LETTER TO WILLIAM H. WEBSTER FROM DAVID L. BOREN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92M00732R000400020014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2014
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 27, 1989
• Content Type: LETTER

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OCA 89-2748
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Congressional Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505
Telephone: [phone]
TO:
?yi
egis ative Liaison
4 August 1989
Enclosed is the KAL 007 letter
that we discussed.
Office of Congressional Affairs
Enclosure
FORA, ? ? OBSOLETE
2-86 53j PREVIOUS
EDITIONS.
Distribution:
Orig -
( 1 - OCA Record /
?1 - :Iron?
OCA/Senate
4 Aug 8 9 )
(40)
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OCA 89-2748/1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Congressional Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505
Telephone: [phone]
FORM
2.86 1533 OBSOLETE
PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
Distribution:
Ori - Addressee
1 - OCA
dironn
OCA/Senate,
4 Aug 89)
(40)
STAT
STAT
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DAVID L BOREN. OKLAHOMA. CHAIRMAN
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN
CAM NUNN. GEORGIA
ERNEST F HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
BILL BRADLEY. NEW JERSEY
ALAN CRANSTON. CALIFORNIA
DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA
HOWARD Al METZENBAUM, OHIO
JOHN H. GLENN, JR.. OHIO
ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
ARLEN SPECTER. PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN WARNER. VIRGINIA
ALFONSE U. D'AMATO. NEW YORK
JOHN C. DANFORTH. MISSOURI
GEORGE MITCHELL MAINE. EX OFFICIO
ROBERT DOLE. KANSAS. EX OFFICIO WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475
ER 89-3144
United tatc.s eStnatt
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
GEORGE J. TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
L. BRITT SNIDER, GENERAL COUNSEL
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK
The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20530
July 27, 1989
Dear Judge Webster:
On December 30, 1980, Senator Sam Nunn, as Chairman of
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, sent a letter
to the Central Intelligence Agency requesting a response to
certain allegations regarding the American intelligence
community's actions in the August 31, 1983, shooting down of
Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight 007. On March 7, 1989, you
responded by letter to Senators Nunn, Kennedy and Kerry,
advising them that neither the CIA nor any other agency in
the American intelligence community was involved with KAL
007.
Inasmuch as your letter did not respond to the specific
questions posed in the December 30, 1988 letter, the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations staff has again
contacted the CIA regarding this 'issue.
On March 20, 1989, CIA Congressional
Liaison, met with the Permanent Subcommittee staff and
assured them that the CIA had conducted an extensive
investigation into this matter. further advised
that your letter of March 7, 1989 was written with the intent
that it could be shared with the public. The Subcommittee
staff requested further information on the matter. On May 1,
1989, iclvised them that a classified briefing on
the matter could be provided to interested Senators and
staff.
At this point, I believe it is essential that the CIA
provide a coordinated intelligence community briefing on the
investigation conducted in response to Senator Nunn's
December 30, 1988 letter for the Members of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigation. To alleviate any security
concerns, the briefing will be coordinated throulh the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senator Nunn's
letter requested that the CIA respond to the following
allegations:
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The Honorable William H. Webster
July 27, 1989
1) Did the United States intelligence community
place, or assist in placing, a radar signal
registration device and/or a pulse coded
modulation system on board KAL flight 007? If
not, did any foreign intelligence service place
the aforementioned devices on KAL flight 007?
According to material provided to the Subcom-
mittee, these devices were allegedly manufac-
tured by the Victor Dalmo Company.
2) Did the United States intelligence community
have any role in directing KAL flight 007 to
fly over Soviet territory?
3) Dill the United States intelligence community
routinely use civilian aircraft to skirt Soviet
territory in order to monitor Soviet air
defense reactions?
4) Did _United States military and civilian air
traffic controllers know of KAL flight 007's
course deviation? If so, did they warn KAL
flight 007? And if not, why not?
5) Did the United States intelligence community
confiscate or destroy the United States Air
Force's Minimally Attended Radar Station's
tapes relating to KAL flight 007?
Enclosed for your review are questions compiled by the
families of the victims of KAL 007. Senators Kennedy and
Kerry previously relayed these questions to the CIA in
separate correspondence.
Sincerely,
?
David L. Boren
Chairman
Enclosure
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QUESTIONS PROVIDED TO SENATOR 'JUNN
March 8, 1988
QUESTIONS FOR KAL 007 INQUIRY
1. Did the KAL 007 crew know it was off course before the
airliner was shotdown?
2. Did the FAA controller at Anchorage know that KAL 007
was off course and heading toward Soviet.airspaCe_before
the airliner was shot down?
3. Did any members of the U.S. military know that KAL 007
was off course and heading toward Soviet airspace before
the airlimer was shot down?
4. Did pilots or crew members of other aircraft know that
KAL 007 was off course before the airliner was shot down?
5. Did the Japanese know -- either military or civilian
-- that KAL 007 was off course and heading toward Soviet
airspace before the airliner was shot down?
6. If anyone knew that KAL 007 was off course before the
airliner was shot down, why did no one take action to warn
the crew?
7. Why are there two mutually contradictory versions of
the U.S. radar track of KAL 007ts flight over the Alaskan
mainland?
8. Why does the released copy of the FAA Anchorage radio
.tape parallel to the Tokyo radio tape in frequency and
t;me fail to register KAL 007 and KAL 015 and associated
Tokyo radio transmissions after 1.8.09 Z (Zebra Time), that
is, during the critical events in the disaster itself.
9. Why does the time signal on the Anchorage radio tape
drop by six decibels during the period 1837-1840:30
that is precisely during the period that KAL 007 exploded
or suffered a fast burn in mid air?
10. What is the meaning of the notations in Captain Chun's
handwriting in KAL 007's computerized flight plan filed at
Anchorage?
11. Why is there a 6 minute and 20 second gap between the
HF section of the Tokyo Radio tape and the VHF section
that follows it -- 1835:40-1842:00 Z?
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12. Where did the wreckage of KAL 007 actually hit the
water in the Sea df Japan?
13. What were the findings of the dives made by Dr. Robert
Ballard of Woods Hole on behalf of the U.S. Navy.
14. Is there any evidence to suggest that KAL 007 was
carrying sophisticated intelligence equipment whose
'function was unrelated to KAL 007's status as a commercial
common?carrier- airliner?
?t;
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)UES( iNS 2P,OVIDED 3Y 'ME
...January 8, 1989
1. The tape of data shown on the consolidated radarscope at
Elmendorf AFB which would have shown KE 007's track was erased.
Were these data received e:.1:ewher in the system, at NORAD for
example? If so, may we please see them? May we see the log?
2. How many U.S. military aircraft were operating north of Shemya
and south of Karaginski Island at the time KE 007 passed through?
What were their missions? What were their flight tracks relative
to KE 007's? What were their altitudes? What was KE 007's?
3. What recordings were made of the transmissions of Soviet inter-
ceptor aircraft and their ground controllers at the time KE 007
approached and crossed .the Kamchatka peninsula? May we please
see a transcript?.
4. In its early.inquiri4s of the USSR the United States referred
to data concerning KE.:.007 's disappearance from U.S. radar.
What relevant U.S. radar data exist? In particular, we would
like to see data as to KE 007's course, altitude data and speed
near and over Sakhalin Island and the course, altitude and
speed of ail other aircraft in its vicinity.
S. In the ICAO report it is stated that KE 007's transponder
was squawking 1300 when the airliner was in Soviet airspace.
What data does the intelligence community have from any source
as to responses Mode A and Mode' C) from KE 007'stransponder
while the airliner was in Soviet airspace? When did responses
from its transponder cease? What was KE 007's altitude at the
time?
6. In The Target is Destroyed Seymour M. Hersh says he learned
of a U.S. intelligence study which describes a turn to the right
by KE 007 on approachto Sakhalin. Did the turn take place? When.
did it begin? What was the course followed? We would like to see
the study on which Hersh was briefed.
7. On what basis were obviously classified details conceriEg
U:S. radar and SIGINT collection made available to Hershby
members of the intelligence community? An example is the,d-
cussiOn in The Target is Destroyed of Soviet transcontiA1.
communications at the.EIMe of KE 007's penetration of Soviet air-
space. Als7 given in Hersh's book are data on the course of
25X1
missions. ?
STAT
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8. Was the tape of the intercepted voices of the Soviet pilots
over Sakhalin Island which Ambassador Kirpatrick distributed to
interested missions at the U.N. on September 6,, X983 (a) made
by a voice actuated recorder and (b) unedited, as she stated?
If not, what editing was performed and by whom?
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9. Were the transinissions of the ground stations controlling
the Soviet interceptors near and over Sakhalin Island received?
If so, could. we see a transcript of their transmissions with
notation of the time of the transmissions?
10. Are the transmissions attributed to KE 007 as recorded by'
Japanese air traffic control authorties. and shown on the trans-
cript distributed to the press by FAA on Or about September 11,
1983 authentic as to content and time? If not, please describe
the changes made? Who made them?
11. An Anchorage Radio tape covering KE 007 and KE 015 HF com-.-
munications with. Tokyo Radio has been released by FAA under FOIA.
It fails to register any KE 007 transmissions 1707:45 - 1847:39
GMT. Is it a full and unedited representation of the material
received by Anchorage Radio?
? ?
1.2. Why did the U.S. Navy Spend a Month (late September --late
October, 1983) searching and/or recovering objects from the ocean
floor in a small area northwest of Moneron Island? What was it
seeking? What did it find? What 'equipment and expert assistance
were used in the effort?
13. Why was so little of KE 007 found (ar admitted to have been
found)? Why were no large pieces of the, aircraft found (or ad-
mitted to have been found)? Why were so few bodies found (or
admitted to have been found)? Why did the verticle fin of the
tail assembly fragment? Why were the voice and flight data .
recorders not recovered?'
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