and decisive
outcome. The centerpiece of its strategy has been to
gain an overwhelming military position against the
three resistance groups in Cambodia. In this respect
the 1984-85 military offensive was highly successful
for the Vietnamese. The military situation has moved
from stalemate to one in which the Vietnamese retain
the strategic initiative. Thai border bases of each of
the three resistance groups, whose forces have greatly
increased since 1980, were destroyed or disrupted.
Instead of pulling back the bulk of its forces to interior
garrisons during the rainy season, as in previous years,
the Vietnamese have conducted aggressive sweep op-
erations in concert with PRK forces that have sharply
restricted resistance efforts to exploit the tactical
Beijing has signaled that forceful action on the scale of
its 1979 invasion is not likely in the foreseeable future.
Beijing's border posture requires Hanoi to keep ap-
proximately half of its million-man army, armed with
superior Soviet equipment, committed in northern
Vietnam. By the same token, however, those forces
represent a maior deterrent to large-scale Chinese
attack ~~
anoi oyes t at t e net effect of these
efforts will be the eventual destruction of the will and
capability of the resistance and its supporters to
continue, while improving conditions for the PRK to
consolidate its capabilities. n
.. ,and Talking
17. In the diplomatic arena, Hanoi has been equally
assertive. Without yielding on any fundamental issues,
it has sought to build on its military position by
suggesting greater willingness and flexibility in seeking
a diplomatic solution. The 1985-86 political offensive
is designed to exploit the military success of 1984-85
and to create the impression of an irreversible situa-
tion in Cambodia. The olitical offensive has several
components, including:
- Play on the less committed members of
ASEAN-Indonesia and Malaysia-with an eye
to dividing the united ASEAN front and under-
mining Bangkok's policy toward Cambodia.
Khmer Rouge regime.
- Create the impression that discussions on the
POW/MIA issue with the United States repre-
sent general headway on regional issues such as
Cambodia
-Appeal to sympathetic elements in third coun-
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tries, especially Australia and Japan.
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ance, especially Prince Sihanouk.
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- Work at developing the capabil't'~ d credibil-
ity of the Heng Samrin regime
Probing ASEAN
18. Hanoi has attempted to suggest that a process of
dialogue on Cambodia has begun. A primary tactic has
been to intensify efforts to split ASEAN by exploiting
the differing perceptions within the group on how to
deal with the Cambodia issue. Hanoi has concentrated
particularly on detaching Indonesia, traditionally
more accommodating toward Vietnam, from the rest
of the group. (See inset on next page.) For example, it
has tried to portray bilateral talks between Indonesian
Foreign Minister Mochtar and Vietnamese Foreign
Minister Thach in August as part of an ASEAN-
Indochina dialogue. Hanoi has also stepped up court-
ing of Malaysia, which, although nominally a partici-
pant in the hardline ASEAN Three grouping with
Singapore and Thailand, has shown signs of receptive-
ness to Vietnamese overtures.
19. At the same time, Hanoi has taken a generally
harsh approach toward Thailand, castigating Bangkok
for cooperating with China in aiding the Khmer
Rouge and for allowing the resistance to use Thai
territory. Through its Lao surrogate it has attempted to
exploit a dispute involving three villages on the Thai-
Laotian border to put Bangkok on the defensive in the
UN and embarrass ASEAN members in the Non-
aligned Movement. There also are elements of overt
intimidation in the increased frequency of Vietnamese
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The Jakarta Connection
The flirtation between Indonesia and Vietnam has
complex roots and takes several forms. At one level it is
the product of supposedly similar post-World War II
anticolonial experiences, resulting in a revolutionary
kinship. Both countries, for different reasons, share the
view of China as the maior long-term security threat to
They have also stirred reaction in Malaysia, which
often tends to attempt to outdo its Malay cousins in
Indonesia, and which shares the concept of China as a
long-term security threat.
military intrusions into Thailand in pursuit of Khmer
resistance forces. Hanoi is aware of the anxieties in
some Thai quarters-government and private-over
the increased risks and costs entailed in Thailand's
continuing confrontational stance. Some Thai officials
are concerned the Vietnamese will mount future cross-
border incursions as a means of accentuating such
concerns.)
Communist Versus Communist
20. Despite an effort to appear more flexible, Hanoi
has remained consistent in its outlook toward the role
of the Khmer Rouge. The minimum Vietnamese goal
is the end of the Khmer Rouge as a political and
military entity, including, but not limited to, the
"elimination of Pol Pot and his accomplices."' We
believe Hanoi would be willing to co-opt current
Khmer Rouge Communists, other than the top leaders,
iust as it did former Khmer Rouge Communists such as
Heng Samrin and Hun Sen. Indeed, Hanoi says rank
and file Khmer Rouge would be welcome if they
renounce their ties to the group
enduring threat to its national security.
21. The depth of Hanoi's conviction about the
Khmer Rouge issue is hard to overstate. Aside from the
brutal border attacks that were the casus Belli for the
Vietnamese invasion, the group is seen by Hanoi as an
instrument of China's strategy to keep Vietnam weak.
From Hanoi's standpoint, to accede to survival of the
Khmer Rouge in any meaningful Eorm would risk an
22. Both China and the Khmer Rouge itself oppose
Hanoi's attempts to remove Pol Pot and other top
leaders. Although little is known of a "second genera-
tion" Khmer Rouge leadership, we believe the depar-
ture of the existing leadership would have maior
repercussions for a movement whose cohesion is al-
ready suspect. Aside from any efforts by Hanoi to
undermine the group, the ability of the Khmer Rouge
to maintain internal discipline as current top leaders
Heng Samrin's PRK: Nurturing a Puppet
23. Hanoi continues to nurture the slow develop-
ment of the PRK regime and army. The regime has
demonstrated scant capacity for self-governance thus
far, and there is little evidence that Hanoi has begun
to wean it from dependence on the Vietnamese advi-
sory presence that makes or approves most maior
decisions.
24. The PRK armed forces generally Perform very
poorly and remain weak and politically unreliable.
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 25. Nevertheless, there is little chance that the PRK
will be able to fend for itself any time soon. Morale
remains fragile, political reliability is often suspect,
and technical and tactical proficiency are low. Hanoi
will have little choice in the next several years but to
continue providing for the bulk of the PRK's security
needs, albeit with a reduced presence.)
fore carried out by Vietnamese forces.
However, there is evidence of modest headway. [n the
past two years, at least one new PRK division has been
created, armor and artillery units have become opera-
tional, MIG aircraft and pilots have been readied for
service, and several small naval craft have been
delivered. Provincial military units and local militias
have been organized in many areas of the countryside.
Main-force units deployed in border areas have seen
increasing frontline duty and are being groomed to
assume many of the anti-insurgency functions hereto-
27. Hanoi apparently agrees with Mochtar's assess-
ment of the US factor. Hanoi has made explicit its
interest in normalization, and in that connection has
recently made sudden gestures of cooperation on the
POW/MIA issue. In our judgment, Vietnam will
continue to attempt to exploit this issue to create the
illusion of broad-based progress toward US-Vietnam-
ese normalization. For example, in a recent letter to
about a hundred countries comprising Vietnam's
"close friends," Hanoi falsely claimed that a recent US
mission to Hanoi resulted in progress on POW/MIAs
and "other matters of mutual concern," when, in fact,
only the former issue was raised by either side. Despite
the inevitable US denial, Hanoi probably feels it has
been able to add to the impression that the diplomatic
tide is flowing its way, and we believe that it will
continue to take advantage of such occasions in this
effort would increase over time
The US Factor
26. Both ASEAN and Hanoi see the United States as
an important element in an eventual Cambodian
settlement. On his own initiative, Mochtar has extend-
ed the lure of normalization with Washington-the
"new dimension" in his strategy-as Hanoi's reward
for concrete measures to resolve the POW/MIA issue
and compromise with ASEAN on Cambodia. Mean-
while, the ASEAN hardliners-notably Singapore and
Thailand-have been increasingly vocal in urging
increased US aid to the non-Communist resistance.
Aside from its symbolic impact, Singapore views US
aid as a useful counterweight to potentially excessive
Chinese influence on Thailand. Both Singapore and
Bangkok also hope an initially modest US support
Seducing Sihanouk
28. In mid-1984 the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin
made quiet attempts to set up meetings between
CGDK President Sihanouk and PRK Foreign Minister
Hun Sen in Paris. The Chinese and Sihanouk's CGDK
partners vetoed such meetings, to the Prince's great
agitation. Hanoi has since declared it will "never" talk
with Sihanouk, but did not rule out contacts with his
subordinates (such as his son Prince Ranarith) or
29. Sihanouk has publicly and repeatedly stated his
distaste for his coalition partners, particularly the
Khmer Rouge, and his pessimism about the future
toward which Cambodia is being taken. He has also
repeatedly stated his belief that all Cambodian fac-
tions, including that of Heng Samrin, must talk togeth-
er; in that line he has recently proposed an interna-
tional "colloquium" at which all four groups could be
30. We believe there is an even chance that over
the next five years a falling out with the CGDK, a
particularly tempting offer from Phnom Penh, or
merely recognition of his own mortality could lead
Sihanouk to make serious contact with his Vietnamese-
backed adversaries in an effort to engineer a rapid
compromise solution. However, the actions of the
volatile Prince, who has switched sides in previous
Indochinese conflicts, are always difficult to predict.
The Sino-Soviet Calculus
31. The strategic benefits that the Soviets derive
from their relationship with Hanoi, including the use
of facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, will continue to take
precedence over any inducements Bening is likely to
offer. Nevertheless, the one political contingency that
would impact sharply on Vietnam would be a dra-
matic further improvement in Sino-Soviet relations,
accomplished at Vietnam's expense, a factor which
Hanoi may worry about but which we believe is
unlikely during the next two to three years. In any
event, Hanoi's mistrust of Moscow's long-term reliabil-
ity will provide an additional incentive for Hanoi to
resolve the Cambodia issue as early as practicable.
32. Hanoi has made overtures
to Beijing to begin talks and has tried to convey an
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overall impression of improved relations with China
despite Beijing's resection of its overtures. On the
military front, Vietnam seems confident that it can
absorb and contain the costs China imposes on its
Cambodian policy. We believe Hanoi has calculated
that its own defensive measures and Beijing's preoccu-
pation with economic development make it unlikely
that China will mount a "second lesson" similar to its
invasion in 1979. This permits Hanoi considerable
leeway in pursuing its strategy in Cambodia.
Can the Resistance Reverse the Tide?
33. Hanoi's strategy has not only been an immedi-
ate setback to the resistance, but poses an increased
obstacle to Future efforts by the latter to develop and
sustain guerrilla warfare. The Khmer Rouge have been
relatively successful in transferring the locus of the
fighting from the Thai border area to the interior since
early this year. Most of their able-bodied troops have
moved into the provinces and carried out an active
guerrilla campaign against highways, railroads, local
their attacks do not appear to have provoked major
adjustments in Vietnamese and PRK defenses.
34. The Khmer Rouge will retain their dominance
within the resistance and will remain a security threat
in many areas of the countryside. However, the group
is not likely to threaten seriously Vietnam's strategic
advantage. There has been no solid evidence of growth
in Khmer Rouge ranks in the past year or two, and
recruitment efforts probably do little more than re-
place losses, if that. There are also occasional signs of
dissent within the group, but the leadership has man-
aged to prevent significant erosion in overall disci-
pline.
35. Non-Communist troops have had little success
in implementing their announced strategy of waging
guerrilla warfare deep in the Cambodian interior.
Although both the ANS and the KPNLF have plans for
infiltrating well over half of their forces into Cam-
bodia by the end of the year, their record thus far
suggests they will Eall well short of that goal. Vietnam-
ese sweeps, combined with their own internal limita-
tions, have limited most non-Communist forays to
areas little beyond traditional zones of operation along
the border.
36. Aside from the military obstacles facing the
non-Communists, they have severe internal deficien-
cies. The KPNLF, in particular, is racked by factional-
ism that has directly contributed to the inability of the
group to mount a systematic guerrilla warfare effort.
Fundamental questions persist regarding the morale
and motivation of KPNLF soldiers and of those com-
manders who have lost access to lucrative black mar-
kets and have displayed little interest in the rigors of
guerrilla warfare
37. The ANS forces, thanks to more capable lead-
ers, have made surprising headway over the past year
and have surpassed the KPNLF in military effective-
ness. They have also mounted systematic infiltration
efforts and developed contacts with the local populace.
But they also are troubled by internal rivalries, and
Vietnamese pressure as well as Khmer Rouge harass-
ment has kept them offguard and limited the depth
39. The same constraints that impede progress
against the Vietnamese also offer little hope that the
non-Communists can close the gap in effectiveness and
influence with the Khmer Rouge. The latter have
demonstrated repeatedly, despite pressure from China
and Thailand to desist, that they will directly oppose
non-Communist efforts to expand operations signifi-
cantly, particularly when they move into areas the
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Khmer Rouge consider to be their turf. Non-commu-
nist leaders complain of "having to fight the Vietnam-
ese with one hand and the Khmer Rouge with the
other." There is little reason to believe this fundamen-
tal dilemma can be resolvedP
40. Inability of the non-Communists over atwo- or
three-year period to improve their standing relative to
the Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge would be likely to
have severe implications for non-Communist morale.
Both Prince Sihanouk and his son Prince Ranarith are
pessimistic over resistance military prospects-con-
tinued inertia and military setbacks would raise the
risk that they would abandon the effort. ~~
Outlook
Vietnam in the Driver's Seat .. .
41. Our judgment, based on present trends, is that
Hanoi has a better than even chance of achieving de
facto solution of the Cambodian problem by 1990. We
believe that the Vietnamese will be able to seriously
restrict resistance guerrilla activity and prevent the
establishment of liberated areas. At the same time we
believe that the resistance forces will not resolve either
their internal leadership problems or their difficult
relations with each other. Significant Vietnamese force
reductions would be possible, although a substantial
military presence albeit disguised in some way, will
still be required for ioint anti-insurgent operations and
a large contingent of civilian advisers will be used to
oversee the Heng Samrin apparatchiks. We note that
in Laos there are roughly 45,000 Vietnamese troops
and several thousand civilian advisers. The residual
Vietnamese presence in Cambodia probably would not
be less than this.
42. [n our judgment, China, while it will continue
to support the resistance forces and apply military
pressure on Vietnam itself, will not chance the ex-
treme degree of direct offensive action against the
Vietnamese that would compel them to alter their
Cambodia strategy. The Soviets will continue to pro-
vide military and economic support to Vietnam in
order to sustain the alliance and assure access to Cam
Ranh Bay, and as a means of applying pressure on the
Chinese regardless of changes in the atmosphere of
A situation in which the Khmer Rouge sustained or widened the
gap with the non-Communists would also threaten ASEAN unity.
Although Thailand and Singapore would probably want to continue
their aid in order to keep the non-Communist option alive as long as
possible, Malaysia might be persuaded by Vietnam's claims [hat
further opposition is futile.~~
43. The primary factor underlying these judgments is
our estimation that Vietnam is more determined to
accomplish its primary obiectives in Cambodia than any
other non-Khmer party to the affair, and has a greater
investment to protect. By Hanoi's security calculus,
Cambodia is simply too important to permit compromise
on fundamental issues. Specifically, we believe Vietnam
is more determined and steadfast over the long run than
Thailand and its ASEAN partners, and has a greater
investment to protect than does China.0
44. It is our judgment that Vietnam will attempt to
reduce its presence to the extent consistent with the
security situation. In this connection we believe that
Hanoi calculates it can contain damage done by the
resistance and ultimately demoralize it through a
combination of internal security operations and border
interdiction, while building up the Heng Samrin ad-
ministration to a semblance of a functioning govern-
ment. Most important in its calculations, however, is
the assumption that the resolve of its ASEAN oppo-
nents, especially Thailand, will weaken over time and
with the introduction of new leaders without a stake in
the current policy.0
45. Under these circumstances, Indonesia and per-
haps Malaysia would probably attempt increasingly to
dilute ASEAN's position and reach a political compro-
mise, particularly if Hanoi continues its current osten-
sibly flexible diplomatic line. ASEAN's stance would
be undermined if Sihanouk or Son Sann abruptly
reconciled with the PRK regime. A softening of
Thailand's position toward Vietnam would also result
in a rapid reformulation of ASEAN policy. Such a
Thai policy shift could occur by 1990 if, for example,
there were a new government in Bangkok or if
Cambodia became a divisive domestic issue. We do
not anticipate outright rupture of the ASEAN front on
the Cambodia issue. Nevertheless, the ASEAN consen-
sus will be more difficult to maintain.~~
...but WithouT a SeatbelT
46. Alternatively, several incipient problems could
dim Vietnam's prospects. For example, while we
believe the Vietnamese are aware of the implications
of the historical animosity the Khmer feel for them,
their continued presence over the next few years could
cause widespread popular resentment leading to active
support for resistance. This could be the result of
Vietnamese civilian settlement in Cambodia, as well as
the military presence. Another factor is the continued
conscription of thousands of Khmer laborers to con-
struct barriers in hostile and malaria-ridden areas of
the Cambodia-Thailand border.n
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47. We cannot rule out the possibility that the
CGDK resistance forces could solve their leadership
and image problems and galvanize the Khmer people
into more active opposition to the Vietnamese occupa-
tion. This might occur through death or resignation of
some of the more controversial figures in both the non-
communist and DK factions, or by leverage exerted
by aid donors.
48. Finally, and least likely, the Sixth Congress of
the Communist Party of Vietnam, reportedly sched-
uled for spring 1986, could produce a new set of
leaders in Hanoi who would be concerned more with
development issues than with the overamplified secu-
rity concerns represented by the Cambodian venture.
Such leaders would presumably be quicker to make
concessions and withdraw from Cambodia.'
Implications of a Vietnamese-
Controlled Cambodia
49. Implications of a successful consolidation of
Vietnamese control over Cambodia would depend
largely on the manner in which it was achieved. For
illustration we postulate two basic scenarios-one a
contentious process in which ASEAN unity disinte-
grates and Hanoi gets its way largely by default; and
the other a Eace-saving formula that would allow
ASEAN a graceful means of ending its opposition and
formally accepting a Vietnamese fait accompli.C
50. For ASEAN, dissipation of the political consen-
susthat has been the most effective obstacle to Hanoi's
goals in Cambodia would significantly undercut the
organization's international political stature. Agree-
ment on Cambodia has been ASEAN's most powerful
rallying point since 1979. A bitter split between
ASEAN softliners and hardliners over Cambodia could
adversely affect economic and political cooperation in
the region, but a sustained disruption in ASEAN
relations would be unlikely. Collapse of the consensus
on Cambodia could lead Thailand to "go it alone,"
with China and Singapore providing some support for
the resistance for a time, but the loss of the ASEAN
diplomatic stand could also lead to domestic pressure
on Thai policvmakers to reach an accommodation
with Vietnam. While the breakdown of a consensus
over Cambodia and the ultimate playing out of an
accommodation with Hanoi could contribute to in-
' While the emergence of a Vietnamese Deng Xiaoping cannot be
disrnunted, our best estimate a[ [his time is that [he next generation
of leaders in Hanoi, heavily influenced by the Soviets and lacking
the revolutionary ethos of the current group. will be a[ least as rigid
creased inter-ASEAN suspicions, it is doubtful that
existing bilateral differences would be allowed to
fester. Each ASEAN member has a vested interest in
regional security and the broad variety of regional
contacts should help to smooth over differences re-
garding relations with the Vietnamese
51. A more likely scenario is that ASEAN, led by
Indonesia and Malaysia, would gradually ease into a
face-saving accommodation that recognized Vietnam's
dominance in Cambodia and permitted ASEAN to
contain damage to both its external image and internal
viability. Thailand, however, as the "frontline state" in
ASEAN, would require continuing reassurances of
support from fellow members in dealing with a con-
solidated Indochina. A withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops-almost certainly a prerequisite for any
ASEAN-Vietnamese deal-would go far in assuaging
Bangkok's concern, but Thailand's fears over long-
term Vietnamese subversive efforts would require
attention by ASEAN.
52. China would probably continue to oppose
Hanoi's policies in Indochina regardless of a general
acceptance by others of Vietnam's dominion over
Cambodia. Beiiing's leverage, however, would be re-
stricted. Bening would find it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to sustain Thai cooperation in supporting Cam-
bodian resistance forces at current levels. Although
sympathetic Thai officials might be amenable to a
modest aid program for resistance elements, Beiiing's
opportunities for increasing military pressure on the
Vietnamese and PRK would be sharply circumscribed.
Removal of the Cambodia issue as a common cause
with ASEAN would slow the overall diplomatic head-
way Bening has made in Southeast Asia over the past
few years. Bening would also weigh Vietnam's degree
of involvement with the Soviet Union in determining
its policy toward Indochina
53. For the USSR, broad acceptance of a Vietnam-
ese Eait accompli in Cambodia, particularly one
reached on amicable terms, would improve its pros-
pects for developing closer ties to Southeast Asian
states. Moscow, however, would probably have diffi-
culty in exploiting such a turn of events to improve
relations with China. Beijing would probably make
new demands of Moscow to reduce support for Hanoi
in hopes of promoting a split between the Vietnamese
and Soviets
54. Vietnamese success could over the longer term
reduce Hanoi's dependence on Soviet assistance and
consequently reduce Moscow's political leverage there.
Eventually, Moscow's use of Vietnamese military facil-
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25X1
 hies might be curtailed. On balance, however, we
believe the Soviets' broader interests are best served by
resolution of the Cambodian conflict on Hanoi's terms.
Implications for the United States
55. IE the ASEAN consensus broke down as Hanoi
imposed its solution, the United States would face
pressure to take sides with the opposing ASEAN
members. There could be recriminations from Singa-
pore and Thailand over US reluctance to provide
military aid to the non-Communist resistance. Indone-
sia and Malaysia, on the other hand, might look to the
United States to persuade the hardliners to compro-
mise. Thailand, with support from Singapore and
Malaysia, would seek stronger US security guarantees
and greater arms assistance. Under a settlement for-
mula acceptable to ASEAN the way would be
smoothed for eventual normalization of US-Vietnam-
prospects for resolving other issues.
56. A potential casualty of such a turn of events
would be the current congruence of Chinese and US
interest in opposing Hanoi's policy. Given its funda-
mental strategic concerns over an entrenched Viet-
namese control of Indochina, Beiiing would not be
likely to accept US rationale for increasing dealings
with Hanoi and would seek new ways to prevent
Hanoi from gaining its ends.
57. However achieved, a settlement in Cambodia
that left a Communist administration in Phnom Penh
would, in our judgment, lead a significant proportion
of the 230,000 displaced Khmer now in encampments
inside Thailand to elect not to return to their country,
This would create pressure on the UN system and its
donor countries to continue indefinitely the relief
program for these people, and would almost certainly
generate Thai pressure on the United States to resettle
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 The Capabilities and Order of Battle of Vietnamese Forces in Cambodia a
We believe that the Vietnamese forces permanently
based in Cambodia, augmented by the existing
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) forces, can
accomplish most of the security missions that Hanoi
envisions Eor its forces:
- Demonstrating control of the border and its
environs to prevent establishment of a "liberated
area" and to reduce levels of infiltration by
resistance forces.
- Securing the Cambodian interior sufficiently to
enhance the legitimacy of Heng Samrin's PRK
regime and permit delegation to PRK Forces of a
greater degree of responsibility for rear area
security.
Vietnamese troops in Cambodia as of 1 September
are estimated to number about 130,000 to 190,000.
This new estimate, down from the previous one of
150,000 to 170,000, reflects both mode with-
drawals and a reanalysis of existing data
Vietnam has improved its logistic system in Cambo-
dia to the point where there are no maior shortages of
ammunition or petroleum products.
Hanoi is dependent on Soviet military aid, which is
abundant (Vietnam ranks seventh among Soviet aid
recipients). We expect this level to continue-allowing
some equipment modernization within the People's
Army of Vietnam (PAVN), but not greatly increasing
the capabilities of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.
Vietnam has said that it intends to withdraw from
Cambodia by 1990. Although Hanoi probably would
like to reduce its forces, we not only find this date
unrealistic, but believe that Hanoi intends to maintain
a sizable military presence in Cambodia indefinitely.
Should the fortunes of the Vietnamese and PRK
forces in Cambodia take a turn Eor the worse, Hanoi
has a demonstrated capability to bring in additional
25X1
25X1
? This annex reproduces the Key Judgments of Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum NI IIM 85-1001Q published with the
above title in October 1985 as a companion [o this Estimate.
25X1
LOl~I
IE, over a period of a year or more, non-Communist
resistance forces succeed in efforts 25X1
some augmentation of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia
may be necessary~~
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1. This d