POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY IN 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003800100002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 3, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/20 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003800100002-7
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140
COPY NO.
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
4!;205
POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP
WITHDRAWAL FROM
EAST GERMANY? IN 1950
ORE 2-50
Published 3 February 1950
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/20 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003800100002-7
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/20 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003800100002-7
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s Eitors T
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S jipeE T ?
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POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY IN 1950
SUMMARY
The possibility of a complete Soviet troop
withdrawal from East Germany in 1950, al-
though it cannot be entirely discounted, is
slight. The USSR may, however, consider-
ably reduce' its East German occupation force
in 1950 and propagandize the reduction as the
first step toward complete withdrawal of its
troops from the area.
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air
Force have concurred in this report. It contains information available to CIA as of
18 January 1950. .
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SECR
POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY IN 1950
In an attempt to increase the prestige of
the new East German Government, the USSR
has granted it diplomatic recognition, per-
mitted the passage of a general Nazi amnesty
law, and promised early return of all Soviet-
held German prisoners of war. As intimated
by German , Communist propaganda at the
time of the creation of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR), the Kremlin might under-
take a more decisive move: the unilateral
withdrawal of its troops from East Germany.*
The Soviet Union would obtain certain ad-
vantages from a complete troop withdrawal.
This action, ostensibly the result of negotia-
tions with the Pieck Government, would raise
the prestige of the GDR and might result
In gradual West German pressure for a with-
drawal of Western troops from Germany. It
would relieve the USSR of direct responsibility
for GDR police state tactics, would eliminate
the "contamination" to which Soviet troops
are subject in East Germany; and could be ex-
ploited by Soviet propaganda as proof of the
USSR's "peaceful intentions."
The principal advantages to the USSR of a
complete troop withdrawal do not, however,
outweigh its principal disadvantage?the
weakening of Soviet control in East Germany.
The USSR does not now have a control ap-
paratus within the East German State ade-
quate in itself to insure *continued Communist
control. The USSR might be able during 1950
to improve its present control apparatus to
a point of security where (in combination with
* A Soviet decision to effect a troop withdrawal is
not believed to be dependent on a prior peace
treaty between the USSR and the GDR.
the capabilities of its troops in Poland to lend
moral and, if need be, timely physical support)
it could safely effect a complete troop with-
drawal. However, such a security combina-
tion in an area as important as East Germany
is not likely to satisfy the Soviet Union's ex-
treme security consciousness. Furthermore,
if re-entry of Soviet troops into East Germany
to support the Communist regime became
necessary, the result would be to destroy
quickly and effectively the advantages of the
original withdrawal and simultaneously to ex-
pose the true status of the GDR. Therefore
it is more likely that the USSR would consider
a well-tested security apparatus, possessing a
very high capability of control without out-
side military assistance, indispensable to com-
plete troop withdrawal. In view of the above
considerations, the possibility of a complete
troop withdrawal in 1950 appears slight.
On the other hand, the appointment of So-
viet Marshal Rokossovsky as Polish Defense
Minister and the current Soviet effort to ex-
pand East German paramilitary forces, which
are probably preparatory measures for an
eventual complete troop withdrawal from East
Germany, may foreshadow a reduction of the
Soviet occupation force in 1950. The USSR
can considerably reduce its present occupation.
force of 375,000 without endangering Com-
munist control and, by calling this reduction
the first step in complete troop withdrawal,
could gain a favorable propaganda theme.
Because many of the units withdrawn would
probably be redeployed to Poland, a partial
withdrawal would not fundamentally change
the offensive or defensive capabilities of the
USSR in the area.
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? POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL
PROM EAST GERMANY IN 19,0 ?
General
4. We suggest that, in addition to the factors considered
in this repert, Soviet airfield construction in Eastern Germany
is not to be reconciled with a full?scale withdrawal.
is
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0
GPO?State Serv.-50-4631
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