ON-SITE INSPECTION FOR ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001101440028-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: August 21, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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ACIS - 1410/85
21 August 1985
NOTE TO: DCI /
DDCI
Attached is a copy of a brochure
addressing on-site inspection. Such things
are rare.
In any case, the punchline is on pages
38/39/40. My basic concern remains: if
one seeks arms control deals with a very
large nation (like the USSR), which is
inherently hostile and neurotic about
secrecy and deception, why would one want
constraints so sweeping (or detailed) that
on-site inspection would be a necessary
element to the deal's verification and to
US perception that our security was safe?
(There are answers but they don't make me
feel so good.) This tautology continues to
lurk behind US arms control theology and--I
suspect--it will go on unresolved for a
long time. Nonetheless, there are a number
of good ideas in here.
If I can assist you more here, please
STAT
CIACI S
Attachment:
As stated
cc: DDI
DDS&T
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RICHARD L. SHEARER, JR.
the national defense university
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MONOGRAPH
SERIES
The National Defense University Press publishes
monographs on the formulation of national security policy, the
development of military strategy, the problems of national
mobilization, the management of resources for national
security, and the plans for joint and combined operations.
Written by experts in selected policy areas, the monographs
are intended to suggest policy alternatives, inform the thinking
of national security decisionmakers, and stimulate debate and
discussion throughout the national defense community.
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ON-SITE INSPECTION
FOR ARMS CONTROL
Breaking the Verification Barrier
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ON-SITE INSPECTION
FOR ARMS CONTROL
Breaking the Verification Barrier
Colonel Richard L. Shearer, Jr., USAF
Senior Fellow
National Security Affairs Monograph Series 84-7
National Defense University
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319-6000
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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLICATIONS
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research fellows, faculty, students, and associates of the University
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trial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff
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Unless otherwise noted, NDU Press publications are not copy-
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DISCLAIMER
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or im-
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Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The manuscript for this monograph was copy-edited by Mr. Ben-
jamin V. Mast under contract DAHC32-84-M-1 174.
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CONTENTS
Foreword ............................................ vii
About the Author ..................................... ix
Chapter
1. The Problem of Verification ........................ 1
Verification: Savior or Culprit? ....................... 3
A Neglected Solution: On-site Inspection .............. 10
2. Why Improve Verification? ......................... 13
Purposes of Verification ............................. 15
Levels of Verification ............................... 19
Heightened Importance at Reduced Levels ............ 21
Prerequisite to Arms Control ......................... 22
New Dimensions ................................... 23
3. On-site Inspection ................................ 25
Secrecy-Openness Continuum ...................... 27
Range of Possibilities ............................... 30
US Attitude Toward On-site Inspection ................ 31
Soviet Attitude Toward On-site Inspection ............. 33
Prospects for On-site Inspection ..................... 35
Recommendations: Goal, Path, Pace ................. 38
4. Strategy to Promote On-site Inspection ............. 41
US Initiatives ...................................... 44
Educating and Acclimating the Soviets ................ 46
Negotiated Provisions that Are Not Directly Intrusive .... 51
Negotiated Provisions that Require Increased
Intrusiveness .................................... 57
Endnotes ............................................ 59
Abbreviations ....................................... 65
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FOREWORD
The United States and the Soviet Union have engaged in
arms control negotiations for decades. But the talks have
produced only a few agreements, the arms race has continued,
and the outlook is discouraging. Why so little progress?
Among the unsettled issues hindering the arms control
agreements, the problem of verification-which limits both the
scope and effectiveness of agreements-has been one of the
most contentious.
In this monograph, Colonel Richard L. Shearer, Jr., US Air
Force, examines the role and methods of verification in arms
control negotiations. He finds that current verification means
are inadequate; instead, he recommends a renewed effort at
on-site inspection as a method that might encourage progress.
Colonel Shearer suggests ways in which the United States
could benefit by allowing Soviet inspectors on American soil
without requiring the Soviet Union, historically opposed to
such intrusions, to reciprocate.
Many observers consider that the United States should
now take the lead in advancing stalled arms control
negotiations. The National Defense University is pleased to
offer this rethinking of the idea of on-site inspection to all
concerned with improving arms control and US national
security.
Richard D. Lawrence
Lieutenant General, US Army
President, National Defense
University
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Colonel Richard L. Shearer, Jr., US Air Force, wrote this
monograph while assigned as a senior fellow in the Research Di-
rectorate of the National Defense University. Colonel Shearer
has earned a bachelor of science degree in mathematics at the
University of Maryland; a master of science degree in systems
analysis at West Coast University; master of science degrees in
management and in operations research and statistics from
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; and a Ph.D. in management,
also from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Colonel Shearer's
past assignments include the Space and Missile Systems Or-
ganization in Los Angeles, California, and the Office of External
Affairs, Headquarters US Air Force Studies and Analyses, at the
Pentagon. He is currently assigned at Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio.
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1
THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION
Unverifiable agreements only increase uncer-
tainty, tensions, and risks. The critical obstacle in vir-
tually every area of arms control in the 1970s was
Soviet unwillingness to accept verification measures
needed for more ambitious limitations.
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
US Secretary of State
14 July 1981
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THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION
On 26 May 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union
signed the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement,
SALT I. In the United States, it signaled the beginning of an
era of cooperation with the Soviet Union and generated high
expectations for arms control. But today the promise of arms
control remains largely unfulfilled. There is a variety of rea-
sons for this failure. A major contributing factor is the inability
of the United States and the Soviet Union to develop the mu-
tually acceptable verification procedures needed to safeguard
more substantial arms control measures. A review of develop-
ments to date clearly shows that the verification procedures
agreed to by both sides have constrained arms control prog-
ress and have had unintended force development implica-
tions. Furthermore, they have led to the neglect of on-site
inspection as a tool to help assure treaty compliance.
Over 14 years ago, the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion sat down to negotiate mutual limits on strategic weapons.
Legitimate optimism was based on several factors:
? Both recognized and sought to avoid the horrors of war.
? Rough parity existed.
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? Both possessed enough weapons for deterrence-
enough to absorb a first strike and still inflict unaccept-
able damage on the other in retaliation.
? Opposing forces were stable because neither side could
decisively alter the strategic balance in its favor by strik-
ing first.
Even though SALT I entered into force in October 1972, and
SALT II was negotiated and signed in June 1979 (although
never ratified), the strategic arms race has continued virtually
unabated.
The United States began deploying multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on ballistic missiles in June
1970. The Soviet Union followed suit with a massive buildup ex-
pected to continue throughout the 1980s. The United States is
responding with a modernization of its forces-the MX, Trident,
Pershing II, and cruise missiles; the B-113 and Advanced Tech-
nology Bombers. The US buildup will continue into the 1990s.
Furthermore, with the advent of accurate missiles and high-
value (multiple-target) weapons, the United States and the So-
viet Union have jointly moved toward unstable force deploy-
ments. Increasingly, both sides appear to believe that it is more
advantageous to strike first and correspondingly more self-
defeating to ride out an attack. All this is being done without
violating the launcher limits or modernization constraints of
SALT I or SALT II.
What went wrong? Nobody argues with the traditional
arms control objectives of reducing the risk of war, reducing
damage should war occur, and reducing military costs.' Why
then have the United States and the Soviet Union made so lit-
tle progress when progress is so much in their mutual
interest?
Many valid and interrelated reasons come to mind:
? The arms race evolves in an "action-reaction" pattern,
with each side misunderstanding and overreacting to
the other's actions. The less one side knows of the
other's capabilities, plans, and intentions, the more it
tends to react to possibility rather than reality-and
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tends to arm for more than the real threat. The other
side, in turn, sees a buildup that it believes to be exces-
sive. Feeling threatened, it reacts with its own build-
up-and the spiral continues.
? Both sides rely on worst-case analyses. Since neither
side knows the other's intentions, each bases plans on
its estimate of the other's capabilities. Since the horrors
and consequences of nuclear war demand every margin
of safety, each side seeks satisfactory outcomes (or
guaranteed deterrence) even when the conditions of
war are dictated by the other side.2 But satisfactory out-
comes in the worst of circumstances require better
forces than are needed for equal outcomes in equal cir-
cumstances. Preparing for the worst means having
something more than parity. Both sides preparing for
the worst can only fuel the arms race.
? Neither side is willing to accept the parity that a true
commitment to arms control would entail. Further, they
find it difficult to agree on a definition of parity in which
forces are not symmetrical. The Soviets have often
been accused of seeking arms control agreements only
to discourage US actions, with no intent to slow their
own military buildup.3 On the US side, popular support
for arms control has raised pressure for agree-
ments-especially before elections-but support for
arms control in the government has fluctuated widely. In
fact, the Reagan administration was broadly perceived,
at least initially, as being uninterested in arms control
and committed to reestablishing a margin of US military
superiority.
? Organizational interests and bureaucratic inertia afflict
both parties. While cooperation between the US De-
fense Department and industry is necessary and benefi-
cial, unsatisfied military needs and corporate desire for
profit foster mutual support for individual programs with-
out due regard for larger US interests. On the Soviet
side, there are many organizations dedicated to weapon
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development whose very survival could be called into
question by appropriate arms limitations.
? Cultural, technological, and other differences make
problems too hard to solve. The Soviet obsession with
secrecy is an obvious problem with respect to verifica-
tion. On the other hand, US moves to take advantage of
technological progress-MIRVs or cruise missiles, for
example-have also hampered arms control progress.
Still other reasons can be found, but the underlying truth is
that nations have historically relied on arms to insure their se-
curity, and they do not willingly lay down or reduce their arms
when facing an adversary they fear and distrust. So arms con-
trol agreements require that each side be reasonably confi-
dent that the other is complying with agreed upon conditions.
To verify compliance with US-Soviet agreements, the Sovi-
ets can monitor US activity from open sources-congressional
hearings and reports, the media, professional journals such as
Aviation Week, Department of Defense annual reports and pos-
ture statements, and public speeches. The Soviets may be con-
cerned that the United States will withdraw from or abrogate a
treaty-witness discussions in the United States on protecting
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by deploying missiles
now banned by the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Neverthe-
less, the Soviets should realize how nearly impossible it would
be for the United States to covertly plan, develop, and deploy
military systems or forces that violate a US treaty. Covertly de-
veloping and deploying any system would be very hard for the
United States to manage. If that system also violated a US
treaty, the prospects for program approval and funding, for all
practical purposes, would be nil. So it is entirely understandable
that the Soviets have not supported inclusion of strong, recipro-
cal verification measures in arms control agreements.
The United States, on the other hand, in seeking to as-
sure treaty compliance, faces a closed Soviet society where
information is tightly controlled. Furthermore, monitored data
on Soviet forces must be publicly releasable and convincing
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since the American public in general and the Senate in partic-
ular must also be assured of Soviet compliance. In a climate
of suspicion and skepticism caused by the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the apparent anthrax deaths at Sverdlovsk, and
"yellow rain" in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, the
United States will reject anything less than full and effective
verification of treaty compliance.
The United States has been steadfast in calling for ade-
quate verification provisions as a condition of arms control
agreements. In 1969, for example, President Nixon told the
SALT I negotiators that agreed upon measures must be subject
to adequate verification. The Arms Control and Disarmament
Act Amendment of 1977 reads, "It is the sense of Congress
that adequate verification of compliance should be an indispen-
sable part of any international arms-control agreement." Presi-
dent Reagan reaffirmed the requirement on 29 June 1982 in a
letter to Ambassador Edward Rowny, the US Special Repre-
sentative to Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations: "The
American people will not accept an agreement unless it is equal
and verifiable, and contributes to stability."
Strategic arms control agreements to date have generally
met the test of adequate verification, but not because treaties
included provisions to improve verification. They met the test
only because agreements were limited to provisions that were
inconsequential or could be reasonably verified by national
technical means (NTM).4 For example, there is no compre-
hensive test ban treaty largely because NTM can't distinguish
low-yield underground explosions from earthquakes. Agree-
ments do not limit missile and weapon production. Launchers
are controlled, but keeping old missiles is permitted. Missile
launchers can be reloaded and used to fire two or more
missiles-a loophole the Soviets can use to advantage since
many of their ICBMs are "cold-launched."5
The role of verification in strategic arms limitation is well
documented. Many examples illustrate how verification capa-
bilities have shaped arms control agreements and even influ-
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enced force structure decisions. In the 1960s, the United
States maintained that verification required on-site inspection.
However, the Soviets did not accept on-site inspection of their
strategic weapons, so negotiations progressed slowly. The
breakthrough came with the advent of satellites that could
monitor launchers and aircraft, and at times the weapons them-
selves. Thus, SALT I, with provisions for verification by NTM,
was signed and ratified in 1972 only after the United States
dropped its requirement for on-site inspection.
By the time SALT 11 was signed on 18 June 1979, both
sides had deployed MIRVs. Therefore, to reach agreement,
the negotiators needed to devise rules for counting warheads
to cap the number of warheads per missile. Both sides agreed
not to flight-test or deploy intercontinental or sea-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with more warheads than had been
flight-tested as of 1 May 1979.6 The agreement still limited the
number of launchers, rather than missiles, but the counting
rules in effect restricted the number of warheads deployed in
those launchers.' For example, the Soviet SS-1 8 missile is le-
gally limited to carrying 10 warheads-the maximum it has
been tested with-although it is capable of carrying many
more.
Although the US Senate has not ratified SALT II, Presi-
dent Reagan has initiated START (Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks) and proposed that ballistic missile warheads be re-
duced to 5,000, with no more than 2,500 on ICBMs-presum-
ably using the counting rules from SALT II to determine the
maximum number of warheads permitted, since counting pro-
cedures were not specified.8
The apparent progress on verification since the late
1960s ignores the effect that verification rules have had on
weapon systems. Controlling launchers or missiles instead of
warheads has encouraged "MIRVed" systems, because they
increase power within agreed upon constraints. The US de-
ployment of Minuteman III with 3 warheads and Poseidon with
9 or 10 did not violate SALT I even though these missiles in-
creased US destructive capability tremendously.9 The MX
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missile with 10 warheads is designed for maximum capability
within SALT II constraints. The Soviets have also deployed a
variety of MIRVed ICBM and SLBM systems, following the
same legalistic formulas.
Unfortunately and ironically, the MIRVed systems that
these "legal" force multiplying efforts create are valuable tar-
gets themselves. One warhead hitting a MIRVed missile can
destroy several enemy warheads-this fact encourages first
strikes and, with the advent of accurate delivery systems, un-
dermines the stability that existed before SALT I. If an equal
and verifiable limit had been negotiated on warheads instead
of launchers, the incentive to deploy MIRVs would have been
reduced. Deploying non-MIRVed systems, on the other hand,
would increase both the utility10 and survivability" of the set
number of warheads, perhaps offsetting the economic advan-
tages of MIRVing. Certainly, if the United States had foreseen
the problems of Minuteman vulnerability and the difficulties of
finding a survivable basing mode for MX, it would have been
strongly motivated, under a warhead limit, to deploy only sta-
ble, non-MIRVed ICBMs.
Current rules also discourage the stabilizing move of
replacing MIRVed missiles with single warhead missiles in ex-
isting launchers. Because launchers are controlled rather than
missiles, such "de-MIRVing" would leave the count un-
changed. Why deploy fewer warheads than allowed if the count
won't change? Thus, verification rules encourage maximum
MIRVing within negotiated limits, undermining the potential util-
ity and survivability of weapons systems and hastening move-
ment toward unstable systems.
Verification procedures that allow accurate warhead
counts regardless of launchers would remove many of the in-
centives to deploy highly MIRVed, destabilizing systems and
negate the need for artificial counting rules that have undesir-
able or unintended consequences. Moreover, movement to-
ward more qualitative arms control measures and strategic
systems without large, obvious launchers also underlies the
need for improved verification methods. National technical
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means alone will not be able to meet future verification
requirements.
A NEGLECTED SOLUTION: ON-SITE INSPECTION
As noted earlier, the United States maintained that verifi-
cation required on-site inspection until the advent of photo-
reconnaissance satellites. The satellites could observe
aircraft, silos, or submarines needed to deliver nuclear
warheads. These observable delivery means, in effect, served
as surrogates for the warheads, giving the United States an
alternative way to verify compliance and opening the door to
SALT I, SALT II, and progress in arms control. But weapons
are now being developed that don't depend on anything NTM
can observe-hampering continued progress and even under-
mining the basis of current agreements. Surrogates have
been useful, but their days are numbered. The time has come
to reexamine on-site inspection-its prospects, its benefits,
and its problems-without being put off by the usual argu-
ments, "It's too hard to implement" or "The Soviets won't ac-
cept it."
This paper begins that reexamination and recommends a
strategy to promote increased on-site inspection. The United
States would benefit from the recommended strategy even if
the Soviets remained opposed to it.
Chapter 2 discusses verification, developing and justi-
fying the need for improvement as a prerequisite to arms con-
trol progress and pointing out where on-site inspection could
help. Chapter 3 addresses on-site inspection in more depth,
suggesting unique benefits, offering alternative inspection
techniques, and assessing the prospects for implementation.
Chapter 4 proposes a US strategy to promote on-site
inspection.
Verification will remain central to arms control, and on-
site inspection should become a key ingredient in that proc-
ess. The quest for stability and peace requires an effective
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verification program. On-site inspection can break down the
barriers that have so far made verification a major limiting fac-
tor in arms control agreements.
The two superpowers have been negotiating seriously
since 1969. Progress, although slow and at times grudging, has
been made. The United States should expect more cooperation
on verification in the future as both sides build on past agree-
ments. If the Soviets do not cooperate, the United States
should recognize that it cannot depend on arms control for na-
tional security. Instead, the United States should then proceed
with additional programs to meet Soviet challenges-programs
above and beyond those needed for an integrated arms
control-defense approach to security.
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2
WHY IMPROVE VERIFICATION?
We insist on an equal balance of forces. And,
given the overwhelming evidence of Soviet violations
of international treaties concerning chemical and bio-
logical weapons, we also insist that any agreement
we sign can and will be verifiable.
President Ronald Reagan
State of the Union Address
25 January 1983
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WHY IMPROVE VERIFICATION?
Historically, the United States and the Soviet Union have
discussed procedures for better monitoring of each other's
strategic forces only as part of arms control agreements. In a
sense, this has actually complicated negotiations. Improved
monitoring provisions would help build confidence between
nations, even if developed and negotiated separately from
arms control agreements, because they would relieve many of
the fears underlying the arms race. Whether negotiated in
conjunction with or subsequently tied to arms control agree-
ments, such provisions would allow more substantial controls
while satisfying traditional verification requirements.
The objectives of verification are to detect and deter vio-
lations of an agreement and to provide national and interna-
tional confidence that signatories to a treaty are complying
with its provisions. Deterring violations and building confi-
dence depend on detection ability. As one side's ability to
detect violations improves, the other side's risk in noncompli-
ance increases; confidence that treaty obligations are being
fulfilled rises accordingly.
Verification goes beyond normal military intelligence func-
tions. It requires a determination of whether violations have
occurred-a determination based on the collection and evalu-
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ation of data (monitoring), but also requiring judgment and de-
cision at the political level, because evidence can usually be
interpreted in different ways. Nevertheless, the better the
monitoring process, the easier it should be to decide on viola-
tions or, conversely, to assure treaty compliance.
The ideal for monitoring is free access, much like that en-
joyed by a military inspector general, to examine any suspi-
cious activity. In an adversarial situation, such access is
unrealistic. Still, any movement in that direction will serve the
objectives of verification.
Verification of treaty compliance is necessary for reason-
able relations between countries. But it alone cannot ensure a
stable strategic balance or reduce fears of aggressive behav-
ior. Military activities not controlled by treaty must remain the
target of traditional intelligence activities-especially since
controls in one area can release resources to be applied to
uncontrolled activities.
Traditional military intelligence is easier than verification. It
entails watching activities where they normally take place-
known test sites or ship construction yards, for example. Verifi-
cation of the absence of banned activities, however, requires
evidence that they are not occurring anywhere-even though
extraordinary concealment measures will most likely accom-
pany deliberate violations. Traditional intelligence seeks gen-
eral characteristics and force levels. Verification can require
exact measurement of capabilities or exact counts because
"small" violations, if intentional, are politically important. Fur-
thermore, evidence gathered not only should be usable in pri-
vate consultations with the Soviets concerning potential
violations,' but also should be publicly releasable to be useful
in reacting to unresolved violations.
On the other hand, monitoring and verification can be
simplified through such appropriate treaty provisions as
noninterference with NTM (or by avoiding provisions that are
hard to verify). In fact, because monitoring for verification pur-
poses and traditional intelligence functions overlap, improve-
ments in one area generally help in the other-and both help
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in the accurate assessment of capabilities and intentions so
necessary in reducing fears underlying the arms race.2
Hence, improved verification in general and on-site in-
spection in particular should be viewed as more than corolla-
ries to arms control agreements. They also deserve attention
as confidence building measures (CBMs) between nations,
negotiated for their own sake rather than only as part of an
arms control agreement. On-site inspection provisions as
CBMs-in the spirit of those negotiated at the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe-would provide these
benefits:
? Improved knowledge of activities not controlled by
agreement and reduced fear of those activities under-
mining the stability sought in negotiated arms control
agreements. Or, where effort is rechanneled, improved
monitoring would increase warning time to allow an ap-
propriate reaction without undue haste or overreaction.
In either case, unwarranted fears and the momentum of
the arms race would be reduced.
? Fewer problems arising from simultaneous negotiation
of arms control measures and verification provisions.
People who have invested a large effort in reaching
agreement may not have the patience to accept legiti-
mate challenges concerning inadequate verification.
Treaty opponents, on the other hand, may seize on veri-
fication problems to hamper both negotiation and ratifi-
cation. CBMs would ease verification problems and
thereby reduce objections to arms control agreements
from the American people, both in and out of
government.
? An "enabling mechanism," opening the door to agree-
ments not yet foreseen or pursued because of an inabil-
ity to verify them. For example, mobile ICBMs are
considered "good" on doctrinal grounds because they
are reasonably invulnerable and therefore offer crisis
stability, but the United States wants the Soviet SS-16
banned for verification reasons. Similarly, the United
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States designed the Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS)
system for MX with elaborate and expensive provisions
for verification by NTM, without ever exploring straight-
forward and relatively inexpensive on-site inspection
methods. On a more historical note, verification prob-
lems were partly responsible for delaying the SALT I
agreement, until the development of reconnaissance
satellites allowed verification by NTM.
The interaction between verification and intelligence goes
beyond monitoring. Intelligence information may indicate or
even confirm a violation, but still, the information will not fully
satisfy verification needs if it isn't releasable in a convincing
form or can't be used without revealing sensitive collection
methods. Suppose a sensor spots a suspicious activity. If a vi-
olation is subsequently confirmed by an agent or another
source that can't be revealed, action may still be restricted to
asking for an explanation. But a much stronger response
would be supportable if an approved monitoring method, such
as on-site inspection, could be used for confirmation. The Cu-
ban missile crisis demonstrated the importance of having both
convincing and releasable information. Actual photographs of
missile site preparation played the key role in convincing the
American people and the United Nations that the Soviet threat
was real. Without photographs, US government agencies
might have been unable to reach a consensus on Soviet inten-
tions, to say nothing of developing the strong response made
by President Kennedy.
Negotiated inspection provisions would therefore serve to
investigate suspicious activities, to confirm data from other in-
telligence sources, and to provide the convincing, releasable
information necessary for consultations or appropriate re-
sponses to violations. If an activity in question violated an
arms control agreement, then treaty monitoring purposes also
would be served, with the problem of verifying desired agree-
ments reduced accordingly.
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Agreements can include provisions for any level of verifi-
cation, ranging from none to total. Verification may not be re-
quired in cases where-
The violator would not gain an advantage, such as in
the agreement "to notify each other immediately in the
event of an accidental, unauthorized or other unex-
plained incident involving a possible detonation of a nu-
clear weapon which could create a risk or outbreak of
nuclear war."3
? The violations would be reasonably obvious, such as in
the atmospheric test ban from the Limited Test Ban
Treaty.
? Signing an international agreement doesn't necessarily
mean accepting a new restriction. For example, the
United States agreed to ban biological weapons after
unilaterally renouncing them.
The opposite extreme would be total verification. Absolute
compliance with an agreement can never be guaranteed, al-
though the Antarctic Treaty approaches the ideal with provi-
sions (periodically exercised without incident) for exchange of
information and "complete freedom of access at any time to
any and all areas of Antarctica." In view of the limited activity
and facilities in Antarctica, the opportunity to conceal a mean-
ingful violation is practically nil.
Unfortunately, such a high level of verification can't be ex-
pected in most arms control agreements, and to insist on it
might preclude the very agreements we seek. So the US
standard has been adequate verification, "whether or not we
could identify attempted evasion, if it occurs on a scale large
enough to pose a significant military risk, in time to make an
appropriate response."4
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Judging adequacy is not a straightforward task. It involves
assessing the other party's intentions. Is he honorable? Will he
abide by the treaty but stretch the rules? Will he covertly violate
the treaty if he thinks he can get away with it? Or would he actu-
ally violate the treaty openly to gain a significant advantage?
It involves assessing his opportunities and risks. Would
violations be obvious, or could they be hidden easily? Would
he be better advised to expend resources in areas not con-
trolled by treaty? How can we respond to his actions?
Judging adequacy also involves assessing timing. How
long would it take to make a significant change? When would
the first signs be evident? Considering decision, research, de-
velopment, production, and deployment lead times, how long
would the United States need to respond?
Furthermore, judging adequacy involves assessing the
possible advantages to be gained by the other party. Could he
alter the strategic balance? Would he be more adventure-
some? Could he use extra forces for coercion or for war-
fighting?
It's no wonder that reasonable men disagree on the ade-
quacy of verification. The standard can be low whenever we
trust the other party, whenever he has little opportunity to
cheat without risking a serious response, and whenever the
possible advantages to be gained from cheating are small. But
if these conditions change, the standard of adequate verifica-
tion must also change.
The United States, after much debate and some acri-
mony, accepted SALT I verification as adequate and ratified
the treaty. The Carter administration judged SALT II ade-
quately verifiable, but because the Senate never voted to rat-
ify SALT II, the country as a whole never decided the ques-
tion. If anything, US trust of the Soviets has declined since
SALT I, and developments such as MIRVs and cruise missiles
have increased cheating opportunities.
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Yesterday's standards of adequacy may not be valid to-
day. They may, in fact, be even less valid in the future, espe-
cially if overall strategic levels are reduced so much that
cheating would provide greater advantages. Despite Soviet
arguments to the contrary, judging a treaty's verification provi-
sions adequate today does not assure their adequacy tomor-
row. A judgment of adequacy should instead be viewed as just
one step down the path toward more meaningful arms control.
In 1972, in the Basic Principles of Relations Between the
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, the
two countries agreed, "The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. regard as
the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general
and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective
system of international security in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the United Nations." Complete disarmament is
a worthwhile, though perhaps utopian, goal. It's just not realistic
to think of either country giving up its major source of power un-
less the international situation changes drastically. But mutual
reductions, even substantial ones, are possible because current
and projected inventories of nuclear weapons are large enough
to sustain such cuts without endangering either country's status
as one of only two superpowers. So long as the United States
and the Soviet Union can safeguard their vital interests, they
have much room to maneuver.
Reductions to levels approaching general and complete
disarmament (GCD) would require multinational agreements
and much better verification procedures than exist today.
Given today's inventories, several hundred extra nuclear
warheads wouldn't seriously change the strategic balance.5
Cheating on a scale to make a substantial difference would be
hard to conceal, so motivation to cheat is low. With smaller in-
ventories, however, a few hundred warheads would be much
more important; at levels anywhere near GCD, they would
provide clear strategic superiority. Motivation to cheat and
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fear that the other side was already cheating would both be
strong-clearly motivating a new arms race-unless verifica-
tion procedures adequately guaranteed treaty compliance.
Negotiating toward a goal such as GCD is admirable but
of little value beyond propaganda without complementary
work toward improved verification, especially as the conse-
quences of cheating increase. A world in which nations don't
rely on military strength is hard to imagine. However, if the
standard of the Antarctic Treaty-"complete freedom of ac-
cess at any time to any and all areas"-could be applied to
sovereign territory, why couldn't negotiations produce a world
with far fewer weapons? The question is unrealistic, but it at
least considers means as well as ends and recognizes that
better arms control demands better verification.
PREREQUISITE TO ARMS CONTROL
Arms control is a process, not an event. Progress is peri-
odically documented or ratified in a treaty, but problems al-
ways remain as technology and weapon systems advance.
Work to build better agreements must proceed, based on ex-
perience gained. To date, strategic arms control agreements
have helped channel activity, but they have failed to reduce
arms or related expenditures. Continuing the extensive effort
to control arms is hardly justified if better agreements cannot
be anticipated.
The need for progress is well recognized. In fact, SALT II
contained a joint statement of principles for further negotia-
tions, including "reduction in numbers," "further qualitative
limitation," and "cooperative measures" to enhance verifica-
tion by national technical means. But past Soviet behavior and
the high stakes involved limit progress to treaty provisions on
which the United States can impose a high verification stand-
ard. Nor is the problem strictly limited to US-Soviet relations.
Over 125 countries have agreed to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Article VI of the treaty
states, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pur-
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sue negotiations in good faiih on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and com-
plete disarmament under strict and effective control." Many
non-nuclear countries feel that the United States and the So-
viet Union have failed to live up to this commitment, and some
have cautioned that lack of progress on disarmament could
undermine restraints on proliferation.
Without better verification, arms control will not progress
and may eventually unravel. As pointed out by former Secre-
tary of State Haig, "Failure of the entire arms control process
in the long run can be avoided only if compliance issues are
clearly resolved."6
Arms control agreements are shaped by our verification
ability. Using national technical means, we can adequately
confirm many things: numbers of silos, submarines, and stra-
tegic bombers; conduct of ballistic missile tests; and even
presence or absence of mobile ICBMs. Also, we can often in-
fer MIRV capabilities, payload, accuracy, hardness, and
range. But our capabilities are lacking or, at best, marginal in
other areas: monitoring research, development, production,
storage, and disposition of weapon systems; differentiating
between nuclear and non-nuclear missiles; and verifying
cruise missile range or Backfire range (especially with aerial
refueling).
Better verification procedures will allow treaty measures
that would be otherwise unattainable. While recognizing that
there are many ways to improve verification, especially with
reasonable cooperation, on-site inspection in particular would
open up new arms control dimensions for consideration.
MIRVs and very high-yield weapons might be banned. Chemi-
cal and biological weapon limitations could be better verified.
Qualitative improvements could be better controlled. Bans on
mobile but survivable ICBMs could be lifted. More nuclear-free
or even weapon-free zones would be possible. The number of
weapons on alert could be limited to preclude surprise
attacks.
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With sufficient on-site inspection, all phases of a weapon
system's life cycle-from research through final disposi-
tion-could be controlled. Fears of technological surprise
would be reduced. We could count warheads directly and an-
swer questions about the disposition of old weapons, excess
production, or missiles for reloading silos. And we could re-
duce our reliance on observation of tests by NTM to verify
capabilities.
In short, on-site inspection could eliminate many of the
verification barriers to stable and substantive arms control
measures. These barriers won't fall at once, because accept-
ance of on-site inspection will be resisted, especially by the
Soviets. But the potential benefits justify long, hard effort if
that is what it takes to make progress in the face of Soviet re-
sistance. Even grudging movement, if continued long enough,
will substantially change the world of future generations.
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3
ON-SITE INSPECTION
In the case of provisions that cannot be moni-
tored by NTM, it will be essential to develop and
reach agreement on cooperative verification meas-
ures ... that can help provide the necessary confi-
dence in compliance.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
1981 Annual Report
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ON-SITE INSPECTION
The quality of verification depends, in the final analysis,
on the extent to which countries are willing to reveal informa-
tion they consider sensitive. We have progressed on disclo-
sure of information, but many desirable arms control
measures may be unreachable without on-site inspection-
complementing other verification methods where possible, but
standing alone if necessary. However, in most circumstances,
on-site inspection will reveal unprecedented levels of informa-
tion and will allow access to what have been restricted areas.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States, to differing ex-
tents, will resist this movement away from secrecy. Thus,
greater openness will require counterbalancing benefits.
Relations between countries can range from complete se-
crecy, each country knowing nothing about the other's forces
and activities, to complete openness, with free access and
unhampered information flow. Arms control agreements and
associated verification methods are fostered as relations
move toward the openness end of the continuum. Thus, we
need to view on-site inspection as a potentially valuable tool,
to be used with other cooperative measures and other verifi-
cation methods. As such, on-site inspection deserves re-
newed emphasis by the United States.
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On-site inspection also deserves consideration because,
if negotiable, it would be the most reasonable way to verify
many arms control measures. The following examples are in
order of increasing intrusiveness:
? In SALT II, the United States and the Soviet Union
agreed not to supply ICBM launchers with more than
one missile each and not to provide storage facilities
for, or store extra missiles at, launch sites. This provi-
sion could be verified by banning suitably sized facilities
within an agreed "rapid reload" distance of launch sites,
or by requiring all such facilities to have openable roofs
so that inside activities could be periodically observed
by NTM. Alternatively, on-site inspection could verify
the absence of missiles and missile storage facilities.
? SALT II bans the production, testing, and deployment of
the Soviets' mobile SS-16 missile. It does not ban the
SS-20, which is similar except that it has two stages,
rather than three, and therefore lacks intercontinental
range. However, differentiation between the two by
NTM is very difficult. Furthermore, deployment of the
SS-20 with only two warheads instead of the current
three, or deployment with smaller warheads, would give
it the ability to attack targets in the United States. On-
site inspection could improve confidence that the
SS-16 ban is being followed and permit a verifiable ban
against configuring the SS-20 for intercontinental
range.
? Production and stockpiling of biological and chemical
weapons can't be verified by NTM. Large, obvious facil-
ities are not needed, and the development processes
involved are similar to commercial research and indus-
trial processes. On-site inspection could help assure
compliance with the existing biological weapons ban
and lead to verifiable constraints on chemical weapons.
? Counting missiles is better than counting launchers, and
counting warheads is better yet. Counting launchers is
incongruous, as underscored by the fact that SALT II, if
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ratified, would require the Soviets to dismantle 250
launchers but permit them to keep the associated mis-
siles and warheads. On-site inspection would allow
counting of warheads on missiles and checking of "un-
authorized" sites and facilities to preclude illegal missile
deployments.
As noted above, these examples are arranged in order of in-
creasing intrusiveness. The first involves verifying the ab-
sence of missiles in facilities near launch sites, but not
inspecting actual weapons. The second could involve in-
specting missiles, but only at SS-20 sites. The third would re-
quire access to a wide range of production facilities. And the
fourth could require access to all strategic weapons and all fa-
cilities large enough to store strategic weapons.'
In the third and fourth examples, actual inspection of all
appropriate weapons and facilities would be excessively
costly and time consuming. But it is the opportunity to inspect
that is crucial. If any leak, small mistake, or suspicious activity
could lead immediately to an inspection, with international re-
action and publicity, cheating would be more risky. Greater
risk in cheating would certainly raise confidence in
compliance.
Verification by on-site inspection could also be inexpen-
sive compared to verification by NTM-not only for tlP coun-
try seeking to verify compliance, but also, in some c,-ses, for
the country deploying a system subject to verification. For ex-
ample, when the United States planned to deploy MX in multi-
ple protective shelters, the plan included production and
deployment provisions to facilitate observation by NTM: ports
to be opened on the top of each shelter so contents could be
viewed by satellite, entrance barriers to slow movement, stor-
age rules, and limited access to the deployment area. In all,
several billion dollars would have been spent just to set stand-
ards for verification by NTM in case the Soviets deployed a
similar system. (The Soviets could count MX missiles accu-
rately from open literature and congressional hearings.) Suita-
ble on-site inspection provisions would have saved several
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billion dollars, set a higher standard for verification, and pro-
vided a precedent to move toward more openness in arms
control.
Acceptance of on-site inspection doesn't imply opening
one's borders to let hordes of foreigners snoop and pry into
anything whenever they want. On the other hand, it does imply
accepting some level of intrusiveness and conceding to a
foreign power information that it might not have otherwise. In-
trusiveness must be balanced with reciprocal gains and im-
proved arms control agreements, recognizing that on-site
inspection procedures can be developed from a wide range of
possibilities.
? Provisions could apply to different stages of a weapon
system's life cycle: research, development, testing, pro-
duction, deployment, storage, or disposition. Effective
bans at one stage would eliminate the need for controls
at later stages, and controls at multiple stages would
raise confidence in counts or even eliminate the need
for controls at intermediate stages. For example, effec-
tive controls on production and disposition of weapons
would eliminate the need for deployment and storage
controls-the big worries today-because knowledge
of weapons produced and weapons destroyed would
provide an accurate count of existing weapons by sim-
ple subtraction.
? Currently, the United States verifies quantitative limits
on deployment by reconnaissance satellites and quali-
tative limits by using NTM to observe tests. Verifiable
controls on additional activities would improve assess-
ments of forces, and better information on research and
development might constrain potential future weapon
systems before resources for deployment are commit-
ted. The history of arms control shows that it's almost
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impossible to "put the genie back in the bottle" once it
is released.
? Inspection could be carried out by the parties signing an
agreement-jointly or unilaterally-by third parties, or
by representatives of international bodies. To minimize
problems associated with publicity and national pride,
inspection activities and results could be kept confiden-
tial, contingent on resolution of problems or violations.
? Inspection could make use of mechanical monitors or
overflight by aircraft. Inspectors could be stationed at
fixed locations or limited to specific areas. Agreements
could limit their actions or grant them wide latitude. In-
spections could be unscheduled or periodic, or limited
to a set number of inspections per year with times and
places decided by the inspecting party.
The above examples are illustrative but not exhaustive.
They show that on-site inspection could be employed in a
wide variety of circumstances, that reciprocal gains are possi-
ble, and that rejection of a specific method doesn't necessarily
imply rejection of inspection in general. The best inspection
method will depend on the situation, and a combination of
methods will often be preferred. For example, mechanical
monitors can be calibrated accurately, can sense things peo-
ple can't, and can work continuously-with only intermittent
checks by inspection parties to insure that nobody is tam-
pering with the mechanical monitors.
With the development of reconnaissance satellites, verifi-
cation by national technical means became the standard for
SALT I and the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Each party
agreed not to use deliberate concealment measures to
impede verification by NTM. Similar provisions were incorpo-
rated into the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and SALT II.
Even though the TTBT and SALT II have not been ratified, the
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precedent for relying on NTM to verify compliance with stra-
tegic arms agreements has been established.
The Joint Statement of Principles in the SALT II agree-
ment modified the precedent somewhat; it called for addi-
tional, but unspecified, "cooperative measures contributing to
the effectiveness of verification by national technical means."
In spite of this call, the United States has shown little interest
in on-site inspection, not because of objections to inspection
per se, but because national technical means satisfied the ex-
isting requirements without negotiation problems. Although
treaties had to be carefully structured to be verifiable by NTM,
at least they weren't delayed or precluded by verification re-
quirements. Therefore, most Americans have learned to dis-
miss on-site inspection out-of-hand. They do not assess its
pros and cons or object to inspections on US territory, but they
have a preconceived notion that the Soviets won't accept it.
The American character seems to include a tendency to look
for quick solutions and then move on to the next problem-
never checking back to see if the problem was really solved or
if a better solution existed. When verification by national tech-
nical means was accepted instead of on-site inspection, the
latter was popularly labeled "a bad idea," not worth further
pursuit.
Over the last few years, the US government has been
mounting a campaign for more cooperative verification meth-
ods, and on-site inspection certainly qualifies. Indeed, the US
arms control community has shown renewed interest, al-
though popular opinion in America has not yet followed this
shift. The instinctive view that the United States, with its al-
ready open society, should benefit relatively more than the
Soviet Union from increased openness may not hold in all cir-
cumstances. The United States must take special care to pre-
clude loose enforcement provisions or loopholes that the
Soviets might use to their advantage.
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Although the Soviets have modified their position some-
what over time, they have historically resisted on-site inspec-
tion, claiming that it was just a cover for espionage. In fact,
they have opposed verification controls in general. Their op-
position is understandable in view of their ability to monitor US
military activities through open sources.
Soviet resistance to inspection should not be viewed as
rhetoric or merely an attempt to gain US concessions (al-
though, in part, it may be just.that). Based on their Russian
culture and background, the Soviets' attitude probably reflects
a true fear of espionage. They view the world around them as
hostile-with reasonable justification. Historically, they have
been obsessed with secrecy, especially in military matters.
Although Russian xenophobia is historic, a more impor-
tant Soviet characteristic-the need to maintain internal
control-has reinforced it. The relatively small group in control
of the government has sought to maintain an air of crisis and
encirclement to justify deprivation of consumer goods and civil
liberties. The fear of invasion has motivated the Soviet leaders
much less than the more realistic fear that their control in
Eastern Europe and at home could unravel. The government
has controlled the distribution of information and minimized
contact between its own people and the outside world. The
Soviets would view intrusive actions related to verification as
matters of security. Those actions would be under the jurisdic-
tion of the Defense Ministry and the KGB and would not be as
subject to diplomatic or political pressure as in the United
States.
Accordingly, Soviet opposition to on-site inspection has
been greatest when it involved military matters or foreigners
on Soviet soil. The Soviets have agreed to inspection con-
cerning nonmilitary matters on non-Soviet soil. The most obvi-
ous example is the Antarctic Treaty. But they have also
agreed to inspection of facilities on the seabed and inspection
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of all stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on
the moon and other celestial bodies.
In spite of Soviet resistance, there has been some prog-
ress. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) has negotiated confidence building measures
(CBMs), including a provision to invite "voluntarily and on a bi-
lateral basis ... observers" to military maneuvers. Inspection
by invitation as a CBM is a big step away from the inspection
on demand that will probably be needed to prove arms control
compliance, but exchanges of observers have, nevertheless,
taken place.
The history of arms control also shows increasing Soviet
willingness to allow collection of information on its military
forces. In the early 1960s, the Soviets insisted that no verifi-
cation was required. In SALT I they accepted verification by
national technical means. SALT II added MIRV counting rules,
data exchanges, and advance notification of tests. Finally, ad-
ditional but unspecified cooperative measures became a prin-
ciple for negotiations after SALT II. Certainly, relations could
be much more open, but progress has been made.
Soviet resistance to on-site inspections on Soviet soil has
hindered negotiation of some arms control agreements-not-
ably a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons ban.
But inroads have been made in this area too. For example, the
Soviets have professed a willingness to allow on-site inspec-
tion of weapons dismantling. More importantly, the Soviet Un-
ion actually concluded an agreement, in the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty (PNET), for on-site inspection by US repre-
sentatives on Soviet territory, albeit not weapons inspection.
Although the treaty has not been ratified by the US Senate, it
sets an important precedent. President Ford underscored this
change in the Soviets' attitude when he signed the treaty on
28 April 1976: "The treaty ... is an historic milestone in the
history of arms control agreements: For the first time it pro-
vides for extensive cooperative arrangements for on-site ob-
servation.... This accomplishment ... demonstrates that our
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two countries can soberly negotiate responsible and beneficial
agreements despite the difficulty of the challenge."
PROSPECTS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION
Although any acceptance of intrusive arms control meas-
ures is encouraging, it doesn't necessarily indicate a basic
change in Soviet policy. The Soviets will continue to resist
greater openness. The United States will have to take the lead
in promoting more open relations, realizing that progress will
be gained grudgingly and that the Soviets will seek conces-
sions in return. The Soviets would be giving up a unilateral ad-
vantage by agreeing to any sort of on-site inspection; they
already enjoy the benefits of an open US society. On the other
hand, the United States wouldn't accept all types of on-site in-
spection, even if they are reciprocal. For example, inspections
that would help the Soviets advance technologically without
offering a counterbalancing benefit to the United States would
not be in the US interest. The United States could also face
problems in getting US companies to accept inspections-es-
pecially if proprietary information might be compromised.
When we blame inspection difficulties on the Soviets, we can
easily concentrate on Soviet resistance and overlook US
rights, sensitivities, and security needs. On-site inspection
would infringe on the sovereignty of the United States as well
as the Soviet Union. In the United States, it could also infringe
on personal rights.
To further complicate matters, provisions for on-site in-
spection, in contrast to procedures for verification by national
technical means, are very difficult to negotiate. National tech-
nical means are set up and controlled unilaterally. On-site in-
spection requires reciprocal measures and joint operations.
The negotiators must iron out a myriad of details on issues
such as frequency and duration of inspections, entry and exit
points, transportation routes, allowable equipment, numbers
and types of people involved, and even living accommoda-
tions. The issue of whether inspections will be on demand or
by invitation must be addressed, and the Soviets will seek
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concessions elsewhere for agreements that improve verifica-
tion. The Soviets have historically shown a greater propensity
than the United States for taking advantage of loopholes;
therefore, the United States must take the time to iron out all
the details properly.
To expect rapid implementation of on-site inspection pro-
visions isn't reasonable. But the situation isn't hopeless either.
As noted earlier, significant progress has been made, and the
Soviets have moderated their position over time. In the early
1960s, the Soviets condemned satellites as tools of espionage
and claimed that a state had the right to destroy satellite
spies. However, when they started to benefit from their own
satellite reconnaissance program, they softened their position.
By 1967 the Soviets had, in effect, dropped their call for a for-
mal ban on reconnaissance satellites by signing the Outer
Space Treaty. (However, for propaganda purposes, they con-
tinued to speak against satellite espionage.) By 1972 they had
completely reversed their position by signing SALT I, in effect
agreeing not to interfere with national technical means.
Therefore, the United States should not reject on-site in-
spection simply because of Soviet resistance or implementa-
tion problems, nor because other ways exist to verify current
or near-term arms control measures. It is worthwhile to set
precedents for the time when large reductions, new technol-
ogy, or new control measures will require better verification
methods. Progress today will pave the way for further prog-
ress tomorrow, whereas continued reliance on NTM will make
it harder to break away and negotiate new verification
methods.
The Soviets have demanded parity and equal security,2
but they have a decided advantage in obtaining knowledge of
US forces and plans. They must yield that advantage to pro-
duce truly equal security and develop the mutual trust and
confidence needed for substantial arms reductions.
Equal security demands equal verification, and equal ver-
ification demands that the Soviets forgo the excessive secrecy
that has historically characterized their international relations.
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Moreover, improved verification isn't solely a US advantage.
The Soviets can't learn all they would like from open US
sources and national technical means. Even if they could, they
wouldn't be able to realize the potential benefits of arms con-
trol agreements without accepting mutual provisions to verify
compliance. Nevertheless, the Soviets will not yield their cloak
of secrecy easily. The United States will have to continue to
push for better verification methods.
The United States tried and failed in the 1960s to get the
Soviets to accept on-site inspection. Why should US efforts be
more successful now? Many reasons might be advanced. For
example, economic problems in the 1980s might motivate the
Soviets to cut back on military expenditures and be more re-
ceptive to arms control measures; as the Soviet Union be-
comes more entwined in international relations, more internal
and external contacts might be required; or the communica-
tions revolution might lead to a breakdown in the control of in-
formation in the Soviet Union.
The greatest hope for change, however, stems from the
Soviets' new-found status as one of the world's two super-
powers. With their accumulation of strategic and conventional
strength, their fear of invasion has become less reasonable.
They have, as a minimum, obtained rough parity with the
United States. National pride and confidence should follow.
They have improved their information sources, including the
deployment of reconnaissance satellites. Their fear and suspi-
cion of the outside world, and its use to maintain a crisis
atmosphere, should therefore lessen-especially as the lead-
ership and the general populace include fewer people with di-
rect memories of World War II and the last invasion of the So-
viet Union.
Now may well be the time to test the waters for another
reason. The new leaders in the Kremlin may be more re-
ceptive to change than past ones, although they come from the
same Soviet ideological mold. The next generation of leaders
may be less influenced by World War II and the Stalin era and
offer even more hope for progress. The process of changing
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Soviet attitudes toward on-site inspection should, neverthe-
less, begin now, because it will take time to change cultural
patterns and to gain increased access to Soviet territory.
RECOMMENDATIONS: GOAL, PATH, PACE
Reliance on national technical means for verification is a
dead end. Verification by NTM simply can't handle the prob-
lems that must be solved to accommodate evolving technol-
ogy and make substantial progress in arms control. SALT II
principles agreeing to, but not defining, cooperative measures
to enhance NTM were a step in the right direction. The Rea-
gan administration's push for more openness and creativity in
verification is another positive step. Indeed, on 6 January
1983 a Soviet disarmament proposal indicated a possible shift
on verification. It offered a commitment to measures that in-
clude, "when necessary, international procedures," but the
measures are not tied to NTM.3
Regardless of progress elsewhere, arms control problems
can't all be solved without on-site inspection. The United
States should promote such inspection, despite its problems,
and use it as a focus to induce more open relations with the
Soviet Union. Ultimately, both the United States and the So-
viet Union will have to accept on-site inspection to break down
the barriers to verification and mutually beneficial arms
control.
A variety of verification tools will certainly continue to be
used, but on-site inspection is a particularly promising one. In-
spection provisions will prove hard to implement and will re-
quire substantial groundwork. But preparations can begin
now, without waiting for a specific opportunity to employ on-
site inspection. As inspection techniques evolve and gain ac-
ceptance by both the United States and the Soviet Union,
there will be ample opportunity to implement them, and suffi-
cient problems to justify their further development.
Therefore, the United States should make increased on-
site inspection a national objective and pursue appropriate in-
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spection methods whenever and wherever possible. The
United States should persuade the Soviets to accept the fact
that equal security requires equal verification. While both
sides should strive to eliminate verification barriers to arms
control progress, the United States will have to take the lead
in promoting on-site inspection.
The path to increased inspection is not obvious, however.
Measures to promote it will have to take into account disad-
vantages and potential adverse reactions. Could arms control
opponents undermine beneficial measures by insisting on in-
spection where it isn't needed? Would efforts toward inspec-
tion detract from other efforts? What would the United States
have to give up in return? What resources would be required?
Can the United States reasonably expect to succeed? What
would be the effect of complete resistance by the Soviets?
How long would it take to make progress?
We cannot establish a goal without considering the path
and pace to reach it, but an arduous path or slow pace does
not lessen the goal's intrinsic value. I believe the potential
benefits justify a substantial US effort to develop and negoti-
ate on-site inspection provisions.
To that end, Chapter 4 outlines a strategy to promote on-
site inspection. The strategy is designed to produce an envi-
ronment conducive to inspection and to produce benefits to
the United States even in the face of Soviet intransigence. I
recommend it as a starting point for a more comprehensive
US inspection strategy-to be developed and implemented
under the auspices of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA).
Progress will depend on the determination as well as the
resistance of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and
it won't come quickly. To progress at a reasonable pace, the
United States must be steadfast in its objective but allow the
Soviet Union time to change.
Of course, any US efforts to promote on-site inspection
shouldn't be considered as alternatives to other arms control
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or defense efforts. We must build on the past. National techni-
cal means will remain fundamental to verification for the
foreseeable future. On-site inspection initiatives should be de-
veloped to complement NTM as well as address problems
NTM can't handle. Nor can we lose sight of the fact that arms
control is only one ingredient in national security. The United
States must also ensure that its military capability is sufficient
to support national objectives and to motivate the Soviets to
accept balanced reductions.
Progress promises to be slow, requiring detailed, time-
consuming negotiations, with little immediate payoff in terms
of reducing defense expenditures. But that is the history of
arms control. The implications of an arms race and the dan-
gers of war have justified the effort in the past and will con-
tinue to do so in the future.
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4
STRATEGY TO PROMOTE ON-SITE
INSPECTION
Our approach to verification will be to empha-
size openness and creativity-rather than the se-
crecy and suspicion which have undermined
confidence in arms control in the past.
President Ronald Reagan
18 November 1981
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STRATEGY TO PROMOTE ON-SITE
INSPECTION
On-site inspection provisions that the Soviet Union-or
the United States-would reject are easy to design. The chal-
lenge is to develop mutually acceptable provisions that
provide necessary verification data while minimizing intrusive-
ness. For example, if visual inspection of cruise missiles
proves unacceptable, a variety of mechanical sensors could
be used to differentiate between nuclear and conventional
warheads; or if access to silos and missiles is not allowed be-
cause of security reasons, reentry vehicles might be counted
on their deployment modules, separated from the missiles.
Detailed inspection methods for particular situations can't
be specified in advance. Instead, they will have to be devel-
oped and negotiated on a case-by-case basis. This chapter
discusses steps that will promote an environment conducive
to on-site inspection rather than providing a cookbook of spe-
cific provisions. The recommended steps are in order of in-
creasing intrusiveness:
? Actions by the United States to set precedents for on-
site inspection and to put pressure on the Soviets.
? Negotiated provisions that are not directly intrusive but
would help in developing on-site inspection arrange-
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ments or would make it advantageous to allow on-site
inspection even without reciprocity.
? Reciprocal negotiated provisions that would entail ac-
ceptance of some measure of intrusion.
Because the Soviets are averse to it, on-site inspection will
not be increased significantly unless the United States takes the
lead in promoting it. The United States can undertake several ini-
tiatives that would bring on-site inspection to the forefront but
don't require time-consuming negotiations or binding
commitments.
State a US objective. Obviously, the US government must
decide whether or not it wishes to seek actively more on-site in-
spection. If the decision is positive, the United States' first action
should be to declare that it will seek to increase the use of on-site
inspection to aid verification and arms control progress. Such a
statement would be consistent with President Reagan's call for
more openness and creativity in verification, and it would em-
phasize the need to go beyond the principles for future negotia-
tions expressed in SALT II.
The US position should specify that verification procedures
must be improved continually to handle evolving systems and
technology and to permit more comprehensive arms control
measures. Past agreement to rely on NTM must not be only a
precedent. It must be also a starting point on which to build. The
major barrier to on-site inspection should be seen for what it
is-the Soviets' problem with increased contact with the outside
world. It is a barrier that hinders arms control and fuels the arms
race. A stated US objective to promote on-site inspection not
only would represent a commitment to more open and creative
verification procedures but also would emphasize that the onus
for progress is on the Soviets.
Ratify TTBT and PNET. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
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were submitted to the US Senate on 29 July 1976 for ratifica-
tion. The administration should seek Senate ratification of
both treaties.
The TTBT limits nuclear weapons tests to 150 kilotons,
bans such tests outside designated sites, and calls for an ex-
change of data to aid verification by national technical means.
The companion PNET allows nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes at other than designated test sites, provided that in-
dividual explosions don't exceed 150 kilotons.
The PNET also contains several important precedents for
verification: relatively free access to sites before, during, and
after nuclear explosions; use by the inspecting country of its
own equipment in the country to be inspected; the promise of
assistance and freedom from interference; and the establish-
ment of a joint consultative committee to resolve verification
problems and consider proposals for the joint development of
standardized verification equipment. Those provisions are in
addition to the use of NTM and are not designed as just a
means of contributing to NTM effectiveness.
Ironically, formal action on the companion treaties has not
been taken, apparently because of the inability to accurately
verify by NTM the yield of weapons tests carried out under the
TTBT. The irony is compounded by the fact that both the
United States and the Soviet Union informally agreed to follow
the TTBT 150-kiloton limit, but without the required exchange
of data that would make NTM measurement of yields more ac-
curate. As a result, the United States has been unable to con-
firm positively higher-yield Soviet tests, even though yields
well in excess of 150 kilotons have been indicated several
times.
The Russian saying, "The better is the enemy of the good
enough," often holds true in the United States when we fail to
act today because of the promise of something better tomor-
row. (Witness the history of strategic bombers and the more
recent proposals to skip the B-113 in favor of the Advanced
Technology, or Stealth, Bomber.) The TTBT and PNET cer-
tainly appear "good enough" to deserve serious consideration
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for ratification. The simple act of ratifying two treaties that
were signed in the mid-1970s would accomplish the following:
? Provide a dramatic gesture to underscore the need for
on-site inspection.
? Improve both sides' ability to monitor nuclear weapon
tests.
? Establish a joint committee to improve on-site inspec-
tion methods and develop equipment for verification.
? Firmly establish precedents for on-site inspection.
One can argue that the precedents for inspection were al-
ready set when the treaties were signed and that they apply
only to peaceful explosions rather than weapons or military
forces. Nonetheless, ratification in the context of a US call for
increased on-site inspection would be a positive action to add
weight to the US position.
Historically. the Soviets have been slow to accept new
ideas, which is not surprising in light of their closed society
and intolerance of questioning state policies. But they are not
immune to change, especially if it is evolutionary rather than
revolutionary. To foster a change in the Soviet Union, the
United States must make sure the Soviets understand how
they will benefit. They must have time to evolve and learn to
appreciate the following points:
? The American people need assurance that treaties can be
verified. The need is legitimate because of the imbalance
in open sources of information, and unless the need is
satisfied, the US Senate will not ratify arms control
agreements.
? As verification improves, the US press, the public, and
Congress will increase their support for arms control.
Progress in arms control will become more likely, and
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both the United States and the Soviet Union will benefit
accordingly.
? As on-site inspection increases, contact between US
and Soviet people will help build mutual trust. This will
help slow the momentum of the arms race, which feeds
on uncertainty and fear.
? Deterrence requires an understanding of a potential ad-
versary's destructive capabilities. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union seek deterrence. Having a
potential adversary overly fear your military power be-
cause of poor understanding may be of some value, but
it is merely short-term value. In the long term, the po-
tential adversary will react to his excessive fears rather
than to reality, and will build more defense counter-
measures than he needs.'
? Finally, for some future systems and technologies, veri-
fication may prove impossible without on-site inspec-
tion; and without verification, there won't be control. The
Soviets may take comfort in being able to monitor US
actions through open sources, but they might have sec-
ond thoughts on verification concessions if the United
States proceeded to produce more advanced systems
than the Soviet Union could. Cruise missiles are an
area where the United States leads in technology and
where negotiated control of deployments may prove
unreachable due to verification problems.
Of course, to think these ideas aren't understood in So-
viet arms control circles is naive. But the Soviets must over-
come a culturally ingrained predilection for secrecy. The
Soviets see the United States as their enemy. With their his-
tory of having been repeatedly invaded-most recently by
Germany, with whom they had signed a nonagression pact-
the Soviets base their international relations on their assess-
ment of foreign capabilities, not on proclaimed peaceful inten-
tions. The current US buildup of strategic forces, following the
postwar policy of containment, fuels the Soviets' suspicions.
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Education alone won't change such ingrained attitudes.
Time and perseverance will be needed to bring the Soviets to
accept a world of more and more on-site inspection. There-
fore, a US strategy to promote on-site inspection shouldn't ex-
pect rapid acceptance of comprehensive inspection schemes.
Instead it should be based on finding and implementing ac-
ceptable actions where possible, working with the Soviets to
develop inspection techniques, and evolving comprehensive
plans by building on past accomplishments.
Pressure the Soviets. The Soviets are isolated from many
of the pressures that influence decisions in the United States,
but they are neither completely immune to world opinion nor un-
concerned with their reputation in the international community.
The United States can bring a variety of pressures to bear on the
Soviets through public channels such as the press, the United
Nations, and other international bodies, and through private
channels such as the US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commis-
sion (SCC) for SALT or direct personal contacts. The following
tactics serve to illustrate how a campaign of pressuring the Sovi-
ets might be implemented.
At the most basic level, the United States should persist
in emphasizing the value of on-site inspection and point out
that it is the Soviets' penchant for excessive secrecy that
blocks arms control progress. If the Soviets are serious, hon-
est participants in arms control, then they should have no
qualms about cooperating to improve confidence in compli-
ance. In fact, excessive secrecy suggests a policy of noncom-
pliance because it suggests that there is something to hide.
The Soviets should be discouraged from proposing bla-
tantly unacceptable disarmament measures and thus portray-
ing themselves as champions of peace. The United States
should not simply reject such propaganda ploys and thus look
uncooperative in arms control. Instead, it should respond in
each instance with a proposal that moves in the desired direc-
tion but includes verification conditions for the Soviets to meet
to prove they were serious in the first place.
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For example, the nuclear freeze movement, which put the
US government on the defensive, was exploited by the Sovi-
ets. The roles might have been different had the United States
proposed an agreement to freeze production of nuclear
warheads on the condition that deterrence could still be as-
sured by allowing redeployment of existing warheads on more
modern, stable weapons systems. Additionally, such an
agreement could have been contingent on verification proced-
ures-including inspection of production facilities and reliable
counting of deployed and stored warheads-being negotiated
and a timetable being set for negotiating warhead reductions.
More than likely, the Soviets would have rejected such condi-
tions. They would then have appeared to be the greater obsta-
cle to a freeze, defusing pressure on the United States.
In other words, if Soviet behavior blocks movement to-
ward a goal that is reasonable or worthy of serious considera-
tion, the United States should emphasize conditions the
Soviets must accept before movement is possible. Of course,
any condition put forth for the Soviets to accept must also be
acceptable to the United States on a reciprocal basis. So the
United States must carefully plan and coordinate in advance if
its responses to Soviet proposals are to be timely.
The United States would therefore have to invest effort in
developing on-site inspection arrangements, coordinating
them within the government, and deciding circumstances in
which they could be used. With such plans in hand, the United
States could move from rhetoric to more positive actions. Per-
haps the easiest and most straightforward way to apply pres-
sure for more open relations would be formally and publicly to
provide the Soviets-preferably through multinational
bodies-with information on current and planned US military
forces and systems that is already public knowledge, and then
request reciprocity. The Soviets already get extensive infor-
mation from sources such as Department of Defense Annual
Reports, military posture statements, DOD fact sheets on mili-
tary forces and systems, open Congressional hearings, and
the media.
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At worst, pressure through public or multinational forums
for reciprocal information would fail to induce the Soviets to
release more information. But it would dramatize the differ-
ence between US and Soviet societies to the world at large
and popularize US support for confidence building information
exchanges. At best, the Soviets would provide additional offi-
cial information which could then be used as a baseline for
monitoring, verification, and on-site inspection.
The United States could also offer the Soviets on-site in-
spection of facilities and activities that are already open to the
public or where only easily obtained information would be re-
vealed. For example, the public is already invited to tour many
military bases, research labs, and contractor facilities; equip-
ment from all services is often displayed for public inspection,
especially on Armed Forces Day; and space and missile test
launches are routinely viewed by the public. So inviting the
Soviets to make such inspections would be of little cost or
damage. And if the inspections were offered to other countries
as well, international pressure for the Soviets to reciprocate
should increase.
The United States could increase the value to the Soviets
of on-site inspections by including activities or facilities that
are not easily accessible or that go beyond normal public rela-
tions. A good example would be to invite Soviet representa-
tives to witness the dismantling of Titan II launchers.
Undoubtedly, offering such inspections without insisting on a
measure-for-measure quid pro quo would raise many objec-
tions in the United States, even though the United States
could unilaterally set inspection conditions and thereby control
information access. However, the decision to offer such in-
spections should rest not on the expectation of reciprocity, but
rather on the value in setting precedents and putting pressure
on the Soviets-keeping in mind that anything offered unilater-
ally can be withdrawn unilaterally.
Lastly, the United States could offer the Soviets on-site
inspection on a reciprocal basis-either as a confidence build-
ing measure or as part of an arms control agreement. Such an
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arrangement would require considerably more preliminary
work since it would require mutually acceptable terms, entail
the release of valuable information, and could not be easily
withdrawn. On the other hand, it would make available valua-
ble information for the United States in return, enhance verifi-
cation, and strengthen the foundation for further cooperation.
Allowing Soviet access to US information that couldn't be
obtained otherwise will cause strong objections in the United
States. However, the information received in return may be
even more valuable. For instance, agreements to exchange ob-
servers at exercises or weapon tests should be more valuable
to the United States than to the Soviet Union because the Sovi-
ets already enjoy access to many other open sources of West-
ern technical information. The United States would have to
assure that reciprocal inspections at this level are balanced
and meaningful-more than attendance at parades or other
public demonstrations.
In sum, the United States can take a variety of actions to
promote on-site inspection, ranging from educating the Sovi-
ets to mounting a pressure campaign against them. The effort
wouldn't be worthless because even rejected proposals for re-
ciprocal on-site inspection could have considerable propa-
ganda value. But propaganda should be only a secondary
objective. The primary goal should be to show how on-site in-
spection can be used to improve verification without impairing
national security, thereby promoting arms control progress.
NEGOTIATED PROVISIONS THAT ARE NOT DIRECTLY
INTRUSIVE
Several cooperative measures are possible that would
help establish .a framework for on-site inspection but wouldn't,
in themselves, require intrusions into Soviet matters. This sec-
tion discusses three such measures, each requiring prior
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union:
increased responsibility for facilitating verification, negotiated
principles for on-site inspection, and the establishment of a
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joint US-Soviet committee to develop and promote better veri-
fication methods.
Responsibility for provisions to enable verification. The
United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to the principle
of verification by national technical means, with appropriate but
unspecified cooperative measures contributing to NTM effec-
tiveness. A stronger principle would be that a nation deploying
strategic arms has the responsibility to provide for realistic verifi-
cation of compliance with strategic arms agreements, perhaps
tied to a requirement for notification of new systems. As an ex-
ample, SALT II requires notification of the first launch and the
twenty-fifth or last launch before deployment of a new light ICBM
(article IV, para. 9). The two dates would provide a reasonable
period for resolving any verification problems.
Historically, the United States assumed the de facto re-
sponsibility for accommodating Soviet verification-witness
the extensive debate that took place on the verification of MX
in the Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS) basing mode and the
congressionally dictated need for arms control impact state-
ments for new weapon systems. With the suggested provision
for verification responsibility, both sides would have the same
general obligation, but wouldn't necessarily have to satisfy the
obligation in the same way.
The MX in multiple protective shelters is a good case in
point. In spite of the potential for verification stemming from
the open nature of US society, the MPS plan included provi-
sions for high-fidelity verification depending only on national
technical means, at a cost to the United States of several bil-
lion dollars. The cost was justified by the proposition that if the
Soviets were to deploy an MPS-like system, they would have
to meet the verification standards set by the United States.
This proposition is somewhat dubious since the Soviets never
agreed to any such conditions.2 The justification would have
been more logical if both countries had assumed a responsibility
to facilitate verification. Provided that responsibility was
not tied to NTM, the United States could have saved several
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billion dollars by developing and offering a verification scheme
for MX based on on-site inspection.
Negotiated principles for on-site inspection. In the same
way that the Joint Statement of Principles in SALT II set a basis
for further negotiation, appropriate joint principles would ease
implementation of on-site inspection. For example, a commit-
ment to minimize intrusiveness, or conditions to limit the release
of information resulting from inspections, might well relieve fears
and promote cooperation in developing mutually acceptable in-
spection techniques. Paragraph 8 of the Standing Consultative
Committee (SCC) regulations sets a precedent for controlling
distribution of information: "The proceedings of the Standing
Consultative Committee shall be conducted in private. The
Standing Consultative Committee may not make its proceedings
public except with the express consent of both commissioners."
The SCC has kept its proceedings secret, allowing the resolution
of verification problems without the drawbacks of press cover-
age, public debate, and public posturing.
A principle of particularly far-reaching potential is that of
"substitution," wherein the United States or the Soviet Union
could allow suitable on-site inspection of their own forces as a
substitute for providing currently accepted aids to verification
by NTM. By allowing appropriate inspection, for example, the
United States could avoid artificial rules for counting weapons,
avoid having to put functionally related observable differences
(FRODs)3 on B-52s modified to carry cruise missiles, and
avoid the de facto requirement to accommodate verification by
national technical means as discussed in the MX example
earlier. Interestingly, agreement to this principle wouldn't actu-
ally require either side to allow inspection on its soil, but ad-
vantages would accrue to the side permitting it. One side
could continue to follow "standard" procedures while the other
side used the "substitution" principle for its own benefit:
? Saving money would be the most direct benefit-by
avoiding such things as functionally related observable
differences or add-ons to facilitate verification that pro-
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vide no increase in effectiveness and, as was the case
with MPS for MX, may even reduce effectiveness.
? Controls on warheads rather than launchers and a veri-
fiable method to count warheads accurately would be
conducive to deployment of non-MIRVed, relatively sta-
ble forces. Current controls on launchers and rules for
counting warheads encourage highly MIRVed systems,
which are high-payoff targets. On-site inspection would
allow verification of the actual number of warheads that
launchers or missiles contain, so controls on launchers
and missiles wouldn't be needed. With controls only on
warheads, any side permitting inspection of its missiles
would be strongly motivated to deploy its limited num-
ber of warheads on single-warhead carriers-because
an attack on a non-MIRVed force would always de-
stroy fewer warheads than the attack would use up.
Non-MIRVed forces can also be used more efficiently
than MIRVed forces and still effectively threaten
MIRVed forces. Thus, assuming appropriate but not un-
reasonable conditions, the side permitting inspection of
its missiles through use of the "substitution" principle
would have a more effective and survivable force that
would discourage attacks against it.4
? Even without redeploying limited warheads on single-
weapon missiles, an accurate count of existing war-
heads on ICBMs or SLBMs could permit deployment of
additional forces. Use of current counting rules for limit-
ing warheads depends on the assumption that all mis-
siles are deployed with the maximum allowable number
of warheads. However, this assumption results in an
over-count because, for a variety of reasons, many mis-
siles have fewer warheads than allowed. On-site in-
spection of missiles without the maximum number of
warheads could confirm that the warhead limit wasn't
reached and allow deployment of more missiles.
Permitting on-site inspection could, therefore, enable a
country to increase its overall power within a warhead
limit.
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With verifiable controls on warheads, stability would be
promoted by keeping the maximum percentage of warheads
loaded on alert forces, thereby minimizing vulnerability to at-
tack. Today the majority of US bomber and submarine war-
heads are not on alert; the Soviets could change the strategic
balance substantially by a surprise attack to keep the United
States from generating its strategic forces (going to high read-
iness or high at-sea rates). Off-alert warheads are therefore
valuable targets. They can be destroyed with few attacking
warheads, and unfortunately, they are often close to popula-
tion centers, making escalation to countervalue attacks proba-
ble. However, if the percentage of off-alert warheads were
low, an attacker would have little to gain in a surprise attack;
he could not confidently plan to destroy all of the large per-
centage of warheads on alert. In the extreme case, were all
warheads loaded on alert forces, an attacker would use a
portion of his strategic warheads and might destroy no war-
heads in return. The surprise attack would change the balance
in favor of the side attacked! With controls only on warheads,
it would therefore be advisable to reload warheads from forces
coming off alert to those going on alert. This action would
eliminate much of the motivation for a surprise attack while
maximizing the utility and deterrent value of a limited number
of warheads. Naturally, the current ratio would have to
change, with either more bombers and submarines or fewer
warheads. If the hoped-for reduction in warheads is not forth-
coming, the "substitution" principle would permit a side to de-
ploy additional forces if its off-alert warheads were accurately
and verifiably counted. In either case, the motivation for a first
strike would be lowered.
The key to most of the above force deployment improve-
ments is not on-site inspection per se. Rather, the key is a
method to verify a warhead limit. But current verification meth-
ods fall far short of those required to accurately control war-
heads, and on-site inspection could be the method needed.
In sum, on-site inspection in conjunction with the "substi-
tution" principle wouldn't force either side to accept on-site in-
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spection. The Soviets would not be denied their excessive
secrecy. But if they wanted to comply with SALT agreements
or current START proposals without sacrificing secrecy, they
would have to forgo an opportunity to save money, increase
their power, and deploy their missiles in a more stable
manner.
Joint US-Soviet committee. Development of mutually
binding provisions, or even principles, for on-site inspection
will require a forum for discussion and negotiation. Two fo-
rums which already exist might be useful in such an endeavor:
? The SALT I agreement established the joint US-Soviet
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which, along
with other responsibilities, functions as a forum for ad-
dressing questions on compliance with strategic arms
agreements. Furthermore, the Joint Statement of Princi-
ples in SALT II obligated the United States and the Soviet
Union to "seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the
operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in or-
der to promote assurance of compliance with the obliga-
tions assumed by the Parties."
? The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
works on verification of disarmament agreements. Al-
though multinational in character, it could provide a
useful forum for fostering expansion of on-site inspec-
tion through development and implementation of ac-
ceptable inspection arrangements or, failing that, at
least encourage the Soviet Union to work with the
United States to improve verification.
However, both these organizations are oriented toward
compliance with existing agreements rather than developing
and implementing new ones. In addition, multinational forums
are seldom useful in bilateral US-Soviet matters, except indi-
rectly. A new joint organization may be most appropriate to
promote improved verification techniques in general and on-
site inspection in particular. Alternatively, the role of the SCC
could be expanded to handle these functions, taking advan-
tage of the SCC's well-established working relationship. The
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SCC has apparently worked well to resolve questions of com-
pliance with existing treaties. The next step is to develop new,
mutually acceptable monitoring techniques, which are needed
for substantial arms control progress.
NEGOTIATED PROVISIONS THAT REQUIRE INCREASED
INTRUSIVENESS
Negotiated implementing provisions would, of course, be
the end objective of a campaign to promote on-site inspection.
At this time, the United States can't draw up a list of specific
provisions to seek. That must await considerable groundwork
and implementation of other preparatory actions already dis-
cussed. However, keeping in mind the long-term advantages
in acclimating the Soviets to on-site inspection and building
mutual trust, the United States should seek opportunities to
expand inspection provisions incrementally and not hope to
implement a major inspection arrangement all at once.
The ultimate benefit of on-site inspection won't be real-
ized without access to military forces on Soviet territory. Al-
though this must remain the long-term goal, initial progress
may be more likely if inspection of military forces on Soviet
territory can be avoided. (Witness the Peaceful Nuclear Explo-
sions Treaty and confidence building measures in Europe.)
The United States could seek agreement on inspection of mili-
tary forces such as submarines, ships, or aircraft while they
are outside the Soviet Union, or on inspection of nonmilitary
activities in the Soviet Union to verify that they are not improp-
erly engaged in controlled activities. Indeed, the United States
should work to expand application of existing European confi-
dence building measures (CBMs) deeper into Soviet territory
and to negotiate US-Soviet agreement on inspection provi-
sions, either as CBMs or as means to enhance verification of
current arms control agreements.
Finally, the path to arms control progress could be
opened as verification barriers are eliminated. With tech-
niques in hand, accepted by both sides, to deal with previ-
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ously intractable verification problems, the United States and
the Soviet Union could concentrate their efforts on more com-
prehensive and effective arms control measures.
Such a goal may be too idealistic, and critics will no doubt
label it unattainable in light of expected Soviet resistance. In-
deed, if it were an all-or-nothing proposition, such a campaign
would be much harder to justify. But the United States could
gain considerable interim advantages even if the Soviets re-
main uncooperative.
? As a minimum, the United States would gain a propa-
ganda advantage by offsetting Soviet propaganda ploys
and substantiating to the world at large that Soviet se-
crecy is a major stumbling block to arms control
progress.
? Even if the Soviets resist on-site inspection per se, the
campaign could induce them to accept other less intru-
sive verification measures and to move toward more
open relations.
? Under the proper conditions, US use of the "substitution"
rule would be conducive to deployment of more
survivable, stable US forces; would allow an increase in
US power within weapon constraints; and would let the
United States avoid expenditures to make its systems ver-
ifiable by national technical means.
Conversely, pursuit of advantage should not be the main
objective of a US inspection strategy. Ultimately, both sides
will be more secure when they accept each other's right to
reasonable parity and stop striving for unilateral advantages.
But such a state will depend on the development of mutual
trust, based on confident knowledge of each other's capability
and intent. On-site inspection promises to be a key to that
development-a key that could open the door to a new era of
arms control.
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ENDNOTES
CHAPTER 1
1. While there are three traditional arms control objectives, reducing
the risk of war is apparently the most important one, seemingly pur-
sued at the expense of raising the consequences of war and spurring
higher defense budgets. Deterrence has been used to justify higher
force levels and modernization efforts, and both US and Soviet de-
fense budgets are increasing. The Soviet defense budget has grown,
after adjusting for inflation, at about 3 percent per year since 1959.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Posture Statement for
FY 1983, the Soviet Union has outspent the United States on de-
fense since 1972 and now allots 12 to 14 percent of its gross na-
tional product to its military budget. US defense spending has been
rising since 1976, and continued growth is sought to narrow the gap
between US and Soviet capabilities.
2. An example of the effects of "worst-case" analysis can be seen in
the United States Military Posture Statement for FY 1983, prepared
by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC. It
projects (in chart 11-9) what would result if the Soviets launched a
surprise attack and the United States retaliated after riding out the
attack. Assuming that this first strike came without warning, the post-
exchange position would, as expected, favor the Soviets. In spite of
the fact that most defense experts consider a surprise attack improb-
able, the results are used to justify "sustained US modernization." If
both sides seek equal post-exchange capability following a surprise
first strike, it's obvious that neither side will be satisfied with parity.
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3. The US commitment to arms control is also suspect: the United
States signed SALT I while fully intending to continue deployment of
MIRVs, and arguments in the media and Congress justified SALT II
as acceptable because it would not require any changes to US force
modernization plans.
4. The meaning of national technical means (NTM) has not been
agreed to formally in negotiations. However, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (in Verification: The Critical Element
of Arms Control, Washington, DC, 1976) called NTM "sophisticated
methods of data collection which do not operate from installations in
the territory of the parties being monitored." This definition is con-
sistent with international practice. It implicitly places reliance on
photo-reconnaissance satellites and a variety of sensors.
5. A cold-launched missile is expelled from its silo by gas expan-
sion. The missile then ignites outside the silo, minimizing damage
and facilitating reload. A hot-launched missile is ignited in its silo,
damaging the silo and necessitating extensive refurbishment before
reuse. Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs are cold-launched. All US
ICBMs are hot-launched, although MX, if deployed, will be
cold-launched.
6. Additionally, the United States has agreed not to deploy Minute-
man III with more than three warheads, although it has twice been
tested with seven reentry vehicles. Testing is a key ingredient in veri-
fication because it is reasonably observable by NTM and both the
United States and the Soviet Union test new systems before
deployment.
7. Counting rules also encourage "worst-case" analysis through the
assumption that missiles will have the maximum number of war-
heads allowed. This tends to increase the projected threat and lower
estimates of surviving warheads after an attack. Therefore, it raises
required force levels.
8. For a more complete discussion of President Reagan's proposal
and its verification and force structure implications, see Mark M.
Lowenthal, The START Proposal: Verification Issues, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 25 June
1982.
9. During the second session of SALT I negotiations (16 April to 14
August 1970), the United States proposed a ban on MIRVs with verifi-
cation through on-site inspection, but the Soviets rejected the pro-
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posal. The Soviets subsequently sought a MIRV ban, but not on-site
inspection. When SALT I was signed in May 1972, deployment of
MIRVed Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles was underway, and
the United States no longer supported a MIRV ban.
10. MIRVed systems create targeting problems because all war-
heads on a missile must be used at the same time and against tar-
gets that are within the footprint of the missile (the pattern in which
the multiple warheads land). Further constraints arise from the de-
sire for "option purity," which means all a missile's targets must be in
the same target class-for example, all military, all in the same
country, all in the same limited or selective attack options, or all
avoiding urban damage. The problem is especially difficult in the
case of SLBMs with many warheads, a small footprint, and the possi-
bility of revealing a submarine's location and making its remaining
SLBMs vulnerable when a single SLBM is launched.
11. Deploying a set number of warheads on non-MIRVed missiles
would increase survivability in several ways. It would facilitate mobil-
ity, making the missiles difficult to find and target. By creating more
targets, it would force an enemy to spread his attack; so each missile
would be the target of fewer weapons and would have a greater
chance to survive. Most importantly, if both sides have the same
number of warheads, the country launching the first strike, due to
misses and less-than-perfect reliability, would have to expend more
warheads in an attack than it could destroy, thereby assuring the
other side more surviving warheads than the attacker retains.
CHAPTER 2
1. Article XIII of the ABM Treaty provided for the Standing Consulta-
tive Commission (SCC) to promote the objectives and implementa-
tion of the provisions of the ABM Treaty and, subsequently, the
SALT I and II treaties. The SCC keeps its proceedings secret to facil-
itate consultations. Furthermore, the SCC has apparently worked
well in resolving compliance problems. According to Arms Control
and Disarmament Agreements: Text and History of Negotiations,
1982 edition, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washing-
ton, DC, p. 138, In each case raised by the United States, the So-
viet activity in question has either ceased or additional information
has allayed U.S. concern."
2. Additional, authoritative material on the purposes of verification
and the relation of verification to traditional intelligence functions is
available in Verification: The Critical Element of Arms Control, ACDA
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Publication 85, Washington, DC, March 1976. This pamphlet and
many other US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publications
are available at no cost from the ACDA Bureau of Public Affairs.
3. From the "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Out-
break of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," signed and entered into force on
30 September 1971.
4. US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Verification of
SALT 11 Agreement, Special Report No. 56, Washington, DC, August
1979.
5. The United States has over 9,000 nuclear warheads in its strategic
arsenal and the Soviet Union has over 7,000. If tactical nuclear weap-
ons were counted, the numbers would more than double. Therefore,
adding several hundred weapons to either side would change the to-
tals by less than 5 percent. Of course, looking only at totals ignores
the qualitative difference between weapons. For example, the 1,000
warheads planned for deployment on MX are important because they
would survive an attack and be available for retaliation. Their ability to
enhance US first-strike capability is of lesser importance.
6. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Policy Statement on Arms Control to the
Foreign Policy Association, New York, 14 July 1981.
CHAPTER 3
1. Many people assert that the Soviets could not covertly deploy a
strategically significant number of ICBMs. However, Amrom H. Katz
(in Verification and SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the
State, Washington, DC, 1979) offers a reasonably convincing way for
them to do just that. He suggests putting an SLBM-carrying subma-
rine into any of hundreds of warehouses. The missiles would not re-
quire any external support, and since they would be on a
pre-surveyed site rather than a moving submarine, their accuracy
would be improved. The submarine itself could be discarded, leaving
the missiles covertly deployed and ready to be launched. Of course,
the submarine isn't needed, but the example is useful to convince
people that such a deployment could be carried out, using current
technology and without unusual construction activity or obvious com-
munication equipment.
2. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have endorsed the
objective of equal security. For example, on 29 May 1972, a joint US-
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Soviet communique said, "The two sides intend to continue active ne-
gotiations for the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to conduct
them in a spirit of good will, respect for each other's legitimate inter-
ests and observance of the principle of equal security." Similarly, the
SALT II principles for further negotiation said, "The Parties will con-
tinue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equal-
ity and equal security." However, the Soviets seem to refer to the
principle more often than the United States, both to justify their own
actions and to condemn US modernization efforts as attempts to cir-
cumvent the principle.
3. Reported in The Washington Post, 7 January 1983, p. 1.
CHAPTER 4
1. A prime example of reacting to fear and not reality was the nonex-
istent missile gap in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the short
term, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sought to take advantage of
US overestimates of Soviet forces. In the long term, the United
States overreacted with a massive strategic buildup that put the So-
viets in a position of inferiority for almost two decades and finally led
to massive nuclear arsenals on both sides.
2. The question of verification for MX in MPS was actually more
complicated than indicated in the text because MX opponents used
potential verification to forestall MX development. As a result, MPS
was designed for high-fidelity verification, felt by many people to far
exceed normal "adequacy" standards. Nonetheless, the thrust of the
MPS example remains valid.
3. The purpose of functionally related observable differences
(FRODs) is to allow NTM to identify the mission of a specific aircraft
when that type of aircraft performs several missions, not all of which
are counted the same way in SALT. Thus, all B-52s equipped to
carry cruise missiles will have FRODs, observable by NTM, to differ-
entiate them from B-52s not equipped to carry cruise missiles. Simi-
larly, the Soviets agreed to give FRODs to their 31 Myasishchev
aircraft used as tankers to indicate that they can't perform the mis-
sion of heavy bombers.
4. The US proposal for START, calling for controls on warheads and
missiles instead of launchers, was a move to change the unit of ac-
count for arms limits away from launchers, but it didn't go far enough.
With a missile limit of under 1,400 and a warhead limit of 5,000, mis-
siles would have an average of over 3.5 warheads each. A portion of
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the warheads could be deployed on a non-MIRVed ICBM force, but
then the SLBM force would be very highly MIRVed, worsening foot-
print and targeting problems and seriously imbalancing the Triad. A
START agreement containing a limit on missiles would preclude a sta-
ble non-MIRVed ICBM force. It may seem ironic that proliferation of
missiles could be desirable, but verifiable controls on only warheads
would make this the case.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ABM ........... antiballistic missile
CBM ........... confidence building measure
FROD ......... functionally related observable difference
GCD ........... general and complete disarmament
ICBM .......... intercontinental ballistic missile
MIRV .......... multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
MPS ........... multiple protective shelters
NTM ........... national technical means
PNET .......... Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
SALT........... Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SLBM ......... sea-launched ballistic missile
START ........ Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TTBT .......... Threshold Test Ban Treaty
65
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NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
MONOGRAPH SERIES
84-6 Industrial Preparedness: Breaking With an Erratic Past.
Timothy D. Gill.
84-5 Fighting a Long Nuclear War: A Strategy, Force, Policy
Mismatch. Christopher I. Branch.
84-4 Strategic Bombers and Conventional Weapons: Air Power
Options. Thomas A. Keaney.
84-3 NATO Politico-Military Consultation: Shaping Alliance De-
cision. Thomas J. Kennedy.
84-2 National Emergency Telecommunications Policy: Who's in
Charge? Robert A. Reinman.
84-1 The United States and Brazil: Opening a New Dialogue.
Robert J. Branco.
83-9 Strategic Target Planning: Bridging the Gap Between
Theory and Practice. Richard Lee Walker.
83-8 NATO's Theater Nuclear Forces: A Coherent Strategy for
the 1980s. Jean D. Reed. (AD No. A136609) (GPO)
83-7 The US-Japan Alliance: Sharing the Burden of Defense.
Robert F. Reed. (AD No. Al 35527) (GPO)
83-6 The National Space Program: From the Fifties into the
Eighties. Cass Schichtle. (AD No. A134799) (GPO)
83-5 Computers on the Battlefield: Can They Survive? Richard
J. DeBastiani. (AD No. A132888) (GPO)
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83-4 The Chinese People's Militia and the Doctrine of People's
War. Thomas C. Roberts. (AD No. Al 32635) (GPO)
83-3 Improving US Theater Nuclear Doctrine: A Critical Analysis.
Jerry M. Sollinger. (AD No. A131625) (GPO)
83-2 US Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism. James
B. Motley. (AD No. A129779) (GPO)
83-1 The Sixteenth Nation: Spain's Role in NATO. William L.
Heiberg. (AD No. A127635) (GPO)
82-7 Coping with Change: United States Policy Toward South
Africa. Scott Fisher (AD No. Al 26376) (GPO)
82-6 Logistics Over the Shore: Do We Need it? Dan J. Beakey.
(AD No. A124894) (GPO)
82-5 Base Development and the Rapid Deployment Force: A
Window to the Future. Lewis C. Sowell, Jr. (AD No.
A122833) (GPO)
82-4 US Space System Survivability: Strategic Alternatives for
the 1990s. Robert B. Giffen. (AD No. B069357) (GPO)
82-3 Soviet Intentions and American Options in the Middle East.
Benson Lee Grayson. (AD No. Al 18663) (GPO)
82-2 The German Army and NATO Strategy. Stanley M.
Kanarowski. (AD No. Al 22372) (GPO)
82-1 Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Implications for the
Superpowers. Roger F. Pajak. (AD No. Al 21852) (GPO)
81-3 Accelerated Production: The Air-to-Air Missile Case. John
C. McLaurin. (AD No. Al 19759) (GPO)
81-2 Nuclear Testing and National Security. Roger N. Fritzel. (AD
No. A121032) (GPO)
81-1 Ballistic Missile Defense and Deceptive Basing: A New Cal-
culus for the Defense of ICBMs. Raymond E. Starsman. (AD
No. A104391) (GPO)
80-9 Construction Support for Mobilization: A National Emer-
gency Planning Issue. Edward G. Rapp. (AD No. A094251)
(GPO).
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80-8 Defense Management in the 1980s: The Role of the Serv-
ice Secretaries. Richard J. Daleski. (AD No. A095558)
(GPO)
80-7 Peacetime Industrial Preparedness for Wartime Ammuni-
tion Production. Harry F. Ennis. (AD No. A089978) (GPO)
80-6 Oceania and the United States: An Analysis of US Inter-
ests and Policy in the South Pacific. John C. Dorrance.
(AD No. A089120) (GPO)
80-5 Roland: A Case For or Against NATO Standardization?
Daniel K. Malone. (AD No. A084881)
80-4 Commitment in American Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Ex-
amination for the Post-Vietnam Era. Terry L. Deibel. (AD
No. A084965) (GPO)
80-3 A United Front Against Hegemonism: Chinese Foreign Pol-
icy into the 1980s. William R. Heaton, Jr. (AD No. A082321)
(GPO)
80-2 The Philippine Bases: Continuing Utility in a Changing Stra-
tegic Context. Lawrence E. Grinter. (AD No. A082320)
(GPO)
80-1 The Future of Jerusalem: A Review of Proposals for the Fu-
ture of the City. Lord Caradon (Sir Hugh Foot). (AD No.
A082319) (GPO)
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Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence.
US Army, President
Institute for National Strategic
Studies
John Despres, Director
THE NDU PRESS
Director of Research and Publisher
Colonel John E. Endicott. USAF
Deputy Director, Administration
Lieutenant Monica M. Cain, USN
Associate Director and Professor of
Research
Colonel Frederick T Kiley. USAF
Deputy Director, Production
Major Donald Anderson, USAF
Senior Editor
George C. Maerz
Office Manager
Laura W. Hall
Writer-Editors
Evelyn Lakes
Janis Hietala
Thoma.-,
Office Supervisor
L. J. Conk
Editorial Clerks
Pat Wiiii,irns
il_ead Clerk)
Dorothy M Mack
Caro! A Valentine
Office Assistants
Hattie Johnson
Cecelia Giles
The advisory reader for this monograph was Dr. Mark
Lowenthal, Specialist in NE.tional Defense, Congressional Re-
search Service. The principal editor for the monograph was
Thomas Gill.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/01 : CIA-RDP87M00539RO01101440028-8
National Security Affairs Monograph Series 84-7
National Defense University Press
Washington, D.C. 20319-6000
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