WONSAN AIRFIELD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A059500260001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 107
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246A059500260001-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material.contaIns Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by law.
COUNTRY North Korea
SUBJECT Wonsan Airfield
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES
REFERENCES
23 June 1961
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80TOO246AO59500260001-3
1
50X1-HUM
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
2, Designat:'G1 - Ordinary c cs gnabicii
Designation D=.arin g 'ligI
Calling Code
- Mi? it a ry Un i;:
Other
Location
.1) P'1ic) c Unit
2) t'T ?ko dirate
3) Ceographinai Coordi.rat~-,
4) Di eptim. of Rwway
5) E 1f--der l1natiorx
6) high-mark
7) LandmaFk
4 u ti an
5~ Hieto Y
Personne'l'.. & Ad,iniatrec~ .o:?a
1) Unit Stationed
2) Ysna:e>n: t & Opprat .era ,Frf Air F1 1d.
3) Personna1
4) Organ.i.T ti.ai & Duty
5) Un for & Other
7 Des~:rip i.o~ ;
1) A:? . a o piad
b
2) Runny & Durface of AtT i?ieId
3) Alr?rrafr_ Aircraf Dcacoy yen
4) Grog hi A Cor.l1tianz, of AIr' F~eld
5) Establishments beyir . (,ot::stiuctati
5) ~i~,e:hc-.rt aj. Estaba!.is zc~r t
a, x.r_a4ic~;,,aw~f~':a:.i1; luipwn,
b :r Radas?
c, Eeacon system
d .:j CQf.7I;.unicatior19
Meteorological
7) u i rlaticres. on other .;~?a et ig1~~~a z ;+.c ::s :? plan r,tic ~ on paint)
~) apply
K^a ..nfome lion 2 eiw trial. ';ro
f A.i. rpian a'$
(2) Aviation PC L
(3,) IAir?pi?1no > ilar.?c& Parts
:: 1 fkoerisl Cozr4~!.` m i+` atio a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
b. Food Supply
c o Clothing
d4 Equipmert on Hand
e. Main%en e
9) Buildings
13) Flight Training
a. Training Hours and Days
b0 Type of Flight Train ng
Fl.igh Training Area
do Flight Carders
etioni..ri ;the wadi me assignment
given to the 2 th pegrent are, as folwLo%~s: e) Compared with the other
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246A059500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
regiments of the 2nd Division, the 2tth Regiment was lacking in
interception capability., wh i 4 h is the most important tank for a
fighter unit; b) 1his regiment was equipped with MIC-15 HIS planes-
(Doamtar,Wit: When the NK,PAF converted its equipment to MIG 17 planes,
it took two years for com lotion of the conversiono According to
the plan of the, NKPAF, the lit Division would be equipped 50X1-HUM
with 3IG-19 planes, and the 26th Regiment -would change is present
egtii t of MiGI. BIS plants to MiG l7 planes. It was said that
the: training of pilelk,s for conversion to the
new equipment was coat sleted
e) in c-nsiderati on of the armament capacity of the NKPt,F; the
Soviet loan to NK; and the types of planes required to elevate
the strength of the NK.PAF, it would be impassible to convert the
equip rant of the attire Nd{PAF with th,s new type of aircraft
simultaneously,, F`ur'ther, conversion to new equip lent might be
meaningless because of the technical s:bil:ity of the NK air
force- Thus the trainin ; re4mentu of the 1jKPAF would be unable
to be equipped with the same type of Cighte:ra as those of the
other regiments in the sage division, From this point of view,
the 26th Regiment of the 2nd Division would also be jgaipped with
a different type of aircraft as corn :red with the other regiments
of the division.
ee bth Fie 'meat: lt.aou the combat capability of the Seth Regiment
was considered to be equivalent to that of the 58th Regiment
stationed at Sondoi Air Field, there Caere differences between the
two re/ .tit?:nts th' 5F4,.h Regiment we,; superi.or for deiytime
interception; and the latter for nigp-'-.tine ntercept_ cno The
two regimnts : re engaged in traainir:,~ activities for the missions
of daytime interne ion and nighttime interception, respecti7ely0
The 5&th Regiment had one MIG-17 PF -3srttaliono bring the Korean
War the 543th Regiment made triumphant achievrcments, awed was given
an honorable. title of "Honor R.e;gf sxten , 00 At present this regiment
is considered the first or second st ;;sngest flight regiment In Nt0
(Comment: The 56th Re ter t produced tvo war heroes and there
were. a number of model combat. memberse in it Of the regimen- al
members, more than ten persons higher than battalion commander
level had been con .erred wi,4h mentor. o = combat medelso Those
who A e;.-eived t rain _ng from i.h ese modol. ,ombet members were
considered to he superior in combat cILpa.bil tiea as compared
with those: trained by other regiments in NK,) This regimet 1a
mission was to Inturcvept en$r. y .lanes
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
but it was not giiren a particular mission to attack the enemy. ~
In accordance with
circumstances, there is very little possibility this regiment would
change its bass to sow place in the western coastal area in order
to protect bomberso Under present goographical conditions, the let
aril 3rd Divisions would hav- the miesion of protecting 'bomberso
d, ,nth Base: Upon the deactivation of the Engineering Battalions from
each f1. iglt regiiw.nt i1,4 5th Base wae? established 50X1-HUM
at the Wonsan Air Field. This base 'was responsible for management
and maintenance o ' all. the 'light un% ss, including the food supply
for the artillery regime t at the air field. For eonvrenien a of
the organizational system,, the 5th Ease was temporarily assigned. to
the 2nd Division t=which was etaationod at the Wonsan Base as one of
the combat units. Although the bass was under the command of the
2nd Division cwmnandera its was actually an independent organization
assigned the mission o2 rear,- support 0 Since the 5tb. Base is
permanently stationed at Wonsan Air Yield., the base would not be
direcytly related to any rnav Ent of the 56th or 26th regiments, or
the 2nd Division0 From this standpoint, the bass is quite different
from the combat units staticwd at. Wcnean Air Field,, In order to
carry out the duty of rear L
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246A059500260001-3
the 26th and 56th Regiment's Staff Offices, and each
battalion chief of staff, were alternatively appointed as
the operations off_icer-offthe -day. Upon orders from the
Division Control Station, the operations officer-of-then-da;r
fired a takeoff signal gun for the alert-planes of-the-dad'
(after the signal was fired, a flight controller took
charge of the takeoff of the planes), and he also took
operational telephone calls through a K-10 type sw3tchboart.
(He operated the switchboard himself).
Since the appointment of the operations officer-of-the-day
had nothing to do with a regin nt.a flight training schedule
as mentioned before, an operationaa staff officer from the
56th Regimert might be on d'ty as an operations officer--of-
the=day on a flight, training day of the 26th Regiments or
vice versa. The duties'of the operations officer--of-the-day
were: 1) Firing of take-of_f signal gun for alert-planes-
of-the-day, and 2), sending and receiving calls through
the operational telephone.
*Flight Controller: A regimental ccammander or deputy
regimental commander was appointed as flight cont roller
on his regiment rs flight training day. He was responsible
for the flight activities of all aircraft in the air as
well as landings and take-offsg and also for technical
.flight control of -take-offs of the alert -plane s-of-the-day.
W`ho there was no flight training, a flight ccntroller was
appointed among senior flying officers above the level of
deputy battalion commander frau either the 26th or 56th
Regiments. The flight cont roller controlled landings and
take,ch a :0 kilcmete:r-square
area and with the Last ,ona marr?kec. over t:7e sec. In additicn, each zone
contained a special f'lyn; ;iistri.c:t 15 lsm. leric and 10 km wide. each secar:,t
zone also served as a fo:; ;atiorimf.]a.ght tk??in.ing e:rea.,
there had seen many dif i-4.culties in imp.i.r; entin,; the training due- to the
facet that each zone was situated eo close to the airfield ani limited in
area $n
1sequertly
., each zone wFs e::car ed arc rearranged so as to rnak,, ii;
at least Z) to. 22 kilometers' distance fz,m. the airfield (See Annex 24 o? 25
for the s ed., Since the special flying c rill. J.ncluded abrupt changes in
air route and t here?fo:r(-, wEA liable to interfere with other planes training
it was strictly forbi ?.der.; to go over the h"undary out of the designated
zone. In view of the nun ber of planes participating in the day's training1
indi.vidua;,. pilots tier: assigned to respective training zones in edvancee
The lstp, rd , 3rd and i4th. zones were used by one regiment at a time with
the 5th sea zone being used mainly by the 116'4-h Fe.giment and occasionally
by the 26th., The fledging pilots tiers not s)_ebjected to over.-the-'sea
training because they were ]liable ?.o the d an ger of losing th air potition,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
4) F"i ,_t Orders:
During the training flight the flight leader was entirely responsible for
issuing pertinent orders.. Orders for the :'lying drill within the flight
training zones mentioned above also came E;'.neral:?y from this flight leader.
Only the long distance aerial navigation t.-raining flight was ordered
occasionally by the Division Command Post when the training was c,-ncerried wi~`.h
emergency instructions of the Air Force Cc rimarii :.ricluding air-route corre--
ticn by radar, etc a All the flying activvi_-,ies d' the alert plane.3 of the da,,
solely by the Division Command Post o It was the flying officer of the da,r
and the flight leader always present at the Take=C)ff Line Corrmand Post,
however, that were charged with responsibility for the technical flying
instructions at the time of take-off,
5) Flying Accidents:
There were four aviation accidents, which were attributed mainly to some poor
ground control and the mutual carelessness between. the pilots involved du2i.n,,
their fli4it o 50X1-HUM
between two 14IG-15 BISs piloted by Junior Lieutenant CHOOSE Por;g-son (nnta)
and Senior Lieutenant HM Il-pong (nta; respectively of tde 2nd Company,
l.st Battalion
.9 26th hegi_rnent, In this aerial. collision w' ich shattered
both planes into fragrneits CH?OE got killed arid HAN. bailed out, During
the high-speed sir maneuvers (steep formatior, dive) CHI ? CE's MIG--15 BI:;,
one of the formation rrember planes collided against the leading plane
piloted by HAN since CH'C`E failed to t cke care of the for~se of inertia,
produced by the steep diving,
b, The Second Accident. It happensd or a heavily clo-Lded day
'hen a MIC 15 manned by Senior 'aolonei HAS! Myong-kwon (nta)., the deputy
regimental commander for flight, and Lieutena::i: CIHANG Mun-sun (nta), a
company commander, of the 56th ;iegiment, took to the air on an inspectior
flight.. The plane was diving from the altitude of 10,000 meters abovE
the Ch l ongch ? on River towards the Wons n kirf field e s long-distance radio
cornmuni.catim point, breaking through layers of clouds, when it crashed
headlong on a hill (name unknovai) in the vicinity of Yangdok and
exi)lode?d, instantly killing the tho men aboarl. Although knowledge of
its cause was unavailable, the ,3tory made public purported that a certain
Captain, rasporisible officer of the day in tha Division Commani Post I A63
responsible for the accident by deliberately neglecting necessary ground
communications with t ::e plane, The unidentif led Captain vas caurt-
martialed later and executed The Colonel was
posthumously promoted to Xajor Generals 50X1-HUM
m 53
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
c, The Third Accident: The accident happened to the
MIG-17 piloted by Lieutenant KIM Kyu-chang nta), commanding officer of
an unknown flying company of an unknown battalion of the 56th, Regiment
when it was engaging in a special flight alone through clouds over tie
4th Training Ztie in the face of rougi? weather conditions (10 bars), It
crashed on a hill in the vicinity of Yangdok and exploded killing the-
pilot instantly. The post-accident investigation failed to clear up
its cause and it was presumed that loss of the sense of posture cnnti ibute l
to the accident, 50X1-HUM
d. The Fourth Accident: It happened
when junior Lieutenant KO Chin?.hak nta) of the lst Company, 3rd Batt alior. ,
2hth E.e;imznt tried to make a Eb reed landing due to the trouble that a
pull at his control laver did not help in gaining speed, His MIG-15 BIS
was coming in from the southeast to the airfield when the speed dropped
so great that the plane crashed on the ? sandy area some 2 kilometers
southeast of the airfield resu:_ting in its completely burning and its
p lotss being heavily wounded. It was later found out that the accident
was caused by one of the ground maintenance :rew who had carelessly
left his wrench within the plane?s e., i.ne du:'ing his maintenance work.
As rveventive measures against such aviation accidents strong emphasis was
being placed on the following matters 50X1-HUM
All flights must be preceded by complete preparations.
Thorough maintenance.
Strengthened flight and command system
Whenever an accident occurred the AF regirn*:nt in?rolved was ordered to
suspend its flying operations until. such time as the cause was cleared up
(Usually about one week). It was after proper preventive measures again-;
future accidents of the sort were worked out on the basis of the investigated
cause that the reginnent resumed its flight train:_r..g,
11. Anti-Aircraft Defense:
In addition to a P-20 radar for the purpose (see Poirt 94 on the sketch) the
Wonsan Airfield had the 36th AAA Regimeit of a North Korean Air Force anti-
aircraft artil ery division (designation unknown) egtipped with 1)Omm AAA Gunu
which maintained positions on the hills surrounding the airfield ;sod furthermore
a part of the designation-unknown AAA Regiment equipped with unidentified guru
under the direct control of the First Infantry Corps was staticnei on the hil:.s
about one kilometer southwest of the airfield (See Pcint 83 on the sketch),, Y'wo
searchlights (their name unknown) were observed around the runway (See Point ;!
on the sketch). They were utilized pri iari 1y for illuminating the runway in
case of night-time landing and the quantity and location of the other searchlights
actually used for the purpose of air defense are unkr:own, Although two separate
64 -
C-0-N- F- I-D-- E-N-T-I-A-L
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
anti-aircraft artillery units were arrayed around the airfield for the purpose
of air defense it was the 36th AAA Regiment with its headquarters located at the
airfield that was entirely responsible for the rrissi)n of the AAA guns. (The
36th Regiment had all its strength and equipment located in the area and was
logistically supported by the 5th Base in matters such as feeding.) About ten
times a year the AAA regiment launched an air-ground joint operation together
with the 26th and 56th Regiments. The joint t^ainin, had two objectives:
one was to train the pilots in attacking enemy AAA positions and the other to
train the artillery men (by sighting practice) in shooting down Enemy planes.
Though stationed near the airfield. the AAA unit under the direct control of the
lst Infantry Corps was responsible primarily f :)r ant'.-aircraft defense of the
Wonsan city and port facilities and it was ons_;r in view of its geographical
location that the unit was saddled with the additional mission of air defense
for the airfield (Operation of the P-20 radar for anti-aircraft defense activity
omitted here. See Item h) of 7). Each AAA regiment, placed under the control
of North Korean Air Force had no organization equivalent to the battalion and
was directly composed of six co;npenies9 each of which was equipped with 4 to i
100mm automatic. AAA guns (See Point 89 for details of 100mm AAA guns),
Drawn on Annext 25 of 25 attached hereto is they sketch showing disposition of
these AAA posi :ions9 which were denoted. by the alphabet. The following is the
-explanation concerning each denoted AAA. position: 50X1-HUM
(A) One Compa:iy (its designation unknown) under the direct command of the 366th
AAA Eegin nt9 a certain designation-unknown North Korea Air Force AAA
Division: Manned by this company strength and nL.pposedly egxipped with
4 to 6 IDOmm automatic AAA ?zuns the positron was situated on a hill in the
vicinity of CU &9390 about 500 meters north of the 84 meter-hill (CU 689386)
at the northern end of the a.Calma Feninsula (See Annex 23 of 25 for the
sketch of this AAA gun),
(B) The AAA guns exposed on the ground (one cc mpany /Its designation unknow/J~
under the direct command of the 36th AAA fegiment ): See Point 89.
(C) lOOnun AAA Gun Position (one company of the 35th AAA Regiment): See Point f4,,
- 65 -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
(D) AAA Position (manned by two companies of the 36th AAA Regimert ?): 50X1-HUM
The AAA position having eight 100mm automv is AAA guns was situated on the
136-meter-hill in the vicinity of CU 5&.2313 some 4 kilometers south of the
airfield.
It is he an-,i-aircraft machine guns
that must be used against tie planes flying at a low altitude and the 36tz
AAA Regiment apparently did not possess any of them (The 10Drrm automati c
AAA ,gun is effective against bombers).
12. Trans rtation Routes:
The transport routes leading into the airfield t.onsis?geed of the stania?d-guage
railroad laid on the eastern side of the airfic .d's rear gate (Point Tz) and the
10-meter wide asphalt-surfaced road conrec+.ed w:.th the font gate (Point 47).
Construction wok for this asphalt-paved road started as a
part of the roal repairing program for 'Vonsan-si. (The asphalt surfacing work
for the Worsan streets was completed 0). It wasp only the front gate 50X1-HUM
that was open for use to traffic in and out of the airfield (except by rail) and
therefore all persons arxi veh `.cles were to use thi s as phalt-paved road only.
As a rule, no traffic was- allowed through the rear. ga',e (Point 78) where a gua rd
stood on duty at all time"s'for this pur_osz. The persons coming into or going
out of the airfield must have walked from or to the Wnrtsan-Anbyon road two
kilometers southwest of the airfield where they got o;'f' of or onto the Wonsan-:ii
operated bu.s. (The regulation applied oleo to those on recreation at the recr3atiol
center, officers and* their dependents). As for the rail trips into the base,
they were made about twice a month with 3 to 4 freight cars sidelined and park :d
at a time. The supplies transported by rail included an unknown Quantity of
various tyFes of aviation POLp equipment and weapons. Most of the quartermast 3r
supplies came is through this rail transport. There vas neither marine transport
nor air liner service but fish were sometimes airlifted, to be forwarded to the
high-ranking of rici a ls.
13. Security:
Security nissicns all over the airfield were the responsibility of the Security
Company under the 5th Base and the coast lines on the eastern and nora.ern
sides of the Kalma Peninsula were guarded by a designation-unknown infantry unit,
whose soldiers could be recognized as not belonging tc the Coast Gaard Unit since
they were in a uniform similar to that of infantry men. It is possible that the
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246A059500260001-3
unit might be a part of the 45th Infantry Division under the direct control
of the Ministry of National Defense which was stationed on the. 46-meter hill
(CU 697333) with fortified positions built there about 2 kilometers' south
of the airfield. This possibility w s derived from the coast guarding mission
assigned to the Division (Further information on this Division will come later
at the end of this paragraph). The sentry posts operated by the 5th Base
were located at the front gate, the interception point and the rear gate.
During the hours of darkness one mobile sentry was posted in each battalion
area to safeguard the airplanes. The guards were armed with automatic rifles
or cavalry curb:i.nes. Although no information i:7 avai:.able on the coast guard
system there was apparently no particular coast defense measures arranged
specificially for the airfield only. Ncr was there any thing like searchlight 3
for this purpose (The airfield had no fence around it.)c The following are
the v,.ri-us duties related to the matter of security:
1) Officers of the Dar for Garrison:
a. The Commander of the Garrison Headquarters: The Commander of the 56th
Regiment was appointed by the Air Force Commander to be the garrison
commandant responsible for the joint defense of the Wonsan airifield with
the 26th Regiment, the 3,Sth AAA Regiment9 the Civisional Repair Station,
the 5th Base and other attached units such as a radar dete.tior,. and
searchlight illumination companies under his command.
b. The Garrison Staff: Their commanding officer being the garrison
commander the 56th Regiment's staff perfoied additional duty as the
staff of the garrison headquarters.
c. Officer of the D for the Garrison: HE was the officer of the day
entrusted with the authority of the garrison commander and in his absence
acted for him in performing the ,jork relevant to the garrison duty front
the garrison 00 office located within the Building for Combined Use
indicated at Point 37. :n case of emergency the Division headcuarters
notified the OD (and the garrison staff department during work hours) c f
the situation to enable the garrison commander to order an emergency cEll.
Until the garrison staff became ?repared for operations ttt 00 was to take
the place of the garrisirr commander. For successful execution of his
mission such as this the garrison commander was required to keep under
his control and supervision all the officers of the day of the units
stationed in the area of the airfield with the information always on
hand of their strength and security performance. The 00 wLs further
responsible for the night-time security and approved entrance of visitors
into the area. Furnished. by the 26th ani 56th 3egiments by turns on
alternate days the officer of the day was an emergency pilot in the rank
of lieutenant or senior lieutenant (mainly a staff officer').
2) Officer of the Day in Each iJrit: He acted for the unit commancer after the
daily work hours under the control of the garrison commander mentioned above.
. 067_
C-O?-N-F-I-D-F -N-T-I-.A-L
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246A059500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
(As for an emergency sortie of the alert planes of the day the officer of the
day for operatir,ns posted in the Take-Off Line command Post signaled their'
take-off by firing his signal rifle according to the directive from the
Division Command Post).
3) Leave Out and Procedures Rued for Passaje through the Front Gate : .
a. The Leave Out: ithen allowed leave to go out the soldiers were required
to carry the leave out certificates issued in the name of the unit
cc; minder concerned cn the leave out certif is ate forms supplied by the
Security Affairs Depart:tent of the First Corps stationed in Wonsan-si.,
Only on Sundays those soldiers under special circumstances requiring
them to go out were authorized to leave their barracks within the lim:.t
.y
of 2 to 3 percent of the total strength and it was therefore not hard'
possible for soldiers to have leave during their service. In princi p:.e,
officers (living in barracks as well as in the official residences)
were neither to be required to carry ti-e leave out certificates nor
to be interfered with in their g)ing out after the daily -work hours o
houever, the matter was brougit urder 50X1-HUM
control on the pretext of completing combat preparedness and their
1ping. out was possible only after the re ;infer tal commander2s oral pertiis sion
was obtained (The official residences were Iccated within the boundar;r
of the Um). Under whatever circumstances they mi;;ht be they were
strictly forbidden to wear civvies.
b. The Procedures Required for Passa4ethr .ugh the Front Gate: For passage
through the front gate the soldiers were required to show their leave out
certificates issued by the regimental commander concerned, and officers,
their dependents and laborers their passage certificates issued in the
name of the garrison commander which tt.ey had to always carry with the m.
The visitors were stopped at the front gate regardless of their rank or
so:ial standing and were aithorized to pass only after the guard reported
the matter to the garrison staff department by telephone and obtained the
necessary permission.
4) The 1,2th Infantry Division under the Direct, Control of the Ministry of
Naticnal Defense: With its headquarters located at Anbyon the L)ivision hifd
a part of f-ts strength stationed in the area of the 46-meter hill south of
the Wonsan Airifield. All over the area of the :4-meter hill (CU 702328)
and the 4h-meter hill (CU t98333) tie unit was constructing fortification:,
consisting; of and srgraunc. combat concrete trenches with 50X1-HUM
many loopholes exposed towards the East Se, charged with the mission of
defending the east coast line leading to the Anbyon plain. Installed
within these "beehive-like" underground combat trenches were an unknown
number of 75mm caliber ground guns.
140 Weather Conditions: Stated below are only the special phenomena that prevail.
in the area, compared with the general weather conditions throughout North Korea:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246A059500260001-3
1) Sea-f : For about 15 days soiretime in ',ay and June when the weather is in
transition from spring to summer the sea-fcg frequently set in in about 1;
minutes always drifting from the East Sea to lie over all the Wonsan area
so thick that an cbject beyond two meters ahead might not be visible. In
case of a sudden transition from clear to foggy weather all the planes were
forced to discontinue their flight and immediately return to the base.
2) Gale Or Strong Wind): With the ai:^fiel.d looking out on the East Sea the
strong wind always prevails in the area throughout the year, and flight
training continued even in this high wind. Because of this high wind those
outside pilots visiting the Wonsan airfield for the first time must land
with greater precautions while those who had been trained at the Wonsan
airfield found it easy to land at other air bases. However windy it was
except in the case of typhoons and similar strong winds the flying program
was never affected and when an intensely st:rrn wind blow the planes
(MIG-15 BIS and MIG-17) must maintain a 15 degree angle of inclination
at the time of landing (which is the maximum poss. ble angle of inclination
for airplanes when they were brought to the grourt .
3) Rain and Snowfall: Due to the atmospheric conditions caused by the high
l
d
h
an
in t
e area of Iangdok there was a large rainfall in summer and a
com arativeiy larger snowfall. in wirtei than in the western ,oast arose
T. 50X1-HUM
there was snowfall of one meter at ., ti
ne
continued snowing for a week for sncw removal all personnel in the airfie]t
including the regimental commanders were mobilized to clear away the
snow with brooms and snow-shoevels. At the time of the rainy season in suimter
they had a considerably heavy rainfall as iv the case with other areas along
the east coast. Owing to the excellent -irainage system constructed in the
days of the Japanese Occuration9 however, tie airfield area had never been
inundated with grater. There was a meteorological observatory under the
control of the 5th Base which could provide weather forecasts of about 70
percent accuracy in the effort to prevent passible flying accidents.,
15. Miscellaneous Information:
1) Unit Novemer..t Plan:
a. Rumor about the 26th Ra ment a s Movement to th+ Toksan Airfield: humor
had it for some time that the 2ibth Reg; ment would move to the Toksan
airfield.,, Although the talk quieted down it had been
movement plan and w e ter the a. was based on any truth were unknown.
b. Rumor about the 26th R,!aiment?s Movement to the Sondok Airifield: Since
the both the 26th and 56th Regiments plated their primary emphasis upon
the day-time flight training there were inevitably some difficulties
generated in their trai. ning program. There wa.3 a report
-69-
C-Ci--N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246A059500260001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/19: CIA-RDP80T00246AO59500260001-3
that in carder to solve the situation the 26th Regiment wruld be reloeatEd
at the Sondok Airfield where the 5Fth Regiment ,hose primary efforts in
training were for the night-time flying was stationed. Subsequently, it
was reported that the plan was suspended for some unknown reason.
2) Medical Care for Patients: Diagnosis for the pilots was made only by tre
chief medical of ficer (in the rank of Major) of each regiment whose medical
certificates were the requirements for sick pilots to be evacuated to the
Central kF Hospital in i'1yongyan,;. On the day preceding the flight training
day the chief medical officer stayed together with the pilots in barracks
in order to observe the physical c,onditicn of individual pi:.ot and see that
they had ample sleep,, Before the training started on the f:.i&ht trainirg
day he examined each pilot's pulse and inquired of each one about how hE
felt, If th ere was a man who felt even slightly out o f fix he would be
ordered to stay out of the training. Other, ppatients.. officers and men,
were taken care of by the Base Hospital which turned over to the 13th Ni?PA
Hospital (under the direct, control of the Ministry of National Defense)
(located at Yangdok) those cases -ihat required more delicate care than
that the Base Hospital could prow'-de. The 13th Hospital wan the only
hospital which had been granted the authority fa.r deciding irhether those
evacuated patients should be discharged from service depending on the
relative seriousness of their diseases.. For transportation of emergency
cases the Base Hospital had an ambulance which was kpTt
parkced ir, front of the aospital. 50X1-HUM
3) Motion Pictures, Theatrica:1 Peifo:::mances aryl Recreation Fac_.lities: The Base
Theater indicated at Point 49 showed mct ion pictures once a week, most c f
which were war films or counteres;nionage pictures produced by North Korea'
Communist China and the Soviet Union. As for the theatrical. plays they
went in e group to the gereral theaters in Wonsan-si about once a year.
Most of the theatrical performances they were allowed to see were those
which dealt Hrith the rev"l.utionar7r moves?eat sta