CPPG MEETING: SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000800100008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 19, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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,.~~ . 8220953
?'\ DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
July 19., 19.82
MEMORANDUM FOR MR, WILLIAM P, CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting: Soviet Leadership Transition
The attached discussion paper responds to Robert
C. McFarlane's memorandum 90499 of July 13, 1982 to
Larry Eagleburger in connection with Tuesday's CPPG
on the Soviet leadership transition.
aul' ]3remer,, I
Executive Secretary
Discussion paper
cc: OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
Defense - Colonel John Stanford
OJCS - Major Dennis Stanley
CIA -
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CPPG ISSUE PAPER
Soviet Leadership Transition
No conceivable Soviet succession scenario is likely to
precipitate a serious immediate crisis either within the USSR
or in US-Soviet relations. It is conceivable that Brezhnev
will step down, be kicked upstairs, or be replaced in a
pre-planned move by the collective leadership. Under these
circumstances, the potential for sharp near-term conflict
among Brezhnev's successors would be minimal. The potential
for a sharp struggle among the leadership would be somewhat
higher in the event of Brezhnev's sudden death. However, in
either case the overwhelming preoccupation of the Soviet
leadership will be to project an image of calm and policy
continuity.
--U.S. Interests: To underscore the continuity of our
policy and U.S. leadership in world affairs and avoid actions
which needlessly raise tensions or convey the counter-
productive impression that we are seeking to take advantage of
the Soviets at a time of uncertainty and potential instability;
to convey to a successor leadership the message that if there
are significant positive changes in Soviet policies there will
be a significant positive response from us; and to test the
willingness of a successor leadership to improve relations
with the U.S. on the basis of our agenda. Pressures will
build for unilateral U.S. gestures to improve the
relationship: these should be firmly resisted.
--Soviet Interests: To smooth the transition of power to
Brezhnev's successors, ensure internal security, and avoid
creating an atmosphere of crisis which could be exploited by
external adversaries. The immediate period will be a time of
internal adjustment as the new leaders maneuver for power,
with consensus lacking for major new initiatives until their
own positions are secure. Although the propaganda machine can
be expected to project a "peace-loving" image, significant
near-term changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies will
thus be unlikely.
--Key third party interests:
(1) U.S Allies: We expect that our allies will wish to
.influence our policies toward the new leadership, and they
will want us to act with restraint and to avoid any actions or
statements which are likely to raise East/West tensions
unduly, as they -shape their own courses. The allies will
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welcome assurances of continuity in our own policy toward the
Soviet Union. They may press for a return to detente and a
quick summit invitation to the new Soviet leadership.
(2) Soviet allies: Brezhnev's departure will have major
political repercussions in Eastern Europe, since the current
leaders throughout the area, with the exception of Poland,
have close and longstanding personal ties with Brezhnev. We
doubt that Brezhnev's ouster or death will precipitate wide-
spread civil disorders in Poland or elsewhere in Eastern
Europe, but his successors will seek to avoid any impression
of political weakness in Moscow. Soviet allies and proxies in
the developing world may well minimize activities which could
provoke a U.S. response until the initial stage of the Soviet
leadership transition has been completed. Vis-a-vis the
Soviets, they will be looking for new opportunities to press
individual claims on Soviet attention and resources, but such
opportunities will probably be rare, at least at the outset.
(3) Neutral/Non-Aligned: The NNA, like our allies, will
be motivated by concerns for stability and avoidance of an
atmosphere of East/West crisis.
Political: Our principal objective will be to make clear
that we deal with the Soviet Union as a country and not with
any particular leadership. We will want to emphasize that our
approach to US-Soviet relations will continue to based on the
principles of reciprocity and restraint. It would be
advisable to emphasize points of continuity in our relations,
such as negotiations on START and INF. To underscore our
world leadership, our response should be authoritatively, at
Presidential level.
Should Brezhnev die in office, we would expect that his
death will be marked by a Soviet state funeral. We recommend
that our delegation be headed by the Vice President, rather
than the President, in view of the current strains in US-Soviet
relations. The delegation should include Secretary Shultz and
prominent, bipartisan Congressional, business, and scientific
leaders. We would, of course, want to consult closely with
our allies on level of representation at the funeral.
Economic: As part of our larger response we will wish to
make clear that we are prepared for a major expansion of
mutually beneficial economic relations, in the context of
general upward movement based on'significant changes in Soviet
policy. At the same time, there will be no requirement for
immediate decisions on East/West economic.questions.-
Military: The Soviets may place some limited forces-in
Moscow and possibly other urban areas on increased readiness
status as a contingency measure against domestic unrest.
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However, the Soviets will almost certainly avoid any unusual
military activities which might provoke a U.S. reaction. We
should avoid any military actions which could be seen as
provocative by the Soviets or our allies, such as freedom of
navigation manuevers, which should be examined carefully on a
case by case basis. Any military actions that can be considered
beyond normal and could possibly evoke an other than normal
response should be reviewed carefully.
Domestic/Legal Constraints: U.S. Congressional and public
opinion will undoubtedly favor a restrained U.S. response which
emphasizes policy continuity and our willingness to respond
favorably to new signs of moderation in Soviet international
behavior.
Information/Media Policy and Plans: Our information policy
should be geared to our broader political objective of avoiding
actions or rhetoric which would appear designed to exploit the
Soviet leadership transition or needlessly exacerbate East/West
tensions and of testing the new leadership's professed
constructive intentions. It should be keyed to the policy line
announced by the President.
SPECTRUM OF U.S. OPTIONS
--Intelligence Assets Available
Our ability to predict events before and during the Soviet
political transition will be limited. We would want to make
maximum use of Embassy Moscow's contacts. Our embassies in third
countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe and where the
Soviet Ambassador has Central Committee status will be additional
sources of information. Of course, the resources of the
intelligence community will have to be heavily targeted on the
Soviet political transition as well as Soviet military
activities. Another important source of information will be our
allies with whom we would pursue an active program of
intelligence sharing.
--Political/Diplomatic; Economic; Military Opt-ions Available
-- We see three broad options:
(1) Embark on a concerted effort to influence the Kremlin
leadership transition process. This course of action would
almost certainly be futile in view of the closed nature of the
Soviet decision-making process and our limited leverage over
'internal political developments-in the Soviet Union. We lack
precise enough information about the political beliefs and
potential polici-es of various contenders to be able to'.predict
with any certainty how they would behave once they had succeeded
Brezhnev. Even if more precise judgements on this question were
possible, an attempt to favor one candidate or group over
another could redound to the disadvantage of those we favored.
Moreover, such an effort on our part would appear provocative to
the Soviets and to our allies and friends as well.
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? SECRET/SENSITIVE
(2) Adopt a posture of willingness to deal, on the basis of
the policy approach which we have outlined since the beginning
of the Administration, with whichever leadership group emerges.
We would underscore that we remain ready for an improvement in
US-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant
changes in policies of concern to us, and particularly policies
affecting the prospects for peace. Announced by the President,
this approach would stress our readiness for a reduction of
tensions and progress in specific aspects of our relationship if
the Soviets are prepared seriously to address the full range of
our concerns. There are two possible variants: 1) a
restatement of our agenda inviting new Soviet restraint in
response; or 2) an elaboration of our agenda with new
negotiating proposals in a few specific areas, as concrete tests
of the new leadership's intentions and agility. We favor
variant 1 of the option, but we recommend thorough discussion of
both variants, since they represent the basic policy choices
before the U.S. Government.
(3) Adopt a posture of watchful waiting. We,do not favor
this course, since it would dispense with the limited leverage
on Soviet outcomes we do have, and since it would be seen as
purely reactive and unworthy of our world leadership role.
Resources/Assets Available
--Political: In addition to Presidential-level statements
and communications,.we would want to carry out an extensive
diplomatic dialogue with the Soviets on all outstanding issues.
For example, we should be prepared to continue with the START
and INF negotiations without interruption. In those cases where
we have active dialogue on specific regional issues, we should
indicate willingness to continue if warranted by indications of
Soviet seriousness. Depending upon the timing and circumstances
of the transition we might wish to consider an early
Ministerial-level meeting between Secretary Shultz and the
Soviet Foreign Minister. The agenda for such discussions will
depend on the overall posture we adopt. We should consult
closely with our Allies to ensure maximum policy coordination
and unity during the transition period.
--Economic: We should not change our approach to East/West
economic issues solely as a response to the Soviet political
transition. However, we should make clear to the new leadership
that future economic relations will depend on Soviet actions
across the full range of our relationship.
--Military Forces: As noted above, U.S. and allied military
forces should maintain their normal posture-unless Soviet
military activities dictate otherwise.
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--Covert Action: N/A
--Informational Capabilities (VOA, ICA, etc): U.S.
information agencies should continue their normal operations,
including those which are critical of Soviet policies, such as
the occupation of Afghanistan and support of martial law in
Poland. However, these agencies should conduct their opera-
tions in accordance with our overall objective of avoiding
actions or rhetoric which could appear designed to exploit the
Soviet political transition or needlessly raise international
tensions.
For a Recommended Course of Action
--Timing Considerations: We might have some advance
warning of the impending transition, although our ability to
predict such developments will be limited at best. It is also
possible that Brezhnev will die or be ousted with no immediate
warning. Thus, contingency planning for U.S. participation in
a possible state funeral as well as certain other preparations
to enable us to respond promptly to a leadership change should
be undertaken. For example, we should agree to prepare draft
Presidential statements which could be modified as necessary
when the transition occurs. To do so, we need early consider-
ation of what our overall posture should be.
--Coordination Requirements:
--National: Consideration of our overall agenda should go
forward in this forum. At the time the actual transition
takes place, it may be necessary to establish a working group
in the State Department to coordinate U.S. participation in a
possible state funeral and other aspects of our policy during
the transition. It might also be necessary to establish a
special SIG/IG mechanism to coordinate the longer-term USG
response to the transition.
--International: Among our first responses to a leadership
change would be letters from Secretary Shultz to key allied
and friendly foreign ministers providing our assessment of the
situation and recommending close policy coordination. The
North Atlantic Council in Brussels will be a a key mechanism
for continuous exchange of information and policy coordination
with our European Allies. We will want to devote similar
sustained attention to consultation with the Japanese and ANZUS
allies, with the Chinese and with key third world countries.
Implications of Decision
--Degradation of Operational Capabilities Elsewhere: It
may be necessary to shift some intelligence collection assets
from other priorities to effect required close monitoring of
the Soviet transition and military posture. There need be no
other degradation of operational capabilities elsewhere.
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--Political Impact:
(1) International: Our ability to bring about a
coordinated and restrained Western response to the transition
will be a key in our ability to induce Soviet international
restraint and to convince the new leadership that its interest
lies in adopting a more moderate course...
(2) Domestic: There will be pressures on us both from
those who would advocate an appeal to Soviet "doves" and those
who would argue for an aggressive posture toward the Soviet
Union during its leadership transition. However, as stated
above, we believe the vast majority of the Congress and the
American people will support a statesmanlike posture stressing
the continuity of U.S. policy.
--Economic Impact: As noted above, we would not expect
that existing trade and economic relationships, e.g. grain
sales, would be affected by either the Soviet transition or
our response to it.
--Security Requirements: Certain domestic groups might
seize upon a transition as a pretext for demonstrations or
even violent activity against the Soviet diplomatic or
commercial presence in the U.S. Should this happen, the
Soviets might retaliate against our personnel and facilities
in the Soviet Union. We should be prepared to take such
measures as are necessary to fulfill our obligations to
provide appropriate protection. We otherwise anticipate no
increased security threat to our personnel and facilities in
the Soviet Union as a result of the transition.
Legislative Coordination Requirements:
As early as possible following the announcement of
Brezhnev's death or ouster, we should brief the House and
Senate leadership on our assessments of the succession.
Secretary Shultz might wish to testify in open session before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and/or the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on our approach to US-Soviet
relations in the transition period. However, in our contacts
with Congress, we should avoid public speculation on the
details of the leadership struggle or premature judgements on
the policies of the new leaders.
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CPPG Issue Paper
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