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REVOLUTION IN COMMUNICATION

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP92B00181R000300270028-9
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2013
Sequence Number: 
28
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 14, 1987
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP92B00181R000300270028-9.pdf [3]1.04 MB
Body: 
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/23 :CIA-RDP92B00181 8000300270028-9 ;~:_: OI'1~1 ~f'Y11,1111 ~~ 1 DURING the last two decades; military radio communications ~ have been revolutionised by the application of solid- state and digital technology., _ As a result, equipment has .become more versatile, mole reliable and, in real terms, less expensive.. It is more compact than its predecessors and able to operate with less power. At the same time, the widespread :application of modular design techniques has, to an extent, provided opportunities for tailoring the miz of standard components and subsystems to meet the' peculiar requirements of particular users. Modular desigrrhas.also been responsible for extending the functional repertoire of certain types of kit; a good example of this is NAPCO's CITQ-270 `snap-on' applique which is designed to convert the VRG-12 and other tactical manpack radios for meteor burst working within the space of a few minutes. ~ . The bad news is .that the rate of technological change is now such that there is a very rea] danger of systems becoming obsolete before they are fully fielded. This is only partially offset ~by the ease of upgrading, which is a product of the increased software content of modern military radio. In this period, VHF has established itself .as the favoured band for short-range land- . based communisations, and FM as the-most common form of modulation. Here, as the reduction in channel spacing has continued, digital frequency synthesizers have played an important part in arriving at the modern forward area equipment. Tactical systems have become smaller and lighter, to the point where almost identical By John Williamson~~ sets can appear as either vehicle communications centres or peripheral manpacks. Now, the tactical radio which is entirely digital up to the IF stage, is just around the corner. . Progress in long distance communication has been less consistent. iJntil quite recently, HF was the primary means of long haul military communications. However, .although in use since 'the early years of the century, HF had, and has, a number of intrinsic disadvahtages. While these were acceptable to earlier generations of users, by the 1960s they were becoming increasingly unacceptable for modern applications. In particular,.HF propagation was, .and is, subject to ionospheric disturbance and distortion, and graphic coverage is variable. At the. same time, some traffic types - including high-speed data communications - were not possible or only possible with a substantial price penalty. Moreover, since it was extensively used by military and non-military users alike, the HF part of the spectrum was. becoming very congested. At the time HF seemed to be running out of steam,? long haul communications using geo-synchronously orbiting satellites were demonstrated to'be a practical proposition, particularly for naval communications. One major user, the 'US Navy, began to put most of its communications eggs into the ~ 1TT's AN/VRC 89 long/short-range SINCGARS set . Declassified and Approved For ~ Marconi's Scimitar system at use in combat conditions satellite basket, relegating HF to.ammnor fall- . back role. Initially lacking the financial and technical .resources to construct their own military satellite capability, the European nations continued to develop and refine HF techniques. A number of events have subsequently caused the reliance on satellites as the only .serious element in long haul, non-wired military communications to be questioned. .Even before the suspension of the Shuttle programme and the latest failure of the Ariane rocket, the business of actually launching satellites was rather uncertain. There was also the related difficulty of repairing faults in situ. ' More critical, though, was the recognition that satellites in orbit are highly vulnerable to hostile attack. Since it was possible to destroy an incoming high-speed missile at .near-orbital height, went the reasoning, the destruction of a virtually stationary object such as a communications satellite was also achievable. ? Growing unease came to a head in the late 19.70s in a US exercise which assumed that .all friendly satellites had -been knocked out by enemy .action. Chiefs of staff were alarmed by the 1950s vintage HF.technology. which remained at their disposal.' .. These developments were instrumental in the revival of US interest in HF, and -spawned such initiatives as the High Frequency .Improvement programme and later, the High.Frequency Anti-Jam (HFAJ) . project. . Today, there is much less hostility to satellite communications than was evident earlier in the decade. The belief is now that a hostile force in practice would nor incapacitate friendly satellites, since this would be an unequivocal indication c,f irc Release 2013/04/23 :CIA-RDP92B00181 8000300270028-9 ~.To make fhe.task?of the enemv.even riinrP Y. pproved For Release 2013/04/23 :CIA-RDP92B00181 8000300270028-9 comomea;with'an encryption capability.or,: in what are known as~hybt`id systems, direct sequence modulafion.'The'latter is.designed to counter the effects of jamming with increased signal ,gain: __ - An example is Teletra's"Hydra series. of radio sets, one of which _-the Hydra/Y - future intentions. . Also, the vulnerability of satellites is -not confined to one side or the other, and in a tit-for-tat offensive against satellites, the enemy would probably be.inconvenienced.in the same measure as the friendly .forces. Electronic warfare . (EW) . is now . an established part of short-range military radio communications and is fast becoming a trend for HF. General Western interest in the various EW technologies was heightened .after the studies of the 1970s Middle East conflict showed that the Egyptians were able to use Soviet radio disruption techniques to some effect against the Israelis. Frequency hopping, which the South Africans.claim to have pioneered, is one of the main weapons in the EW armoury. Disruption . . The basic idea of frequency hopping is that if .a number of synchronised tranceivers (usually operating in a .net in land. applications) is .changed sufficiently frequently throughout the duration of a message, the disruption?or acquisition of the message becomes extremely difficult. . In operation, .radios are. programmed to dwell for ,a very short time in a pseudo .random sequence on the aarge-number of .frequencies which .constitute.-the `.hop. set'. Two types of hop set are ,possible - orthogonal and non-orthogonal... , -. . The first is designed so what there is no mutual .interference between different hop sets. With the latter, different hop sets may occasionally use the same frequency at .the same time. However, in operational nets which have a low. send-to-receive ratio, tt;e probability of this happening . is quite .small and deterioration in performance is negligible. . Non-orthogonal -can also make more efficient use 'of the available frequency. spect-rum. is.claimed `by its manufacturer to give a 9dB ~ Ha C ' rns orp s RF-3490 digital data buffer s advantage when compared to more designed fordara applications on the NA/PRC-.117 conventional fro.,,,e..,,.. L___-_- _ --- ro.,,,e.,.,.. ~___--- achieved with frequency hopping. Marconi .between failure) levels required by the reports that its .Scimitar system has 'be en military..? demonstrated working. satisfactorily when Although 'in ahe course of the year the placed L00 m away from three 1 kW MT BF of the first examples ofthe frequency . . jammers. "h opping variants of .SINCGARS was This notwithstanding some early ho e , p s reportedly lowered from 200 to 400 hours, 'for the technology have not been fulfilled h . .. t e official requirement'is for 1250 hours. The history of one of the .major frequency At present, the army has agreed to.accept hopping programmes -. the USA's single 300 non-frequency hopping radios in 1.989 channel ground/air radio . system .for field trials in 1990. If successful,.tfie army (SINCGARS) is instructive in this regard will h : t en authorise ITT in 1991 to_produce SINCGARS is a $5.6 billion .project 300 frequency hopping sets which must meet designed to furnish:a jam- roof l p rep acement .the original MTBF. specification. for the US Army's old AN/P,RC=77 -and This:means that if the reliability problems AN/VRC-12 radios. are .sorted out, no lar a-scale g .Production Conceived in the mid=1970s th 'e , e ro ct P J quantities of frequency hopping radios will initially looked at medium hopping (around be released until around 1994, with exports 150 hops/sec) and':fast hopping.(around 2000 banned until the turn of .the .century. changes per. second) radio variants, and Export -markets aside, there are .mixed involved a number of US and joint US/UK ~ views about what these developments could manufacturers. In the event; fast hopping mean for ITT's competitors in this sector. proved to be unattainable, and in 1983 ITT Some companies envisage ashort-term~US was.awarded.the main contract to ;produce market opening up with?the military buying a 200 hops/sec system.. " a proven off-the-shelf frequency hopping By the spring of last year, SINCGARS was system. 12 ?months behind schedule. Then, last Most .of such equipment is produced by December, representatives of the army and overseas manufacturers: Leaving aside for ITT agreed to further restructure .the political reasons 'South African (and programme. The cause of this was ITT's probably Israeli), sources of supply, inability to achieve the MTBF (mean time European companies .such as Marconi, R ~ Part of the Marconi ICS3 broad-band HF system acal, Plessey, Thomson and Telettra could compete in a market worth tens of millions of pounds. Ii3NE'S DEFENCE VJEEKLI' 74 FEgRUAP,Y lag? - ~ ~ - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/23 :CIA-RDP92B00181 8000300270028-9 hopping s Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/2 nor woula tney work with SINCGARS. Modifying equipment to be compatible with SINCGARS in the future might easily go beyond the revised schedule for the introduction of SINCGARS itself, and the spares holding and maintenance tasks would . be considerably complicated. Some observers consider that a more likely outcome will be to attempt to speed up the .SINCGARS programme by the appointment of a major second source supplier with experience in frequency hopping technology. If 300 hops/sec is a medium speed for VHF systems, 100 hops/sec would be quite ,fast for long haul narrowband links. In simple terms, .the faster the rate of hops required, the more the energy that has to be introduced into the system. This energy is residual, and can produce problems of side-lobes, interference and noise to compound the difficulties of the already less than optimum HF environment. The relationship between hop rate and the defensive and operational requirement of pazticulaz forces is quite complex. An enemy will find it useful to intercept and analyse a friendly force's signal traffic at some times, and shut communications down by jamming on spot frequencies at other times. To circumvent this, the friendly force frequency hops its communications. Hop sequence In the first circumstance this leaves the hostiles with the task of replicating the hop sequence and rate to access any message's content. At very high hop rates, the laws of physics intervene and due to the propagation times of signals, it becomes impossible for an enemy receiver to change frequency with sufficient rapidity to accomplish its task. So far as jamming is concerned, frequency hopping can be countered by either using a follower jammer or spreading power over a wide frequency band. In both cases, the amount of power available to the jammer on any one frequency will probably be lower than that originally transmitted. This means that to succeed in its task, the jammer will be obliged to move closer to its target, thereby providing some opportunity for cat and mouse manoeuvring on the part of the friendly force until the source of disruption is brought within range of defensive assets. Among the survivors of the recent US enthusiasm for HF is the HFAJ. Originally inspired by the US Navy, HFAJ now has multi-service applications and could be worth an initial $3 billion to an equipment supplier.. The technological requirement has so far proven so complex that only proposals submitted by a team led by Rockwell and Marconi, ?and supported by Westinghouse and Magnavox, have received serious attention. Although.this, singularity flies in the face bf conventional US procurement practices, the partners are optimistic that they will get the go-ahead. Latest reports suggest that the first HFAJ contracts will be announced in March, and involve systems for the US Navy. These will be based on Marconi's ICS3 broadband system architecture, which is used by the Royal Navy, the Royal Netherlands Navy and the Hellenic Navy, and has been sold to the US Navy for use in its new LHD1 class of combined assault ships. ICS3 is a broadband system which, its manufacturers argue, has key advantages when it comes to frequency hopping at HF. The system's architecture enables all transmissions to be amplified and radiated simultaneously using a single power bank of amplifiers and broadband antennas. This arrangement removes the need for any RF mechanical units. ~ ~? The net result is that frequency changes are relatively fast, and can be made in rapid succession. Additionally, the radiated HF power can be adjusted instantly and independently for each frequency, and the separation between adjacent HF channels can be reduced to as little as 50 kHz. - _. Moreover, narrowband HF and MF channels can be incorporated to suit BAGLIET ' FAST OFF SHORE PATROL ANO ATTACK CRAF t tL. (06) 57.56.223.57.82.709 TELEX 625824 SAMI I -FAX (O6) 5782709 ~ Harness system for the Scimitar family of radios particular users' requirements. ICS3 has the US nomenclature AN/URC-109. Not all armies or navies share the US belief in the value or practicality of frequency. hopping in modern military communications. The British Army, for example, has not yet made a final commitment to the .technology, although it has conducted trials with Racal's Jaguar and 1`4arconi's Scimitar systems. In part, these trials were designed to test the feasibility of managing large numbers of frequency hopping radios in very close proximity - an environment which would be encountered in a European theatre of war. Initial scepticism has apparently been reduced after 100 radios were operated satisfactorily inside a single field. In the absence of a large home mazket, UK manufacturers have had to turn their attentions abroad where, indeed, they have had some considerable success in selling the idea and the technology. ' . Racal has sold over ?70 million worth of its system, _ a sum which includes a ?20 million deal with Oman. Australia's .planned Raven system, in which Plessey is the major contractor, has major frequency hopping capabilities. Meanwhile, Marconi has most recently been awarded a ?40 milion-plus contract to supply derivatives of its broadband Scimitar system to the Swedish Army and elements of the Swedish Navy. ~~~~ 244 JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY la FERRUARV iag7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/23 :CIA-RDP92B00181 8000300270028-9

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