HOW SHOULD AMERICA RESPOND TO GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE? A REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON NEW THINKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00004R000300040019-1
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: REPORT

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How Should America
Respond to
Gorbachev's Challenge?
A REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE
ON SOVIET
NEW THINIQNG
Convened under
the auspices of the
Institute for East-West
Security Studies
Institute for East-West Security Studies
New York 1987
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Report of the Task Force 15
L Introduction: Gorbachev's Policy is Different . 15
IL Foreign Policy Trends Under Gorbachev 16
III. Domestic Policy Under Gorbachev 20
IV. Western Interests and Policy Responses 25
V. Conclusion 33
About the Institute for East-West Security Studies 35
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Foreword
Recent signs of important changes in Soviet thinking about
its domestic and foreign affairs pose important new challenges
and opportunities. Taken together with major reforms being
undertaken in most other European socialist countries, these
changes call for a process of policy reexamination in the West
and a new dialogue between East and West on ways to create
a more stable and cooperative relationship.
These changes in the East have not yet been fully responded
to by the West. It is increasingly clear that they represent more
than a change in style or rhetoric. What then are the implications
of these changes for Western policy? How should America and
its allies respond to Gorbachev's challenge?
With this in mind, the New York-based Institute for East-
West Security Studies, an independent European-American
public policy research center, convened a bipartisan- 38-member
Task Force of prominent Americans to examine the content and
policy implications of the new thinking and propose policy
recommendations. The Task Force members met six times over
an eight-month period in Washington and New York European
officials and specialists, together with members of the U.S.
Congress, participated in specific Task Force meetings.
This bipartisan American Task Force represents the first stage
of a multi-year process by which the Institute for East-West
Security Studies intends to engage Americans, Europeans, and
Soviets in a systematic discussion of the changing relationship
between East and West. The Institute regards this Task Force
study as a necessary first step towards establishing a new East-
West dialogue and looks forward to contributing to and
broadening that dialogue. Following the work of this American
Task Force, the Institute plans to initiate a second Task Force
with broad European participation designed to carry the
discussions further.
The Board of Directors of the Institute expresses its
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appreciation to the members of the Task Force, both for their
dedication during the eight-month process which led to this
,report, as well as for their important substantive contributions.
The successful conclusion of a written report with which all
members of the Task Force concurred is due in great measure
to the exceptional chairmanship of Joseph Nye and Whitney
MacMillan, and to the skills of Institute staff members Allen
Lynch and Keith Wind. Special appreciation is also paid to Robert
Legvold, John Hardt, Marshall Goldman, and Richard Ullman,
members of the Task Force who contributed working papers
to the six sessions.
The Institute is deeply grateful to the Carnegie Corporation
of New York? The Ford Foundation, George Soros, and Harold
Newman for their financial support of this Task Force project.
Individual members of the Task Force-Dan Rose, Steve Swid,
Mike Forrestal, Guenther van Well, and Harold Newman-
graciously opened up their homes for the meetings of the Task
Force. Their hospitality is deeply appreciated.
Several members of the Institute staff deserve particular
recognition for the success of this report, including Task Force
coordinator Keith Wind, principal drafting rapporteur Dr. Allen
Lynch, Director of Studies F. Stephen Larrabee, Claire Gordon,
Peter B. Kaufman, and Ian Richardson. Special thanks are paid
to Amy Lew, who typed the manuscript through seemingly
endless revisions. Finally, I'd like to express my personal
appreciation to my colleagues on the Institute Board of Directors
for their foresight and commitment to making this project
possible.
The members of the Task Force believe that this report is
an important contribution to the East-West dialogue and are
working to make its contents widely known among the policy
communities in East and West. The Institute for East-West
Security Studies is proud to have sponsored this study and looks
forward to continuing the process which this Task Force has
begun.
John Edwin Mroz
President
Institute for East-West
Security Studies
New York
October 10, 1987
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The changes that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has recently
launched in both domestic and foreign policy have captured
world attention. On a range of key issues-from domestic
economic reform to nuclear arms control to emigration-
Gorbachev's leadership has revised long-standing Soviet
positions and in the process challenged the United States and
its allies to reexamine many of the assumptions behind their
own policies toward the Soviet Union.
The following report on Soviet policies under Gorbachev and
their impact on Western interests and responses represents the
first concerted effort in the United States to analyze and evaluate
the significance of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies
and their implications for East-West relations. More specifically,
the report proposes a series of policy recommendations and goals
which respond to the new opportunities presented by the
changes in the Soviet Union.
The report appears at a critical juncture in U.S.-Soviet relations,
as the two superpowers are about to convene a summit and
sign a treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles. This
event provides an appropriate occasion to examine the broader
spectrum of US.-Soviet and East-West relations, and the next
steps the two sides could take to enhance international stability
and put their relations on a stable footing over the long term.
The broad scope of the report responds to the need to address
all of the sources of instability in the East-West relationship-
military, political, economic, ideological-in order to construct
a sounder long-term foundation for peace.
The bipartisan character of the report underlines the strong
consensus reached on the need to reexamine America's Soviet
policy and engage the Soviet leadership in a process aimed at
a long-term and stable relaxation of tensions. We feel that the
report is a noteworthy contribution to the debate now emerging
in the United States over the future direction of U.S.-Soviet and
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East-West relations and that the analysis and conclusions it puts
forth deserve to be taken as a point of departure in that debate.
Task Force Co-Chairmen
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Whitney MacMillan
Harvard University Cargill, Inc.
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Key Findings
In the face of domestic economic stagnation, widespread social
apathy, and a widening technological gap vis-a-vis the West,
Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has undertaken the
most far-reaching revamping of the Soviet system in over half
a century. While the Soviet Union remains a closed communist
society, Gorbachev has challenged a whole series of ingrained
practices and attitudes, from strictly centralized economic
management to an often militarized foreign policy, which has
been the basis for Soviet policy since Stalin's time. In foreign
affairs, he has introduced new concepts and new flexibility into
Soviet diplomacy. Yet the West has not come to terms with
these changes.
Balancing Soviet power and maintaining a strong Western
alliance remain central to U.S. national interests. By the same
token, the U.S. and its allies have a long-term interest in
encouraging the moderation of Soviet power. Because the Soviet
Union is a global power, Gorbachev's initiatives demand an active
response by the United States and its Western allies. In many
areas, from arms control to emigration, the Soviet Union has
begun to make changes in directions long advocated by the
West. While far from complete, these changes present new
opportunities, and challenges, which the West should not ignore.
The Task Force strongly recommends that the United States
and its Western allies welcome the reformist tendencies that
Gorbachev has set in motion and encourage those which promote
a moderation of Soviet power. Toward that end, the U.S. and
its allies should engage the Soviet Union in an effort to explore
possibilities for agreement and resolve key points of tension.
A purely reactive Western approach in the face of the new
Soviet policy is not an acceptable option, the Task Force believes.
Western policies as well as Gorbachev's domestic policy priority
are bound to affect Soviet foreign policy. There is considerable
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uncertainty about the long-term success of Gorbachev's reforms.
Nevertheless, over time, the new course chosen by Gorbachev
will affect the ways in which the Soviet Union carries out its
role as a superpower. A more subtle and flexible Soviet diplomacy
requires the West to develop a broader and more active policy
toward the Soviet Union, including standards to define and meet
common security requirements in a rapidly changing interna-
tional environment. Failure to do so would sacrifice the
diplomatic initiative to the Soviet Union as well as abdicate our
responsibility to future generations to pursue prospects for
substantially improving relations between East and West.
What is Changing in Soviet Foreign and Domestic
Policy?
The West needs to think anew about specific changes the
Soviet Union has made in its own policies. Many of these changes
are only beginnings and ultimate Soviet intentions remain
unclear, but it is important to note that some of them move
toward long-standing Western preferences:
? Arms Control - The USSR adopted the Western proposal
of a zero option on the INF issue. In addition, the USSR
has moved toward the Western positions on verification,
including on-site inspection. It has also raised the prospect
of asymmetrical conventional force reductions in central
Europe. It has accepted the principle of deep reductions
in offensive strategic weapons and proposed a concept of
"sufficiency" in military forces.
? Role of the Military - There has been a reduction in the
Soviet military's role and influence in the highest policy-
making councils, and Gorbachev has made clear to the
military that they have to accept spending restraints and
greater openness in the dissemination of military
information.
? The International Economy - Gorbachev has placed special
emphasis on reducing Soviet autarky by increasing trade,
joint ventures, and expressing an interest in cooperating
with such major international organizations as GATT.
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? The Domestic Economy - Gorbachev has initiated a major
decentralization of operational responsibility for the
economy, and he clearly intends to move toward a more
flexible, modern, and efficient economic planning and
management. - He has admitted the inadequacy of Soviet
statistics and called for more accurate economic information.
? Human Rights - In the fields of culture and dissent,
Gorbachev has displayed a degree of openness and
toleration unthinkable just three years ago. In the area of
emigration, the change has been less dramatic but
Gorbachev has increased the emigration of Soviet Jews,
Germans and other groups. While glasnost' has a long way
to go, it has dearly led to progress on human rights, which
has been a major concern of the West.
? Regional Issues - While Gorbachev has as yet made no
significant effort to scale back existing Soviet global
commitments, he has given a lower priority to the military
expansion of Soviet interests in the Third World than his
predecessors.
? Eastern Europe - While urging loser and more "efficient"
economic integration, Gorbachev has permitted a somewhat
more flexible expression of specific national interests in
Eastern Europe than his predecessors.
Agenda for Action
These changes in Soviet policies and the prospect of a Soviet-
American INF treaty and summit by the end of this year highlight
the need to tackle a wide range of problems in East-West relations.
The Task Force recommends that as first steps Western policy
choices focus on five key areas:
? Security Issues - The U.S. and its NATO allies should
intensify talks with the Warsaw Pact aimed at reducing
conventional forces and eliminating offensive strike
potentials, particularly those designed for surprise attack
Given the geographical differences and existing force
imbalances, new approaches must include asymmetrical
reductions of forward-based armored units, which present
the greatest threat of surprise attack.
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Both sides need to move rapidly to conclude an agreement
on deep cuts in strategic offensive nuclear forces. These
reductions should be designed to enhance strategic stability
and eliminate the capacity to launch a crippling first strike.
At the same time, both sides need to find ways to strengthen
the ABM Treaty and to ensure that any research on strategic
defensive systems is consistent with preservation of the
Treaty.
The West should push for a rapid conclusion of the global
Geneva chemical weapons negotiations, including the
establishment of an international verification regime. Such
an agreement would help increase confidence in Europe
at a time when some are concerned over the implications
of the elimination of medium- and shorter-range nuclear
missiles from the continent.
? International Economic Issues - Except in a precisely defined
area of strategic technologies, which entails tighter, more
efficient COCOM regulations, expanded East-West trade is
in our interest. The West should welcome Soviet efforts
to develop the legal foundation for a system of equitable
joint ventures. While Western governments should not
subsidize credits, neither should they oppose the extension
of private credit through normal commercial rates and
practices to the Soviet Union. The prospect of observer
status in the GATT and IMF should be used to encourage
greater openness and information about the Soviet
economy.
If the Soviet Union demonstrates heightened respect for
human rights, the U.S. government and Congress should
consider bringing their policy in congruence with U.S. allies
by reevaluating the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amend-
ments restricting trade with and credit to the USSR The
West should aim to normalize the framework for trade with
all Warsaw Treaty countries, on the basis of mutual and
reciprocal interests.
In addition, the U.S.-Soviet umbrella agreements on
scientific and technological cooperation should be revived
and expanded, on the basis of full reciprocity.
? Human Rights - The West should welcome increased glasnost'
while continuing to make clear to the Soviet government
that its observance of internationally recognized human
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1 S.
rights is the mark of a civilized power and a condition for
truly collaborative relations between the Soviet Union and
the West. The West should insist that the Soviet Union
fully live up to the commitments it undertook under the
Helsinki Final Act to encourage the free movement of
people, ideas, and information across international
boundaries.
? Regional Issues - In Afghanistan, the West must continue
to make clear that Soviet occupation of that country poses
strict limits to genuine collaboration between the USSR and
the West. Conversely, a rapid Soviet withdrawal, with
sufficient international guarantees, would be a forceful
demonstration that the "new political thinking" has specific
policy implications.
In other areas of conflict which could lead to possible
superpower confrontation-such as Central America,
southern Africa, and the Persian Gulf-the West should
intensify discussions aimed at clarifying interests and
creating conditions for greater stability. Within this
framework, U.S.-Soviet meetings on regional issues should
be upgraded as part of a regularized summit process. The
purpose would be to seek solutions to these problems in
conjunction with other concerned parties.
In the Arab-Israeli dispute, the U.S. and USSR should
work together to advance a peace process which guarantees
the territorial integrity and interests of all states and parties.
? Political Dialogue - U.S.-Soviet summit meetings, as well
as meetings at other governmental and non-governmental
levels, should be held on a regular basis.
Condusion
The West must have no illusions about the need to balance
Soviet power, but neither should it overlook opportunities to
encourage the Soviet Union to be a more responsible and
integrated member of the international community. Although
the long-term success of Gorbachev's policy remains uncertain,
the process he has launched holds out a promise of a further
moderation of Soviet power and an opportunity to develop and
institutionalize areas of cooperation in the East-West relationship.
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Some in the West worry about giving the Soviet Union a
"breathing spell." They fear that Gorbachev's economic reforms
will simply strengthen the USSR in the long run. But Soviet
economic and social problems will not be quickly solved. In
the meantime, greater openness and pluralization should be
welcomed for their own sake as well as for the effect they can
have in moderating the way Soviet power is used.
In order to seize the opportunities offered by new Soviet
policies, the U.S. and its allies need to respond creatively to
Gorbachev's initiatives. In order to do that, the West must be
dear about its own policy objectives and priorities. New political
thinking in the East requires new policy thinking in the West.
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Report of the Task Force
I. Introduction: Gorbachev's Policy Is Different
After two and a half years in power, Soviet leader Mikhail
S. Gorbachev has made it clear to both domestic and foreign
audiences that he intends to carry out a thorough restructuring
of the Soviet system in an effort to make the Soviet economy
capable of effectively assimilating the opportunities offered by
contemporary science, technology, and methods of management.
Concerned that the Soviet system inherited from the Brezhnev
period had become ossified, with consequences for the USSR's
international standing as well as its material well-being, the new
Soviet leadership has called into question a whole series of
institutional arrangements and attitudes-ranging from a strictly
centralized economic management system to an often militarized
foreign policy-that has provided the foundation for Soviet
policy for nearly sixty years. Not content with the kind of
administrative adjustments that ever since Khrushchev's time
have been the Soviet substitute for meaningful reform,
Gorbachev has repeatedly underscored the need for structural
economic reform and, just as important, for social and political
reforms in order to sustain the economy over the long run.
The sheer magnitude of change that is currently being
attempted in a country of the size and international import of
the USSR would of itself demand the world's attention. The
interest of the international community is further engaged by
the emphasis the Gorbachev leadership has placed on aligning
Soviet foreign policy more closely with long-term internal
requirements, particularly the modernization of the economy.
This has entailed an evident rethinking in Soviet policy circles
about the requirements of foreign and security policy in an age
characterized by mutual nuclear deterrence and global
interdependence.
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II. Foreign Policy Trends Under Gorbachev
When Gorbachev became General Secretary many Western observers assumed that in March 1985,
nature of domestic affairs - t due to the pressing
i the
foreign policy would show little Y i
nnovation natmfirst. Yet
Gorbachev's actions and statements t? Yet
Party Congress in FebnuPamcularly since the 27th
policy perspective differs c nifintl~t that his fore
Predecessors. g Y from that of lhgis
pr the conceptual sors While a change the is currently often Y more noticeable
seems to policy level, the new Soviet leadership
deficiencies recognize that serious economic and technological
jeopardize the USSR's international position,
that reversing and
these trends
requires but also man res not only major economic
man, new f
It is im
oreign policy approaches.
tions of Gorbachev when considering the foreign initiatives Policy plica-
unduly on the concept of tiveS and statements not to focus
"new thinkin
been advanced by Gorbachev g" as such, which has
rubric for the General Secret and his associates as a general
affairs- Any 'new thinking" takes place within a his mtetorical contex cortex l
of adaptation by the Soviet leadership is this broader pattern, and not any P tl external realities. It
be the focus of Western attentionparticular slogan' that should
In many ways, the world view that Gorbachev and his
colleagues have been formulating represents an ex
crystallization of tendencies that have e cit
li
piecemeal form-in Soviet been Present-Often in
chew's anti-Stalin s policy circles since Nikita Khrush-
But the resultant speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956.
constitutes a tart ct nthesis of new ,and traditional elements
to integrate domestic anforeign P h Perspective which seeks
combination. policy in a mutually reinforcing
First, the Soviet leadership international relationshi s should concluded that the USSR's
task of economic mode be subordinated to the pie
for domestic refo-ation at home. Gorbachev's desire
rm has led him to search for stru
in critical areas -in arms contro ctures of stability
provide a durable and t most visibly-which would
choices that must be maded~ttheecomework for the resource
The need for such stability assumes ~g decade and beyond.
Gorbachev since instability in the USSR'sforeign importance relations lations could
 affect not only the politics of resource allocation but the viability
of Gorbachev's own political position.
Second, the Gorbachev leadership has concluded that a
favorable international environment can only be created on the
basis of a political' accommodation with the leading industrial
powers, and above all with the United States, which remains
the focal point of Soviet attention in foreign affairs. The Soviet
choice for accommodation thus represents more than a "tactical"
adjustment to shifting circumstances, the "breathing spell" that
some in the West have detected. Rather, it reflects a strategic
reevaluation of the international environment and of the
international factors affecting the USSR's global position.
Third, there has been a major reexamination of security issues.
Top Soviet officials, including the Soviet military, stress that a
nuclear war cannot under any circumstances be won. As a
corollary the leadership now argues, with implicit criticism of
Soviet security policy under Brezhnev, that security cannot be
obtained through military means alone. Security in the nuclear
age is said to be mutual in character and, due to the destructive
potential of modern weaponry, a common concern of all
countries. Relatedly, Soviet policy analysts and Gorbachev
himself claim to reject nuclear weapons as a durable guarantor
of peace. They assert that even nuclear parity, which they
continue to regard as a major historical achievement of socialism,
could cease to be capable of ensuring stability in the face of
an unregulated arms competition between East and West.
Nuclear arms control thus assumes priority as a means of
reducing the external threat, limiting resource requirements for
the military, and establishing a framework of stability in East-
West strategic relations, although the effect on Soviet arms
programs and deployments is still unclear.
Fourth, the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence is being
revised. Key Soviet policy analysts now interpret peaceful
coexistence less as a form of class struggle-the traditional Soviet
viewpoint-and more as a long-lasting condition in which states
with different social and political systems will have to learn how
to live with each other for the indefinite future. As Yevgeny
Primakov, a close advisor to Gorbachev, recently noted in a key
article in Pravda, peaceful coexistence is no longer regarded "as
a breathing space" by the Soviets. "Interstate relations," he
emphasized, "cannot be the sphere in which the outcome of
the confrontation between world socialism and world capitalism
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is settled.' Such coexistence is said to imply not the simple
absence of war but instead an international order in which not
only military strength but relations of confidence and cooperation
prevail, and "global problems"-the arms race, ecological
problems, Third World development-can be resolved on a
collaborative basis.
Finally, the Gorbachev leadership evidences increasing
recognition of the multipolar and interdependent character of
contemporary international relations. This view is reflected in
a growing tendency on the part of the USSR to deal directly
with key regional actors, such as China and Japan in the Far
East, Egypt and Israel in the Middle East, and Mexico in Central
America. The main goal has been to reduce the USSR's diplomatic
isolation, which was increasingly evident in the late Brezhnev
era, and to multiply Soviet options. If this process continues,
the West can expect increasingly sophisticated and pragmatic
Soviet policies throughout the world.
Of course, rhetoric and policy are two different things, and
the world will have to wait to see just how far shifts in attitude
and doctrine will be reflected in practice. It is thus difficult to
gauge precisely how the "new thinking" has affected foreign
policy. Yet, significantly, changes in Soviet policy in specific
areas-agreement to the U.S. proposal of the zero option, rejected
by the Brezhnev/Andropov leadership, on the INF issue; and
interest in participation in GATT and the IMF as well as key
Asian/Pacific economic organizations-does suggest deeper
changes that are more than a response to tactical opportunities.
Most significant, recent changes in Soviet statements on
European conventional arms issues, especially a stated
'willingness to accept asymmetrical reductions in conventional
forces and a restructuring of forces and operational doctrines
so as to eliminate offensive capabilities, open possibilities for
meaningful conventional arms negotiation which could enhance
East-West security. How far these changes will go remains
unclear. Gorbachev and his associates seem to have realized
that the USSR cannot achieve its desired world of radical nuclear
reductions without changes in its own conventional force posture
as well. As yet, these changes have been largely rhetorical.
However, given the special legitimizing function of political
"K July 9, 1987, p. 4.
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rhetoric in communist systems, such changes should not be
dismissed out of hand.
Clearly, an important motivation behind the new Soviet
policies is to strengthen the USSR as an international presence
over the long term. Some Western observers have thus wondered
whether the West would not be more threatened by the success
of Gorbachev's policies than by their failure. Such an
interpretation misreads the stakes that are involved in
Gorbachev's course of reform. First, Gorbachev has admitted
that his comprehensive reform will not be achieved overnight;
rather, it is a process seen as spanning decades. Second, to the
extent that it is within Soviet capacity-which remains
considerable-no politically significant sector in the USSR will
permit a weakening of Soviet power. The issue for the West
really involves the question, what kind of USSR does it wish
to see emerge from the process of internal revitalization and
how will it use the power at its disposal? The reform course
that Gorbachev has chosen, by encouraging the formation and
institutionalization of interests and social sectors long
underrepresented in Soviet policy-making, could over time affect
the way in which the USSR relates to the outside world. Clearly,
Gorbachev has no intention of significantly relaxing the
Communist Party's monopoly of power and its control over the
Soviet public agenda. Yet, if the ways in which power is exercised
are modified so as to multiply those voices within the Soviet
system who have an objective interest in cooperative
relationships with the outside world, it could well change the
way the Soviet Union conducts its foreign affairs.
While the motivating factors behind the Soviet reform process
are overwhelmingly domestic in character, they open new, albeit
limited possibilities for constructive Western policies to advance
the common interest in a more stable, cooperative, and mutually
beneficial international order. The way that Gorbachev has
launched the reform process, by stressing the tight linkage
between internal and foreign policy and by a series of doctrinal
statements and policy initiatives aimed at intensifying the USSR's
ties with the international community, opens new opportunities
for more thoughtful, creative Western policy toward the USSR
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III. Domestic Policy Under Gorbachev
Gorbachev's primary goal is to revitalize a stagnant
system economy from
Soviet
assimilate contemporary restrucog o of f the th S Soviet
to within. improve This economic produc6vity estru and more effectively
the
t
technological developments into the
daily Soviet economy. In the 1970s the Soviet economy
maintained average growth rates of 4-5 in the 1980s that figure dro percent per year, while
shown himself intensely aware of phecent. Gorbachev has
technological backwardness of the USSR compared economic/
rivals as the United States, Western Europe P tp such key
far less satisfied than , and Japan. He is
previous Soviet leaders with enumerating
past Soviet accomplishments and is determin
g l force the
Soviet economy to confront demandin g to
Gorbachev believes that the USSR's ability international standards.
international to maintain its
position will depend on its economic
at home and that the USSR "has no choice" Po enter on
the path of radical reform, as he put it to the J~' anu ryt 1987 enter on
of the Communist Party's Central Co 1987 meeting
Gorbachev's basic choice fors Committee.
fundamental issues of strategy ~~ reform has raised
perhaps, Gorbachev's economic program meansi Most is serious mplies restructuring of Soviet resource allocation. The choices involved
are not simply limited to tradeoffs between
military and consumption, as is often assumed in the West but inclut des
those among military expenditure cons
economic investment essential to the long-term and soundne f
the Soviet economy, and, by extension, the power s USSR's international position. That Gorbachev is acutebase of
ly awtaree
of these tradeoffs is shown by his application of
restructuring, to the military, which has had to accept~nst its
on military spanding Indeed, the adoption of the concept of
"reasonable sufficiency" by the new Soviet leadershi
remains to be defined in operational terms-a P-wluch
an effort to limit demands upon to reflect
understanding limits to the military and political utility
of armed force in general and nuclear weans
Under these circumstances a general relaxation of international
tensions, with a corresponding relaxation of
upon scarce resources, is central to the viability off Go bdemans
acchee ds
program.
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The key elements of Gorbachev's domestic
combination of economic, social, and reform include a
tical measures. In the
economic field, the focus is on: poli
(1) Structural Rernganiz, n _ Under Gorbachev's s
system
less of planning will shift toward strategic cen trategy' the
detailed and more indicative- ti'~ti?n, with
More control ovplanning coming from
the central agencies.
strategy will be held by the on general Planning and
top, while responsibility for day-to-day apolitical leaders at the
making will be decen Y Y management decision-
factories, Operating under a market-simulating mechanism in
ish the is expected t
self
o perform as a self-financin
ing are fougndgin the fields of this institutional restructu center. Prototypes the establishm agriculture and foreign trade, with
ent of the of State
which combines the -Industrial Commission,
functions of several agricultural
and the State Commission for Foreign ministries,
supersedes many of the functions ofthe Economic Foreign T de~sMinistry
Inherent in Gorbachev's approach is the assumption Ministry.
Planning of the framework of development is both that central
with, and a Precondition for, the development ofoth compatible
at the decentralized management level of market forces
and faories,
as it assures bureaucratic acceptance of localf seellf_m
self-Dancing, and autonomy.
anagement,
(2) Imyruved ProductivitY -
any previous Soviet leader that the Soviet1eco understands better than
a basic impasse in its development, s Homy has reached
cient growth
longer be assured through uffi
can no
scarce resources such as the simple expansion of increasin
take place on the basis of dramaticaanlld capital but rather must
of available resources. There ally improved productivity
of near l 19 ~. for example, be a labor shortage
Gorbachev tmillion rea ~ mohe current five-year plan
will use material and human efficient economy that
output that oes better and will generate
approaches the world level of quality. This strategy
appears to take as its model the
Western industrial transformation of the postwar
economies, in which efficient technological
systems were introduced to si
tivity of energy, agricultural resources, candy increase the produc-
inputs to production ~es' manpower, and other
made clear the rationale r Gorbachev leadership in general has
replacing a system based on extensive
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but wasteful production with processes that display greater
efficiency and quality. As Gorbachev noted in his 1986 Party
Congress speech: "A national economy which possesses
enormous resources has run up against a shortage of them."
Nevertheless,
the process is not without risks: the wager upon
human capital can be won only in the long run, while the prospect
of a drop in the standard of living in the short run adds to
the social pressures facing Gorbachev. How the economic reform
unfolds thus bears close observation.
(3) A Soviet Technological-Information Revolution - Computer
applications, microelectronics, the use of lasers and robotics are
all part of the dramatic change occurring in the economies of
the Western industrial nations. Gorbachev has repeatedly
stressed that the USSR must not fall further behind in this new
frontier of science, technology, and economic development.
Given the serious shortcomings of the Soviet economy in this
area, the central challenge of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) may be in its technological message. Civilian technological
dynamism drives U.S. SDI research programs and, whether or
not the military defense vision of SDI is credible or attainable,
many of its technological components are. Thus, SDI symbolizes
a further, potentially serious erosion of Soviet claims to being
an economic superpower, and because of its uneven economic
base, the USSR may become a more technologically inferior
military power. The Gorbachev leadership is thus determined
to dramatically raise the technological level of key economic
sectors, which will at the same time raise the dilemma facing
the West as it decides upon the scope of technological transfer
to its competitor in the East. However, the climate needed for
scientific inquiry, communication, and rapid technological
progress is antithetical to one in which a closed, controlled state
influences key developments in the scientific sector. The
unleashing of Soviet scientific capability and the full utilization
of Soviet technical talents requires a more open, equitable system.
The release of Andrei Sakharov and the relaxation on internal
discussion (glasnost) may represent first steps in that direction.
(4) A More Open and Interdependent Foreign Economic Sector -
If the Soviet economy is to make progress in this new
technological revolution, it must at least selectively join the world
market. Thus Gorbachev has called for controlled interdepend-
ence with the West (as well as closer economic integration with
i1! the USSR's East European allies). Reform of Soviet foreign
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~ __ 731' i?. Y i.w 'a,--. r? ' :T?y"7iA~?J!?i~.;.'i_"d~ iii
1 I'
economic institutions is aimed at promoting direct contact and
cooperation between Soviet enterprises and those of their trading
partners in Eastern Europe and the West. Soviet officials have
identified Western machinery imports as playing a significant
role in the planned technical progress of the Soviet economy.
Soviet foreign trade bodies have already been reorganized to
provide greater flexibility in trade relations and a framework
for joint ventures. Finally, the financing of imports will require
a shift in priority toward export orientation and acceptance of
increased dependence on foreign imports. If this process
advances far enough, the export sector may come to challenge
the military-industrial complex for priority in resource allocation.
Gorbachev's economic strategy thus requires a thorough
overhaul of the Stalinist economic structure that has prevailed
in the USSR since 1929. Certainly, the purely economic difficulties
and dislocations associated with such a task-unemployment,
plant closings, elimination of subsidized pricing of basic goods-
will be daunting. What is more, the economic reform that
Gorbachev has proposed necessarily entails important social and
political reforms as well, since powerful vested interests as well
as deep social inertia remain with a stake in the existing system.
Gorbachev's program is thus truly comprehensive. Its success
will depend not only on the logic of economic plans but on
Gorbachev's skill as a politician to convince the Soviet people
that they have a future that is worth possible short-term
sacrifices, or at least changes.
It is with this awareness that Gorbachev has advanced the
twin concepts of "democratization" and glasnost : "Democrati-
zation," in the specific sense used by Gorbachev, should not
be confused with the Western meaning of the term but rather
be seen as serving two closely related functions: as a means
of purging those in the party leadership and bureaucracy
resistant to Gorbachev's program (by forcing them to compete
with party candidates more sympathetic to Gorbachev's vision);
and as a way over the longer term to make party officials more
accountable to the party and local constituencies they represent
(e.g., by increasing the role of the local soviets, or government
councils).
This appears to be the meaning of the electoral reform recently
initiated in the USSR while elections would remain open only
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to Party-approved
Political accountabilitandidates, the relative d
Political
would y implied b ecentralization of
mean a by multiple candidates for select
offices local influences, ply leadership that is more
decentralization As both spur and pur ares
nd Is moto the
ocratization could ment, Gorbachev's
at least as far as dom result in a more flexible Political system,
Policy of glasnost; or r greater openness espoused of Public discussion,
Soviet soviet aimed at influencing the attitude of
governmental sociyle s a whole (and not simply the
designed P) Whereas "democratization,, as a complement to the democratization" seems
no bac ev requires to introducep~lcal and Personnel changes
Bing criticism of those in the bureaus, 8lasnost, while
Gorbachev s policies ~au~'
collaboration , is also aimed at eliciting acY Opposed to
Cor v's msof~ct society-especially the intellthe igentsia t
-in
remain definit g of the g
e Soviet system.
soviet limits to the debate about the co While there
y -especially when it touches u uise of Soviet
policy-the intention to shake u Pon foreign and defense
more independence of thou p rigid hierarchies and Promote
(such as the thought appears real, with co current anti-Stalin discussionluences
Gorbachev himself ma
y ) that Perhaps
a not be able to contain. In aps
event,
as the price por ars wing to risk a cert' any
for both discrediting co~ ate loose~g of the reins
and attracting the "white collar,, rproductir
to his technolo intelligentsia -who are pessentciaei
side. In this g3'-intensive, creativity-oriented
side. I ev's sense, glasnost' represents a cause-to his
h
aimed h domes broader policy and not a component part t
short-te pmt
tic or foreign audiences. short-term ex
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IV. Western Interests and Policy Responses
The Task Force's review of Soviet domestic and foreign policy
under the Gorbachev leadership leads to the conclusion that
the Western powers should welcome and encourage-the reformist
inclinations initiated by Gorbachev, which hold out the promise
of moderating Soviet -power. Taking into account the largely
internal determinants of Soviet domestic policy, the West should
take advantage of the possibilities of encouraging those elements
in Soviet policy that best advance Western interests. The
importance of a united, consistent Western policy is underscored
by the series of recent changes in Soviet policy, all of which
correspond to long-standing Western preferences. To
recapitulate:
1. Arms Control - The USSR adopted the Western proposal
of a zero option on the INF issue. In addition, the USSR
has moved toward the Western positions on verification,
including on-site inspection. It has also raised the prospect
of asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces in Europe.
It accepted the principle of deep reductions in offensive
strategic weapons and proposed the concept of "sufficiency"
in military forces.
2. Role of the Military - There has been a reduction in the
Soviet military's role and influence in the highest policy-
making councils, and Gorbachev has made clear to the
military that they have to accept spending restraints and
greater openness in the dissemination of military
information.
3. The International Economy - Gorbachev has placed special
emphasis on reducing Soviet autarky by increasing trade,
joint ventures, and expressing an interest in cooperating
with such major international economic organizations as
GATT.
4. The Domestic Economy - Gorbachev has initiated a major
decentralization of operational responsibility for the
economy and clearly intends to move toward a more flexible,
modem, and efficient economic planning and implemen-
tation. He has admitted the inadequacy of Soviet statistics
and called for more accurate economic information.
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.AT
as a long way
Y ed to progress on hum
6. has been a in major concern of the West. an rights, which
Renal Issues - Whil significant effort teaGorbachev has as yet made
has back existin
of Soviet given a lower priori g SO Viet global
expansion e he
Predecessors. interests in the Third to the n,t~,
World than his
7. ~~ Europe
economic - While urging closer and
'nOre con fle integration, Gorbachev has more "efficientt
e
Eastern xi bl expression of Pernutted a somewhat
Europe than his specific national interests
If the West d Predecessors, in
wires to encourage
advantage of the opportunity these tendencies
of tensions in East- they Offer , and to take
for a d
W
a more
est elation
urable relaxation
creative policy toward , it must
recognition of interdependence the Soviet gin to formulate
the effort morn. The explicit
an o osubordinate eignbto dthe o Soviet leadership and
based on opportunity develop a system of meet- Policy Provides
Towardco titive but not nujit Soviet-Western e~tions
consultatio this end, the Western ed interstate relations
the USSR ns among
themselves regarding Powers should intensify
ON Until there future policy toward
ectives, Priorities, a Western consensu of action
can es, and the tradeoffs among t s about policy
should be be effective over the long among them, no course
of tension geared to testing Soviet term. West
in the Fast-West readiness Western to resolve efforts
geopolitical rnaandnhip, thereby addressing
international stability concerns aflo
a Program of glen and reduced military x the USSR ththese efforts should domestic reform Peindltnles that
as a means of ch be on constraining the The
g the use of focus of
ange
international conduct,
as Exacting standards for armed force
enforcing
enforcing as well as strict
of compliance- would have to measures Of v ri
understandin be developed yet, if and
a
g could be reached in this critic
26
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1, 1 i ' Human &ghts
Gorbachev has in the fields of
II toleration displayed a degrof ure and dissent
toter , unthinkable just three ears Openness and
Gorbachev migration the change has bee ago.
the area of
hasui
r
crcased the e s dramatic but
iation r
tans and oth
t
a
er groups
es of Soviet
g has clean 1 While glasnost' Jews,
h
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area, . whole new areas for long-term East-West collaboration
would emerge.
An agenda for action, which could provide the basis for an
effective Western consensus, would include the following:
Security Issues - The prospect of a US.-Soviet agreement on
eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) by the end
of this year represents an important achievement in nuclear arms
control and symbolizes a hopeful change in the tenor of East-
West relations. Progress has proved possible due to the missiles'
secondary military significance and a radical reevaluation of the
Soviet negotiating position. If an INF treaty is to translate into
durable progress on the core security issues facing East and
West, however, both Moscow and the West need to act upon
the central fact emerging from the INF discussion: that nuclear
and conventional force issues cannot be treated in isolation from
one another. A series of recent signals from Moscow and other
Warsaw Treaty countries indicates a willingness to explore
asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces based in Europe
and, just as important, to enter into discussions with the Western
powers about ways of reducing the offensive potential of forces
based in Europe. The Soviet leadership appears to have come
to the conclusion that it cannot secure a further diminution in
NATO's nuclear presence on the continent without at the same
time addressing the issue of its own conventional posture and
operational doctrine.
There is every reason, therefore, for the West to test Gorbachev
and initiate alliance-to-alliance talks aimed at developing criteria
for putting such concepts into practice. At the same time, the
Western powers need to face two central issues: (1) How much
do they in fact desire-given the possible geopolitical
consequences-conventional arms reductions that would
witness a significant reduction in the numbers, and change in
the nature, of Soviet (and necessarily U.S.) forces in Europe?
(2) What is the West itself prepared to trade off in order to achieve
such reductions? Difficult tradeoffs will be necessary if progress
is to be made on this central issue of East-West security. While
other issues remain on the agenda, especially those involving
strategic nuclear arms control, Soviet willingness to reexamine
the character of its conventional commitment in central Europe
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,122
~mored units asymmetrical reductions s, new approaches
which of forward-bas
attack pint the greatest threat of surprise
? Both sides need
on deep to
move rapidly to conclude
cuts n strategic Offensive nuclear forces.
aSree These
These
ate and
aelimin the cam designed to enhance strategic
tparity to launch a g~ir
first stability
the the h M same tune, they need to find ways to Ways to fir strike.
Treaty and to ensure g
stren
defensive systems is that any research on strategic
Treaty. consistent with Preservation
of the
? The West should push for a rapid
Geneva chemical conclusion of the
establishment of weapons negotiations, includin global
t e
an international verification g the
an agreement would lead to'ncre ~ e? Such
at a time when some ased confidence '
of Europe
medium- are concerned in
and short er- ?v~ the elimination
continent. age nuclear missiles from the
undetrta b EeO1nu policy - The sweeping
Y Gorbachev lead economic reform
Opportunities for East-West Offers
autonomy being economic Chi P important The gr new
trade, the ' given to certain enterprises nvon . The greater
Increasing emphasis on jo~Prisinvolved in foreign
that has been expressed in greater ~ ventures, and the interest
viet involvement with such
28
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would
constitute a watershed
affecting the justification in the East-West this end, ? ?,for the Western n
confrontation
uclearPosture
`Y statts and stern capit should . Toward
InPlanning realistic sec in the key
post-INF Europe This
adapted to the c cludes both he ~tY Options
a
ha
s control proposals g defensiv
ngIng instances
reatenin
and mo
e poster
re effective, non-
conventional forces, gbSnt and Missions for the remainin
itself-as in the recPn+ me that, the West will g
th
atj
.
e rendering aefensive e
Soviet arms control
in th face
creative Initiatives
? responses and initiatives and incapable of
The U S. and its Nq on its own. Thus:
the Warsaw Pact allies should
aimed at intensify talks with
e
on
ff
ug c
ill
ensive strike
ventional forces and
des' potent
gned o
' In Particularly
for a differences and exis surprise attack Given the those
must includt"'g force imbalanc geographical
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international economic institutions as the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), all raise the possibility of a
qualitatively new level of East-West economic contacts.
As the West reviews its economic relationships with the USSR,
the overriding standard for its policies should be the ways in
which economic ties with the USSR affect the Soviet role in
the international community. Certainly, there is broad scope-
except in a precisely defined area of strategic technologies, which
entails tighter, more efficient COCOM regulations-for exchange of goods and services between Moscow and the West,
and deals which reflect the true cost of the items exchanged
should be encouraged. It is thus a mistake for Western
governments to prevent the USSR from receiving private credits
at commercial rates. An expansion of Soviet economic contacts
on the global market would heighten incentives within the USSR
to compete abroad and thus increase pressure on the choice
of resource allocation within the country. The same holds true
for any realistic joint venture policy, which will have to meet
rigorous market requirements if it is to succeed: relevant prices
(to avoid dumping charges), adequate repatriation of capital, and
opening up the Soviet market to joint venture products. Such
a policy, based upon expanding Soviet-Western trade on the
basis of market value, would tend to complicate Soviet decision-
making on both resource allocation and policy toward the West
and introduce factors for restraint into the Soviet policy process.
Consequently, the Task Force recommends that:
? Western governments, in collaboration with the private
sector, should welcome the Soviet effort to develop the
legal foundation for a system of equitable joint ventures.
Key sectors for such collaboration include: energy
equipment, machinery, transport, communications, agricul-
tural technology, and financial services.
? While Western governments should not subsidize credits,
neither should they oppose the extension of private credit
at commercial rates.
? Provided that Moscow demonstrates that operational
decentralization of the economy is genuine-so that prices
reflect approximate opportunity costs-and that glasnost' is
extended to the international economic sphere by supplying
detailed and reliable information relating to markets and
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Production, the West should
USSR observer give consideration to
status granting
International Mo
li
GATT and
net
possibl i
arY Fd
un.yn the
? If the Soviet Uti
on d
emonstrates he
human
rights, the U.S. gove ightened respect
consid
[or
' re
nt and C
er bcri
ongress I by reeval nging their policy in congruenc should
ments the Jackson -V with US. alli
nts teStrictin anik and Stevenson es
West sho g trade with and credit uld aim to no dit to the USSR The
W~saw T
the frame
reaty
work f
countriesor trade
with
reciprocal on the 1%
_-
--
of
? The U S "Eual and
So
.- teC viet umbrella a
hnological c
agreements on
i
entific and
--k-1
Possibly anon should be sc
i n co revived and expanded,
'Jill 11jill"1,111 the basis of fun reci pow nth the next summit meeting, on
should ?? - Western governments
welcome and
increased
glasnost, while
to citizens
the
to tSoviet lead
ershi
contini
p thatun I ! TeC ed huma
? g to insist
its observanc
n ri
e of
1,; a condition for ghts is the mark of internationally
t
ry collaborative a civilized Power and
Union
and the relations
Union full West. The West should ' b n the Soviet
y live
up t th ins t th th
oe coatat the Soviet
it
A
ct to encourage
undertook
ideasnd
enco under the
information free movement of
More, ar, it is im ati a fact cross international perils.
improvement in S
of political boundaries.
lif
oviet t
e that progressive
reatment li make it easier for the of its o
sfor citizens would also
U.S. government to pre ress for
nation trading status for
Regional the USSR most-favored-
Iss
ues
international
A key test of Soviet willin
Will* be policy
with its long-term gness to align its
I con munjty in to cooperate with requirements
re
institutions , on the one pan o economic and
on the other, t and, and sufficient
confrontatio aten to spill over into Political
southern A rica~s in the Middle East, Central t-power
America, and
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solving Points of to the international
i instabilit
y. Two kinds of situations tension in areas of
special case of should be regional
a sovereign state where the USSR has dire ' va the and compounded by the tensions (2) areas where regional Y invaded
social developmen between levels conflicts,
t f
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A rapid Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is an important
litmus test of Soviet desire for international stability. To the extent
that the Gorbachev leadership keeps that country under Soviet
occupation, its actions will belie its words to the effect that the
USSR is committed to peaceful coexistence among states,
regardless of social or political system. Certainly, the West, in
cooperation with the international community and the United
Nations, should make every effort to provide international
guarantees that Afghan territory not be used to the detriment
of Soviet security interests. At the same time, the Soviet
leadership needs to recognize, in accordance with its assumed
international obligations, that the Afghan people have the right
to establish a government of their choice, irrespective of Soviet
preference.
? The West must make clear to the Soviet leadership that
continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan poses strict
limits to genuine collaboration between the USSR and the
West, and that, conversely, a rapid Soviet withdrawal would
be a forceful demonstration that the "new political thinking"
has specific policy implications.
In other regions, such as the Middle East, where the
superpowers are less directly engaged but the possibility of a
local conflict exploding into a great-power confrontation remains
imminent, the USSR and the concerned Western powers should
begin exploring practical arrangements to defuse tensions and
provide for stability. This effort must proceed from the
recognition' that, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, for example, where
the two superpowers' interests are deeply rooted in geography
and political commitment, there can be no effective peace that
excludes one or the other. In that region, the Gorbachev
leadership has launched a series of initiatives aimed at shoring
up Soviet influence throughout the area-most notably by
restoring the political dialogue with Israel-and putting the USSR
potentially in the position to act positively toward a peace
settlement.
? In areas of conflict which could lead to possible superpower
confrontation-such as Central America, southern Africa,
and the Persian Gulf-the West should intensify discussions
aimed at clarifying interests and creating conditions of
greater stability. The existing framework of periodic U.S.-
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r
i !1a
1 ! --~-~
IY!
Soviet meetings
Par' Soviet a gs on regional issues should be uof _C
pgraded
be to neguled summit pros Pgraded as
e
ss. The Purpose would
g? beyond an ex
positions to
the discussion of possible solutions to hese problems.
? In the Arab-Israeli Problems.
the United the Task Force
States and the wCO eeth that
advance a Soviet Union work tog peace process which guarantees t e to to
integrity and interests of all states and the territorial
Substantive Political Parties.
jointly to explore the Dialog - Moscow and the West need
the decades kind Of international order each
ahead. It is vital that the seeks in
in which each side put of the
the same forth conflicting concepts ofearly 1970S'
to the i rubric, not be repeated. Cons detente under
hate high-level political talks on equently, both sides need
the operational compatibility an ongoing basis to explore
peaceful coexyStebetween the Soviet doctrine of
of the class struggle-and traditionally, seen by the USSR as a fo
seeks to normalize the Western concept of detente rm
the ideological governmental relations while ,which
dispute between East and quarantining
relationships. West from international
? The Task Force thus 'co
meetings' as well as meetings d other governmental and
held on a
regular basis.
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M.
V. Condusion
The Gorbachev leadership has defined a clear agenda in
domestic policy and intends to harness its foreign policy to serve
that end. In all of its policy decisions, therefore, the West needs
to be clear about its goals, priorities, and the tradeoffs among
them. Indeed, that is a sine qua non if Western policy is to be
effective and constructive in the face of Gorbachev's "new
thinking" in foreign affairs. The West no longer has the luxury
of inaction, which it appeared to enjoy during the waning
Brezhnev years and the rapid series of Soviet successions.
The West should thus not be indifferent or merely reactive
to Gorbachev's policies. First, such an attitude would put the
West perpetually on the defensive, leaving Gorbachev to define
the policy agenda himself. The disarray caused by Soviet
acceptance of the Western position on the zero option on the
INF issue underscores the need for the West to reexamine long-
held positions and define a policy agenda more in accordance
with its own definition of interests.
Second, a "wait and see" attitude by the West would consciously
forfeit opportunities to encourage Soviet adaptation to
international conditions. Finally, a Western failure to respond
creatively to the opportunities offered by the new directions
in Soviet policy would indicate indifference as to the fate of
Gorbachev's policy, which is considerably more outward-looking
and interested in collaborative international relationships than
any in the recent Soviet past. Western policy choices as well
as Gorbachev's domestic policy priority are bound to affect Soviet
foreign policy. Domestic economic reform requires a stable
international environment. The West should explore every
possibility-consistent with its own interests-to engage the
Soviet leadership in the effort to improve East-West relations,
and to make dear to the USSR the requirements of being a
constructive international partner.
Viewed historically, current Soviet attitudes toward foreign
affairs, which suggest a more realistic Soviet adaptation to the
international environment, may be interpreted as confirmation
of a patient Western policy combining military strength and
political flexibility. Ironically, many of the contemporary Soviet
statements on "mutual security" and "interdependence" echo
prevailing Western views of the early 1970s. In response to a
series of aggressive projections of political-military power by
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the USSR in the mid- to late-1970s, culminating in the invasion
of Afghanistan, the West, and especially the US, quickly shed
this rhetoric, downplaying arms control and collaborative
security approaches. In certain ways, the West remains transfixed
by the image of Soviet power that developed during the late
1970s, while the Soviets themselves are adopting approaches
comparable to those widespread in the West in the early 1970s.
To break this cycle, both must adapt creatively to the break
that the Gorbachev leadership is making with important aspects
of the Soviet past. The West can test the seriousness of Soviet
initiatives by encouraging the USSR to continue developing
negotiable proposals and practical approaches to issues of
common security. The West must also be prepared to consider
the practical consequences of its own policies, and to advance
more creative initiatives. For that to happen, and yield results,
there will have to be new political thinking in both East and
West.
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About the Institute
The Institute for East-West Security Studies is the only
permanent center bringing East and West together in sustained
dialogue, study, and research on security issues which affect
countries of both the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization
alliances. Established in 1981 as an independent international
initiative, the Institute brings to New York for a ten-month period
each year up to a dozen scholars and officials from a broad
range of countries in Europe and North America to examine
political, economic, and military problems of East-West security.
Their work is supplemented by study groups, conferences,
seminars, lectures, and publications as well as by regular
meetings of a Board of Directors and an Academic Advisory
Committee composed of prominent persons from East and West.
The Institute's work is directed toward identifying policy-
oriented options to enhance stability, reduce antagonisms and
the dangers of conflict, and expand East-West cooperation. The
Institute's sustained East-West interaction process is designed
to help clarify differences in perception, search for ways of
building on shared concerns and stimulate new ideas for
improving security for both East and West.
The Institute values its independence and accepts no
government monies. A not-for-profit organization, tax-exempt
in the United States, it is completely financed by foundations,
corporations, and individuals in Europe and the United States.
European governments are encouraged to and do provide in-
kind contributions including the hosting of major conferences
and meetings.
The Institute publishes an East-West Monograph Series, an
Occasional Paper Series, and Meeting Reports on a regular basis. Its
offices are located at 360 Lexington Avenue, New York, New
York 10017.
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BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The Institute is governed by a 45-member Board of Directors which meets
twice a year to determine policies, make financial and other decisions, and
discuss substantive issues. The Directors of the Institute are pleased to sponsor
this Report on Soviet "New Thinking." The views expressed, however, do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of the Board of Directors or its members.
CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE BOARD
Academician Ivan T. Berend
President
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest
Whitney MacMillan
Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer
Cargill, Inc.
Minnetonka
PRESIDENT CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE
John Edwin Mroz COMMITTEE
Institute for East-West Security Ira D. Wallach
Studies Chairman of the Board
New York Central National-Gottesman, Inc.
New York
HONORARY CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
Dr. h.c. Berthold Beitz
President
Alfried Krupp von Bohlen and
Halbach-Foundation, Essen
CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE ACADEMIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Professor Curt Gasteyger Professor Janusz Symonides
Director Director
Programme for Strategic and Polish Institute of International
International Security Affairs
Studies Warsaw
Graduate Institute of International
Studies, Geneva
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Pauline Neville-Jones
Minister (Economics)
Embassy of the
United Kingdom
Bonn
Dr. Manuel Medina Ortega
Vice President
European Parliament
Madrid
H.E. Harry Ott
Deputy Minister for Foreign
Permanent Mission of the
German Democratic
Republic to the United
Nations
New York
H.E. Dr. Jan Pudlak
Director
Institute for Foreign Relations
Prague
Professor Dr. Klaus Ritter
Director
Foundation for Science and
Policy
Ebenhausen
The Honorable Olin C.
Robison
Chair of the IEWSS Nominat-
ing Committee
President
Middlebury College
Middlebury
President
New York
Harold H. Saunders
Visiting Fellow
The Brookings Institution
Washington, DC
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Professor Dr. Max Schmidt
Director
Institute of International
Politics and Economics of
the German Democratic
Republic
Berlin
Dr. Eleanor Sheldon
Business Consultant
New York
Mitchell I. Sonkin, Esq.
Partner
Pryor, Cashman, Sherman &
Flynn
New York
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Guest Scholar
The Brookings Institution
Washington, DC
Michael I. Sovern, Esq.
President
Columbia University
New York
H.E. Emmanuel S. Spyridakis
Ambassador of Greece to
Yugoslavia
Belgrade
Dietrich Stobbe
Member of the Bundestag
Bonn
Stephen C. Swid
Treasurer of the Institute
Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer
SBK Entertainment World
New York
Peter Tarnoff
President
Council on Foreign Relations
New York
 Dr. Seyfi Tashan
President
Turkish Institute of Foreign
Policy
Ankara
Thomas J. Tisch
Chair of the IEWSS Finance
Committee
Managing Partner
FLF Associates, Inc.
New York
H.E. Guenther van Well
Ambassador of the Federal
Republic of Germany to
the United States
Washington, DC
Secretary and Counsel
Frederick Gelberg
Partner
Gelberg & Abrams
New York
Auditor
Peat Marwick Main & Co.
New York
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