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CENTRAL NTELLIGENCE~CY
REPORT
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
CD NO.
SUBJECT Econom:~, - Aieiltu-e. co11e_tivization
Political - Party agitation
HOW
DATE OF
DATE DIST. 9S Nov 1952
PUBLISHED Daily newspapers; monthly periodicals
WHERE
PUBLISHED
puchareat
NO. OF PAGES
20
DATE
PUBLISHED
Nov 1951
- ? Jun 19
32
LANGUAGE
Rumanian
.
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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An intensive winter collectivization campaign, called for by G?heorghiu-Dej
in November 1.951, was prominently featured in the Rumanian press from January to
mid-May 1952. Commualat organizations in rural areas participated in the
campaign, and efforts were made to win the "free consent" of the peasantry in
the organization of collectives.
The drive underwent two phases. From 1 January to 20 February the press
and Communist organizations called for the organization in the APR (Rum ai?n
People's Pepublic) of collectives of the Soviet kolkhoz type. Weekly meetings
were organized, teams of agitators made house-to-house canvases, cultural chambers
were used for propaganda. On 21 February, the emphasis of the campaign suddenly
changed, as seen by a Scanteia article of that date calling for the formation of
TOZ, rather than of collectives as previously. The TOZ is a loose association
of peasants formed for ceumnon plowing of the land, as promulgated in Decree 66
of the Council of Ministers dated 25 January 1952. The TOZ are of two types,
temporary and formed for one season only, or permanent. This is the most rudi-
mentary step in the collectivization process since private ownership of land
and tools is retained. In effect, the TOZ is little more than a cooperative
contract between a group of independent peasants and an MPS for plowing of
ludividual parcels of land. This s:uift in party, tactics may have been an
attempt to draw a reluctant peasantry into collectivization while allowing
private ownership. It also suggests that a more moderate objective was adopted
because collectivization had not proceeded as planned.
From the beginning of April to 20 May the collectivization campaign gradually
yielded to the spring planting drive, and the number of articles on TOZ and
collectives declined rapidly. There were scattered indications of failures in
collectivization in some areas, but the press gave a general impression of
continued and successful collectivization.
STATE
ARMY
F)QNAVY
MAI.
NSRB
FBI
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The next important mention of collectivization occurred on 3 June. Ana
Pauker had been in charge of collectivization and presumably headed the winter
drive. However, Scanteia of 3 June 1952 reported that she was deprived of this
responsibility for "deviations" from the party lLne in agriculture. Sue was de-
clared guilty of neglect in the establishment of new collectives, and was accused
of tolerating kaiaks, a chief target of the collectivization campaign. In
addition, she was accused oi' violating the rule of "free consent," according
to which peseante could not be forced to join collectives.
This report gives in?ormat!on on principles of collectivization as stated
by Gheorghiu-Dej, various phases of the collectivization campaign, formation of
collectives and TOZ, difficulties in collectivization, and crop yields per
hectare achieved by collectives and TGZ. Data is from Scanteia, organ of the
PMR (Rumanian Workers' Party), which was covered for the period 1 January -
3 June 1952 for the report, and fr:im various periodicals as indicated.
Two articles appearing in Problems Economics in November 1951 ("Agricultural
Collectives," by Hillel Kohn, Alex. Cndi, end Marton Cristal, and "A Trans-
formation in Rumanian Agriculture Under the Leadership of the Party," by V.
Vaida) declared that Gheorghiu-1)ej considered the economic consolidation of
collectives to be one of the chief tasks of the PMR. Kohn Undi, and Cristai
quoted Gheorghiu-Dej as stating that while collectives were numerically few
in the RFR, they were the chief instrument by which socialization of agriculture
would be brought about, and that the final victory of nociali.sm in Rumania
depended ca winning the struggle for collectivization. Scanteia further high-
lighted the party's interest in collectivization by declaring on 22 February
1952 that "agricultural collectives occupy a role of honor in the national
economy."
Propaganda Campaign Emphasizing Soviet and Rumanian Successes in Collectivization
Both articles from Probleme Economice emphasized that Gheorghiu-Dej felt
the need for an extensive propaganda campaign among the peasantry. This campaign
was to stress the great achievements of Soviet kolkhozes and the success of Soviet
work and organizational methods. It was to emphasize the successes of Rumanian
collectives, agricultural associations, state farms, and MIS in order to convince
the peasant mass's of the superiority of socialist agriculture and thus bring
about the establishment of collective farms with their free consent. The party's
task, as stated. by Gheorghiu-Dej, was as follows: "The party is faced with the
task of carrying out the policy. formulated by its Central Committee, of fighting
for a stable alliance with the middle trata of the peasant class and leading
these peasants slowly along the road to socialism. In this it must be guided by
the Leninist dictums 'Rely on the poor peasants, ally yourself with the middle
strata of the peasantry, carry on relentlessly the fight against the kulaks.I"
According to V. Vaida, in the article mentioned above, Gheorghiu-Dej had
repeatedly emphasized the necessity of observing the principle of free consent
in organizing collective farms. He had stated that the only method to be used
in the struggle for convincing the peasantry was the use of specific examples of
the advantages offered by collective farms. Vaida mentioned that party directives
were actually violated in areas such as Trei Hcaune, Tarnava-Mica, Alba, Valcea,
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and Argea;. vm>re extravagant promises were given and pressure exerted on the
peasantry to make them join collectives, and that Georghiu-Dej had stated that
all competition designed to bring about spectac,.1ar results, all pressures exerted
on the Peasantry for speeding up collectivization were detrimental to the cause
of socialism and could only weaken toe alliance between workers and peasants.
"Thus," Vaida added, "we see the extreme significance which our party and
Cheorghiu-Dej attach to free consent as a result of inner conviction on the part
of the peasantry."
ICulak Problem
. As for the k.ilak problem, Vaida wrote that "the socialist tzanaformation of
agriculture iafurtstee the k-lake and tbeir supporters, the Argo-American
imperialists." He declared that kulaks discredit and sabotage agricultural
collectivization beca?a-e it weakeni their strength in the villages and because
it prevent, them from exploiting the peasants. He quoted Gheorghiu-Dej as
stating t et "the kulak is doing hie very best to -+revent the establishment of
collective farme, to prevent hie isolation from the poor and middle strata of
the peasantry, because he is aware that agricultural collectivization wi'l rain
him. "
The definition of a kulak given by Scanteia on 13 December 1951 -- a kulak
is one who refugee to collectivize hi=, who refuges to enter the
who still posaessea private property, -- is of interest in that it seem rtog or
permit designation as a kL1ak of any peasant in a village who refuses to join a
TOZ or collective and wishes to continue. Individual ownership. Thus, the line
between coercion and free consent would seem to be a very fine one. Evidence of
this is Scanteia's descriptions of the actual collectivization process during
the winter campaign, First, according to Scanteia, local Communists organized
an initiative committee. This committee called for an agitation campaign. Then
an organizational committee was formed. Prominent local Communists called a
meeting of all peasants and propcsedthe formation of a collective. Genarally
several peasants spoke against the ilea. These were at once publicly designated
as kulake. This appeared to eilen^e any other objections, and the TOZ or collective
was then organized with "free consent." Scsnteia spoke-
approvingly procedure in articles appearing y, I a
ppearing on 17 Pcbntrsy, 20 Fe Pebruuy, 21 'FFeb nua iary March,
9 March, and 28 March.
On 3 January, Scante_a. declared that kriaK, were discovered in many villages
in Cluj Region. Their property was confiscated and those who "unmasked" them
were rewarded vitn 23 percent of the agricultu:el products found concealed on
their property. This procedure was followea in Calarasi when kulak Petru Criaan,
owner of 1G.39 hectares, was discovered coneraling 1,590 kilograms of wheat and
2,530 kilograms of corn.
Scanteia reported on 5 January, that the collection of agricultural products
in Radu Negnx, Celarasi Rayon, was below plan rejuirements because of the efforts
of kulaks. Party organizations '.!losed their eyes" to this situation and failed
to punish 30 who did not deliver quotas. As a matter of fact, local party
officials were either related to the kulake o? were old friends. Instead of
standing out as ahtning examples in the fight against saboteurs, rayon and even
regional committee members committed Serious errors.
In Arpasul de Jos, in Sibiu Region, Scantela reported on the same day,
trials were held against kulaks. Working peasants testified against the lailake,
unmasking their plots which had resulted in failure to meet quotas and failure
to produce from the land the amount required of them.
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On 17 February, Scanteis declared that many medium peasants were so im-
pressed by the agitation campaign that they themselves became strong agitators
against 1nzlak3. In Celaru, Victor Cinca vent against the party line by not
favoring the establishment of a collective and consequently was e:ccluded from
the party. In Dreghaniceni, efforts to form collectives were blocked by kulaks.
After 20 February, more frequent and vehement atterks on kulak~ appeared.
On that date, Scanteia of 20 February reported that in Maracesti the "plots of
kulaks Stan Buzea and Dobre Buzea were in vain," and a permanent TOZ was planned.
On 21 February, Scant=.ia advised party orgeen.ietionE and people's councils to
unmeek the lies and plots of ku?aks who Beak to prevent the peasants from uniting
in TOZ. On 1 March, the paper described the intense agitation campaign in Husi
Rayon. The. campaign was actively opp -d by kulak= Oh. Z. Menolache, who was the
son of a kulak owning 20 hectares, Lucian I. Nestler, and others who sought to
prevent collectivization. On 9 March. Scenteia rep.-rted the "unmasking" of
various kulaks daring the expansion of a collective in Bolan. On 20 March. an
article explained how kuleks were receiving fair and just treatment.
On 27 March, Scanteia reported that constant vigilance was maintained against
kulaks in Cuza-Voda. One kulak, Nicolee Paraschiv, was discovered in the
collective in trragalina and expelled. After that, work proceeded smoothly.
On 28 March, it was reported that the local Communists in Fleva had formed
an organizational committee for the creation of s collective. Their first act
was to unmask kulsks Tome Chita and loans Teal.;rescu, who spoke against the
formation of a collective in the community.
On 29 March, Scanteia described what can happen where there is a lack of
vigilance against kale ks, as follows; in Castranova, Dolj Region, 35 kulaks
owning from 18 hectares to 50 yokes of land were "reduced to medium peasants
overnight." That is, local authorities designated them as "medium peasants,"
even though they were automatically classed as kalake by virtue of their large
holdings. This constituted a gross viola tip of the resolution of the plenary
session of the Central Committee of the PMR of 3 - 5 March 1949. The local
council and prima-ry party organizatiaas aided class enemies through personal
friendship. The local council designated the kulaks as medium peasants and
gave them an unjust share of the agricultural p'roduc'tion which should have gone
to the state. Thus, for example, kulak Dumitru Dinca received 1,884 liters of
milk, 914 kilograms of beans, 553 kilograms of peas, 130 kilograms of sunflower
seed, and other products. Kulaks Ion Baluta, Dutu I. Pope, Ion Cotora, and
others also obtained large rewards which they used for speculation. A meeting
of 1,000 members of pr mary party organizations led to the unmasking of Constantin
M. Badea and Constantin Ivan Baden, who had aided these kulaks. Constantin Ivan
Badea had been vice-president of the executive committee of the People's Council
of Castranova. This failure of the rayon committee to educate the primary party
organs in "revolutionary vigilance" was classed as a deviation from the party
line.
As early as November 1951, Vaida in Probleme Economics had quoted Gheorghiu-
Dej as calling for an intensive propaganda campaign among the peasantry. Such a
campaign was prominently featured in Scantela after 1 January 1952. Seventy-seven
articles dealing or connected with the campaign appeared in this newspaper in
the first 3 months of 1952; the number decreased in frequency in April and -May.
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50X1-HUM
Methods used in the campaign included the publicizing of lists of new
collectives, agitation, education, political-organizational work, and the
description of model Soviet and Rumanian collectives to show the superiority
of collectives over private ownerships.
A. Progress of the Campaign from 1 'anuarv to 20 Febrr -y 1952
of In this first period of the campaign the main emphasis was on the formation
"collectives" or "collective farms" patterned on Soviet kolkhozes. Thirty-
siz articles on collectivization appeared in Scanteia from 1 Jan
February. nary to 20
Many of the articles dealing with agriculture in the first half of January
were devoted to praise of Soviet collectivization. On 3 January, Scanteia
discussed radio courses broadcast in Craiova on methods used in Soviet
agricultural
collectives. A 4 January article described "basic work" in Tana to u
peasants to form a collective. On 5 January there was a discussion ofease
pamphlet translated from the Russian which showed the successes of a typical
Soviet kclkhoz in which the members live in happiness and prosperity. It was
stated that Rumanian peasants can attain similar security through collectivize-
tion. On 12 January, Scanteia printed eight articles praising
zation,
zation, giving examples of successes achieved on individual~~s. On 14 collectivi-
an article appeared praising a Soviet film on collectivization. An article on
15 January explained that agriculture in the People's Democracies is far more
advanced than in other countries, because of collectivization. On 16 January,
Scanteia criticized the Medias Rayon party committee for not concerning itself
with the formation of new collectives.
In the latter half of January the collectivization campaign in the news-
papers was largely replaced for a week by the currency reform theme. Again in
mfd-February the collectivization drive ceased for 3 days, giving way to the
launching of the spring planting campaign.
On 15 February an agitation campaign in one area was reported to have con-
vinced 5,000 peasants to form collectives. On 17 February Scantela discussed
"political organizational work for the formation of new agricultural collectives,"
declaring that agitation for the establishment of new collective farms was the
responsibility of primary party organizations. In Caracal this agitation was
being carried on by the rayon party committee, by the UTM (Union of Working
Youth), the UFDR (Union of Democratic Women), and by ARLUS (Soviet-Rumanian
Friendship Society). Agitation and propaganda were so intense that Scanteia
designated this a model area. Individral measures for the "education" of the
peasantry varied. The organizational bureau of the rayon committee of Caracal
organized a 10-day conference to study decrees of the Central Committee of the
PMR, issued 3 - 5 March 1949 and 18 September 1951. The conference also studied
USSR kolkhozes. The rayon committee analyzed existing collectives in Bicinis
and Gostovat and issued directives requiring primary party organizations to
apply measures found successful in other areas. Peasants who had visited the
USSR gave talks. The UTM and UFDR organized displays and issued pamphlets
directed at women and children to show them the advantages of "alliance between
peasants and workers." Specialists from people's councils spoke. The rayon
committee conducted peasants from Apele Vii, Rotunda, Reseal Celery, add Odain
on visitsto collectives in Ciroiu, Draghiceni, Stoenesti, Traian, and other
communities in the rayon. They were shown the high standard of living and the
efficient mhnner of organization of collectives. They noted that many collectivists
sold their own products for shoes, a radio, or building material. Many medium
peasants were so impressed that they spoke ardently in favor of collectives and
became strong agitators against kulaks.
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On 19 February Scanteia repo' tea to t the ;,tea in Reycn party commt.ttee was
carrying on intense political wore to convince p_a;ants of the benefits of joining
a collective. Peasants were conducted on tours cf o.llectlvPS, and. heard speeches
by kumeni.ans who had visited the USSR.
Thus, in the first month ,tnd a hell :.f the. winter campaign, rayon committees
were active in concwzttng peaiante through primary party and other organizations
to show them the benefits of ccl.hctivi,atlcn end the high standard ref living
which they would enjoy on a collectire.
B. Progress of the Ga~slgn Fri ?1 Fe`,ruwrvt_, ~p I4Y~'
On 21 Fobr?.ar?. 1952 tug empha~ie M the ctrrpntgn sidder.ly changed. Up to
this date., as drama" etete the main empheaiy was on the tornation of kolkhot-
type collscti.v:?3; ,;,, ;after, th-: party called mainly for the formation. of 72.
a modified type ..F crgeaization in whicl, ind!vld'uY1 cw~-e,rshlp of the land is re-
tained and the lama le worked in t ier. with the aid of MTS tractor,_ The change
in emphasis was also marked by as tents?~ttied. "education" drive after 20 February,
more bitter attack on kulake, and mo-e fr-ruent criticism o? miat&. s.
It would appear that a concentrated effort was being made in the earlier
period to social] as much as po=?tble of the arable area in pretaratton for
the spring planting campaign.. lied the winter co1.l.e(:ttvizatioa campaign been as
successful as hoped, it would presvm ily have continued in the same vein,
However, the charge to emphaei3 on the "formation of ?')Z on the Soviet
model," heralded by Scanteia on 21 February a; "an Important means for obtaining
rich harvests," euggenta that tor. large-scale cr,11cct.ivi7ation plnaned before
the spring planting had not been eucc_iefiil. aL' that soother approach was
indicated. In urging the growth of TOZ, to which 1Nr,a,tnts co'ull t'' mole easily
attracted autos they lost cone of their rights In the process. the regime seemed
to be reflecting a t'undamental " ange of t~sctir..a, a.,ad a partial retreat from its
previous position of ceiling for kthe surrender of la.yl thrc'wwi the forming of
kolkhoz-type collect.ves,
Reports from Scanteia on the progress of ties (amprstgn are as follows:
On 20 February, Scanteia fe;cribed th-' "_'uetelted work of education" in
Martaceati to persuade peasants to form ",!.)Z-
In the 21 February article Scanteie gave an Example of the higher yields
obtained on lend operated by a TCOZ. Party organizatioi:e and executive committees
of-people's councils were called upon to carry out "intensive political work" to
convince peasants of the value of o:ganirt:g according to the Soviet model and
according to the ecllective decree of 18 September 1951. Groups carrying on
this "edocatlonal work" were advised to give concrete examples of superior
harvests and greater income: to be derived through the TOZ, and to unmask the
plots of kulaks who s_=_k to prevent the p scants from uniting to form TOZ.
On 22 February, Scanteia continued the r.ampaiRn by saying that primary
party organizations should carry on mass political work to persuade each
collectivist to fulfill hie duties, in return, fir which the working class would
supply him with ell. his need Another article of the Sara, date declared that
common working of the land. through the T.I is one of the best means to procure
better harvests, Party organizations, people's c> poll=_, and M's in many rayons
popularized successes of T01 in order to persuade peceants to form such organi-
zations.
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On 23 February, according to S anteti, r:-w wart formed in Conetanta
Rayon after an intensive campaign by primary- party orgenizat.i.ous, executive
ccm