COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HOSTILITIES IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001700010019-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 15, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/18 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001700010019-4
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SECURITY IN INFORMATION
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
15 November 1951
?
MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD
FROM: Task Team, NTE 55
SUBJECTS Communist Intentions with Respect to Hosttlities in Korea
1. The following discussion of Communist intentions is presented
without benefit of the latest IAC assessment of indications and of enemy
capabilities, beta essential to an -analysis of intentions. It therefore
represents only a Preliminary and tentative presentation of Stiff views
and has been prepared primarily to serve as a basis for Board guidance
of the Staff.,
2. There are several divergent authoritative views of Communist
intentions in Korea. This situation results from the fact that most of
the deterrenants of intentiens are of a subjective character and that the
most important objective determinant, capabilities, presents problems of
assessment from in absolute point of view as well as from the point of
view of its relative importance is a determining factor* The following
era representative of views currently held by various competent.. sources,
a. The Chinese Communists strongly desire a cease fire while ?
the Soviets and North Koreans desire a continuation of the war.
b. The, Soviets want a cease fire but the Chinese Communists
desire a continuation of the Conflict..
00 Cease-fire talks were initiated purely as a military stratagem
to mask preparations for further offensive operations in Korea.
d. The Chinese Communists will go on fighting indefinitely
since their original terms for a cease-fire along Or near the 38th
Parallel were rejected.
DOCUMENT NO.
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e. If there is a cease fire in Korea, the Communists will
relax their pressures elsewhere in the Far East.
f. If tnere is a Cease fire in Korea, the Communists will
intensify their pressures elsewhere in the Far East.
30 In the following paragraphs we will dismiss three major questions:
? A. Do the Communists want a cease fire in Korea and if so, on what terms?
B. If a cease fire is not achieved, what courses of action will the Com-
mnnists falai in Korea and elsewhere in the Far East? and C. If a cease
? fire is achieved in Korea what courses of action will the Communists follow
In Korea and elsewhere in the Far East?
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.SECURIT/ INFORMITION
A.
Fire in Kor
4.. We believe that the Chinese Communists desire a cease fire in Korea
and hope to obtain an agreement along the existing militan. line without mak- '
ing further commitments for inspection, exchange of Plisse or withdrawal of
.foreign troops. If a cease fire.on these terms cannot be obtained, ie "do not
believe that theChinese Communist desire for a cease fire is so strong as to
praept the Chinese Communists to make more than token concessions to other UN
conditions in further negotiations for a cease-fire. We believe that the USSR
has been WW1 less willing thaa the Chine Cannunists to negotiate a Cease,
tire short of the 38th Parallel hat, 'beingunwilling or unable to provide the
assistance cessary for decisive'Communist military action in Korea, apparent-
ly is offering no serious objections to present Chinese Communist cease-fire
efforts. We believe that the North Koreenregime probably desires a continua-
tion of effortsteedrive VI forces from Korea or at least desires the re-
establishment of the 38th Patailel boundary, hat is forced to adjust its posi-
tion to that of the USSR and Communist China.
? 5. This asses nt of Communist intentions is based in part on the
follesing considerations:
a. Thus far at least, both the Chinese Communists aud the USSR
apparently have limited their eommitments in Korea. The Chinese ppear
tehave
unw ngtar ethausting their resoexces to drive UN forces
beyond the 38th Paralleli and the USSR has,apparently been unwilling to
risk general war by aerticipating in the Korean hostilities to the etent
necessary to provide the Comeunists with the capability of destroying
florceoln Korea. The USSR almost certainly mUst have calculated ini-
tial4 that the Ntunth Koreans would quickly overrun Korea. Several menthe
later, the introduction of new forces beoame essential-- in th Commum-
ist view -- to preserve the security.of the Chinese and Soviet fronti
and to restore the North Korean regime and the prestige of international
Communism. At least OM reason for th use of Chinese Communist rather.
than Soviet forces was probably the Communist desire to minize the
danger of gldbal war. Again, it met have ppeared to the Commeniean
that a listed' Chinese commitment would result in. a total victory in
Urea. Certainly by June 1951, it must have become apparent to the Com-
muniste that additional forces would be necessary to delve out the rika
and even to defend Earth Korea and maintain the seouritir of Commanist
forces in Korea.
I 4
lb. Although the Chinese have be committing more hoary eqpipment
to Korea, and although the Sewiete ha strenuous efforts to build .
up Canmunist air capabilities, it still does not pear that the OcoMuniate,
are preparing to commit sufficient, strength in to daft the Ta.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
forces. This could only be done if both the Chinese and Soviets were
Iii.14.ing to make much greater commitment in Korea involving grave risks of
global war. Chinese and-Seviet etrategy fat Asia probably does not re-
quire an immediate adhievampnt of their Objeetives at the risk of general
war, Rather, it is long term and patient. Time will split the erd.ty of
the West, time will enable Russia to arm. and train a mod rn Chinese arm,
time is in the Communist favor in SEA where the liberation armies with
Chinese support are prepared for long-tarn struggles after the pattern of
/hogs in China.
c, Meanwhile the support of the Korean war ha* resulted inemounting
,pressures on the Chinese Communist and North Korean regime, and the
political, economic, and military strains in Chita promise to increase as
the war 'continues.FUrthermore these strains result froma campaign
which, in terns of the present Cammtnist commitment, no longer offers '
premise of a successful military resolution and which has inhibited sup-
port to revolutionaey activity. in SEA. .
d, As the Korean war continues and Chinese Communist resources are
dissipated in Korea Peiping becomes inereesingly dependent on the USSR.
Howeeer, it is likely that a high priority Chinese Caentudst objective
is to d;velopia sufficiently strong economic and military position to in-
sure equality in their relationships with the USSR. Thus, the Chinese
,Commenists may desire a cessation of hostilities in Korea not only because
the operation has .been costly but because a tactical retreat in Korea will
afford opportunities for preparing for long-range major struggles.
e. The USSR has a great prestige Stake in Korea in that the North
Korean regime was a Soviet creation. If the Kremlin has estimmted that
.it could avoid involvement in general war indefinitely, it probably mould
be willing to have ari indecifive Korean Conflict continue in Order to
(i) avoid an unsatisfactory settlement in Korea; (ii) continue the drain
=Western resources as part of a global effort to strain the economies
and military effort of the West; (iii) increase the vulnerability of
Communist China to Soviet penetration and control, and (iv) provide op-
portunitiesfor combat experience for Soviet pilots and an evaluation of
Soviet and UN equipment.
f. Arguments to the effect that the USSR desires a cease fire in .
Korea as part of a plan to promote the relation of international ten-
sions does appear to be supportable. There are few indigatiops that the
present strategy of the USSR is directed to such an end,. Rather, Soviet
strategy appears to be based on a "belligerent defense" in which the
USSR holds on to everything it has; deliberately.nainteins and even pro-
motes tensions; devotee kmaxiimna effort to defensive preparations; and
waits for the %mit to weaken as Soviet-provoked tensions create exploit-
able social and economic pressures within the Western alliance.
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6. Another View of ComMunist intentions for which a strong argument can
be made is that the continuation of the ceaserfirelalka have become strateg
designed lo cover-the air build-up in Nandhuria and the training and deployment
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into Korea of Chinese Communist units equipped with modern Soviet weapons.
This assessment of Communist intentiondimq? in fact, be only a modification of
the eatitate made in Paragraph 4 since it, too, rests on the belief that the
Communists initially desired a, cease fire on favorable terms but UN conduct of
the negotiations conVinced than that an acceptable cease fire could not be ob-
tained. Argumenta advanced in support ,of this or similar views Are as follows
a. The Peiping regime is not disturbed by the, losses in Korea and'
views the continuation of the War as an oppOrtOnity to attract modern
military equiment from the USSR to develop a modern military .force in
China.
. .b, One of the major Chinese Communist 'objectives in Asia is a weak
or friendly Japan. UR forces must be driven or withdrawn, from Korea. to
.parmit.effective action, against japan and to forestall the potential ,
threat posed by a re-armed .japan. Therefore the Chinese cannot Accept'
any resolution of the Korean war which does not result in withdrawal of UN. ?
forces from Korea. -
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SECURITY INFORMATION
Bo If a Cease Fire in Korea Is Not Consummated, What Are Probable
Communist Courses of Action?
In Korea
7* A final breakdown of cease-fire negotiations will almost certainly
result in a reassessment by the Communists of their military position ia-
Korea. The history of the military operation in Korea makes abundantly '
evident the fact that the Communists cannot hope euccessfully to maintain
4 sustained large-scale military operation without the introduction Of
armor and air power. If the Chinese Communists are to continue hostilities
in Koreas they almost certainly will endeavor within the limits of their
capabilities to introduce these two military elements ? intelligence
reparts indicate that the ComMunists have been moving tanks and artillery
into Koreas although not in a quantity sufficient to indicate an intention
to undertake an early offensive. The build-up of air powers however,
which has been substantial in the last few months, may indicate an inteneo
tion to conduct large-scale air operations against UN targets including UN
forces.
8. We believe that the Communists have modified their maximum objec-
tive of forcing thesUN from all of Korea as a consequence of the demonstrated
_capabilities of the UN. Although this maximum objective may have been mod?
ified, we believe that minimum Communist aims in Korea remain unchanged. ?
Specifically, we believe:that Communist retention of 4 substantial area of
northern Korea is regarded as vital to the security of the USSR and Commu-
nist China and that if UN forces succeedin penetrating this areas the USSR
will introduce additional Soviet forces even at the serious risk of. general
war with the US.
Elsewhere in Asia
90. If cease-fire_ negotiations break downs we believe that the con-
tinued presence of the US Seventh Fleet and the increased Communist military
effort that will be required in. Korea will result in an indefinite post
ponement of any military action against Formosa. The continuing and heavy
requirements of the Korean war will further restrict Chinese Communist
operations with respect to Indochina and Burmao ? Large-scale military action
against both Indochina and Burma would probably not be undertaken? Howevers
such action against either one of. those countries would still remain a
continuing possibility? Unless theCommunists decide to greatly increase
the tisk of general wats an attack on Hong Kong or Japan is not probable?
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SECURITY INFORMATION
C. If a Cease Fire in Korea Is Consummated, What Are Probable Communist
Courses of Action? .
100. We believe that it Communist China agrees to a cease fire under
the minimum terms which the UN now postulates, it wbuld be a firm indica-
tion of a Chinese Communist intent to concentrate on the development of
a stronger economic and military base in Preparation for a long term struggle
against the West rather than an indication Of Communist intentions to relax
tensions in the Far East. We believe that the Chinese Communists would use
resources made available as a result of the diminished commitment in Korea
to increase their covert assistance to revolutionary movements in S.E.A.
We do? not believe, however, that the Chinese Communists would, within the
next year or two, risk a repetition of the Korean experience by openly
Invading Indochina or Burma.
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