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25X1
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Central lntdligFnce Agency
DDI-
3 0 J-,,; 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
SUBJECT: Proposed Study on Quality-of-Life Comparisons
1. John McMahon asked me to get back to you on your proposal for a
Quality-of-Life Comparison Project. As you know, the Directorate of
Intelligence has for many years produced comparative assessments of the US and
Soviet economies. Recent examples include a 1981 JEC.study by Gertrude E.
Schroeder entitled Consumption in the USSR: An International Comparison. An
updated version of ts study w111 be published soon in H orst Herlemann Jed.),
Quality of Life in the USSR, Westview Press. 1986. I am attaching a draft of
that study for your inspection.
2. Our latest comparative assessment of the US and Soviet economies was
published last October. A copy of that assessment is also attached. As you
will see, the last section of the assessment draws some comparisons between US
and Soviet living standards. If those comparisons would be useful to the
presentation of US policy in international forums, we could work together in
declassifying those parts of the study that you need.
3. We also prepared a paper in 1982 on the economic problems of Sovi
client states. I-also attach that paper, which we could update if needed.
4. We are planning to begin some exploratory research in the Fall that
will place the Soviet economy in an international context by incorporating our
US-Soviet comparisons into the 124-nation framework develo ed by the United
Nations' International Comparisons Project.
5. The project you propose would indeed be sweeping, as you say in your
note to John. While I agree wholeheartedly on the value of such a product for
public and private diplomacy, it would consume scarce resources that now are
25X1
25X1
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SUBJECT: Proposed Study on Quality-of-Life Comparisons
focused on the dramatic attempts at social, political and economic change
underway in the USSR. I am very reluctant to pull analysts from these issues
for a project such as you suggest. However, if the attachments have value for
your purposes, I would be glad to discuss updates and/or repackaging that
would make them more useful.
Robert M-.; G rtes
Deputy Director fIntelligence
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SECRET 25X1
SUBJECT: Proposed Study on Quality-of-Life Comparisons
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - DDO
2 - DDI Registry
2 - FO/SOVA
1 - SOVA/DEIG/DEA
2 - SOVA/DEIG/DEA/CA
SOVA/
(27 Jan 86)
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`"-W Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1116R001202310002-1
ItOUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SUP
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CONFIDENTIAL
DDI? -'JT"
24 January 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Douglas J. MacEachin
Director of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: Proposal From Director of INR for a Quality-of-Life
Comparison Study
W
Per our recent conversation, I have redrafted a reply to Mort
Abramowitz for your signature. We checked with OGI and EURA, and
neither have done any quality-of-life studies on socialist countries.
Douglas J. MacEachin
UNCLASSIFIED When Separated
From Attachments.
CONFIDENTIAL T~ 25X1
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CONFIDENTIALI 25X1
SUBJECT: Proposal From Director of INR for a Quality-of-Life
Comparison Study
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - DDO
2 - DDI Registry
2 - FO/SOVA
1 - SOVA/DEIG/DEA
2 - SOYA/DEIG/DEA/CA
SOVA,
(24 Jan 86)
CONF' ^_N`:. . 25X1
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A Comparison of the
US and Soviet Economies:
Evaluating the Performance
of the Soviet System
Confidential
SOV 85-10173
October 1985
Copy629
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
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k51e fs - -o0 /
fDI
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
--
--- -
--- ---
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
17
18
19
20
21
22
Remarks
TO #5: Please prepare a response for DDCI signature.
3637 (10-81)
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John McMahon
Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Study on Quality of Life Comparison
John Whitehead had planned at the lunch on Friday, December
13, to raise the possibility of DDI's doing a comparative study
of the relative success of command and mixed market systems.
Time precluded and he has asked me to write to you expressing
the Department's interest in the study.
What we have in mind is set out in the attached paper:
"Proposal for Quality of Life Comparison Project." We do not
believe we could turn to academia or to a foundation to
complete such a sweeping project. We believe that DDI is the
only group with the capability for doing the thorough job
needed to make the project worthwhile. We believe the project
would be of significant value to US foreign policy interests
and merits a high priority.-State would, of course, remain
ready to assist in any way possible.
State's continuing concern over this subject was expressed
in Ambassador Richard Schifter's speech at the Ottawa Human
Rights Experts Meeting in May and in an October 16 telegram to
all diplomatic and consular posts on "Countering Soviet
Propaganda on Social and Economic Issues." Copies of both are
attached. Secretary Shultz was so impressed with Ambassador
Schifter's speech that he personally drew upon it in his
meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
/,
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
I have been informally advised that DDO shares our interest
in this project. I realize that the real impact in taking on
the task would be upon DDI. That is the price of having a good
reputation.
Please let me or John know of your decision on the above.
Attachments:
1. Proposal for Quality of Life Comparison Project
2. U.S.-Soviet Quality of Life: A Comparison
3. State telegram 317500 - Countering Soviet Propaganda on
Social and Economic Issues.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
Proposal For Quality of Life Comparison Project
Over the years the Soviet Union has attempted with
considerable success to portray its social and economic system
as superior to the pluralist, mixed market systems in the
West. The Soviets criticize us for unemployment, crime, and
racism while emphasizing Soviet guarantees of jobs, free
medical care, subsidized housing, universal literacy and social
equality. This propaganda line has helped advance Soviet
interests in the Third world and elsewhere. Gorbachev is now
using it increasingly to deflect western criticisms of the
Soviet human rights record.
Unfortunately, we in the West have not done nearly enough
to counter this Soviet propaganda line. This is doubly
unfortunate given the fact that the performance of the Soviet
Union and its allied countries on social and economic issues is
not a selling point for their system, but its Achilles Heel.
The Soviet Union, for example, is plagued by chronic shortages
of the most basic commodities, by falling life expectancy due
to alcohol abuse and indadequeate health care, by cramped and
dilapidated housing and by widespread political and economic
corruption. These problems, moreover, are endemic to command
economic systems and are shared in varying degrees by every
single country that has chosen or been forced to follow the
Soviet model.
Recently we have begun overt efforts to counter this
propaganda line. At the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting in
May we compared the United States and the Soviet Union on a
variety of quality of life indicators, including per capita
living standards, housing, agriculture and medical care. We
raised systemic Soviet economic problems, chronic consumer
shortages, the black market, widespread corruption,
discrimination against women, epidemic alcohol abuse,
increasing death rates and the Soviet privileged class, the
Nomenklatura. A decidedly weak and flustered Soviet response
confirmed the effectiveness of this kind of comparison.
We are now in the process of trying to disseminate these
materials more widely. We would like to see world public
opinion as knowledgeable concerning the failure of the Soviet
social and economic system as it now is regarding Soviet human
rights abuses.
We do not believe this can be done simply by publicizing
U.S.-Soviet comparisons on quality of life indicators. What we
believe needs to be done is to show conclusively that countries
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADRI,
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
which follow the Soviet social and economic model invariably do
worse than countries which follow the mixed-market route. This
would decisively refute claims - echoed even among the Western
left - that command economies serve Third world countries
long
than mixed-market ones do. Cuba, for example, has g
been pointed to as an example of how a command economy can be
made to work, although this is manifestly not the case. If we
could ram this message home worldwide, we could eliminate much
of the attraction left-wing systems still enjoy in the minds of
impressionable Third World and Western European youth. The
effect on Soviet and Eastern European audiences would also be
considerable.
What we propose is a major research project comparing the
relative success of countries under command and mixed market
economies. Certain countries such as West Germany and East
Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, and North and South Korea,
and perhaps Cuba and Venezuela would constitute natural pairs,
ripe for comparison. Other pairs could be chosen on the basis
of having begun from essentially the same social and economic
base at the same point in time, tracing their respective
developments under command as opposed to mixed market
economies. Third World countries would certainly have to be
included. The indices chosen for inclusion in the comparison
would be broad economic indicators as well as the quality of
life categories highlighted at the Ottawa meeting.
Given the broad sweep of this project, we do not believe it
could be done effectively in academia or by a foundation. The
only group with the manpower, access to information and breadth
of expertise world wide to do the job as it needs to be done is
DDI. While we recognize that DDI has its own agenda, we regard
this project as of the first importance. We urge the Agency to
undertake this project on a high priority basis and we propose
May 1, 1986 as a reasonable completion date.
For a final product, we would like to see a detailed,
readable classified study, which we could subsequently launder,
declassify and release as an internal Department of State
document. In the initial planning stages of the project, we
would propose that your DDI people sit down with our expert in
the Office of Soviet Union Affairs who could give them a full
read out on what we as end-users are looking for.
Attached is a copy of the U.S.-Soviet quality of life
comparison speech given by Ambassador Richard Schifter at the
Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting in May. Also attached is a
recent cable to all diplomatic and consular posts on countering
A
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
-3-
Soviet propaganda on social and economic issues. This cable
contains talking points prepared for Ottawa, including updated
information and points on topics such as crime not used at
Ottawa.
Attachments:
As stated.
Wang *3312n
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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.Department of State ,TELEGRAM
PAGE 11 OF 65 STATE 317511
ORIGIN EUR-/S
ORIGIN OFFICE $061-0
INFO PMP-81 EUR-95 PMA-11 PMD-81 REA-91 RPE-11 OECD-11 EWEA-11
EEC-11 GC-01 EEV-83 CA-03 SOEC-BI NO-61 fl-01 NE-02
GE-01 UK-02 SOV-91 FI-I1 CE-81 SOML-01 OCT-11 PO-62
IT-92 PA-01 MT-/2 FR-12 WE-02 SP-12 PMS-11 PL-12 HU-12
PM-01 AL -01 BU-02 YO-02 RD-02 BE-01 GR-91 TU-/l CY-81
SE-81 AU-81 SW-I1 CZ-12 NL-01 LU-01 IC-I1 SI-11 DA-81
/076 Al AS
----------------------------------------------------------------
INFO LOG-90 ADS-DD INR-11 SS-00 AF-00 CIAE-00 EB-0S
HMO-9i 10-16 NEA-Ib NSC-O1 ARA-80 NSAE-00 SSO-I0
NA-O8 PM-1B EAP-0I AIT-02 PA-01 $16-83 USIE-IC
SP-02 SPD-01 /069 R
DRAFTED BY EUR/SOV:JRSCHMIDT
APPROVED BY EUR:RLRIDGWAY
EUR/SOV:LDSELL
EUR/SOV:MRPAPRIS
EUR:MPALPIER
P:WHCOURINEY
NA/HR:BCONNUCK
?NSC:WPEARSON
INR/SEE:RBARAZ
S/S:MMBOVA
S/S-C:JANDRES
------------------122510 1818282 /11/38
R 1664271 OCT 85 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS
CONFIDE DENT I AL STATE 317501
INFORM CONSULS
C O R R E C I E D C O P Y (TAGS LINE OMITTED)
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, SOCI, PROP, ECON, EAGR, PREL, UR
SUBJECT: COUNTERING SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ISSUES"
1. (C) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE CONTAINING SUGGESTIONS
FOR COUNTERING SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ISSUES.
2. (C) OVER THE YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAS ATTEMPTED TO
PORTRAY ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM AS SUPERIOR TO THE
PLURALIST, MIXED-MARKET SYSTEMS FOUND IN THE WEST.
SOVIET PROPAGANDA TYPICALLY CRITICIZES THE WEST, AND
PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, FOR UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME,
AND RACISM WHILE EMPHASIZING SOVIET GUARANTEES OF JOBS,
FREE MEDICAL CARE, AND SUBSIDIZED HOUSING. THIS
PROPAGANDA LINE HAS ENJOYED SOME SUCCESS IN THE THIRD WORLD
AND ELSEWHERE, AND HAS HELPED THE SOVIETS TO DEFLECT
WESTERN CRITICISMS OF THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
3. (C) RECENTLY, THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEGUN TO CONSIDER
WAYS TO BETTER COUNTER SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ISSUES. WE PREPARED MATERIALS FOR USE AT THE
OTTAWA CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS MEETING IN MAY THAT
REBUT SOVIET CLAIMS OF SCFEFIORITY ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ISSUES. THESE MATERIALS CO1PARE THE UNITED STATES AND
THE SOVIET UNION ON A VARIETY OF QUALITY OF LIFE
INDICATORS, INCLUDING PER CAPITA LIVING STANDARDS,
MOUSING, AGRICULTURE AND MEDICAL CARE. OTHER AREAS
COVERED INCLUDED SYSTEMIC SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS,
CHRONIC CONSUMER SHORTAGES, THE BLACK MARKET, WIDESPREAD
CORRUPTION, CRIME, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, EPIDEMIC
STATE 317510 1054 EUR49S5
ALCOHOL ABUSE, INCREASING DEATH RATES AND HIGH INFANT MOR-
TALITY, AND THE SOVIET PRIVILEGED CLASS, THE NCMENKLATURA. THESE
MATERIALS FORMED THC CORE OF A REBUTTAL STATEMENT DELIVERED BY
U.S. HEAD OF DELEGATION AMBASSADOR RICHARD SCHIFTER AT OTTAWA ON
MAY 22. A DECIDEDLY WEAK AND FLUSTERED SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE
STATEMENT CONFIRMED ITS EFFECTIVENESS.
4. (C) REPRINTED BELOW, AS TALKING POINTS, ARE THE
MATERIALS PREPARED FOR USE AT OTTAWA. THEY INCLUDE
POINTS, ON SOVIET CRIME AND OTHER SUBJECTS, NOT USED AT
OTTAWA. POSTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO DRAW ON THEM AS
APPROPRIATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MOST COUNTRY OrFICIALS,
JOURNALISTS, ACADEMICS, MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC
COMMUNITY AND OTHER MOST COUNTRY OPINION MAKER'.
S. (CI AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER'S OTTAWA STATEMENT, ENTITLED
'U.S.-SOVIET QUALITY OF LIFE: A COMPARISDN", HAS ITSELF
BEEN PUBLISHED AS NO. 713 IN THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC
AFFAIR'S CURRENT POLICY SERIES. POSTS MAY WISH TO
PROVIDE SELECTED MOST COUNTRY CONTACTS WITH COPIES OF THE
STATEMENT. ADDITIONAL COPIES CAN BE ORDERED FROM
PA/OAP. POSTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT
WITH ANY SUGGESTIONS OR QUESTIONS REGARDING THE
APPROPRIATE USE OF THESE MATERIALS. REPORTING CABLES ARE
ALSO WELCOME. CURRENT PLANS ARE TO UPDATE THESE
MATERIALS ON A REGULAR BASIS AND MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO
POSTS.
6. (U) BEGIN TALKING POINTS: CONSUMPTION AND OVERALL
STANDARD OF LIVING
-- IN THE EARLY 1968'S, SOVIET LEADER KHRUSHCHEV
BOASTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SURPASS THE UNITED
STATES IN LIVING STANDARDS BY 1918.
-- TODAY, 55 YEARS AFTER KHRUSHCHEV SPOKE AND 67 YEARS
AFTEk THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, THE SOVIET STANDARD OF
LIVING, MEASURED IN TERMS OF PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION,
REMAINS BARELY ONE THIRD OF THE U.S. LEVEL. INDEED,
SOVIET LIVING STANDARDS ARE MUCH LOWER THAN IN ANY
DEVELOPED WESTERN COUNTRY.
-- A RECENT STUDY DONE FOR THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH INDICATES THAT THE
AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN LIVES CONSIDERABLY BELOW THE U.S
POVERTY LINE.
-- EQUALLY DRAMATIC COMPARISONS CAN BE MADE BETWEEN THE
AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN AND THE AVERAGE UNEMPLOYED WORKER
IN THE UNITED STATES. IN THE RECESSION YEAR OF 1982, FOR
EXAMPLE-THE WORST SINCE WORLD WAR II-TNE MEDIAN PER
CAPITA INCOME FOR UNEMPLOYED WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES
WAS $000 DOLLARS. THE AVERAGE INCOME OF A FAMILY WITH AN
UNEMPLOYED WORKER WAS 28,000 DOLLARS. WHILE IT IS TRUE
THAT SUCH AN INCOME IN MANY CASES REPRESENTED A
SUBSTANTIAL DECLINE IN LIVING STANDARDS, IT IS ALSO TRUE
THAT A SOVIET FAMILY LIVING ON THE EQUIVALENT OF 20,000
DOLLARS WOULD NUMBER AMONG THE SOVIET ECONOMIC ELITE.
-- THE LIMITED SUCCESS THE SOVIET ECONOMY HAD ENJOYED
IN THE PAST WAS DEPENDENT ON CONSTANT ADDITIONS TO THE
LABOR FORCE AND ON THE AVAILABILITY OF PLENTIFUL AND
INEXPENSIVE RESOURCES. NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS
USED UP ITS SURPLUS LABOR POOL AND ITS RESOURCES ARE MORE
COSTLY, ITS GROWTH RATES HAVE PLUMMETED.
-- THE SOVIET UNION, IN FACT, IS NO LONGER CLOSING THE
GAP BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE DEVELOPED WEST. INDEED, THE
6AP IN PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION HAS REMAINED CONSTANT OR
WIDENED OVER THE PAST DECADE AND MOST ECONOMISTS PREDICT
(CONFI'D'ENTI AL
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Department ofState TELEGRAM
PAGE B2 OF 95 STATE 317566
THAT IT WILL'FURTHER WIDEN IN THE FUTURE.
7. N1 SYSTEMIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (SHORTAGES AND
CORRUPTION)
004 EURA915 STATE 317550 96S1
PEOPLE NAVE COME TO TAKE IT FOR GRANTED. ANECDOTES ABOUT
CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY HAVE BECOME A STAPLE OF SOVIET
HUMOR.
-- THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS CHARACTERIZED BY PERVASIVE
SHORTAGES OF CONSUMEP GOODS AND THE WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION
THESE SHORTAGES GENERATE. THESE FEATURES, MOREOVER, ARE
NOT TEMPORARY PROBLEMS WHICH WILL SOLVE THEMSELVES
THROUGH CONTINUED PROGRESS OVER TIME. THEY ARE PROBLEMS
ENDEMIC TO THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF CENTRALIZED ECONOMIC
PLANNING. THIS SYSTEM, BASED ON THE NOTION THAT A SMALL
GROUP OF PLANNERS CAN EFFICIENTLY ALLOCATE RESOURCES FOR
AN ENTIRE ECONOMY, HAS CREATED INSTEAD AN ECONOMY OF
BOTTLENECKS, SHORTAGES AND WASTE.
-- IN THE SOVIET UNION, UNLIKE ANYWHERE IN THE
DEVELOPED WEST, THE MOST BASIC CONSUMER GOODS ARE IN
CONTINUOUS SHORT SUPPLY AND RATIONING REMAINS A COMMON
FACT OF SOVIET LIFE. THE SITUATION HAS BEEN SO BAD IN
SOME LOCALITIES IN RECENT YEARS THAT FOOD RIOTS HAVE
REPORTEDLY OCCURRED.
-- IN 1961, IZVESTIA REPORTED THE INTRODUCTION OF RATIONING
FOR SOME CONSUMER STAPt'ES IN TWELVE MAJOR SOVIET CITIES, INCLUDING
IRKUTSK, KAZAN, TBILISI, VOLOGDA, AND NABEREZHIIYE CHELNY
OIOW CALLED BREZHNEV). MEAT AND BUTTER HAVE BOTH BEEN
FORMALLY RATIONED IN THE CITY OF SVERDLOVSK AND ITS
SURROUNDING VILLAGES FOR SEVERAL YEARS. PRESUMABLY, THE
SAME IS TRUE OF MANY OTHER AREAS CLOSED TO FOREIGN
VISITORS.
-- THE LONG LINES OF PEOPLE QUEUING FOR SCARCE ITEMS ON
SOVIET CITY STREETS HAVE BECOME FAMOUS THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD. THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IS SO
CAPRICIOUS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL WHAT VILL BE
AVAILABLE FROM ONE DAY TO THE NEXT. THIS IS WHY SOVIET
HOUSEWIVES FREQUENTLY JOIN LINES WITHOUT ENQUIRING WHAT
IS FOR SALE. THEY SIMPLY ASSUME THEY HAD BETTER GET
WHATEVER IT IS WHILE ITS AVAILABLE.
-- THIS IS ALSO ONE IMPORTANT CAUSE OF SOVIET
PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEMS, SINCE IN ADDITION TO HOUSEWIVES,
EMPLOYEES OF BOTH SEXES COMMONLY TAKE UNAUTHORIZED
ABSENCES FROM THEIR JOBS TO CHASE AFTER SCARCE
NECESSITIES.
-- THESE ENDLESS SHORTAGES FORCE THE AVERAGE SOVIET
FAMILY TO SPEND TWO HOURS SHOPPING EVERY DAY JUST TO
OBTAIN THE BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE. '
-- THE ENDLESS WAITING IS BAD ENOUGH, BUT THE SOVIET
CONSUMER OFTEN FINDS THAT THE PRODUCT WAITING FOR HIM AT
THE FRONT OF THE LINE IS HARDLY WORTH THE WAIT. THE
QUALITY, VARIETY AND DESIGN OF THE CONSUMER GOODS
AVAILABLE IN THE SOVJET UNION ARE, IN FACT, NOTORIOUSLY
POOR BY BOTH WESTERN AND EAST EUROPEAN STANDARDS, AND
RETAIL TRADE AND PERSONAL SERVICE FACILITIES ARE SCARCE,
PRIMITIVE AND INEFFICIENT.
-- AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, THE CHRONIC SHORTAGE OF BASIC
CDNS',,ER GOODS HAS FOSTERED THE CREATION OF AN ENORMOUS
BLACK MARKET IN SCARCE ITEMS. THIS HAS IN TURN LED TO
WIDESPREAD OFFICIAL CORRUPTION, AS PERSONS WITH
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER SCARCE COMMODITIES DIVERT
THEM FOR PERSONAL GAIN.
-- CORRUPTION EXISTS IN ALL SOCIETIES, BUT IN THE
SOVIET UNION IT IS A PERVASIVE AND NORMAL PART OF LIFE.
STEALING FROM THE STATE IS SO COMMON THAT THE SOVIET
-- THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE AWARE OF THE
PROBLEM, OF COURSE. ANDROPOV, AND NOW-GORBACIFV, HAVE
MADE A CRACKDOWN ON CORRUPTION A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THEIR
DOMESTIC POLICIES. IT HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY RAIDED AT
PARTY PLENUMS AND THE SOVIET MEDIA IS REPLETE WITH
STORIES OF CORRUPTION, BRIBERY AND THE EXECUTION'S OF
THOSE UNFORTUNATE ENOUGH TO BE SELECTED AS EXtMPLES OF
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW. WHAT THE SOVIET LEACEPSNIP
SEEMINGLY FAILS TO REALIZE OR SIMPLY WILL NOT FACE IS
THAT AN ECONOMY OF SHORTAGES INEVITABLY BREEDS CORRUPTION.
-- SOME WESTERN ECONOMISTS ESTIMATE THAT AS MUCH AS 25
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT MAY BE
DIVERTED TO BLACK MARKET PURPOSES EVERY YEAR. EVEII THE
SOVIET AUTHORITIES DO NOT DENY THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE
BLACK MARKET ECONOMY. AN ARTICLE IN THE AUGUST 19, 1985
EDITION OF IZVESTIYA. FOR EXAMPLE, REPORTED THAT
APPROXIMATELY HALF OF ALL CONSUMER SERVICES IN ESTONIA
ARE PROVIDED BY ILLEGAL PRIVATEERS.
-- IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THAT THE CHRONIC
SHORTAGES AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION WHICH CHAFACTERIZE
CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LIFE ARE FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF THE
SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM. THEY REFLECT THE SYSTEMIC
INFLEXIBILITY OF A CENTRALIZED ECONOMIC PLANNING SYSTEM
WHICH BREEDS BOTTLENECKS AND INEFFICIENCIES.
-- THE SOVIET CONSUMER IS FURTHER DISADVANTAGED BY THE
HISTORICAL SOVIET PREFERENCE FOR SPENDING ON DEFENSE AND
HEAVY INDUSTRY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER SECTOR.
-- SOVIET PER CAPITA SPENDING FOR DEFENSE, FOR EXAMPLE,
IS, IN RELATIVE TERMS, TWICE AS HIGH AS IN ANY DEVELOPED
WESTERN COUNTRY. WE ESTIMATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION
SPENDS 14 PERCENT OF ITS GNP ON DEFENSE, COMPARED TO ONLY
7 PERCENT FOR THE UNITED STATES. -
-- GIVEN THESE SYSTEMIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND EMPHASIS
ON HEAVY INDUSTRY AND WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, IT IS LITTLE
WONDER THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES AND PRESS COMMENTATORS
CHRONICALLY COMPLAIN ABOUT THE EVILS OF 'CONSUMERISM,'
AND AGAINST THE EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF MATERIAL GOODS.
-- THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVIZED AGRICULTURE ALSO
CONTRIBUTES 10 THE HARSHNESS OF SOVIET LIFE. MUCH OF THE
PROBLEM IN FOOD SUPPLY, FOR EXAMPLE, STEMS FROM THE LOW
PRODUCTIVITY OF COLLECTIVIZED SOVIET AGRICULTURE. AS IS
WELL KNOWN, THE FORCED COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN
THE EARLY 1936'S DIVESTED SOVIET FARMERS OF THEIR LAND.
WHAT IS NOT SO WELL KNOWN IS THAT THE BRUTAL CONFISCATION
OF GRAIN SUPPLIES THAT ACCOMPANIED IT RESULTED IN A
WIDESPREAD FAMINE THAT KILLED AS MANY AS SIX MILLION OF
THEM IN THE UKRAINE ALONE. COLLECTIVIZATION NOT ONLY
KILLED SIX MILLION PEOPLE, BUT IT PERMANENTLY CRIPPLED
SOVIET AGRICULTURE.
-- THE SOVIET UNION, IN PRE-REVOLUIiL; I;'i O-YSS THE
WORLD'S LARGEST GRAIN EXPORTER, IS NOW THE WORLD'S
LARGEST GRAIN IMPORTER.
-- 26 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET WORK FORCE WORKS IN
AGRICULTURE AS COMPARED TO 3 PERCENT IN THE UNITED
STATESJL YET THE SOVIETS OFTEN HAVE TO IMPORT UP TO 25
PERCENT OF THEIR GRAIN. AMERICAN FARMERS, WHO OUM THEIR
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Department of State TELEGRAM
PAGE 63 OF 65 STATE 317500 0051 EUR4925
OWN LAND, ARE TEN TIMES MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN THEIR SOVIET
COUNTERPARTS.
-- EACH YEAR APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT OF THE GRAIN,
FRUIT, AND VEGETABLE HARVEST, AND AS MUCH AS 50 PERCENT
OF THE POTATO CROP PERISHES BECAUSE OF POOR STORAGE,
TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION TECHNIQUES.
-- EVEN THOUGH PRIVATE PLOTS IN THE SOVIET UNION OCCUPY
ONLY 4 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY'S ARABLE LAND, THEY ACCOUNT
FOR ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY'S PRODUCTION OF
POTATOES AND MONEY, OVER 40 PERCENT Of ITS FRUITS,
BERRIES AND EGGS, AND ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF ITS MEAT, MILK,
AND VEGETABLES. PRIVATE PLOTS, IN FACT, PRODUCE 25
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S TOTAL CROP OUTPUT.
STATE 317500
STATUS AND LOWEST PAYING JOBS IN SOVIET SOCIETY.
ONE-THIRD OF ALL WORKING SOVIET WOMEN, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE
EMPLOYED AS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS. BY CONTRAST, ONLY 1.5
PERCENT OF AMERICAN WOMEN ARE SO EMPLOYED.
-- SOVIET AUTHORITIES OFTEN POIN) TO-THE LIBERAL
MATERNITY BENEFITS ACCORDED TO SOVIET WOMEN. YET THE
SOVIET UNION IS CURRENTLY SUFFERING FROM A SEVERE LABOR
SHORTAGE BROUGHT ON BY DECLINING BIRTH RATES. THIS
REDUCTION IN BIRTH RATES, IN TURN, IS DUE TO THE
EXTRAORDINARILY HIGH ABORTION RATE. THE AVERAGE SOVIET
WOMAN HAS BETWEEN FIVE AND SEVEN ABORTIONS PER CHILD
BEARING LIFETIME. THE FACT IS THAT THE LOW SOVIET
STANDARD OF LIVING COMPELS WOMEN TO WORK TO SUPPLEMENT
THE FAMILY INCOME. MATERNITY BENEFITS, WITH EXTRA MOUTHS
TO FEED AND BODIES TO CLOTH[, ARE, IN MANY INSTAIICES,
SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH TO ENCOURAGE A FAMILY 10 LET A CHILD BE
BORN.
-- HOUSING IN THE SOVIET UNION IS IN AS SHORT SUPPLY AS
MOST CONSUMER GOODS.
-- UNLIKE SOVIET MEN, THE WORKING DAY OE A SOVIET WOMAN
DOES NOT END AS SHE LEAVES THE FIELD OR FACTORY. SOVIET
--
SNARE
AT LEAST TWENTY PERCENT OF ALL URBAN FAMILIES STILL
KITCHEN AND TOILET FACILITIES WITH OTHER FAMILIES.
WOMEN ARE EXPECTED 10 DO THE COOKING AND THE HOUSEWORK
AND THE WAITING IN LINE.
FIVE PERCENT MORE LIVE IN FACTORY DORMITORIES. YOUNG
TOPICALLY FORCED TO LIVE WITH THEIR
- IN THE WEST, WOMEN HAVE EFFECTIVELY BANDED TOGETHER
MARRIED COUPLES ARE
AIT YEARS FOR HOUSING OF THEIR OWN. TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND SEXISM, BUT SOVIET WOMEN HAVE
PARENTS AND MUST W
NO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE POLITICAL POWER. IN ITS ENTIRE
-- THE MOUSING THAT DOES EXIST IS EXTREMELY CRAMPED,
HISTORY, ONLY ONE WOMAN HAS EVER SERVED ON THE POLITBURO;
MORE SO THAN IN ANY OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRY IN THE
NONE SERVES THERE NOV. FEWER THAN FIVE PER CENT OF
WORLD. THE AVERAGE SOVIET HAS 14 SQUARE METERS OF LIVING
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND ONLY ONE QUARTER OF
SPACE, FOR EXAMPLE, COMPARED TO THE 49 SQUARE METERS
COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS ARE FEMALE.
AVAILABLE TO THE AVERAGE AMERICAN. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
E FOR EVERY ROOM IN THE SOVIET
P
OP
IN THE LATE 1972'S THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES CRUSHED A
L
E
ARE APPROXIMATELY TWO
COMPARED WITH TWO ROOMS FOR EVERY PERSON IN THE
UNION
DISSIDENT ORGANIZATION OF FEMINIST ACTIVISTS - CENTERED
,
AROUND THE SAMIZDAT JOURNAL 'MARIYA' - WHO HAD BANDED
UNITED STATES.
TOGETHER TO PUBLICIZE THE PLIGHT OF WOMEN IN SOVIET
-- SOVIET STATISTICS REVEAL THAT IN 1963, 32 PERCENT OF
SOCIETY.
ALL URBAN HOUSING HAD NO NOT WATER, 23 PERCENT WAS
WITHOUT GAS, 19 PERCENT WITHOUT INDOOR BATHS, 12 PERCENT
11.
BI) HEALTH CARE
11 PERCENT WITHOUT SEWAGE
VLTHOUT CENTRAL HEATING
,
WITHOUT WATER
--
SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE OFTEN FOND OF POINTING OUT
..
FACILITIES AND 9 PERCENT
THAT HEALTH CARE IN THE SOVIET UNION IS FREE. AS WITH SO
-- THE ROUSING SITUATION IS WORSE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE,
MUCH THAT IS FREE OR SUBSIDIZED IN THE SOVIET UNION,
AND CONTAINS MANY FEATURES REMINISCENT OF THE 19TH
HOWEVER, YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR.
CENTURY -- OR EVEN THE 16TH. THERE, FOR THE MOST PART,
HEATING IS WITH FIREPLACES, FOOD IS COOKED ON WOOD STOVES
OR IN WOOD-FIRED OVENS, OUTHOUSES PROVIDE THE TOILET
FACILITIES, WATER FREQUENTLY IS FROM A WELL.
-- ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE NEW HOUSING
BUILT IN THE SOVIET UNION IN RECENT YEARS, ALMOST ALL OF
IT CONSISTS OF CHEAPLY AND SHODDILY CONSTRUCTED HIGH-RISE
APARTMENT BUILDINGS WHICH ARE EVEN MORE POORLY
MAINTAINED. MOREOVER, NEW BUILDING LAGS CONSIDERABLY
BEHIND THE INCREASE IN NEW HOUSEHOLDS.
-- AT THE CURRENT RATE OF BUILDING, IGNORING THE FACT
THAT POORLY CONSTRUCTED SOVIET HOUSING RAPIDLY
DETERIORATES, THE PER CAPITA SPACE AVAILABLE TO SOVIET
CITIZENS WILL BEGIN TO APPROACH THE WESTERN STANDARD IN
APPROXIMATEL`: 150 YEARS.
-- SOVIET HOUSING WOES SHOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE GIVEN
THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION SPENDS LESS THAN ONE FIFTH
AS MUCH ON HOUSING AS THE UNITED STATES AND WELL UNDER
HALF OF WHAT IS SPENT IN SPAIN AND JAPAN.
-- ALTHOUGH THERE ARE PLENTY OF BEDS IN SOVIET
HOSPITALS, THE PEOPLE WHO LIE IN THEM LEAD A PRECARIOUS
EXISTENCE. ONE THIRD OF THEM, FOR EXAMPLE, DEVELOP
POST-OPERATIVE INFECTIONS DUE TO UNSANITARY CONDITIONS IN
THE OPERATING ROOM. THREE PERCENT IS CONSIDERED NIGH IN
THE WEST.
-- THE DOCTORS WHO CARE FOR THEM, MOREOVER, ARE POORLY
TRAINED BY WESTERN STANDARDS. MEDICINE IS NOT A
HIGH-PRESTIGE OCCUPATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND DOCTORS
ARE AMONG THE LOWEST PAID WORKERS IN SOVIET SOCIETY.
SIGNIFICANTLY, 78 PERCENT OF THESE LOW-PAID PHYSICIANS
ARE WOMEN.
-- SOVIET MEDICINE IS NOT IMMUNE TO THE SAME SHORTAGES
THAT AFFLICT THE REST OF SOVIET SOCIETY. MEDICAL
EQUIPMENT AND MANY MEDICINES ARE IN EXTREMELY SHORT
SUPPLY. ONE THIRD OF ALL SOVIET HOSPITALS, FOR EXAMPLE,
DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE FACILITIES FOR BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS.
BASIC ITEMS SUCH AS BANDAGES AND ASPIRIN ARE OFTEN
DIFFICULT TO FIND. FOOD RATIONS ARE SO SMALL THAT
PATIENTS MUST SUPPLEMENT THEIR DIET WITH FOOD FROM HOME.
-- WOMEN IN THE SOVIET UNION USUALLY OCCUPY THE LOWEST
-- hI NOVOSIBIRSK, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH IS HOME TO MANY
LEADING SOVIET ACADEMIC INSTITUTES AND WHERE ONE WOULD
CONFIDENTIAL
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Department of State TELEGRAM
PAGE II OF 65 STATE 317510 1n4
EXPECT SUPPLIES TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN NORMAL,
ONLY 11 PERCENT OF THE 216 DRUGS ON THE LIST OF
MEDICATIONS TO BE PRESCRIBED IN THE THE EVENT OF SPECIFIC
ILLNESSES ARE ACTUALLY AVAILABLE.
-- ALTHOUGH THESE PROBLEMS IN THEIR HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY SYSTEM ARE SERIOUS, THEY ARE NOT THE MOST
SERIOUS MEDICAL PROBLEM FACING THE SOVIET UNION TODAY.
DRAMATICALLY, OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST TWO DECADES A
SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION HAS OCCURRED IN THE OVERALL'
HEALTH STATUS OF THE SOVIET POPULATION.
-- STATISTICS AND STUDIES SHOW, AND SOVIET AUTHORITIES
DO NOT DENY, THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN-SOVIET
DEATH AND MORBIDITY RATES OVER THE PAST TWENTY YEARS
THE LIFE EXPECTANCY OF SOVIET MALES HAS DECREASED DURING
THAT PERIOD BY MORE THAN FOUR YEARS, FROM 66 IN THE
MID-1960'S TO UNDER 62 YEARS TODAY. RECENT STUDIES
INDICATE THIS FIGURE MAY EVEN NAVE FALLEN TO AS LOW AS 56
YEARS. IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE SAME PERIOD, MALE
LIFE EXPECTANCY INCREASED FROM 66 10 71 YEARS. INFANT
MORTALITY IN THE USSR HAS INCREASED FROM 26.2 PER 1,009
LIVE BIRTHS IN 1971 TO PERHAPS IQ PER 1,000 TODAY. U.S.
INFANT MORTALITY DURING THE SAME PERIOD HAS DECREASED
FROM 24.7 PER 1,809 TO 11.7.
-- THE SOVIET FIGURE FOR INFANT MORTALITY IS
NECESSARILY AN ESTIMATE SINCE SOVIET AUTHORITIES STOPPED
PUBLISHING INFANT MORTALITY STATISTICS AFTER 1974 WHEN
THE RATE HAD REACHED 31.9 PER 1,600, ALREADY MUCH HIGHER
THAN IN ANY DEVELOPED WESTERN COUNTRY.
-- THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO STOPPED PUBLISHING LIFE
EXPECTANCY FIGURES. THE REASON WHY THEY HAVE DOME SO IS
OBVIOUS ENOUGH. THE DECREASE IN MALE LIFE EXPECTANCY AND
THE INCREASE IN INFANT MORTALITY IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE
HISTORIC EVENTS. NEVER BEFORE HAS A DEVELOPED,
INDUSTRIALIZED NATION SUFFERED A DECLINE IN THESE
DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS IN TIME OF PEACE.
-- THE REASONS FOR THIS DECLINE ARE EVEN MORE
DISTURBING FOR ANYONE TEMPTED TO LOOK TO COMMUNISM AS A
MODEL FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
-- FACTORS SUCH AS POOR HEALTH CARE, INCREASED SMOKING
AND FREQUENTLY UNREGULATED INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION ARE
IMPORTANT, BUT PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTOR IS
ALCOHOL. SOME STATISTICS WILL MAKE CLEAR THE STAGGERING
IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF ALCOHOL IN THE SOVIET UNION.
-- THE SOVIET UNION RANKS FIRST IN THE WORLD IN THE PER
CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF HARD LIQUOR, MUCH OF IT IN THE FORM
OF NOME-BREWED MOONSHINE KNOWN AS 'SAMOGON.- PRONOUNCED
SAHM'-ON-GOHN) ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN THE SOVIET UNION
HAS RISEN AN AVERAGE OF 4.5 PERCENT A YEAR OVER THE PAST
25 YEARS. THAT MEANS THAT IN TWO AND A HALF DECADES
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION HAS MORE THAN DOUBLED.
-- THE DEATH FATE FRO" ALCOHOL POISONING ALONE IN THE
SOVIET UNION IS RI TIMES THE U.S. RATE, AND ALCOHOL AND
ITS EFFECTS MAY BE THE LEADING CAUSE OF DEATH AMONG
SOVIET MALES.
-- ALCOHOL ABUSE IN THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT SIMPLY A
MALE PROBLEM. ALCOHOL ABUSE IS THE THIRD LEADING CAUSE
OF ILLNESS AMONG SOVIET WOMEN AND IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR
IN BOTH THE RISING NUMBER OF BIRTH DEFECTS AND THE
STATE 317560
INCREASING INFANT MORTALITY RATE.
-- BY 1981 THE NET SOCIAL COST OF ALCOHOL ABUSE IN
DECREASED LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION AMOUNTED
TO A STAGGERING 8 TO 9 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NAT OVAL
INCOME.
-- MUCH OF THE HEAVY DRINKING IN THE SOVIET UIIION
OCCURS IA THE WORK PLACE. PROFESSOR R. LIRMYAN OF THE
SOVIET ACADEMY OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
WRITING IN A 1982 ISSUE 0: 'MOLODOY ROMMUNIST', REPORTED
THAT 37 PERCENT OF THE MALE WORK FORCE IS CHROII,CALLY
DRUNK. NOT SURPRISINGLY, DRUNKENESS IS THE LEAVING CAUSE
OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS.
A POLL CITED IN A MARCH 1961 EDITION OF A SOVIET
NEWSPAPER, 'SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA- REVEALED THAT HALF THE
SOVIET POPULATION REGARDS DRUIIKENNESS AS THE NU116ER ONE
SOCIAL PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET UNION. 74 PERCENT SAID THEY
WERE ALARMED OVER THE EXTENT OF PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS.
-- THESE STATISTICS MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION
NOW SUFFERS FROM AN ALCOHOL ABUSE PROBLEM OF EPIDEMIC
PROPORTIONS, SERIOUS ENOUGH 10 CAUSE A SIGNIFICANT RISE
IN THE NATIONAL DEATH RATE.
-- VITAL IV FEDORCNUK, THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR INTERNAL
AFFAIRS, INTERVIEWED IN THE AUGUST 29, 1951 ISSUE OF
'LITERATURNAYA GAZETA,- CANDIDLY ACKNO'ILEDGED THAI SOVIET
MORTALITY AND SICKNESS RATES NAVE BEEN ON THE INCREASE
AND HE SPECIFICALLY CITED ALCOHOL ABUSE AS THE CAUSE.
-- NO ONE FACTOR NAS FORCED THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO DOUBLE
THEIR CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL. IT IS THE SYSTEM ITSELF
WHICH HAS DRIVEN THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO DRINK, WHICH HAS
CRAMMED THEM INTO SHABBY, OVERCROWDED APARTMENT, WHICH
HAS FORCED THEM 10 SPEND MUCH OF THEIR LIVES WAITING IN
LINES FOR SCARCE, LOW-QUALITY MERCHANDISE, WHICH HAS
GUARANTEED THEM A JOB, BUT GIVEN THEM NO REASON TO WORK,
WHICH RAS ROBBED THEM OF CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN LIVES.
-- THE SOVIET SYSTEM, FAR FROM ENDING INDUSTRIAL
ALIENATION, IRS CREATED A STERILE INDUSTRIAL WASTELAND
WHICH FAILS TO MEET BASIC HUMAN SPIRITUAL AND MATERIAL
NEEDS.
-- RECENTLY, IN MAY 1985, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES
ANNOUNCED YET ANOTHER CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ABUSE OF
ALCOHOL. PRODUCTION IS TO BE CUT BACK, THE DRINKING AGE
RAISED, AND PENALTIES AGAINST THE MANUFACTURE OF HOME
BREW INCREASED. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THESE MEASURES
MAY MEET WITH SOME SUCCESS, WE NOTE THAT SIMILAR
CAMPAIGNS HAVE ALWAYS FAILED IN THE PAST. ALCOHOL ABUSE
IN THE SOVIET UNION IS LIKELY TO REMAIN AN ALARMINGLY
SERIOUS PROBLEM UNTIL THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BEGINS TO
COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROFOUND SOCIAL MALAISE THAT GAVE
RISE TO THE PROBLEM IN THE FIRST PLACE.
-- AS SOVIET AUTHORITIES TNEMSFLVE5 ADMIT, ALCOHOL
AEUSE HAS ALSO LED 10 A S`LADILIY INCREASING L-MME RATE.
THE MYTH THAT IT IS ONLY WESTERN OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
THAT SUFFER FROM CRIME IS DEVASTATED BY THE FACT THE THE
PRISON POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IS 3 TIMES HIGHER
PER CAPITA THAN THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.
-- Wk ALSO NOTE THAT, AS WITH LIFE EXPECTANCY AND
INFANT MORTALITY, THE SOVIETS DO NOT PUBLISH CRIME
STATISTICS. WE KNOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION STOPPED
CONFIDENTIAL
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Department of Slate TELEGRAM
PAGE BS OF OS STATE 317580
PUBLISHING THESE 01HER STATISTICS BECAUSE THEY
DEMONSTRATED THE GROWING FAILURE OF THE SOVIET
SOCIO ICONDMIC SYSTEM. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT, THEN, TO
_SURMISE WHY THE SOVIETS HAVE NEVER PUBLISHED CRIME
STATISTICS. IF THEY WANT TO CRITICIZE US FOR CRIME IN
THE WEST, LET THEM PUBLISH THEIR OWN CRIME STATISTICS.
-- MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY AFTER ALL CLAIMS TO BE
BASED ON THE NOTION OF EGALITARIANISM. THIS, WE ARE
TOLD, IS WHAT THE "GREAT OCTOBER REVOLUTION" WAS ALL
ABOUT. ONE WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT THAT WHATEVER PROBLEMS
THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT HAVE, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WOULD
ENSURE THAT NO CLASS OR GROUP OR INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE
ACCORDED PRIVILEGES NOT AVAILABLE TO OTHER MEMBERS OF
SOVIET SOCIETY.
-- BUT THE TRUTH IS THAT THE VARIOUS SOVIET ELITES (THE
PARTY, THE MILITARY, THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, THE
SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA, THE CULTURAL AND
SPORTS ESTABLISHMENTS) HAVE DELIBERATELY SHIELDED
THEMSELVES FROM THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS FACED
BY THE REST OF THE POPULATION.
-- THE PRIVILEGED 5 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET POPULATION,
CALLED THE NOMENKLATURA, HAVE ACCESS TO SPECIAL -CLOSED-
STORES THAT ARE SPECIALLY STOCKED WITH FOREIGN GOODS NOT
AVAILABLE IN REGULAR STORES, AS WELL. AS BOUNTIFUL
SUPPLIES OF SOVIET GOODS THAT ARE IN SNORT SUPPLY
ELSEWHERE. THE AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN IS FORBIDDEN FROM
ENTERING THESE STORES, WHICH ARE UNMARKED AND HAVE OPAQUE
WINDOWS TO PREVENT THE CURIOUS FROM LOOKING 'IN.
-- HOUSING SPACE IS ALLOCATED BY STATE AUTHORITIES ON
THE BASIS OF SOCIAL STATUS. MANY LEADING SOVIET
ORGANIZATIONS HAVE THEIR OWN HOUSING STOCKS WHICH ARE OF
000D STANDARD AND CENTRALLY LOCATED.
-- THE FOURTH DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH
RUNS A CLOSED SYSTEM OF HOSPITALS, CLINICS AND
DISPENSARIES FOR THE SOVIET ELITES, PROVIDING SERVICES
FAR BETTER THAN THE LOW QUALITY CARE AVAILABLE TO THE
GENERAL POPULATION.
-- THE SOVIET RULING OLIGARCHY ALSO HAS ACCESS TO SUCH
SPECIAL BENEFITS AS FOREIGN TRAVEL, AUTOMOBILES,
ADMISSION TO THE BEST SCHOOLS, COUNTRY HOUSES, ACCESS TO
CULTURAL EVENTS AND PAID VACATIONS IN CHOICE RESORTS,
WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THE AVERAGE CITIZEN. EVEN THE
CENTER LANES OF MAJOR STREETS IN MOSCOW AND OTHER LARGE
CITIES ARE CLOSED-OFF FOR THEIR EXCLUSIVE PERSONAL USE.
-- THIS IS THE REALITY OF THE SO-CALLED CLASSLESS,
EGALITARIAN SOCIETY THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP HAS CREATED.
15. N) CONCLUSION
-- WE IN THE WEST DO NOT CLAIM TO BE PERFECT. WE HAVE
SERIOUS PROBLEMS WHICH DESERVE SERIOUS ATTENTION. BUT
DESPITE OUR MANY PROBLEMS, WE BELIEVE ThAT WE IN THE
WEST, WITH OUR PLUFCLISTIC, MIXED-MARLET ECONOMIES, HAVE
GONE FURTHER TO'.'~:HD MEETING BASIC HUMAN SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS THAN THE SOVIET SYSTEM EVER HAS OR
EVER WILL.
-- WE TALK OPENLY ABOUT OUR PROBLEMS, WHILE THE SOVIET
REACTION IS TO TRY TO HIDE THEIRS AND PRETEND THAT THEY
DON'T EXIST. WHEN SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS CRITICIZE THE
WEST AS VICTIMIZED BY MONOPOLIES, AND POPULATED BY
STATE 317580 005W EUR4915
SOCIETIES IN WHICH THE RICH FEW LIVE OFF THE NUMBERLESS
POOR, THEY ARE UNWITTINGLY HO.DING UP A MIRROR TO THEIR
OWN SOCIETY. NO SYSTEM IS WITHOUT FLAWS, BUT WE AT LEAST
OFFER THE PROSPECT OF FREEDOM WITH PROSPERITY. THE
SOVIET SYSTEM OFFERS NEITHER. END TALKING POINTS SHULTZ
CONFIDENTIAL
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Current
Policy
No. 713
Richard Schiffer
U.S.-Soviet Quality of
Life: A Comparison
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Following is an address by Ambassador
Richard Schiffer, head of the U.S. delega-
tion, before the Ottawa Human Rights
Experts' Meeting of the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), Ottawa, Canada, May 22, 1985.
Ever since this conference began, we
have returned, from time to time, to a
discussion of what is perceived to be the
distinction between political and civil
rights on one hand and economic and
social rights on the other hand. I shall,
therefore, at the outset of this state-
ment, set forth the thoughts of the U.S.
delegation on this issue.
Rights of the Individual
Those of us who trace our views of
government to the writings of the
English and French thinkers of the 18th-
century Enlightenment subscribe to the
proposition that government derives its
mandate from the consent of the
governed, such consent being expressed
in free elections. The government, thus,
reflects the will of the majority. In this
context of majority rule, the philoso-
phers on the subject defined certain
rights of the individual which are so
basic that no government may deprive
him of them, irrespective of the site of
the popular majority by which it was in-
stalled in office. These rights of the in-
dividual are what we understand prin-
cipally under the term "human rights."
They define and clarify the fundamental
relationship between the individual and
his government, and they consist, essen-
tially, of limitations on the powers of
government. Like the biblical "Thou
shall not," the beginning phrase of the
first amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the beginning phrase of our Bill of
Rights, is "Congress shall make no
law"-a phrase followed by the subjects
on which Congress shall make no law,
such as abridgment of freedom of speech
or the press.
When we use the term "right," we
think of a claim which can be enforced
in the courts. The rights guaranteed in
the U.S. Constitution, which in CSCE
terminology are referred to as political
and civil rights, are rights which every
citizen can call upon the courts to pro-
tect.
We view what are here referred to
as economic and social rights as belong-
ing in an essentially different category.
They are, as we see it, the goals of
government policy in domestic affairs.
Government, as we see it, should foster
policies which will have the effect of en-
couraging economic development so as
to provide jobs under decent working
conditions for all those who want to
work at income levels which allow for an
adequate standard of living. These goals
should be attained in a setting which
allows freedom of choice of his work to
everyone. For those who are unable to
find jobs we provide unemployment com-
pensation and, if that is unavailable,
other forms of social assistance. The
economic system which is now in place
in our country is fully in keeping with
the relevant articles of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
The U.S. delegation, in selecting
issues for discussion at this conference,
decided deliberately to limit itself to
problems which, though of great concern
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to the American public, would not re-
quire systemic changes in the Soviet
Union to effect correction. Every one of
the problems we have raised so far
about conditions in countries which de-
scribe themselves as Marxist-Leninist
could be eliminated while staying within
the system.
It so happens, therefore, that the
Soviet human rights problems of great-
est concern to the American public are
the problems which could be most easily
solved by the Soviet Union. They con-
cern, as we have pointed out, the in-
carceration of persons guilty only of giv-
ing expression to their thoughts, the
persecution of religious believers, the
commitment of sane persons to institu-
tions for the mentally ill, cultural repres-
sion, and discrimination against certain
people on the grounds of ancestry. The
Soviet State could, as I have said, cor-
rect these problems without effecting
fundamental structural change.
We had not intended to engage in
discussions of economic and social condi-
tions in the Soviet Union, both because
the American public is not as deeply
aware of or concerned about them and
because correction of any shortcomings
which we would have to point out would,
indeed, require systemic change in the
Soviet Union. We see such changes oc-
curring gradually in some other coun-
tries which had initially adopted the
Soviet economic model. However, we did
not think this meeting to be an appro-
priate forum for a discussion of such
issues. Nevertheless, as the Soviet dele-
gation has clearly insisted that we
engage in a discussion of social and
economic issues, let me say that we are
prepared to join in that debate. To begin
with, I shall respond in detail to the con-
cerns expressed by the Soviet delegation
as to social and economic problems in
the United States.
U.S. Social and Economic Problems
Unemployment. First of all, let me dis-
cuss the problem of unemployment in
the United States. Our present unem-
ployment rate is 7.3%. It reached a peak
of 10.5% in 1982 and has declined sig-
nificantly since then. Millions of new
jobs have been created in recent years,
offering new opportunities to the unem-
ployed as well as to persons newly
entering the job market. While we agree
that an unemployment rate of 7.3% is
still too high and further efforts need to
be made to reduce the unemployment
level, we believe that any person analyz-
ing our unemployment rate should note
the following:
? About two percentage points are
attributable to so-called frictional unem-
ployment, i.e., persons in transit from
one job to another.
? A significant number of the job
opportunities which are available in the
United States at any one time go un-
filled because no one in the locality in
which the jobs are available is interested
in doing the kind of work available at
the wages which are being offered; as
we don't have a system under which
people can be compelled to work, un-
filled jobs thus exist side by side with
unemployment.
? We do not have an anti-parasitism
law; some persons prefer to draw unem-
ployment insurance payments or welfare
benefits rather than take jobs which
they deem unsuitable.
? The percentage of our adult popu-
lation looking for work in the productive
sector of the economy is enlarged by the
fact that we have significantly fewer
people than the Soviet Union in our mili-
tary forces, in our police forces, and, for
that matter, in prison or performing
forced labor; specifically, though the
Soviet population is only 12% greater
than that of the United States, its mili-
tary forces are almost 200% greater,,its
police forces more than 100% greater,
and its prison population, including
forced labor, over 1,100% greater than
the corresponding figures in the United
States.
I have made these points only to ex-
plain what the 7.3% figure means, not
to suggest that it can and should be ig-
nored. Our government is committed to
the proposition that everyone who wants
to work should have an opportunity to
do so. Government policy is dedicated to
the stimulation of economic growth, to
the creation of more jobs, to the raising
of standards of living, to the reduction
of poverty. In a country such as ours,
there is often disagreement as to what
might be the best policy to effect eco-
nomic growth. Different political group-
ings advocate different solutions to the
problems we face. But there is an over-
whelming consensus that unemployment
must be reduced and that it should be
reduced within our present economic
framework.
When we compare our economic
model to alternate approaches, we must
note that, to some extent, unemploy-
ment in our country is a consequence of
our ideas of individual freedom. We do
not assign people to jobs or prosecute
them for parasitism if they fail to take
an available job. As I have noted, there
are people in our country who pass up
job opportunities because they don't like
the jobs that are being offered or con-
sider the wage offers too low. There are
others who are unemployed and might
be able to get a job of their liking and at
a satisfactory wage at a substantial
distance from their home, but they are
loathe to move.
Much of the latter kind of unemploy-
ment is created by the fact that the
economy adapts itself to market condi-
tions. Uneconomic enterprises are thus
compelled to close, sometimes causing
serious dislocation in the communities
dependent on them. In the long run,
such adjustments enable the economy to
adapt itself to change and to increase its
overall productivity. But in the short
run, it creates serious hardships for the
people directly and adversely affected.
To deal with these hardships and to
bridge the periods of difficulty is a con-
tinuing challenge to our Federal, State,
and local governments. We recognize it
for the problem it is and seek to deal
with it. For reasons which I shall state
later, the overwhelming majority of our
people are not at all attracted to the
solution to this problem which the Soviet
Union offers.
There is one other point that needs
to be made with regard to the issue of
employment. We need to emphasize the
role which a free labor movement has
played in the United States in strength-
ening the role of the worker, achieving
increases in wages and improvements in
working conditions. The existence of a
free labor movement, accountable only
to its members and not under the con-
trol of employers or governments, is, we
believe, essential to the protection of the
interests of working people. It has suc-
ceeded in the United States in setting
standards not only for its own members
but for unorganized workers as well. As
I noted yesterday, workers in certain
states which profess to have been
founded for the benefit of the working
people are deprived of the ability to as-
sert their interests through the opera-
tion of free and independent labor
unions.
Homelessness. The distinguished
Soviet representative has raised the
issue of homelessness in the United
States. We recognize the existence of
homelessness in our society. This is a
complex and difficult problem for us, in
large part because in recent years our
laws have not allowed us to incarcerate
or commit to mental institutions persons
who insist on living on the sidewalks of
our cities as long as they are not threats
to themselves or society. Many of these
people refuse to make use of the wide
range of accommodations available to
them. In some societies they would be
charged with vagrancy, parasitism, or
forced into mental institutions. In our
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uite
n the streets
anizations
le hav
or
r
o
un
i
-
i
, q
n o
cities they rema
understandably causing many visitors to
wonder whether there is, in fact, no
housing available for them.
The fact is that our Federal Govern-
ment and our State governments have
spent and continue to spend hundreds of
millions of dollars to provide shelter for
the homeless. Those who cannot be self-
sufficient, such as the elderly, are given
priority in assistance programs. Further-
more, the tradition of voluntarism in the
United States has resulted in the crea-
tion of a great number of nonprofit
groups which have specialized in helping
those in need of what our laws call safe
and sanitary housing. Particular efforts
have been made to assist the elderly.
I should also make it clear that there
are quite a number of people in our
country who live in housing which we
deem substandard. We are interested in
improving such housing, though we
know that what is substandard in the
United States may be standard in coun-
tries which are among our severest
critics.
Discrimination. We readily concede
that persons were for a long time dis-
criminated against in our country on the
grounds of their ancestry, and we recog-
nize that government at all levels shares
culpability with regard to this problem.
However, beginning 40 years ago,
policies on the subject of race began to
change in our country and have changed
at an ever-accelerating pace. Over this
period the Federal Government as well
as State and local governments have
succeeded in stamping otjt all officially
sanctioned forms of discrimination based
on ancestry. Beyond that, laws have
been enacted that require the private
sector to conform to fundamental prin-
ciples of nondiscrimination.
What I have just said does not mean
that we can overnight overcome the
results of generations of discrimination
and disadvantage. I have not carefully
checked all the statistics which our dis-
tinguished Soviet colleague has recited,
but they may very well be correct. What
is important to note is the change in the
figures in recent years, as groups of our
population which were previously dis-
criminated against have seen the bar-
riers fall and have used the opportun-
ities which have been afforded them.
Nothing that I have said is designed
to suggest that we have eliminated
racial and ethnic antagonisms within our
population. They do exist, and govern-
ment is not able to change that fact. But
here, too, we have witnessed change.
Through the activities of various institu-
tions-including, particularly, religious
g
-yo
pe
p
ge
e
n
creasingly been imbued with a commit-
ment to human brotherhood. We, there-
fore, have reason to believe that over
time these antagonisms will continue to
diminish.
My remarks about nondiscrimination
generally apply to Indians as well. But
our Indian people have a special prob-
lem, which they share with indigenous
peoples elsewhere in the world-indige-
nous peoples whose culture and econo-
mies differ markedly from those of the
surrounding society. Many of our Indian
reservation residents are only a few
generations removed from a hunting and
fishing culture. They have found it much
more difficult to fit into industrial socie-
ty than do the descendants of families
engaged in agriculture.
The unusually large unemployment
rate on Indian reservations is related to
this problem. It is, let me emphasize, the
unemployment rate not of Indian people
but for Indian reservations. Indian peo-
ple who have decided to leave the reser-
vations can find and have found jobs
elsewhere in the country. But there is no
doubt that Indian reservations have
found it difficult to attract industry and
thereby create job opportunities for In-
dian people at reasonable wage levels in
their home communities. It happens to
be a problem with which our govern-
ment has concerned itself and continues
to concern itself. I readily concede that
the problem has not been solved. In fact,
I have personally worked and written on
this subject.
I shall complete this discussion of
discrimination by noting again that the
United States has served as a magnet
for immigrants of all races to achieve a
higher standard of life for themselves
and for their children. The fact that a
majority of recent immigrants to the
United States are nonwhites from non-
European areas and that they have inte-
grated into our society at a truly amaz-
ing speed is clear evidence of the
strength of the well-recognized Ameri-
can acceptance of a variety of ethnic
groups into our social and economic
system.
The Role of Women. Much has also
been said here as to the role of women
in the United States. As to the point
made concerning the Equal Rights
Amendment, let me note again that the
courts of the United States have con-
strued the 5th and 14th amendments to
the U.S. Constitution so as to require
legal equality between the sexes.
Admittedly, what is required by law
takes time to be translated into reality
in day-to-day life. The entry of women
into our economic life on a basis of pari-
ty occurred only quite recently, after
1970. It has, however, progressed at
amazing speed. To cite one item of
statistics that comes to mind, in 1970,
2% of all law school students were
women. Today they are 50%.
But new entries do not come in at
the very top. That is why we find
average women's wages to be below the
average earned by men. It was 60% in
1980; it is 64% today and is expected to
continue to rise as the years go by.
Here, too, we do not suggest that we
have reached our goal of full actual
rather than purely legal equality, but we
are clearly on our way toward that goal.
Soviet Economic Progress
Since the October Revolution
As I said earlier, we had not intended to
engage here in a debate on the respec-
tive advantages of the U.S. and Soviet
models, but as the Soviet Union has in-
itiated this discussion, we want to make
it clear that we are not inclined to
shrink from it. Let me say also that we
recognize that the Soviet Union started
to industrialize later than we did and
that the Soviet Union suffered devasta-
tion during World Wars I and II. But let
us also remember that we recalled
earlier in this session that the war in
Europe ended 40 years ago. How far
has the Soviet Union been able to travel
in this period on the way to its economic
goals?
In the early 1960s, Nikita
Khrushchev predicted that the Soviet
Union-would surpass the United States
in living standards by 1980. Yet studies
of comparative per capita consumption
conducted by University of Virginia pro-
fessor Gertrude Schroeder and others
show that today, 25 years after
Khrushchev spoke and 67 years after
the October Revolution, the Soviet
standard of living remains barely one-
third of the U.S. level. These same
studies show that Soviet living stand-
ards are much lower than in any de-
veloped Western country.
The average Soviet citizen, in fact,
lives less well than someone living at the
official U.S. poverty line. An American
family living at that level, for example,
lives on an income which is 41% of the
U.S. average. About 15.2% of our popu-
lation lives at or below that level. By
comparison, as indicated, the average
Soviet citizen lives at about one-third of
the U.S. average, which gives us some
idea of the percentage of the Soviet
population which lives below the U.S.
poverty line. As suggested earlier by our
distinguished Spanish colleague, equally
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dramatic comparisons can be made be-
tween the average Soviet citizen and the
average unemployed worker in the
West. In the recession year of 1982, for
example-the worst since World
War II-the median per capita income
for unemployed workers in the United
States was about $5,000. The average
income of a family with an unemployed
worker was $20,000. We do not deny
that such an income in many cases re-
flected a substantial decline in living
standards. But a Soviet family living on
the equivalent of $20,000 a year would
be quite well off, even after we have ad-
justed for differences in the cost of basic
needs.
In making these comparisons, I do
not mean to suggest that the. Soviet
Union has made no economic progress
since the October Revolution. But the
limited success the Soviet economy has
enjoyed in the past was dependent on
constant additions to the labor force and
on the availability of plentiful and in-
expensive resources. Now that the
Soviet Union has used up its surplus
labor pool and its resources are more
costly, its growth rates have plummeted.
The Soviet Union, in fact, is no longer
closing the gap between itself and the
developed West. The per capita con-
sumption comparisons I cited earlier
have remained constant over the last
decade. Given low Soviet labor produc-
tivity, the gap can reasonably be ex-
pected to widen in the future.
Shortcomings of the
Soviet Economic System
Consumer Shortages and Corruption.
The Soviet economy today is character-
ized by pervasive shortages of consumer
goods and the widespread corruption
these shortages generate. These
features, moreover, are not temporary
problems which will solve themselves
through continued progress over time.
Rather, they are problems endemic to
the Soviet system of centralized eco-
nomic planning. This system, based on
the notion that a small group of plan-
ners can efficiently allocate resources
for an entire economy, has created in-
stead an economy of bottlenecks, short-
ages, and waste.
In the Soviet Union, unlike any-
where in the developed West, the most
basic consumer goods are in continuous
short supply and rationing remains a
common fact of Soviet life. The situation
has been so bad in some localities in re-
cent years that food riots have reported-
ly occurred. In 1981, Izvestia reported
the introduction of rationing in 12 major
Soviet cities, including Irkutsk, Kazan,
Tbilisi, Vologda, and Naberezhnye
Chelny (now called Brezhnev). We have
learned that meat and butter have both
been formally rationed in the closed city
of Sverdlovsk and its surrounding
villages for several years. Presumably,
the same is true of many other areas
closed to foreign visitors.
The long lines of people lining up for
scarce items on Soviet city streets have
become famous throughout the world.
The production and distribution system
is so capricious that it is impossible to
tell what will be available from one day
to the next. This is why Soviet house-
wives frequently join lines without in-
quiring what is for sale. They simply
assume they had better get whatever it
is while it's available. This is also one
important cause of Soviet productivity
problems, since working people are typi-
cally obliged to take unauthorized
absences from their jobs to chase after
scarce necessities. These endless short-
ages force the average Soviet family to
spend 2 hours shopping every day just
to obtain the basic necessities of life.
The endless waiting is bad enough,
but the Soviet consumer often finds that
the product waiting for him at the front
of the line is hardly worth the wait. The
quality, variety, and design of the con-
sumer goods available in the Soviet
Union are, in fact, notoriously poor by
both Western and East European stand-
ards, and retail trade and personal ser-
vice facilities are scarce, primitive, and
inefficient.
As one might expect, the chronic
shortage of basic consumer goods has
fostered the creation of an enormous
black market in scarce items. This, in
turn, has led to widespread official cor-
ruption as persons with administrative
control over scarce commodities divert
them for personal gain. Corruption ex-
ists in all societies, but in the Soviet
Union it is a pervasive and normal part
of life. Stealing from the state is so com-
mon that the Soviet people have come to
take it for granted. Anecdotes about
corruption and bribery have become a
staple of Soviet humor.
The leaders of the Soviet Union are
aware of the problem, of course. It has
been frequently raised at party plenums,
and the Soviet media are replete with
stories of corruption, bribery, and the
executions of those unfortunate enough
to be selected as examples of equal
justice under law. What the Soviet lead-
ership seemingly fails to realize or sim-
ply will not face is that an economy of
shortages inevitably breeds corruption.
Some estimate that as much as 25% of
the Soviet gross national product (GNP)
is diverted to the black market every
year.
It must be emphasized once again
that the chronic shortages and wide-
spread corruption which characterize
contemporary Soviet life are fundamen-
tal features of the Soviet economic
system. They reflect the systemic inflex-
ibility of a centralized economic planning
system which breeds bottlenecks and in-
efficiencies.
The Soviet consumer is further
disadvantaged by the Soviet preference
for spending on defense and heavy in-
dustry at the expense of the consumer
sector. Soviet per capita spending for
defense, for example, is, in relative
terms, at least twice as high as in any
developed Western country. Though we
have heard a great many reminders
from some of our colleagues here of the
importance of the right to life and ap-
peals for an end to the arms race, let us
remember that in the 1970s the Soviet
Union was the only runner in that arms
race, continuing its buildup while the
United States was, in effect, engaging in
unilateral arms reduction. Today, the
Soviet Union spends at least 14% of its
GNP on defense, compared to only 7%
for the United States. Given the Soviet
Union's systemic economic problems and
its emphasis on heavy industry and
weapons procurement, it is little wonder
that Soviet authorities and press com-
mentators chronically complain about
the evils of "consumerism" and against
the excessive accumulation of material
goods.
Effects of Agricultural Collectiv-
ization. The Soviet system of collectiv-
ized agriculture also contributes to the
harshness of Soviet life. Much of the
problem in food supply stems from the
collectivized nature of Soviet agri-
culture. As is well known, the forced col-
lectivization of agriculture in the early
1930s divested Soviet farmers of their
land. What is not so well known is that
the forcible confiscation of grain supplies
that accompanied it resulted in a wide-
spread famine that killed as many as 6
million in the Ukraine alone. Collec-
tivization not only killed 6 million people
but it permanently crippled Soviet agri-
culture.
The Soviet Union-in prerevolu-
tionary days the world's largest grain
exporter-is now the world's largest
grain importer. Twenty percent of the
Soviet work force works in agriculture,
compared to 3% in the United States.
Yet the Soviet Union often has had to
import up to 25% of its grain. American
farmers, who own their own land, are 10
times more productive than their Soviet
counterparts. Each year, approximately
20% of the grain, fruit, and vegetable
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harvest and as much as 50% of the
Soviet potato crop perishes because of
the poor storage, transportation, and
distribution system.
Soviet farmers have not lost their
ability to grow crops. They just lack the
incentive to do so on a kolkhoz [collective
farm]. By contrast, even though private
plots, which are farmed by individuals in
the early morning and late evening
hours, occupy only 4% of the Soviet
Union's arable land, they produce 25%
of the Soviet Union's total crop output.
Housing Shortages and Deficien-
cies. Housing in the Soviet Union is in
as short supply as most consumer goods.
At least 20% of all urban families must
share kitchen and toilet facilities with
other families. Another 5% live in fac-
tory dormitories. Young married couples
are typically forced to live with their
parents and must wait years for housing
of their own.
The housing that does exist is ex-
tremely cramped, more so than in any
other developed country in the world.
The average Soviet citizen has 14 square
meters of living space, for example,
compared to the 49 square meters
available to the average American. This
means that there are approximately two
people for every room in the Soviet
Union, compared with two rooms for
every person in the United States.
Soviet statistics reveal that in 1983, 32%
of all urban housing had no hot water,
23% was without gas, 19% without in-
door baths, 12% without central heating,
11% without sewage facilities, and 9%
without water.
The housing situation is much worse
in the countryside and contains many
features reminiscent of the 19th cen-
tury-or even the 18th. There, for the
most part, heating is with fireplaces,
food is cooked on wood stoves, out-
houses provide the toilet facilities, and
water frequently is from a well.
Although there has been much new
housing built in the Soviet Union in re-
cent years, almost all of it consists of
poorly constructed high-rise apartment
buildings, which are even more poorly
maintained. At the current rate of con-
struction, the per capita space available
to Soviet citizens will begin to approach
the Western standard in approximately
150 years. Soviet housing woes should
come as no surprise, given the fact that
the Soviet Union -j c ds less tip;;inn one-
fifth as much on housing as the 1. ,ited
States and well under half of what is
spent in Spain and Japan.
Status of Soviet Women. Women in
the Soviet Union usually occupy the
lowest status and lowest paying jobs in
Soviet society. One-third of all working
Soviet women, for example, are em-
ployed as agricultural laborers. By con-
trast, only 1.5% of American women are
so employed.
Soviet authorities often point to the
liberal maternity benefits accorded to
Soviet women. Yet the Soviet Union is
currently suffering from a severe labor
shortage brought on by declining birth
rates. This reduction in birth rates, in
turn, is due to the extraordinarily high
abortion rate. Many women have a
history of five or more abortions. The
fact is that the low Soviet standard of
living compels women to work to supple-
ment the family income. Maternity bene-
fits, with extra mouths to feed and
bodies to clothe, are, in many instances,
simply not enough to encourage a family
to let a child be born.
Unlike Soviet men, the working day
of a Soviet woman does not end as she
leaves the field or the factory. Soviet
women are expected to do the cooking
and the housework and the waiting in
line.
In the West, women have effectively
banded together to fight discrimination
and sexism, but Soviet women have no
access to effective political power. In its
entire history, only one woman has ever
served on the Politburo; none serves
there now. Fewer than 5% of Central
Committee members are female. Inter-
estingly, only one-fourth of Communist
Party members are female.
Medical Care and Health Prob-
lems. Soviet authorities are often fond
of pointing out that health care in the
Soviet Union is free. As with so much
that is free or subsidized in the Soviet
Union, however, you often get what you
pay for. Although there are plenty of
beds in Soviet hospitals, the people who
lie in them frequently receive substand-
ard care. One-third of them, for exam-
ple, develop postoperative infections due
to unsanitary conditions. Most of the
doctors who care for them, moreover,
are poorly trained by Western stand-
ards. Medicine is not a high-prestige oc-
cupation in the Soviet Union, and doc-
tors are among the lowest paid workers
in Soviet society. Significantly, 70% of
these low-paid physicians are women.
Soviet medicine is not immune to
the same shortages that afflict the rest
of Soviet society. Medical equipment and
many medicines are in extremely short
supply. One-third of all Soviet hospitals,
for example, do not have adequate
facilities for blood transfusions. Basic
items such as bandages, aspirin, and
syringes are often difficult to find. Food
rations are so small that patients must
supplement their diet with food from
home. In Novosibirsk, for example,
which is home to many leading Soviet
academic institutes and where one would
expect supplies to be significantly better
than normal, only 11% of the 216 stand-
ard drugs to be prescribed for specific
illnesses are actually available. These
shortages are not surprising in light of
the fact that Soviet per capita expendi-
tures on health care are less than one-
third the U.S. level.
Although the problems in the Soviet
health care delivery system are serious,
they are not the most serious medical
problem facing the Soviet Union today.
Dramatically, over the course of the past
two decades a significant deterioration
has occurred in the overall health status
of the Soviet population. Recent studies
show that there has been an increase in
Soviet death and morbidity rates over
the past 20 years. The life expectancy of
Soviet males has decreased during that
period by a little over 4 years, from 66
in the mid-1960s to just under 62 years
today. In the United States during the
same period, male life expectancy in-
creased from 66 to 71 years. Infant mor-
tality in the Soviet Union has increased
from 26.2 per 1,000 live births in 1971
to about 40 per 1,000 today. U.S. infant
mortality during the same period has de-
creased from 24.7 per 1,000 to 10.7.
The Soviet figure for infant mortali-
ty is necessarily an estimate since Soviet
authorities stopped publishing infant
mortality statistics after 1974 when the
rate had risen to 31.9 per 1,000. This
rate was already much higher than in
any developed Western country. The
Soviet Union also has stopped publishing
life expectancy figures. The reason why
this has been done is obvious enough.
The decrease in male life expectancy and
the increase in infant mortality in the
Soviet Union are historic events. Never
before has a developed, industrialized
nation suffered a decline in these demo-
graphic indicators in time of peace.
The reasons for this decline are even
more disturbing for anyone tempted to
look to the Soviet Union as a model for
social and economic development. Fac-
tors such as poor health care, increased
smoking, and frequently unregulated in-
dustrial pollution are important, but
perhaps the most important contributor
is alcohol. This would appear to be the
view of Soviet authorities themselves.
The Soviet Union leads the world in
the per capita coonsumption of hard
liquor. Much of it is uus.ume~l in the
form of home-brewed moonshine known
as samogon. Alcohol consumption in the
Soviet Union has more than doubled
over the past 25 years. The death rate
from alcohol poisoning in the Soviet
Union is 88 times the U.S. rate, and
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alcohol and its effects may be the
leading cause of death among Soviet
males.
Alcohol abuse in the Soviet Union is
not simply a male problem. Alcohol
abuse is the third leading cause of illness
among Soviet women and is a key factor
in both the alarming rise in birth defects
and the increased infant mortality rate.
By 1980 the net social cost of alcohol
abuse in decreased labor productivity in
the Soviet Union amounted to a stagger-
ing 8%-9% of the total national income.
Much of the heavy drinking in the
Soviet Union occurs in the work place.
Professor R. Lirmyan of the Soviet
Academy of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs, writing in a 1982 issue of
Molodoy Kommunist, reported that 37%
of the male work force is chronically
drunk. Not surprisingly, drunkenness is
the leading cause of industrial accidents.
A poll cited in a March 1984 edition
of a Soviet journal, Sovetskaya Rossiya,
revealed that half the Soviet population
regards drunkenness as the number one
social problem in the Soviet Union.
Seventy-four percent said they were
alarmed over the extent of public drunk-
enness. These statistics make clear that
the Soviet Union now suffers from an
alcohol abuse problem of epidemic pro-
portions, serious enough to cause a sig-
nificant rise in the national death rate.
As I remarked earlier, even the
Soviet leadership concurs with this
assessment. Vitaliy Fedorchuk, the
Soviet Minister for Internal Affairs, in-
terviewed in the August 29, 1984, issue
of Literaturnaya Gazeta, candidly ac-
knowledged that Soviet mortality and
sickness rates have been on the increase,
and he specifically cited alcohol abuse as
the cause.
We note with interest that the
Soviet authorities only last week an-
nounced yet another campaign against
the abuse of alcohol. Production is to be
cut back, the drinking age raised, and
penalties against the manufacture of
home brew increased. While it is possi-
ble that these measures may meet with
some limited success, we note that
similar campaigns have always failed in
the past. Our suspicion is that alcohol
abuse in the Soviet Union will remain an
alarmingly serious problem until the
Soviet leadership begins to come to
grips with the profound social malaise
that gave rise to the problem in the first
place. In saying this, I do not mean to
deny that there are drug and alcohol
abuse problems in the United States and
in other countries which deserve our
serious attention. But I am suggesting
that in the Soviet Union we are dealing
with a problem of an entirely different
order of magnitude.
Egalitarianism in the Soviet Union
I have been talking at length here about
some serious difficulties in the Soviet
social and economic system. But there is
one more problem I would like to dis-
cuss. As we know, Marxist-Leninist
ideology claims to be based on the no-
tion of egalitarianism. This, we are told,
is what the great October Revolution
was all about. One would, therefore, ex-
pect that whatever problems the Soviet
Union might have, the Soviet authorities
would ensure that no class or group or
individuals would ever be accorded
privileges not available to other
members of Soviet society.
But the truth is that certain groups
in Soviet society (the party, the military
officer corps, the diplomatic corps, the
scientific-technical intelligentsia, the
cultural and sports establishments) have
deliberately shielded themselves from
the social and economic hardships faced
by the rest of the population. A privi-
leged 5% of the Soviet population,
known as the Nomenklatura, has access
to special "closed" stores that are
specially stocked with foreign goods not
available in regular stores, as well as
bountiful supplies of Soviet goods that
are in short supply elsewhere. The
average Soviet citizen is forbidden from
entering these stores, which are un-
marked and have opaque windows to
prevent the curious from looking in.
Housing space is allocated by state
authorities on the basis of social status.
Many leading Soviet organizations have
their own housing facilities, which are of
good standard and centrally located.
The Fourth Directorate of the
Ministry of Health runs a closed system
of hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries for
the Nomenklatura, providing far better
services than those available to the
general population. The Soviet ruling
oligarchy also has access to such special
benefits as foreign travel, automobiles,
admission to the best schools, country
houses, access to cultural events, and
paid vacations in choice resorts, which
are not available to the average citizen.
Even the center lanes of certain roads
are closed off for their exclusive per-
sonal use. To quote from George
Orwell's Animal Farm: "All animals are
equal. but some are more equal than
others."
Conclusion
In an earlier intervention, the distin-
guished Soviet representative suggested
that we were reluctant to discuss social
and economic issues in this forum. I
hope I have succeeded in dispelling this
impression. Despite our many problems,
we believe that we in the West, with our
pluralistic, mixed-market economies,
have gone further toward meeting basic
human social and economic aspirations
than has the system now in place in the
Soviet Union.
More than 35 years ago, there was
published a collection of essays authored
by prominent former communists or
fellow travelers, including Ignazio
Silone, Andre Gide, Richard Wright, and
Arthur Koestler. The book was entitled
The God That Failed. Each of these
prominent writers explained in his own
words why he had concluded that the
price in terms of personal freedom was
not worth paying to attain the promised
goal of a future paradise. The decades
that passed have demonstrated that the
image of paradise off in the distance
was only a mirage. ^
Published by the United States Department
of State ? Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication ? Editorial
Division ? Washington, D.C. ? June 1985
Editor: Cynthia Saboe ? This material is in
the public domain and may be reproduced
without permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
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