NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE ON UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10M00666R000200520001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 12, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DCI TS0149-83
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July 12, 1983
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH
The Vice President
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN
The Secretary of the Treasury
THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense
THE HONORABLE DONALD P. HODEL
The Secretary of Energy
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence
THE HONORABLE JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK
The United States Representative to the
United Nations
GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive on
United States Security Strategy for the Near East
and South Asia (S)
Attached is the Decision Directive-pursuant to yesterday's National
Security Council meeting. (U)
iam P. rk
Attachment
NSDD-99 TS830149
Copy /
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July 12, 1983
National S?ecuxity Dec Lion
Vinec ive Number 99
United States Security Strategy for
the Near East and South Asia (S)
The recent National Security Study, NSSD-4/82, reaffirmed the
basic soundness of the purposes and objectives of our National
Security Policy toward the Near East and South Asia. The
derivative and complementary regional security interests,
objectives and strategy outlined in NSSD-4are approved and
restated herdwith: (U)
U.S. Regional Interests
-- to prevent the Soviet Union from attaining a position of
hegemony in the region by deterring Soviet expansion and by
supporting the sovereignty of all countries in the region. (S)
-- to maintain continued access for the US and its principal
allies to Gulf oil. ' (TS)
U.S. Regional Security Objectives
-- to deter Soviet aggression and maintain readiness for combat
if necessary. (S)
-- to counter and reverse Soviet efforts to extend influence by
other means. (TS)
-- to protect US and Western access to adequate supplies of
oil. (S)
-- to ensure the security of Israel within secure and
internationally recognized borders. (S)
-- to obtain a comprehensive lasting peace between Israel and
her Arab neighbors and the resolution of the Palestinian problem
based upon the principles outlined by-the President on September
1, 1982. (U)
-- to help resolve other regional conflicts that threaten our
interests. (U)
-- to strengthen regional stability by measures to improve
economic conditions and indigenous defense capabilities. (U)
-- to expand US influence with selected states in the region.
(S)
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-- to limit the ability of unfriendly or hostile regimes to
destabilize or subvert selected friendly countries in the region.
-- to discourage proliferation of nuclear explosive capabil-
ities in the region. (S)
Threats to U.S. Interests and Objectives
The most serious threats to our vital interests and objectives in
the region are the power, influence, and activity of the Soviet
Union. The geographic proximity of the USSR, and its determina-
tion to interfere, directly and indirectly, with the internal
complexion and external alignment of countries which border it
compound the threats. In this regard, the improvements in the
regular military forces of the Soviet Union poised for use in the
region and the enhanced power projection capabilities available
for use in the Near East and South Asia, pose a formidable
challenge. In addition, the inimical regional policies and
activities of governments, such as the fundamentalist regime in
Iran, pose a clear challenge to the moderate oil producing
countries. Finally, our vital interests could be directly
threatened by internal unrest and upheaval in the moderate Arab
countries. (S) "
Intra-regional conflicts, such as the Iraq-Iran war and the
Arab-Israel conflict pose serious threats to our vital interests.
Other potential regional conflicts which would pose grave danger
to US interests include another Indo-Pakistani war and renewed
fighting between the PDRY on the one hand and either Oman or the
YAR on the other. These conflicts threaten our interests by
creating potential superpower confrontations, opportunities for
the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, the spread of
violence and instability, and the estrangement of key regional
states. The continuing Soviet presence in Ethiopia and the PDRY
poses-threats to our vital LOCs and the projection of US forces
into the area. Moreover, Soviet and Cuban support of local
conflicts and insurgencies further destabilize the region. (S)
Strategic Planning for the Near East and South Asia
The foregoing validation of our national security interests and
objectives in the region provides the basis for refining and
revising our regional strategy, as necessary. To advance US
interests requires a comprehensive political-military strategy
which is premised on mutually reinforcing diplomatic, economic
and security initiatives. This strategy must develop and exploit
opportunities to strengthen the US strategic posture in the Near.
East and South Asia and weaken Soviet influence, while enhancing
the perception of key regional states that cooperation with the
US serves their national interests. In keeping with our core
interests, we are committed to acquiring the capabilities to
mount a sustained defense of the region as far forward as
possible, including Iran as appropriate. Our strategy is to
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include balanced use of the three key US assets as perceived in
the region: (S) "
the US ability to deter and counter Soviet aggression; (S)
-- the unique capability among outside powers to take a leading
role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; (S)
-- the technological, industrial, economic and military
strength which the US can bring to bear to assist other
countries. (U)
Strategic Concept for Near-Term Planning
Beyond the defense of NATO's southern flank, the Eastern
Mediterranean and its littoral, our near term military strategy
and the derivative concept and operations plans for the Near East
and South Asia should focus on defending the oil fields, the
transshipment points and the sea and air lines of communication
to this theater. Our plans should, in any case, allow us to
prevent control of these vital resources by the Soviet Union.
Plans should be based on prudent assumptions regarding the active
cooperation of countries in the region, and those outside the
region that might prbvide enroute-support. Until we have
procured the requisite strategic mobility, supporting force
structure and we have assured access to the base facilities
necessary to undertake a robust forward defense of the Gulf
region, our plans should be based on the existing and programmed
capabilities of our forces and those of our friends and,allies
which are not forces "assigned" to NATO or their essential
support. Together with others, we must be ready to move military
assets forward first, to deter Soviet aggression on receipt of
strategic warning, and secondly, to interdict the movement of
Soviet combat forces to the Gulf region. I also want to reaffirm
this Administration's determination to block any military moves
by the Soviets, their surrogates or any other powers which
threaten US and allied access to the critical resources of the
region. (TS)
Cooperation with Other Countries
Because our vital interests in this part of the world are
essentially shared interests, we must redouble our efforts to
obtain the cooperation of our allies and other friendly powers in
bringing stability to the region, deterring threats to vital
Western interests and, in the final analysis, defending those
interests. In addition, mindful of the need for cooperation in
the security of energy, the U.S. remains committed to the goals
of the International Energy Agency and other commitments
enumerated in NSSD 9-82 and NSDD-87. (TS)
-- NATO Allies and Japan. To demonstrate our solidarity and
enhance deterrence we should seek assistance in the form of
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direct military contributions from our principal NATO allies with
highly mobile and specialized military capabilities suitable to a
variety of NE/SA scenarios, especially the UK and France. With
regard to the potential contributions of the UK and France, we
should be'prepared to assist, as necessary, in the movement of
their specialized forces to the region. In ~eeping with ongoing
negotiations, our principal allies and the FRG and Japan, in
particular, should be asked to contribute by assisting in the
improvement of infrastructure which would facilitate defense of
the oil fields and the critical transshipment points. They
should also be encouraged to increase security and economic
assistance to poor but important countries such as Turkey, Sudan,
Egypt and Pakistan. (TS)
-- Cooperation with Turkey. Because Turkey occupies a
strategic position adjacent to Soviet invasion routes, our
cooperation in contingency planning beyond the traditional NATO
missions is of fundamental importance. To enhance Turkish
confidence; promote the cooperation we seek; and, equally
important, to help Turkey realize its military potential, we need
a strategy for securing new and more meaningful increases in
defense funding for Turkey. This may entail, inter alia, a
serious effort to obtain help from allies and the Gulf States and
imaginative steps to resolve the Cyprus and Aegean problems which-
impede allied cooperhtion and frustrate Congressional funding.
Steps must be taken to develop immediate plans for exercising US
and allied forces in Eastern Turkey on a more regular basis. To
overcome concerns within NATO about activities beyond the treaty
area, we need to make a strong case in NATO that the improvements
we seek in Eastern Turkey are required in any event to cope with
a Soviet attack in that area. Our efforts to upgrade co-located
operating bases should be strengthened, and we should continue to
explore other measures which would enhance the responsiveness of
our forces. (TS)
-- Cooperation with Israel. I acknowledge that our ability to
defend vital interests in t e Near East and South Asia would be
enhanced by the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Never-
theless, in recognition of Israel's strategic location, developed
base infrastructure, and the quality and interoperability of
Israeli military forces, we will undertake to resume cooperative
planning with Israel expanding on the work begun earlier. To
this end, we should conduct an internal review on where we could
profit militarily from cooperative planning for major Soviet
involvement and aggression which threaten vital western interests
in the Near East and South Asia. The emphasis should be on
Israeli contributions which could serve our military objectives
in countering Soviet capabilities. This review should commence
immediately and the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense
should be submitted to me not later than August 30, 1983.
Thereafter, we will develop an interagency plan to implement the
findings of this review as feasible and appropriate. (TS)
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-- Cooperation with Arab Powers. Given the critical need for
facilities access in the region and, in some instances, the
potential of Arab military forces, we should continue and expand
our cooperative planning with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain,
Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan. We should also consider what
potential role Lebanon might play in our strategy in the future.
Improvements in our strategic position in the Horn of Africa
should be sought. This could well require increased efforts to
weaken Soviet positions in the PDRY and Ethiopia. (TS)
-- Cooperation with Pakistan. Our efforts to promote
cooperation with Pakistan to meet Soviet contingencies in the
region must be pressed, including plans for joint exercises and
access to facilities, bearing in mind the political and military
challenges Pakistan faces. The precedent established by the
invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan and the
potential for future Soviet encroachments in areas such as
Baluchistan should be discussed anew with the Pakistanis.
Bearing in mind Pakistani sensitivities, our future efforts
should reemphasize the value of prior contingency planning and a
program for Security Assistance which is rationalized with our
own capabilities. In this regard our plans should recognize, the
importance of Pakistan in the interdiction of Soviet LOCs to the
Gulf and Arabian Sea. We must recognize the importance of, and
be willing to help plan to meet, those contingencies which the
Pakistanis find most threatening. We should also continue with
determination and clarity of purpose to discourage the further
development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities. (TS)
-- Cooperation with India. Consistent with our goals. for
cooperation with Pakistan we should adopt a diplomatic strategy
which more explicitly recognizes India's strategic importance in
both regional and global terms. This strategy should have as its
initial objective, the improvement of relations between India,
the PRC and Pakistan and the gradual weakening of India's
military dependency on the Soviet Union. To this end we must
continue our efforts to broaden our economic and military ties
with India including closer liaison between our military
establishments. We must continue our efforts to convince the
Indian Government of the need to resist Soviet expansion and our
determination to do so and to discourage regional disputes which
can only redound to the advantage of the Soviet Union. (TS)
Implementation
I would like the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense-
to prepare a comprehensive agenda of the preferred ways to
implement the military and diplomatic strategies outlined above.
A comprehensive examination of requirements for contingencies in
the region is needed to include prepositioning, communications,
access to enroute and in-theater facilities as well as a detailed
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examination of the relationship between our own arms transfer
policies and other Western arms sales. The work program should
be developed and the reviews should be completed on a priority
basis. The work program should be submitted to the NSC by 30 July
and thereafter periodic-reports should be submitted to me to
describe progress and to discuss problems which may arise. (S)
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