MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A USEFUL BOOK ON SETTING UP COMMUNICATION IN A FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201790001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

5(1X1 -HT TM
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TOPSE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
15 April 1976
MB'IORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM David H. Blee
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR) : A Useful Book
on Setting ommmications in a Front
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article is a review of a book on setting up conummications in a front
during a movement forward for commitment to an engagment in the initial
period of a war. The reviewer finds the book useful, but points out
several inadequacies such as a lack of quantitative indices, generalized or
inadequate information and calculations, and failure to consider the full
impact of the initial nuclear strike o le
appeared in Issue No. 3 76 f 1
50X1-HUM
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference- r tion have been
assigned
David H. Blee
Page 1 of 9 Pages
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Page 1. of 9 Pages
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Intelligence Information Special Report -
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Useful Book on Setting Up
Comimmicati.ons in a Front
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Late 1965
Documentary
Page 3 of 9 Pages
DATE 15 April 1976
Summa
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita
Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor of Communications
Troops I. Kurnosov. This article is a review of a book by General-Mayor of
Communications Troops M. K. Dodenko concerning the setting up of
communications during a movement of front troops for the commitment to an
engagement in the initial period of T -way. The reviewer finds the book
useful, but points out several inadequacies such as a lack of quantitative
indices, generalized or inadequate information and calculations, and
failure to consider the full impact of the initial nuclear strike on radio
communications.
end of Summary
Comment:
enera vor of Communications Troops I. Kurnosov was a lecturer and
candidate of-military sciences. He was deceased as of 4 ` &k, He also
wrote an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (63) for 196_, "'_--eating a
New Communications System CPET
version of '~':ilitary Though. was published three times annta ?:' ? was
distributed down to the level of division commander. It re-ryrr'c 1'r --ased
publication at the end of 1970. F- -7
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A Useful Book
by
General-Mayor of Communications Troops I. Kurnosov
The complexity of directing the movement forward of large masses of
troops over great distances has immeasurably heightened the role of
communications as the basic means of control. For this reason, the study
and working out of the questions of setting up communications under these
conditions, as well as measures directed toward ensuring the centralized
use of various communications systems, are very important and urgent tasks
of operational art.
In this regard, interest is aroused by General-Mayor of Communications
Troops M. K. Dodenko's book, The Setting Up of Communications in a Front
During Movement from the Depth o the Theater of Military Operations for
Commitment to an gagement an erations inert e Initial Period of a War,*
published by the itary Academy of the General Staff of the Aimed Forces
of the USSR.
There is no doubt as to the timeliness of the work, and from this
point of view the military reader can only applaud the Academy's efforts to
state and resolve so many critical and complex questions, including the
setting up of control and communications. The work is also valuable in
that all the calculations were made proceeding from the forces and means of
communications which the troops really possess, that is, such conditions
were taken in which it will actually be necessary to decide questions of
setting up communications in the first operations of the initial period of
a war.
*General-Mayor of Communications Troops M. K. Dodenko. The Setting Up of
mmtuiications in a Front During Movement from the Depth of the heater of
Mi l i to
for Commitment to an En
agement and
Initial Period of a War. A publication of t
General Staff, 1964, 104 Pages, 8 diagrams.
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he 'Military Academy of the
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Stated in the book are the demands made on communications, the basic
principles for setting up a front communications system in the process of a
movement forward, and recommendations concerning questions of setting up
communications in this complex form of troop combat activity.
Examining the operational conditions of the initial period of a war
which influence control and the setting up of communications (pp. 8-16),
the author emphasizes that the use of various technical means for troop
control will be very diverse, the number of communications means will be
sharply limited, and the tasks complex. Moreover, the degree to which the
enemy takes action against the various elements of the communications
system with the goal of disrupting its work increases incredibly.
Here are cited a brief description of various conditions of the
movement of front troops from the depth, the expected pace of relocation of
the troops t e speed of movement of a column is 20 to 30 kilometers per
hour, and the extent of a day's move -- 250 to 300 kilometers and greater),
the possible variants of the setting up and relocation of control posts
(pp. 6-8), and a brief description of individual information flows.
Especially emphasized is the complexity of control when control posts
are in motion, when troops are moving forward by various methods, and when
coordinating matters of cooperation with the armies of the Warsaw Pact
countries and with one's own troops operating up ahead.
In our opinion, the conditions of a movement forward not only of the
combined-arms large units, but of the air army, air defense large units,
and units and facilities of the rear should have been shown. This is even
more in order, as the author subsequently plans a unified, centralized
communications system to support the front troops.
Not denying the validity of the logical arguments, in assessing the
various factors affecting the communications system, and in substantiating
the demands made on it, quantitative indices should have been more widely
employed, which would allow a stricter assessment of the correctness of one
variant or the other for setting up a communications system. The
inevitability of the disruption of the communications system as a result of
the initial nuclear strikes should have been especially emphasized, and the
complexity of restoring it within limited periods of time while demands on
it are not reduced should have been shown.
In the book a description is given of the existing state'
communications systems of some of the countries of the Western Theater of
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Military Operations upon whose territories a movement forward can be
carried out (pp. 17-24). Such generalized material has a certain value,
although it is not sufficient to substantiate the capabilities for setting
up a communications system. Information is especially scanty concerning
questions of the use of radio communications means and the assignment of
direct and alternate communications channels at those points which coincide
with the location of various centers of the communications system.
The substantiation of the principles of the communications system (pp.
25-33) is preceded by the enumeration of communications forces and means
which a front can have in the initial period of a war, and of its
capabilities for the deployment and support of the work of various elements
of the communications system. In doing so, the author concludes that the
field means of communications must not be expended before the front is
committed to an engagement and that during a movement forward a
communications system should be set up by means of the wide use of state
communications installations, and communications centers and lines set up
by the General Headquarters.
The author suggests a series of practical measures that must be
carried out in peacetime in order to prepare the state communications
system to the greatest degree for the control of front troops. As a whole
they do not arouse any objection.
However, in our opinion, some of his assertions are not sufficiently
grounded. For example, practice does not bear out the capability to set up
in 20 to 22 hours a radio-relay line extending 1200 kilometers. These time
limits should be increased by at least four times. That being the case,
then actually only those lines of the General Headquarters which will have
been set up beforehand or begun not less than five days before the troop
movement can be used.
As concerns a communications system, here too, all the questions have
not been fully resolved. For example, casual mention was made regarding
the very important element of auxiliary communications centers, but there
were no well-grounded calculations whatsoever of their needs or their
organizational-technical setup.
In addition, the entire system is calculated only for the control of
the advancing troops, not taking into account the possibility that combat
actions could occur in the course of the movement. The most vulnerable
spot in the proposed system is the lack of calculations concerning the 5OX1-HUM
disruption of the system during the delivery of the initial nuclear
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strikes. Although in itself this period is of short duration, it is
characterized by particular complexity and tension. In addition to
physical losses in personnel and in the technical means of control,
elements of confusion and even panic are unavoidable. Such facts as the
possible withdrawal of some of the personnel from various installations of
the Ministry of Communications, the massive breakdown of external
structures, damage to main and connecting cable lines by electromagnetic
radiation resulting from nuclear bursts, disturbance of atmospheric,
tropospheric, and stratospheric conditions, which impede the work of radio
communications, cannot be ignored. And all of this takes place in that
period when information concerning the events in progress is especially
needed. There is no need to argue that excessive nervousness might occur
in the work of the staffs.
In the book much space is allotted to matters of setting up
communications on the territory of a military district by various means in
time of peace and war, as well as the procedure for using them when front
troops are moving forward and being committed to an engagement. The
author's practical recommendations concern the determination of the places
of deployment of various communications centers, the direction and capacity
of various communications lines, and the allocation of the efforts of
troops of the General Headquarters and the front, and government
communications troops, and the procedure forr 'Joint work with organs of the
Ministry of Communications.
The author cites possible variants in the calculation of the necessary
number of communications channels during the movement forward and
commitment of a front to battle. It is apparent from Table 1 (p. 46) that
in order to ensure the control of front troops during a movement forward
the following are needed: 69 comnim cations channels from the command post,
17 from the forward command post, and 13 from the rear control post.
Accordingly, on the links from the front command post to the General Staff
and from the front command post to Me-subordinate formations there should
be two telephone -channels each, including one for government
communications. The author estimates that during their commitment to an
engagement the minimum number of communications channels needed to control
the troops of a front consists of: 127 from the command post, 38 from the
forward command post, and 44 from the rear control post (p. 52).
Speaking of the inaccuracies of the estimate, it should be voted that
the author makes no distinction between the qualitative aspect of the
channels formed by different means. In addition, on the majority of links
one channel each is assigned, that is, that minimum for which no special
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calculations are required.
Rendering what is due to the positive qualities of wire and
radio-relay means, the author considers radio communications to be the main
means of control during a movement forward of front troops and their
commitment to an engagement, and shows all of its erits, without which it
would not be possible to rely on the continuity of control. One must agree
with the assertion that the absolute prohibition of the use of radio means
for control of advancing troops is impossible. Therefore the main effort
should be directed not toward searching for ways to do without the
employment of radio communications but toward searching for effective ways
to camouflage their operation. Questions of radio camouflage,
incidentally, have not been dealt with sufficiently in the work; there are
no specific recommendations and necessary calculations concerning its
implementation.
The section about the employment of messenger means of communications
(pp. 70-72) is set forth without considering the reorganization of the
messenger means of communications and the military postal service into the
courier-postal communications service, and for this reason, it is not
particularly valuable.
Examining questions of increasing the survivability of a
communications system (pp. 74-83), the author, in our opinion,
overestimated the degree of effect of high-altitude nuclear bursts on the
state of shortwave radio communications. At the front level, the relative
proportion of the shortwave radio communications using reflected waves is
relatively small, and the destruction of the ionosphere is not so grave a
danger. We are compelled to make these remarks not because the effect of
high-altitude nuclear bursts in general merits no consideration, but so
that these bursts will not be overestimated, and that many efforts will not
be unnecessarily expended. Consideration must be given to questions of the
occurrence of electromagnetic radiation capable of creating currents in the
cable systems sufficient for the combustion (in the fullest sense of the
word) of these lines at great distances from the ground zero of the burst.
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As a whole, the book being reviewed is helpful to generals and staff
officers of front and army formations during the study and working out of
questions concerning troop control and the setting up of communications
during a movement forward and commitment to an engagement of front troops.
At the same time we think that the problems it touches upon are ar from
being completely resolved and that this subject calls for additional
research.
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