THE PHILIPPINE MODERATE OPPOSITION: CAN IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000200220001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seeret
Intelligence
The Philippine
Moderate Opposition:
Can It Make a Difference?
EA 85-10200
November 1985
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 Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Philippine
Moderate Opposition:
Can It Make a Difference?
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
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Office of East Asian Analysis, with a
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contribution b
Office of Central
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Reference. Comments an queries are welcome an
d
may be directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia
Division
Secret
EA 85-10200
November 1985
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The Philippine
Moderate Opposition:
Can It Make a Difference?
Key Judgments Since the 1983 Aquino assassination, the moderate opposition has in-
Information available creased its influence in domestic politics and constrained President Mar-
as of 3 November 1985 cos's autocratic political style. The moderates, however, are not yet capable
was used in this report.
of competing on even terms with the ruling party or of pressuring the
government to undertake the fundamental reforms that would slow the
growth of the Communist insurgency:
? The moderates' numerous parties and "umbrella" organizations remain
divided, primarily over the issue of leadership. Internecine squabbles
have stymied fund raising and grassroots organization-which remain
the strongpoints of Marcos's powerful political machine.
? Rallying primarily around a highly personal anti-Marcos theme, moder-
ate opposition groups have failed to develop comprehensive policy
platforms. On the major issue of the US bases, the moderates have
waffled in public although some privately acknowledge that their bene-
fits-including financial compensation, employment opportunities, and
enhanced regional security justify continued US military access to the
Philippines.
? The opposition so far has failed to attract disaffected members of
Marcos's party (KBL) to its ranks.
We believe the moderates are likely to continue to flounder until galva-
nized into action by the imminence of scheduled elections or by renewed
hints from Malacanang of an early election. This in turn means that the
opposition will continue to be hampered in efforts to garner support in rural
areas or to impress consequential political players-including sympathetic
members of the business community-to financially commit to any
particular party or individual.
But it would be a mistake, in our view, to gauge the moderates' longer term
prospects solely by their organizational failings up to now or the absence of
clearly defined policies-misleading benchmarks in a political system long
dominated by charismatic personalities. In the wake of President Marcos's
August threat to call "snap" elections-a threat he made good on in
November-the emergence of Cory Aquino as a potential presidential
challenger with the apparent ability to unify the opposition is a positive
sign that the opposition could field and support a single candidate and have
a chance to defeat President Marcos or some other KBL standard bearer.
Secret
EA 85-10200
November 1985
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If the moderates can capture control of the government, moreover, we
believe they will have a far better chance than the current regime. of
restoring stability.
Although the moderates, in our judgment, recognize the long-term benefits
of continued US access to military facilities in the Philippines and the
economic reforms advocated by Manila's international creditors, their
nationalistic rhetoric will call for renegotiating military and financial
agreements. The moderates are likely to support accelerating reforms in
the Philippine military-including retirement of senior officers and at-
tempts to rebuild morale in the officer corps. They have not, however,
developed a detailed strategy for dealing with the Communist insurgency.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
The Reawakening
Putting the Left on Notice 5
What To Expect 10
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The Philippine
Moderate Opposition:
Can It Make a Difference?
The Reawakening
Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s,
moderate opponents of President Marcos exerted a
negligible influence in domestic politics. Nine years of
martial law (1972-81) placed Marcos in an unassail-
able position that left little room for political dissen-
sion. Elections were canceled or replaced by predeter-
mined plebiscites, and the rewriting of the
Constitution in 1973 consolidated presidential control
and almost guaranteed the perpetuation of Marcos's
powers. The result was essentially the creation of a
one-party state in which opposition ranks were splint-
ered, many of its leaders were jailed while others went
into self-imposed exile overseas, and the opposition
press was largely quieted by chronic closures and
harassment by the government.
A revival for the opposition began with the more open
political atmosphere following the lifting of martial
law in 1981. Students and press became more openly
critical of the Marcos government, and relatively fair
National Assembly elections in 1984 and the prospect
of local elections in 1986 and national elections in
1987 encouraged the formation of several new par-
ties-including the newly merged PDP-LABAN and
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (see the table).
The August 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino,
moreover, gave the legal opposition an opportunity to
boost its public profile and the confidence most
political observers believe was required to begin chal-
lenging Marcos.
The moderates' greatest success came in May 1984
when the opposition surprised both foreign and do-
mestic observers by winning 61 of the 183 contested
seats in the elections for the National Assembly-or
Batasang Pambansa-a fivefold increase.' In our
view, the elections bolstered the moderates' credibility
as a domestic political force and gave them a national
presence not enjoyed since the early 1970s. Largely
successful poll watching efforts by the National
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), more-
over, buoyed public confidence in the electoral process
and further galvanized the commitment of the moder-
ates' newly politicized supporters. Renewed optimism
in the belief that Marcos's stranglehold on political
power was weakening also bolstered the opposition by
encouraging several opposition leaders-such as
Jovito Salonga, Sonny Osmena, and Raul Daza-to
return to Manila from self-imposed exile overseas F_
A Movement of Consequence ...
Although the opposition's relatively modest gains do
not threaten the President in the near term, we believe
they have contributed to putting Marcos on the
defensive as he tries to deal with calls from domestic
and foreign critics for economic, political, and mili-
tary reform. Events of the past year-such as im-
peachment proceedings initiated against Marcos by
the opposition in the National Assembly-also con-
vince us that even if the opposition is unable to
capture the presidency in a snap election or in 1987, it
can continue to constrain Marcos's autocratic political
style, move some of the country's key political and
social figures to take stronger public stands for re-
form, and undercut the appeal of the radical left. In
doing so, we believe the moderates will continue to
have an impact in several areas
In the National Assembly. Although virtually power-
less to prevail in head-to-head votes in the Assembly
with the ruling party, the opposition serves as a
reminder to Marcos that there are costs to carte
' The moderates now hold 58 seats in the 200-seat National
Assembly. Holders of these seats include representatives of the
United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), the Pilipi-
no Democratic Party-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN), the Minda-
nao Alliance (MA), the Concerned Citizens Aggrupation (CCA),
and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Both the opposition and
the KBL have lost several seats through death and disqualification
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Selected Parties and Organizations
of the Philippine Moderate Opposition
Liberal Party Eva Estrada Kalaw The LP is widely regarded as a traditional pre-martial-law
Jovito Salonga party that has moved to the left, particularly since the
Aquino assassination. The party broke with UNIDO in
December 1983 and recently split following a leadership
fight between Kalaw and Salonga.
Nacionalista Party Jose Laurel, Jr. Founded over 77 years ago, the Nacionalista Party has
spawned many politicians now identified as "traditional.
oppositionists." In recent years, the party has become so
closely identified with UNIDO that, in many respects, it no
longer represents a distinct political body.
Aquilino Pimentel Organized in 1981 after a merger of the Pilipino Democratic
Ramon Mitra Party and Lakas ng Bayan, PDP-LABAN is more ideologi-
Jose Cojuangco cally and less personality oriented than the "traditional
style" opposition parties. Its support base is strongest in
Mindanao, but it has developed a fairly good following in
Manila and elsewhere on Luzon.
Social Democratic Party (SDP) Francisco Tatad The SDP was organized in late 1981 by Tatad and two other
Reuben Canoy politicians in advance of the 1982 local elections. Although
its support base rests mainly in the Bicol, the SDP enjoys
greater public exposure than it would otherwise have be-
cause of Tatad's national following as a columnist and the
election of two party members to the National Assembly in
1984.
United Nationalist Democratic Salvador Laurel A nationwide political alliance with a strong base in the
Organization (UNIDO) Metro Manila area, UNIDO was founded in 1980 by Jose
B. Laurel (brother of Salvador Laurel) and Gerardo Roxas
(then president of the Liberal Party). It is currently the
largest and most established of the moderate opposition
groups. Most of UNIDO's leaders are well-known veteran
politicians.
Filipino Social Democratic
Movement (FSDM)
Butz Aquino BANDILA was organized in May 1985, following the
Teofisto Guingona walkout of more moderate forces from the BAYAN Con-
vention. An umbrella organization for "social democratic"
groups, BANDILA hopes to develop into a nationwide
political movement.
The FSDM was launched in early August 1985 at a one-day
convention in Manila attended by over 100 delegates repre-
senting 36 different organizations. Working with
BANDILA and PDP-LABAN, the FSDM seeks a "plural-
istic coalition government" to replace the Marcos regime.
KAAKBAY Jose Diokno The primary goal of this activist group-composed primarily
of university professors and students in the Metro Manila
area-is political education. KAAKBAY is known for its
nationalist-and often militant-stance, but is not believed
to be under the influence of the Communist Party.
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(Continued)
Organized in the wake of the Aquino assassination, ATOM
is an activist coalition involved in many demonstrations and
public protests-including the October 1984 transportation
strike. Although there has been a cooling off between
ATOM and the more radical groups affiliated with the CPP,
many political observers believe there is still significant
Communist influence in the group.
Justice for Aquino Justice for All (JAJA) Butz Aquino Popular with students and younger activists, JAJA-like
Jose Diokno ATOM-was founded in response to the Aquino assassina-
tion. Despite its less radical orientation and "bourgeois"
leadership, JAJA is considered a "tactical ally" by the CPP.
Nonpartisan Organizations Supporting
Unification and Free Election Efforts
Cory Aquino Concern over President Marcos's failing health prompted a
Jaime Ongpin number of businessmen and professionals in December 1984
Lorenzo Tanada to organize a group to plan a strategy for the opposition in
the case of a sudden election-including the naming of a list
of potential opposition candidates from which the final ticket
would be chosen.
National Unification Committee (NUC) Cecilia Munoz-Palma Formed in March 1985, the NUC is a moderate umbrella
organization with representatives from the Liberal Party,
Nacionalista Party, PDP-LABAN, UNIDO, and eight oth-
er regional parties. The NUC has been instrumental in
starting organizational activities in preparation for the May
1986 local elections.
National Movement for Free Elections Jose Concepcion, Jr. An independent civic organization accredited to monitor
(NAMFREL) new voter registration drives in the spring of 1984,
NAMFREL is generally credited as the single most impor-
tant factor in the improved credibility of the National
Assembly elections held later that year.
Makati Business Club (MBC) Enrique Zobel The Makati Business Club, established in mid-1982, is an
Jaime Ongpin ostensibly apolitical organization of executives founded as a
Jose Concepcion, Jr. self-appointed "shadow cabinet" to comment on economic
policy. Since the Aquino assassination, the Club has become
more openly identified with the moderate opposition. Recent
issues of the monthly MBC newsletters have included
updates on developments in the National Assembly and the
Aquino assassination.
Jaime Ongpin Manindigan! ("Stand Up and Be Counted!") was established
Emanuel Soriano by some of the same business leaders in late 1984 in order to
Ramon Del Rosario encourage more active participation by "middle forces" in
the opposition movement.
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 The Moderates' Potential Support Bases
Opposition activities over the past several years have
eroded Marcos's traditional power base and fur-
thered disaffection among potentially powerful con-
stituencies,
One 4f the most potentially powerful sources of
support for the moderates is the business community.
A number of corporate magnates-including Enrique
Zobel, Emanuel Soriano, and Jaime Ongpin-form
the core of disaffected executives and professionals
involved in opposition business groups such as Man-
indigan! and the Makati Business Club.
The Church-a powerful institution in this predomi-
nantly Catholic country-is openly critical of the
Marcos government for its handling of the Aquino-
Ver trial, "unjust" economic and political policies,
and what it perceives as growing persecution of
priests, nuns, and lay workers. Although he has not
openly endorsed the opposition, leading prelate Car-
dinal Jaime Sin is generally viewed as sympathetic to
the moderates and the widely read Catholic weekly
Veritas represents moderate to radical opposition
views
The military's previously blind support for Marcos
shows signs of weakening. The newly emerging reform
movement-led by young flag officers and Philippine
Military Academy graduates-has highlighted in-
creasing dissatisfaction with the current government.
There are even indications that the opposition has
won admirers from Marcos's ruling KBL party. For-
mer Foreign Minister Arturo Tolentino has publicly
called for the President's resignation and has been
quoted 'in the press as offering to lead a future
opposition ticket against Marcos. We believe other
i. BL assemblymen-though presently unwilling to
cross the President-would defect to the opposition
or to a new coalition party in the event that Marcos
dies or becomes incapacitated.
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blanche conduct of government policy. Presidential
initiatives no longer sail through the Assembly and
instead face considerable scrutiny and opposition-
fueled public debate, occasionally resulting in modest
victories for the opposition. Opposition tactics during
the 1985 budget debate, for example, resulted in a
$65 million cut in Marcos's $3 billion proposal for
outlays and produced a public attack on extravagance
in the Ministry of Human Settlements-which is
controlled by First Lady Imelda Marcos.2 The opposi-
tion was also able to embarrass Marcos, according to
the domestic press, in pointing up irregularities in the
enormous sugar industry by calling presidential ally
Roberto Benedicto-head of the Sugar Commis-
sion-to appear before the Assembly's Foreign Trade
subcommittee last April.
relations coup for the moderates.
Even the opposition's failed attempt to debate the
extraordinary powers granted Marcos under Amend-
ment Six of the Constitution in the Assembly had its
costs for the President.' Prime Minister Virata-in a
surprising public statement joined Political Affairs
Minister Perez, Labor Minister Ople, then Foreign
Minister Tolentino, and other prominent KBL mem-
bers in moving closer to the opposition position. At an
August National Assembly press corps meeting,
moreover, Perez-a staunch Marcos loyalist-called
for a nonpartisan approach to resolving the Amend-
ment Six controversy. Private comments to the US
Embassy by several ruling party assemblymen suggest
that this distancing from Marcos was the result of a
turnaround in their own positions and a realization on
their part that the Amendment Six issue was a public
Although crossing party lines is not frequent, press
reports indicate that some KBL members have joined
with the opposition on other issues, such as moves to
postpone startup operations of the costly Bataan
nuclear power plant-the country's first-and calls
for investigating military abuses and human rights
' All peso amounts are converted into US dollars at the June 1985
exchange rate of 18.6 pesos per US dollar.
' Amendment Six, pushed through a national plebiscite in 1981,
allowed Marcos to retain many of the powers he enjoyed during
martial law. These include suspension of the writ of habeaus corpus
for all "crimes against national security," powers of preventative
detention, restriction of the media, and control over industrial labor
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violations. Embassy officials also report open admira-
tion by a number of KBL assemblymen for the
opposition's preparation, performance, and unity in
the Assembly-the one venue in which the moderates
have displayed an ability to put aside their differ-
ences.
On the Supreme Court. Opposition offensives over the
last year, in our judgment, have emboldened the
Supreme Court to challenge the views of the ruling
party, particularly in public forums. Although the
court is still heavily stacked with close Marcos sup-
porters, the domestic press has noted a "faint but
discernible trend" toward judicial independence. De-
cisions cited by the press to support this view include a
unanimous ruling in late 1984 that a military raid on
an opposition newspaper was unjustified, an order in
December 1984 releasing two prisoners detained un-
der a Preventative Detention Action signed by Mar-
cos, an order allowing an opposition rally despite
objections from the military, and another limiting
PDP-LABAN leader Pimentel's liability on rebellion
charges. More recently, the Supreme Court directed
KBL leaders in the Assembly to explain the basis for
their dismissal in August of opposition impeachment
motions-a surprising move
In the Streets. The moderates continue to challenge
Marcos through other methods such as demonstra-
tions, rallies, and discussion groups-commonly re-
ferred to as "the parliament of the streets." Members
of PDP-LABAN and BANDILA, for example, orga-
nized a symbolic "People's Court" on 21 September-
the 13th anniversary of the imposition of martial
law-to try Marcos on charges of graft and corrup-
tion. The legal opposition is distributing copies of
their failed impeachment resolution translated into
major dialects and have released a documentary film
detailing alleged foreign holdings-primarily extrava-
gant estates and commercial real estate-of the Mar-
cos family and its political allies. According to Philip-
pine press reports, the film is the largest selling video
tape in the country
Putting the Left on Notice. As they try to stake out an
alternative middle ground in domestic politics, the
moderates are competing with some success-accord-
ing to the US Embassy-for popular support with the
Communists. Although fairly closely allied with the
radical left immediately following the Aquino assassi-
nation, we believe the moderates have become in-
creasingly concerned over the danger the radicals pose
and the need to emerge as a more distinct voice of
dissent against Marcos. As such, the opposition has
begun distancing itself from the National Democratic
Front (NDF)-the political arm of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP).
Earlier this year, for example, opposition spokesmen
began warning of the threat posed by close association
with the radical left-or "Riding the Tiger." Other
signs of growing chilliness between the moderates and
the NDF include the walkout of key coalition fig-
ures-including founding members Butz Aquino, Jose
Diokno, and activist nun Sister Christine Tan-from
BAYAN's National Convention in May 1985 follow-
ing strongarm tactics by NDF to dominate the group.'
ory Aquino's
refusal to accommodate the left by changing the
location of this year's 21 August rally from Makati to
two locations closely identified with the radicals' often
violent demonstrations-including Mendiola Bridge
near the Presidential Palace-and Butz Aquino's
explicit charge that the Communists were backing the
rival demonstration are other examples of the moder-
ates' growing distance from the radicals.
Growing cooperation among the opposition also may
be undercutting the Communists' organizational ca-
pabilities. Near unanimity among opposition assem-
blymen on participating in upcoming elections-in
contrast to a split between pro- and anti-boycott
camps in 1984
divided the Communist leadership over the party's
role in the balloting, including the issue of support for
specific opposition candidates.' According to the
BAYAN is a Communist-dominated umbrella coalition of radical,
"cause-oriented" groups such as the Nationalist Alliance for Free-
dom, Justice, and Democracy. The CPP reportedly hopes that
BAYAN will attract disaffected members of the moderate opposi-
' The NDF is reportedly still considering support for Butz
Aquino-should he be named the opposition's presidential standard
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It is difficult to predict the changes in domestic and
foreign policy that might result if the moderates
gained control of the government. A draft "minimum
program of government " was released in July 1985 by
the National Unification Committee (NUC), although
it has not yet been officially endorsed. It includes
calls for several proposals, such as ratification of a
new constitution within the first 18 months of a new
administration; abolition of agricultural, industrial,
and commercial monopolies; adoption of a new land
reform program; and the dismantling of presidential
decrees
Beyond this, almost all opposition leaders have waf-
fled on the future of the USfacilities-Subic Bay
Naval Base, Clark Air Base, and ancillary US facili-
ties-and they occasionally make public statements
against them in order to bolster their nationalist
credentials. Although many believe the current com-
pensation package is insufficient, most moderates,
concede
that the benefits of the bases-including $900 million
in security assistance, jobs for approximately 80,000
Filipinos, over $350 million in salaries, local procure-
ments, and housing for US personnel, as well as the
bases' contribution to regional security justify their
presence and offset any potential infringement of
Philippine sovereignty
We believe even an opposition government sympathet-
ic to the United States would continue to wrangle
with Washington over a number of issues that fea-
tured prominently in the last round of negotiations in
1983. Former objectives have included arguments
that Philippine criminal law should prevail inside the
bases and a push for an annual-as opposed to afive-
year-review of the bases agreement. In addition,
Manila has in past negotiations proposed a variety of
measures that would compromise unhampered US
command and control of the facilities, including calls
for almost total Philippine administration of the
facilities and demands for Philippine management of
war reserve stocks
The opposition has been particularly ambiguous on
the question of economic reform. We believe a govern-
ment controlled by the moderates would move to_
dismantle the monopolies and economic privileges of
Marcos's closest allies-in particular those in the
sugar and coconut industries-because of their effect
on the economy and their high political profile. _
Similarly; we believe a mixture of conviction and
political necessity would probably also result in
attempts to redirect government expenditures to pro-
ductive services in rural areas-such as agriculture
and public works. The opposition might not be as
reform minded on other issues, in our judgment. A
more nationalistic orientation, for example, would
likely prompt moves to "review" all international
financial agreements-including the IMF program
and debt rescheduling arrangements with foreign
commercial bankers-with an eye toward further
stretching out repayments on the $26 billion foreign
debt. An opposition successor government might also
be even more resistant than Marcos to actions such as
depreciating the peso-a move central to the IMF
economic recovery program for the Philippines.
Finally, we believe the moderates, out of political
necessity, would support many of the goals of the
military reform movement. We would expect to see
the enforced retirement of senior officers and at-
tempts to rebuild morale and professionalism in the
officer corps. The moderates probably believe Mar-
cos's absence alone would, at a minimum, slow the
Communist insurgency's momentum and encourage
many less committed recruits to return `from the
hills. " If they are right-and we believe they may
be-this would give a new government time to set in
place reforms, such as improving social services,
cleaning up military abuses, and restoring economic
growth, that would address the root causes of the .
insurgency. To our knowledge, however, the moder-
ates have not developed a detailed plan for dealing
with the Communist Party/New People's Army in the
event that the insurgency continues to grow.
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Embassy, BANDILA's efforts during college and
university student council elections in August 1985,
moreover, resulted in a routing of Communist-front
League of Filipino Students (LFS) candidates.
? The US Embassy has reported signs that the rela-
tively stable UNIDO alliance may face a split
should Salvador Laurel persist in his presidential
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... But a House Divided
Despite its revival, the moderate opposition's pros-
pects are seriously undermined by internal weakness-
es, most of which are related to its lack of unity and
purpose-beyond ousting Marcos. These include sus-
picions that some opposition leaders have been co-
opted by extremist groups on the right or the left and
problems arising over uncertain leadership. To com-
plicate matters, new internal divisions among almost
all major opposition parties have surfaced over the
past year:
? According to the US Embassy and numerous press
reports, intensified rivalry between Liberal Party
presidential hopefuls Eva Estrada Kalaw and Jovito
Salonga erupted in October 1985 as a plan to unify
the party by naming Judy Roxas party president
failed, and both Kalaw and Salonga were elected
president in separate meetings.
? PDP-LABAN has been wracked by a leadership
feud between Aquilino Pimentel and Ramon Mitra,
and charges of financial misconduct by other party
officials.
? The Social Democratic Party (SDP), according to
US Embassy and several press sources, has suffered
similar internal bickering as leading players Fran-
cisco Tatad and Reuben Canoy alternately attempt
to oust the other from the party. The SDP has been
further weakened by charges of graft leveled at
party Chairman Tatad by the Marcos government.
Suspicion within opposition ranks of leaders deemed
too closely affiliated with either the Marcos govern-
ment or the Communist left, in our judgment, has
helped stymie unification efforts. Jose Diokno, for
example, is considered by some moderates to be
dangerously close to the Communists. According to
US Embassy officials, many in the opposition view
Laurel and Kalaw as "traditional" politicians brought
up in the same political environment as Marcos and
liable to fall into the same leadership pattern if
elected to the presidency. At the same time, some of
the "cause-oriented" (or ideological) politicians-like
Butz Aquino-are viewed as opportunists who have
jumped upon the opposition bandwagon without work-
ing their way up through the ranks
The most publicized of the opposition's internal diffi-
culties is its inability to choose a single presidential
candidate-or devise a method for doing so in the
absence of a primary system. Opposition leaders who
have made public their desire to run include
UNIDO's Laurel (the only candidate thus far to be
officially nominated), PDP-LABAN's Pimentel and
Mitra, Liberal Party leaders Kalaw and Salonga,
BANDILA's Butz Aquino, and Diokno. Many of the
older politicians, such as Laurel, Kalaw, and Salonga,
are bitter at having been denied the opportunity for
national leadership since 1969-the last election prior
to martial law-and fear that 1987 may be their last
chance to run as-viable contenders, according to the
domestic press. For their part, we believe younger
presidential aspirants view the 1987 poll as a political
watershed for the Philippines and want to be at the
helm directing national affairs in the immediate post-
Marcos period.
In our view, the opposition's difficulty in fashioning a
national grassroots organization to compete with the
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Even before President Marcos's call in November
1985 for a snap election early next year, the moder-
ates had already begun to prepare piecemeal for
elections in 1986. The Aquino family, for example, is
preparing to field strong candidates in mayoral races
in at least three cities in Tarlac Province, according
to US Embassy reporting, and the National Unifica-
tion Committee is drawing up lists of provincial,
municipal, and local candidates.
For its part, the KBL is preparing for upcoming
elections in earnest. Developments over the last sever-
al months suggest that Marcos is moving slowly to
"stack the odds"in his favor rather than have to fight
the public backlash to more overt last-minute elec-
tion rigging. In May, Marcos appointed loyalist
Victorino Savellano chairman of the powerful Com-
mission on Elections (COMELECJ-which oversees
polling and the tallying of election results. The three
commissioners he named two months later have only
modest credentials-according to. the US Embassy-
and are widely believed to be Marcos supporters.
Most political observers believe that these political
appointments reflect Marcos's determination to in-
crease his influence over the election process in order
to preempt a reoccurrence of the moderates' 1984
election successes. As such, we do not expect Marcos
to name oppositionists to either of the two remaining
vacancies, despite his current majority on
COMELEC, and he may, in fact, leave these posi-
tions unfilled as he has in the past.
Marcos's fear of being "surprised" by the opposition
is also, we believe, behind his unwillingness to
reaccredit NAMFREL as the official poll watching
organization for the 1986 elections. A KBL caucus in
July, for example, resulted in proposals for changes
in the election laws, including:
? Lifting the 1984 prohibition against having local
officials act as poll watchers.
? Reversing another 1984 ruling to enable election
inspectors to call police into polling stations.
? Granting COMELEC sole authority to decide
which, if any, group to designate as the official poll
watching organization.
For its part, COMELEC has been "busily strewing
obstacles in NAMFREL's path, " according to the US
Embassy. COMELEC s chairman has drawn up a list
of guidelines for NAMFREL-should it be accredit-
edfor 1986-including a requirement that
NAMFREL submit a list of proposed poll watchers
to COMELECfor its approval.
We believe the prospects for relatively 'free and fair"
elections have also dimmed following the National
Assembly's decision to hand the question of optional
bloc voting to the President. In all likelihood, Marcos
will approve the use of bloc voting-in which votes
can be cast for parties rather than individual candi-
dates-on the grounds that it is a help to illiterate
voters and simplifies the tallying of election results.
The opposition, however, claims that bloc voting will
ease the ruling party's manipulation of election re-
turns by simplifying the process of falsifying ballots.
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powerful KBL political machine is its most serious
failing. BAYAN aspires to achieve this kind of unity,
but has been unable to avoid
factional power plays-particularly moves by the
Communist Party's National Democratic Front to
dominate the organization. Butz Aquino's more mod-
erate organization, BANDILA-founded as an alter-
native to BAYAN-has also failed to provide a
national base for the opposition although it has been
fairly successful in the Manila area, according to US
Embassy reporting.
The principal cost of further organizational failure, in
our view, is that the opposition will continue to be
hampered in efforts to garner support in rural areas or
to impress consequential political players-including
sympathetic members of the business community-to
financially commit to any particular party or individ-
ual
What Would It Take To Improve
the Opposition's Fortunes?
The opposition's prospects would brighten most dra-
matically, in our view, with the emergence of a
charismatic presidential challenger, especially if that
comes in the context of a snap presidential election.
The ground swell of support for Cory Aquino follow-
ing Marcos's threat in August 1985 to advance the
date of the presidential election underscores the at-
traction of a single moderate opposition candidate. In
the wake of the outpouring of public support for
Mrs. Aquino, many opposition hopefuls-including
Kalaw and Pimentel-agreed to support her candida-
cy if she declared her willingness to run. The emer-
gence of Cory Aquino as a likely opposition presiden-
tial standard bearer, in our view, is one of the most
positive signs that the moderates could unite and beat
Marcos in a relatively free contest.'
6 According to a variety of observers, including Makati Business
Club leader Jaime Ongpin, Mrs. Aquino is in many respects the
ideal candidate. She is strongly identified with her late husband-
who has achieved near folklore status as a national martyr-and, as
such, is almost immune to damaging criticism from either the
Marcos camp or the radical left. Although unschooled as a
politician, she has become an increasingly important player in
opposition politics, particularly the unification efforts of the Na-
tional Unification Committee (NUC) and the Convenor Group.
And, unlike almost any other opposition politician, she has man-
aged to remain virtually untainted by the political infighting of the
past several years. Finally, we believe she is among the few
moderates able to rival Marcos for nationwide name recognition.
We remain pessimistic, however, that the opposition
will settle the leadership issue well in advance of a
presidential poll and believe the moderates' best hope 25X1
for capturing the presidency in a snap election or in
1987 is for them to do well in the May 1986 local
elections. A strong showing there would strengthen
their grassroots organization and heighten their public
profile and appeal. If moderates can increase their
influence over local governments-they currently hold
less than 20 percent of the country's governorships
and mayoral positions-they will be in a better posi- 25X1
tion to begin building support for their eventual
presidential standard bearer. Fundraising activities
for the presidential race would be enhanced and
arrangements for local poll watching could begin.
More moderate governors and mayors throughout the
country also would reduce Marcos's ability to inter-
fere with polling procedures, which the KBL has been
known to compromise by enlisting local Constabulary 25X1
and Army units.
Continued cooperation among moderates on issues of
high public concern, we believe, would also lessen the
negative impact of the unresolved leadership dilem-
ma. For example, opposition parliamentarians almost
unanimously resisted the temptation to join a KBL-
sponsored committee to examine US-Philippine rela-
tions-a move we believe Marcos hoped would divide
the moderates as well as shore up the ruling party's
nationalist credentials and send a warning signal to
Washington. We believe they also have gained nation-
wide recognition for their dogged pursuit of the
foreign wealth issue. The opposition is also moving
ahead with its proposed "shadow cabinet," which we
believe could help shape a public awareness of the
moderates, provide a more focused tool for attacking 25X1
Marcos, and present a clearer public image of an
alternative government.
The moderates must also intensify local organization
efforts. Moves undertaken so far have paid clear
dividends, in our judgment. With the support of the
NUC, for example, the moderates have held several
regional conferences over the last several months
including one of over 200 opposition leaders in the
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Visayas. Another in Central Luzon, led by Cory
Aquino and Assemblywoman Cecilia Munoz-Palma,
reportedly attracted 1,200 attendees. Individual can-
didates, notably Laurel, have also begun work in the
provinces-a development that runs the risk of perpet-
uating rivalries between national leaders, but on
balance would be a positive factor in improving
opposition prospects in local election
What To Expect
It would be a mistake, in our view, to gauge the
moderates' prospects solely by their organizational
failings or the absence of a clearly defined leader-
ship-misleading benchmarks in a political system
long characterized by a dominant strongman. And
despite the uncertainties, we believe a moderate-
controlled government offers hope for restoring long-
term stability to the Philippines. No successor govern-
ment will be able to quickly develop the kind of
personal and highly centralized power structure that
Marcos has created over two decades. The necessary
process of alliance building-particularly if the mod-
erates come to power as part of a coalition govern-
ment-will, in our view, require responsiveness to a
wider domestic constituency than Marcos's small
circle of allies. It will also increase pressure on the
moderates to improve domestic conditions, and, we
believe, would produce greater receptiveness to the
recommendations for reform from the foreign com-
munity-including the United States, the IMF, and
the World Bank. The result, in our view, is likely to be
more broadly supported policies than those of the
Marcos government-and thus more effective
government.
It is nevertheless clear that the moderates have a long
way to go before they will be in a position to attempt
to solve the Philippines' problems. In the absence of a
charismatic leader, we believe the opposition will
continue to flounder as elections approach. Gradual
organizational gains by the National Unification
Committee, the Convenor Group, and other groups
within the opposition are likely to be eroded by
continued infighting among the leading players. The
lack of an election primary system will, we believe,
keep the leadership question unresolved and will make
it difficult to settle if the moderates are pushed to
make a decision before the 1987 election. We believe
the moderates' inability to settle the issue was one of
the reasons for Marcos's recent call for a snap election
early in 1986. Until the moderates decide the leader-
ship question, we expect to see a continuation of
maneuvering among the leading contenders for the
presidential nomination
In the event that the 1986 local elections do not
demonstrably increase the opposition's share of may-
oral positions and governorships-either because of its
own shortcomings or because of blatant cheating by
the ruling party-we believe a further polarization of
the moderates and a realignment of at least some of
them to the radical left is a possibility. Success in
1986, however, could act as a catalyst to the moder-
ates-in much the same way that the Aquino assassi-
nation and the 1984 National Assembly elections
buoyed their fortunes-even if the emergence of a
single presidential candidate eludes the moderates.
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