NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 14 MAY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010167-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 167
• Publication Date: May 14, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
14 May 1983
CPAS NID 83-114JX
~4 FTay 1989
?pY 2 8 5
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Contents
Syria-Lebanon: Opposition to the Agreement ........................
France-West Germany: Summit Preview ..............................
Brazil: Possible Debt Moratorium ..........................................
USSR-Canada: Gorbachev's Visit ..........................................
China: Interest in IAEA Membership ......................................
USSR-Peru: Soviet Concerns ..................................................
USSR-Afghanistan: Soviet Comment on UN Talks ................
India-US: Nuclear Spare Parts Issue ...................................... 9
UK: Election Campaign Begins ................................................ 10
Greece-Turkey: NATO Exercise Problems ............................ 11
Kenya-UK-US: Charges of Political Meddling ........................ 11
Special Analysis
EI Salvador: Economic Warfare .............................................. 12
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SYRIA-LEBANON: Opposition to the Agreement
Syria is trying to intensify opposition in Lebanon to the draft
Lebanese-Israeli agreement.
A pro-Syrian newspaper in Beirut reports that a National Front
opposed to the withdrawal agreement will be officially established
today. The group's leaders are to include former President Franjiyah,
former Prime Minister Karami, and Druze leader Walid Junblatt.
The US Embassy in Beirut reports that Lebanese politicians are
increasingly alarmed by Syria's rejection of the withdrawal
agreement. Many of them are concerned that the Syrians might bomb
the parliament building, or carry out other acts of violence to prevent
ratification of the pact.
Maronite politicians are worried that PLO units might carry out
attacks against Christian targets. According to press reports,
President Assail yesterday again told Lebanese Foreign Minister
Salem that Damascus rejects the Lebanese-Israeli agreement.
Comment: The members of the new National Front have long
been wary of the Gemayel government, but Syrian pressure almost
certainly led them to announce at this time their opposition to the
agreement. Syria's sudden attempt to create an opposition front is
unlikely to attract strong support beyond pro-Syrian political groups
and Lebanon's two Communist parties. Nevertheless, violence by
Palestinian and leftist groups could cause other Lebanese Muslim
politicians to denounce the agreement.
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FRANCE-WEST GERMANY: Summit Preview
President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl probably will paper
over disagreements on economics iss~ring their two-day summit
that begins in Paris on Monday.
French officials want the West Germans to adopt measures that
would help reduce France's growing bilateral trade deficit, increase
support for the franc, and promote development throughout Europe
of advanced robotics, computers, and electronics. The French also
want West German agreement to coproduce new weapons systems.
West German officials continue to blame the French for much of
the acrimony that surrounded negotiations on the European currency
realignment in March.
Comment: Mitterrand will be likely to reassure Kohl of his
intention to stick to the austerity program, to resist growing
protectionist sentiment in France, and to remain in the EMS. Kohl
probably will agree in principle to help the French meet their urgent
economic problems but will avoid commitments on trade issues. On
specifics, Kohl may at most agree to French proposals for stimulatin
advanced technology in Europe and weapons coproduction.
Both leaders will publicly emphasize their commitment to
strengthening the EC's institutions at the organization's summit next
month. Mitterrand remains wary of specific West German proposals
that would increase the use of voting by qualified majority in EC
decisions and enlarge the role of the European Parliament. He
probably is concerned, however, that future financial assistance for
France from the EC could be jeopardized if Paris is viewed as
obstructionist.
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BRAZIL: Possible Debt Moratorium
Comment: Discussions beginning on Monday with the IMF may
bring the issue to a head. The US Embassy reports that Brasilia has
been unable to comply with the IMF's targets and is seeking a waiver.
If a waiver cannot be negotiated promptly, Brasilia will have little hope
of restoring short-term credits or raising new money.
Although a debt moratorium might help halt the loss of deposits
from Brazilian banks, West European, Japanese, and small US banks
probably would demand even tougher austerity measures by Brasilia
in return for new money. Moreover, suspensions of payments would
become increasingly attractive to other debtors in Latin Americ
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agriculture, is close to General Secretary Andropov, who likes his
modern ideas for revitalizing Soviet agriculture. Gorbachev plans to
discuss INF and other East-West issues as well as bilateral matters
with Canadian officials, and he hopes to meet with Prime Minister
Trudeau.
The Canadians reportedly want to impress Gorbachev with their
agricultural equipment and technical expertise to encourage him
to recommend purchases. Ottawa reportedly has offered to add
$3-4 million to the $1 billion line of credit available to the USSR this
marketing year for the purchase of agricultural goods.
Comment: The Soviets want to encourage the high-level dialogue
that was resumed at Ottawa's initiative last fall after athree-year
suspension by the Canadians to protest the invasion of Afghanistan.
Gorbachev also will try to induce Ottawa to withdraw its support for
the US position on INF. In this context, he probably will try to exploit
the opposition in Canada to planned tests of US cruise missiles there.
Excessive pressure on this point, however, will risk alienating
Trudeau. The Prime Minister has stressed his commitment to
the testing agreement and has shown anger about protest
demonstrations.
The government probably hopes improved political relations will
lead to increased exports to the USSR and to improved cooperation
in scientific research in the Arctic. Ottawa has been promoting such
trade-especially in high-technology goods-and was disappointed
to have been excluded from supplying oil and gas technology for the
Astrakhan gas project.
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CHINA: Interest in IAEA Membership
Chinese officials are showing renewed interest in joining the
International Atomic Energy Apencv, but several obstacles probably
will prevent an early decision.
Comment: China is the only nuclear weapons state outside the
IAEA, but it has raised the possibility of joining several times. Beijing
may only be trying to make a favorable impression as it considers
importing Western technology for a nuclear power program.
Membership would entail significant costs. Although it would not
legally obligate Beijing to accept IAEA safeguards on power reactors
purchased from a Western supplier state, China would nevertheless
find it more difficult to maintain its opposition to international
safeguards. Moreover, China could expect greater pressure from
supplier states, which object to Beijing's export of nuclear materials
to potential proliferators, such as Argentina and South Africa, without
IAEA safeguards.
If Beijing were to join the IAEA, it probably would not complain
about the continuation of safeguards in Taiwan, which was forced out
of the IAEA in the early 1970s. China would be likely to insist,
however, on having a permanent seat on the Board of Governors. It
then could support developing nations seeking greater influence in
the IAEA and promote more extensive technology transfers.
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USSR-PERU: Soviet Concerns
The Soviets apparently are worried that political developments in
Peru could undercut their position there, and they are trying to
cultivate support in the military and among left-of-center political
elements.
Comment: Moscow's views of discontent in the military seem
exaggerated, but they probably reflect its assessment of the strained
economic situation and the difficulties encountered in operations
against leftist terrorists. The Soviets have tried to secure a position of
influence by cultivating the military. They may fear that a conservative
military regime would move against officers suspected of pro-Soviet
sympathies or against those trained in the USSR.
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CHINA-USSR: Reaction to Criticism
The US Embassy in Beijing has learned
that the Chinese claim they have canceled a visit that had
been scheduled for late this month by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Kapitsa and that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen will not
stop for talks in Moscow en route home from his current trip to
Eastern Europe. These steps reportedly are meant as a sign of
Beijing's displeasure with the Soviet press attacks last month on
China's approach to the bilateral talks. Party
Chairman Hu Yaobang recently complained off the record to East
European journalists about Soviet "sabotage" on the Sino-Soviet
border. In addition, Hu asserted for publication that Moscow's
"hegemonistic" behavior in Southeast Asia could lead to armed
conflict with the USSR.
Comment: The Chinese are clearly warning Moscow that they
cannot be bullied into dropping their principal demands for improving
bilateral relations, especially their insistence that the USSR withdraw
its support for Vietnam. Nevertheless, China still appears interested in
holding the bilateral talks.
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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Soviet Comment on UN Talks
The head of the Middle East Department of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry told French diplomats in Moscow last week that there were
"no results" from the round of UN talks on Afghanistan that ended on
22 April in Geneva. He said that the UN mediator's role should be
limited to facilitating direct talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan
and that there could be no discussion of Soviet troop withdrawals
because this is a bilateral matter between Moscow and Kabul. Soviet
Ambassador Tabeyev, speaking with his Indian counterpart in Kabul
this week, asserted that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is
"permanent" and that it should be accepted by everyone. The UN
mediators and the Pakistanis, on the other hand, are saying that the
latest session was difficult but that it may have laid the groundwork
for progress when talks resume in mid-June.
Comment: Soviet negotiations with insurgents in Afghanistan
appear to be enjoying some success, and the USSR may be adopting
a tougher position in the talks with Pakistan
INDIA-US: Nuclear Spare Parts Issue
The US Embassy reports that senior Indian officials are angry with
the failure by the US to authorize the export of spare parts for the
Tarapur nuclear power reactor that are available only from the
original US vendor. They have privately told US representatives that
the lack of spare parts will force them to reprocess spent fuel from the
reactor ahead of schedule so that the reactor core can be emptied to
permit repairs. Indian press reports allege that the delay by the US
has contributed to a health hazard at Tarapur.
Comment: The reprocessing and spare parts issues threaten to
dissipate the good will accruing to Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to the
US last summer. Indian proponents of greater nuclear independence
are likely to use the spare parts issue to strengthen their opposition to
India's acceptance of international safeguards. India probably would
not be able to reprocess spent fuel from the Tarapur reactor before
early next,vear because the only reprocessing plant is fully committed
until then
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UK: Election Campaign Begins
The campaign for the election on 9 June officially opens today,
with the Conservative Party of Prime Minister Thatcher gaining
strength. Two polls taken this week show an increased Tory lead over
the Labor Party-one of 17 percentage points and the other of
21 percentage points. Only last weekend the two polls indicated that
the Conservatives were ahead by only 8 and 13 points, respectively.
The Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance has remained steady at
17 percent in both recent polls, reflecting the decline in its popularity.
Comment: The Tory advantage is likely to diminish as Labor
develops its attack against the government's weak points, particularly
the unemployment rate of 13 percent. With the Conservatives' current
lead, Thatcher would gain an absolute majority in Parliament and a
margin of as many as 200 seats more than Labor. The drop in the
standing of the Alliance reduces the chances that it can secure a
share of power and indicates public uneasiness with the idea of a
three-way race.
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GREECE-TURKEY: NATO Exercise Problems
The dispute between Greece and Turkey over control of Aegean
airspace almost forced the cancellation of a NATO mobile force
exercise scheduled to begin on 28 May. Alast-minute concession by
Ankara on using the flight path the Greeks preferred allowed the
exercise to continue. Planning was well under way when the Greeks-
who were not involved in the exercise in eastern Turkey-proposed
using an air route over Limnos Island rather than the one over the
Aegean Sea that Turkey and the other participants had already
accepted. At a Defense Planning Committee meeting on Wednesday,
the Permanent Representatives from the UK, Belgium, West
Germany, and Italy expressed their growing frustration with the
repeated intrusion of this bilateral dispute into NATO affairs.
Comment: The tone of the comments made during the meeting
on Wednesday by those Allies who-along with the US-contribute
to the force suggests that their patience is reaching a breaking point.
Any late cancellation in the future may result in the refusal of the Allies
to plan additional exercises in the Aegean until the Greeks and the
Turks resolve their problems.
KENYA-UK-US: Charges of Political Meddling
The US Embassy reports that President Moi is claiming that
Constitutional Affairs Minister Njonjo, a political rival, is drawing on
US and British support to undermine the government. The local media
have provided extensive coverage of rumored plots and charges of
Western meddling in domestic politics, and many politicians have
spoken out against the alleged threat.
Comment: Moi probably does not believe that the US and the UK
are involved in internal politics, but the media coverage could lead to
some anti-US sentiment. Moi almost certainly is making the
accusations to pave the way for firing Njonjo. Njonjo lacks
widespread popular support, and his dismissal is unlikely to
encourage Kikuyu opposition to Moi.
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14 May 1983
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Special Analysis
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The guerrillas are resorting increasingly to economic sabotage as
they attempt to erode confidence in the Army and undermine the
credibility of the presidential election scheduled for late this year. This
strategy carries few military risks for the insurgents, while it compels
government units to assume a static defense posture that increases
their vulnerability to ambushes and other attacks.
The insurgents publicly announced their campaign of economic
sabotage last month. Since then, they have increased their
operations, particularly in the east. They are disrupting the planting of
cotton and the processing of coffee, which together account for
approximately 60 percent of EI Salvador's export earnings.
Local businessmen say the guerrillas are forcing farmers to sign
letters stating they will not plant cash crops.
The increased destruction of bridges is hampering trade and
communications between eastern EI Salvador and Honduras. In
addition, US officials note that attacks on the rail system have
paralyzed traffic between the capital and the east coast, increasin
the discouragement of growers and investors.
Guerrilla activity also is increasing in the central region, where
major hydroelectric power plants are located. Recent attacks on
towns near the heavily guarded plants underscore the disastrous
effects their destruction would have on the already weakened
economy.
Insurgent Goals .
The sabotage campaign is beginning to have a psychological
effect in the east, where attacks on electrical substations have
blacked out whole areas for much of the year. Local businessmen
believe the populace is increasingly demoralized by the guerrillas'
ability to seize territory-even temporarily-and they claim the Army
is losing credibility.
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The threat to Morazan has forced the Army to station one of its
three elite US-trained battalions around the provincial capital. The
resulting reduction in the Army's reaction capability has allowed the
insurgents to operate more freely in other areas. The guerrillas also
hope to inflict a major defeat on the elite units to weaken overall
military morale and resistance.
The insurgents see major olitical benefits if
control in the east.
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Government Response
The armed forces are planning to begin a major military campaign
late this month to secure vital crop-growing areas in the southeast.
Several elite units, along with other local forces, will try to clear the
insurgents from San Vicente and Usulutan Departments.
The clearing operation is to be followed by a civic action program
designed to restore the basic economic infrastructure and build
popular support. Senior military officials regard this effort as a model
for similar operations in other areas. They also believe it will respond
to some of the concerns of younger officers, who have been pushing
for a nationwide civic action program.
Short-Term Outlook
There are no indications that the guerrillas are planning an all-out
effort similar to the "final offensive" of January 1981. Nonetheless,
they almost certainly will increase both economic and military
operations during the next few months. At least some of these actions
are likely to succeed, and hardline insurgent leaders might then push
for alarge-scale offensive to preempt the elections.
The government's planned clearing operation and civic action
program are steps in the right direction. They will, however, commit
most of the reserve forces to one area, leaving other regions
vulnerable to insurgent attacks and sabotage.
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In addition, the plan's longer term success would require
organizing, training, and equipping enough civil defense forces to
prevent the insurgents from returning in strength to contested areas.
Continuing shortages of officers and other personnel indicate that
the government will be hard pressed to achieve its goals.
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