THE CUBAN POLITICAL DILEMNA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020057-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: November 3, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
3 November 1958
MEMORANDUM FCR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Cuban Political Dilemma
Conclusions
L. The 3 November national elections probably will have little
effect in resolving the political impasse in Cuba. Rebel leader
Fidel Castro will almost certainly continue his guerrilla warfare
campaign, although his movement in combination with other existing
opposition groups probably cannot seize the government in the next
few months. The military? which will become increasingly discontented
with the civil war, will remain the only single force capable of
deposing the dictatorship. Almost all the military would be likely
to agree to such action if there were strong popular reactions to
the electoral outcome or a sharp increase in Castro's strength.
A faction of the military, including younger elements, may act
regardless of whether there is a major change in the political
situation. A military-dominated junta almost certainly could not
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restore peace to Cuba unless its membership and actions were such
as to convince a majority of CUbans, including Castro, of its demo.
erotic intentions. However, regardless of developments over the
next few months, it ts possible that the military will be unable to
unite in concerted action and that the political impasse will
continue for some time.
A. Theis Strengths and Weaknesses of Fidel Castrots "26 of July
M07473;1773
2. To date, Fidel Castro has been unable to arouse sufficient
popular support to overthrow the Batista regime, but the regime has
itself been unable to suppress or contain Castro. As a guerrilla
operation, the 26th of July Movement now dominates much of the rural
area of Oriente Province and has spread to other parts of the island.
Since 1956, his armed forces have grown from a handful of filibusters
to their present estimated strength of upwards of 5,000 nen. Although
still unable to challenge the army in sustained combat in open
terrain, they have performed effectively as guerrillas. They have
virtually paralyzed land transport within Oriente and have held
small towns for short periods of time. They also control some rural
2.1 The gare7=157E7grits name from the date of Castrots abortive
attack on the military barracks in Santiago in 1953.
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areas and have interfered with transportation in the neighboring
province of Camaguey. The activities of the movement are being
intensified in the central and extreme western provinces. A rebel
underground organization operates in many cities and acts as liaison
with other opposition groups, both in and outside of Cube. The
movement has branches in several Latin American countries, notably
Mexico and Venezuela, and also in the US, which provide important
financial and logistical support.
3. Castrols Objectives beyond the elimination of Batista are
not clear. This has raised doubts about his long-range intentions
among many non-26 July opposition leaders such as Miro Cardona,
secretary general of the FCR (Fronte Civic? Revaucionario), who
at the moment support Castro. His infrequent pronouncements reflect
no particular program, although they indicate definite concern for
agrarian reform and the regulation of public utilities. He has
stated that if successful he would initially replace the Batista
regime with a provisional civilian government, headed by Dr. Manuel
Utrutia nee, and including representatives drawn from most groups
in Cuba,'
The FOR was formed in Carlafts on 20 July 1958 at a meeting of
representatives of all revolutionmry groups oppused to the
Batista regime.
Dr. Utrutia Lleo is a respected but little known forcer magistrate
of a Santiago court who is now in exile. He is generally con-
sidered to have little pzlitical acumen.
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Ho envisages the restoration of danocratic government following
a transition period. There are no indications of the role Castro
would seek to play in a now government.
4. Although Castro has attracted a widely varied following
-- including some respected Cuban civic: business: and religious
_rows hc:unljko the revolutionary in Venezuela: hae
not yet been able to gain widespread popular support. Twice his
attempts to call a nationwide general strike have failud: largely
bec,use of inability to obtain support in the capital city of
Havana.
5. Castro has failed to convince the majority of the Cuban
people that democratic government can be reestablished only by
revolutionar: action. Cuba continues to enjoy relative economic
prosperity, and a large part of the populAion: probably concerned
that revolution would jeopardize their well-being: appear to hope
that there can be a peaceful transition fron authoritarian to consti-
tutional k-overnment. The Roman Catholic Church, although apparently
becoming increasingly anti-Batista: continuos officially to support
a peaceful chanco of -overnment. Or%anized labor has not been
willing to oppose the Batista regime under which it has received
important benefits. Castrols operations marked by destruction
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of property, brutality, and disruption of community life -- have not
only tended to reinforce popular doubts about the revolutionaryapprUch,
but have also provoked much antagonism.
B. The Role of the Cuban Communists
6. The position of the Cuban Communists seems to be a far cry
from that of their counterparts in Venezuela, who played an important
role in the revolution against former military dictator Perez, and
thereby made possible their general acceptance as part of the civilian
resurgence. There is no evidence that the "26 of July Movement" is
Communist-dominated, although a few alleged Communist sympathizers
have moderately important positions and others may be in .the lower
levels and within the organization's branch in Mexico. In fact the
"26 of aly Movement" has thus far rejected offers of support from the
Popular Socialist Party, the Cuban Communist Party.
C. The Role of the Cuban Military
7. The major obstacle to the success of Castro's revolution
is the military's continued support of the Batista government. The
military, by committing the bulk of its forces in Eastern Cuba, had
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been able to retain control of urban areas and to restrict the
guerrillas largely to mountainous areas. However, there is growing
dissatisfaction and worsening morale among both officers and men in
the armed forces, largely because of the lack of progress in closing
out the two year old civil war and because of widespread military graft
in combat areas. Many of the army enlisted personnel are unhappy because
they have to giro up soft posts for the hardships of combat operations
against the guerrillas, in which the army is suffering fairly substantial
losses. These factors have reduced the effectiveness of army units
in the field. As yet, discontent has apparently not begun to crystal..
lize around specific military elements. This development could occur
if the majority of officers came to belUme that the Castro movement
was gaining such momentum that their continued support of Batista would
jeopardize their awn positions,
D. The 3 November National Elections
G. Faced with growing opposition to his regime throughout
Cuba, President Batista has held constitutional guarantees in abeyance
for most of two years, and has resorted increasingly to authoritarian
measures. Nevertheless, Batista decided to go through with national
elections on 3 November probably in hopes that by removing himself from
office he would deny Castro his major target and thus cause the .
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Castro campaign to lose momentum. To strengthen the effectiveness of
this move, he has declared that he will install the newly elected presi.
dent on 24 February 1959.
9. Batista permitted political parties to campaign, but since
constitutional guarantees remained suspended, electoral activities
were minimal and the public was generally apathetic even in those places
whore the rebels were unable to interfere with voting. It is almost
certain that Andres Rivera Aguero, Datistats hand...picked successor,
won the presidency, and that the government coalition won a large number
of congressional seats and other offices. Although Rivera Aguero could
probably have won a completely free election because of the lack
of unity among the weak non.revolutionary opposition, his election
under the present chaotic internal condition can seem little more than
a sham.
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E. The Outlook for the Next Few Months
10. We believe that the elections and any subsequent efforts
by Batista to withdraw from the limelight probably will have little
effect in resolving the political impasse in favor of the Government.
Even if Batista left the country, the newly elected government would
find it difficult, if not impossible, to convince Castro that it was
no longer controlled by the dictator.
11. Under these circumstances, Castro will almost certainly
continue his guerrilla warfare campaign. While he will probably
gain additional strength, his movement, alone or in combination
with other existing opposition groups, probably will not have the
capability to seize the government in the next few months. There
is little to indicate that important elements in the military or
labor are about to shift their allegiance to Castro. Similarly,
the general public despite the sham elections does not appear on
the verge of giving active support to Castro.
12. A prolongation and possible intensification of wide-
spread guerrilla warfare would further reduce the Cuban Government's
ability to afford adequate protection for American lives and
property. US private investment in Cuba amount $850 million.
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(Only Venezuela and Brazil have greater US investments.) Although
the Castro movement does not appear to be anti-US? its method is
to exert pressure by the destruction of and levies against US as
well as Cuban property. US properties in Cuba are so numerous and
widespread that they must inevitably become increasingly involved
in the spreading guerrilla warfare.
13. The Arty remains the only single element capable of
breaking the political deadlock -- if it is able to act with sub-
stantial unity. Almost all the military leaders would be likely
to agree to take such action if there were strong, adverse popular
reactions to the electoral outcome or a sharp upsurge in Castrots
strength. It is possible that a large faction in the military,
made up largely of younger officers, might decide to act even
though there were no major change in the political situation. In
either case, the military leaders would believe that they could
protect their own positions only by installing a junta dominated
by the military.
14. A military junta by itself would not be able to re-
establish political stability, particularly if the junta included
many of the present top military leaders who are closely associ-
ated with Batista. It would not be recognized by Castro or the
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majority of the Cuban people as a significant change. However, if,
as in Venezuela, a junta were subsequently to purge itself of the
more objectionable initial members., replacing them with younger and
less venal officers, its chances for breaking the political impasse
would be substantially improved. The situation would become even
more favorable if such a modified junta, in an effort to undermine
Castrots cause, took positive steps in the direction of restoring
democratic processes. It is possible that this action by the junta
would be successful and would cause the Castro movement to lose
momentum. On the other hand, if the junta desired to end civil
strife quickly, it would probably have to open direct negotiations
with Castro. The latter's decision to come out of the hills would
depend on the junta's ability to convince him that he and his nen
would be safe from reprisals and that they would be able to take
an active role in national political life.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHER= KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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t.?1104,1,-
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