STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF SPEECH GIVEN BY DCI TO THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL ON MARCH 16, 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 16, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Executiyo '11qTistry
ENOGRAP NOTES OF SPEECII GIVEN BY DCI TO THE
ADVER,TISING COUNCIL ON MARCH 16, 1960
Gordon, and
deal with Gordon's questions at the end of my remarks,
not at the beginning.
?
ordon that if I feel a little
weak this morning, a roung.man named Ad?uer kept me up too
late last night debating the relative progress f the economies of
the United States and th
Soviet Union.
There were quite a list of questions
were presented in
the agenda here and / think you want me to talk about 15 minutes,
and then will you check me on that? - and then havi questions.
And each one of them would furnish food for thought, so I've taken
just a minor, small question the changing Soviet threat i. military,
economic, psychological and subversive. I thought that would (Laugh
Before I really get going / woad like to reinforce
Gordon says about great work of the Advertising Council.
frequent occalsions to be in touch with it (of course very c
ys found it responSive to the proper call of government within
the p oper field. I think it is an absolutely indispensible organ
I4iight say of American policy and American endeavor in the ove
field and particularly In the foreign field.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
? 1110 2.
About a year ago, I had the pleasure of meeting with you.
Since that time there've been a good many developments. I'd like
to take one and discuss it a bit and its impact on the world
situation; and that new event, not new in the sense that it was
unexpected, but new in a sense possibly of bringing in a new era
in international relations, and that was the advertised test of the
Soviet Union into the Southern Pacific: the ICBM test. That, I feel,
was significant because it was advertised, and speaking to the
Advertising Council you'll understand that. They did that for a very
distinct purpose. They did not need to tell the United States Govern-
ment what the situation was because we knew quite well that they had
the power to do this, and to send a missile further if ,they wanted.
The power to send a missile to the Far Pacific is not, does not, have
to be the same as the power to send a missile to the moon. The
moon's further awaythan the Far Pacific. I think they di it, however,
in order to sort of notify the world that they had this capacity and do
Win a very blatant and open manner. They had tested to 'the Far
Pacific before. This is off the record, is it not? There's no?news men
present as such? :\
1 -t
Response by unidentified person: That is correct. This is of
-\
-,
the record, Allen; I should remind you that this proceeding Li
/ \
being taped by White House Signal Office fo7 the c iivenience (I l
/ \
ka
of the White House but 21Cit for public dissemination.
/
/ I
..,-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
1111
Right!
They wanted to advertise for policy and prestige p?irposes
that the ICBM was now an operational unit in the defense and offense
of forces of the Soviet Union. And also that it would be an ever-
growing threat for any country against which the Soviet Union chose
to use it. Since it was a kind of a nuclear blackmail, the fact that
they advertised these tests to about 8,000 miles - 8,000 statute
miles - was I believe for this particular purpose. As I say, this came
as no surprise. We had been following with a good deal of care the
Soviet testing program not only in their long range missiles but
also in their shorter range missiles and the fact that they could do
this and do it with reasonable accuracy was well known.
We do not, are not able to say whether the accuracy of that
particular test was as advertised by the Soviet since we do not know
what their target area, the exact target area, that they had in the
Pacific. We do know, however, that it went into the general target
area because before they made these tests they had certain well-
equipped radar vessels in the area and they posted them in a certain
place in the Pacific and then they shot into that general area. So
that we know that they got somewheres near their target but
obviously we didn't know exactly within a few miles what their target
was. So it of course had no monopoly in this field.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
? 4.
I see Neil McElroy and others there that know very well where
we ourselves stand, and we could have done approximately what the
Soviet did. They may have propulsion engines a little more
powerful today than we have, partly because there's not very much
point in sending a missile further than a certain number of miles
to reach any target one wants to reach. I have on my walls of my
office a map showing where this particular shot went, and if you swing
that around it covers all of the United States down to the Panama
Canal and the Northern coast of South America.
I'm not going to deal here with the problem of the missile gap,
if there be one, that'll be - you'll have other speakers here today,
Herb York has just spoken, I think, some good sense on that subject,
and he and others from the Defense Department will be before you.
I will say this, that there is no doubt that shortly after the close of
World War II the Soviet Union decided that'the long-range missile was
their great target in the military field. From their particular
location as they are placed geographically, this is the type of missile
that is most useful to them. They do not have overseas bases near
to the United States, they do not have the opportunities that we have
because of our geographic position and our alliances to get near to
what might be the chosen enemy.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
? 11)
And realizing this, since about 1948, having taken over the
German technique and the German technicians and German hardware
- a part of it at least (we took over some of it in the V-2, the
German ballistic missile as of the end of the war) - they moved on
very rapidly with a very careful well-planned, well-organized
series of tests beginning in about '47-'48 right up to the present time.
We do not feel however that this program of the Soviet Union has been
put on what I might call a crash basis. They have many, as I will
point out in a moment, they have many competing problems and they
have geared their missile program into their over-all military
program including great emphasis on defense against our possible
bomber attack and our potential in the bomber field and I would feel
they have put as much emphasis probably on the defense, to defend
the homeland, as they have on offense.
I have every confidence in the ability of this country to meet
and to fill any missile gap that may exist. There's some advantages
in being a hind-runner in a race. We can profit to some extent by
what they have proved is do-able and I believe that we have
technicians, capabilities at least equal to that of the Soviet Union
and, if you get on the industrial side, of course far superior to the
Soviet Union.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
?b ?
It is a threat, it is a serious threat, has to be taken seriously,
but I don't see any reason to be panicky about it. We are often
Inclined, I think, maybe a little bit on Capitol Hill, to get into kind
of a numbers racket on this. The ICBM, the IRBM, this whole
family of missiles is a very complicated family. You can't just
count numbers of ICBMs. One has to take into account in appraising
our relative situation many many things. The numbers of missiles
has to be considered in connection with their reliability, in connection
with their accuracy, in connection with their deployment - in many
cases an IRBM in our hands, particularly a Polaris weapon, can
be as useful as an ICBM in the hands of others.
And it is necessary, I think, to get a very measured picture
but one that should not of course lead us to any complacency. I would
like just to add this: We estimate. When I say we estimate, this
leads me to just say a wor ,d about estimates in the Intelligence
Community. We have, I think, now achieved and it is with the
closest cooperation with the Department of Defense and Department of
State, a quite well integrated and unified organization in the Intelligence
Community. We pool our resouices. And we're working together
very harmoniously in the intelligence field. There's naturally
competition here and there. Compe4tion is a good thing; it's a good
thing in intelligence as it is in industry. We haven't any anti-trust
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
laws in the intelligence field but we do each have our separate fields
of activity - working with the State Department officers in the field
and at home, our Military Attackesof the various Services, our
scientists and our technicians, - as I say we pool our resources.
We get together at least once a week in what we call the United States
Intelligence Board. And there we prepare, we pass on, the final
drafts of these various estimates, including an estimate as to let's say
the Russian missile and other strengths in the field of strategic
attack, and many other fields. We'll estimate anything anybody wants
us to estimate within our field. We keep out of making net estimates.
We're mit experts in the United States position. WS just estimate
where we think the Soviet Union is or where we think any other country
is, or what is likely to happen in any particular country; And despite
what was said at the Gridiron Dinner the other night, I don't turn to
the Bureau of the -Budget and ask them how many missiles I can give
the Soviet Union, as was suggested at that time - in funl
We try to look at the facts without fear or favor whether Neil
MeElroy or the Defense Department likes them or doesn't lik them,
or whether t th?liecretary of State likes the reports we make or not.
That's none of our concern. We try to report exactly the facts as we
find them, and we have many differences of opinion. Mary member
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP8OM01009A001502600006-0
of the Uniteetates Intelligence Board which includes myself
Chairman, the representative of Intelligence for the State Department,
the representative of Intelligence for the Defense Department, and
then the 0-2 of the Army and the A-2 of the Air Force, and the
Director of Naval Intelligence and a representative from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and the
Atomic Energy Commission for their particular specialities.
So when I say here we estimate, I am basing these few statements
that I will give on our national estimates. We estimate that today
Khrushchev does not consider that he could knock us out - knock out
the United States - without risking unacceptable retaliatory damage.
We also estimate that Khrushchev has no plans to attack us at a given
moment in the future if we keep our guard up, that is if we keep our
defense up. We estimate that Khrushchev does not believe that it is
necessary to destroyy, the world by nuclear attack in order to win it.
He has other means, he believes. And we believe that he is putting
equal exppluisis on other than military means to achieve his ends.
/t
He believes that be 'can win the world by the drive and vigor of
Communist ideology plus certain specific implementing courses of
action.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
?1.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Those dude, many of them, but they---those include
?
penetration of selected key areas. For example take Indonesia,
Southeast Asia, particularly Laos, and Cambodia, India, Iraq. and
now upcoming with more and more importance from their point of
view because of the impending chaos there. Black Africa. The
Communist resources throught the world, and they're very
considerable, the Communist Parties, their front organizations, their
deep cover agents throughout the world particularly in this Hemisphere,
have been told to exploit the theme of nationalism and anti-Americanism.
We see some of the effects of that in Cuba and in the Caribbean and
further deep in Latin America today. And we know pretty well what
reports they get. It is not too difficult to penetrate the Communist
Parties throughout the world. We have done that - done that quite
effectively, I think and we know, we know what the instructions are
from Moscow that are given to the Communist leaders of countries
like Cuba, Indonesia, India and others. And they differ to some extent.
I haven't the time to go into that in detail today, but we know what their
program in is these respects because they cannot keep that secret.
The Communists are fairly talkative at time, and the people they're
dealing with are not the hard-boiled deep-cover agents only of the
Soviet Union whose security is good, but they are the Communist
leaders of these various other countries.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
?
They are therefore fomenting and aiding nationalist revolutions
in this Hemisphere and also in countries like Afghanistan, Iran and
various parts of Black Africa. As I said, they have their popular
front in addition to their parties in many countries. Their parties
are strong, the Communist parties are strong, in many countries of
the world. In Europe their - strongest party today is in Italy; they
still have a strong party in France, and in Indonesia, Japan and parts
in the Far East and Southeast Asia. And they are capitalizing on the
fact that today we are going through and will be going through for many
years a crisis in the Republican-Democratic form of government.
It has proved practically impossible to translate on a world-wide basis
the type of government organization that we have here in the United
States, that England has, that many of the European countries have.
They are not ready for it. They can't handle it. They've tried to do
it and I think we'll have to find that, to see many years, before they
can evolve to a situation where they can have anything like 9m' form
of government that we have. I think maybe we've made some mistake
\
from time to time to expect that they would be able to do that. We have ,\
seen in order to avoid going over to a Communist form of government,
they've gone to military dictatorships and in many cases these have
worked out pretty well. Pakistan, Sudan, and in many countries,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
? ? ---
Burma, it has been in this way that they are trying to tide over
the period of their tutelage in government. And I think we must be
very patient with them.
I will stop now - - I have 10 minutes more?
Response: Well, I mean if you're going to answer questions
? AWD: be glad to. VU close the in about three minutes.
We in this country and in other countries of the Western world
with our Free Press, we see our own problems and we advertise our
own problems very freely, and members of the Advertising Council
understand that. Sometimes I think we do it a little bit too freely,
but its a free world and we have a free press, thank go dness. One
thing we don't see is, don't understand, the problems the other fellow
has. They do not advertise. The Soviet Union rarely advertises the
terrific problems that they are facing today. But that would be
another speech.
In agriculture they're having a very difficult problem. They
are having a very difficult problem meeting the consequences of the
great leap forward in education. You can't educate a man without
giving that man a thinking apparatus. When he begins to think he is
not going to restrict his thinking to the technical fields where the
Soviet would like to keep that particular individual.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
1111 ?
12.
We have had some very dramatic reports recently about the
what I would call the intellectual unrest in the Soviet Union as a
result of this. IChrushchevi while the master, and the undisputed
master of the Soviet Union today, is not the master to a point where
he can act in total disregard of the feelings of the peoples of the
Soviet Union. He's finding that more and more. He's caught in a way.
In order to get the great industrial advance, he has had to educate;
the scientific advance, he's had to educate. But as he educates his
own people, he may be educating Russia over the years - it's not
going to be quick - by evolution - I don't believe there's going to be
a revolution there - but by evolution he may be creating a situation
where over the years we wiU have a somewhat different Russia than
we face today, and possibly one somewhat easier to deal with. It
will not be easy for the immediate future and we have many many
problems.
stop there. Thank you very much.
(Applause.)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
IP ? 13.
QUESTION P RIOD
Allen, most of these ladies and gentlemen I think attended
the dinner last night at the Mayflower - I believe you were unable to
be there and there was a panel discussion by several newspaper
people about Cuba. And it was pointed out that with respect to that
ammunition ship which was blown up that Mr. Castro had not upon
examination of the transcript, had not actually said that the Americans
blew it up. He said that the people who didn't want the Cubans to get
arms blew the ship up, and Americans didn't
arms. And each of the newspaper
ant the Cubans to get
en present disclaimed any,
responsibility for this episode. Bill Lawrence of the New York Tim s
who was the moderator asked us to ask you the question, "Where
were you that day?"
Having got the complete answer to that question, sure the audiienc
AWD:
II p1
ad innocent on that. "
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
One of the questions sent in. Allen was: this group would
like to hear your comment on the relationship of the Soviet Union
and Communist China.
AWD: One of the troubles I might mention that Khrushchev
has is with China. At the moment it's an unhappy marriage. But
we don't see it directed toward the divorce courts in the very near
future. There's Et, great deal of ideological bickering back land forth
between the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union is worried
about the rapid industrial growth of China; it sees these 500,000,000
people on its frontiers crowded together and then north of-it the,
great mass of Siberia that is very largely underpopulated.
Ideologically as I see their differences Khrushchev disliked the
attempt to introduce the ,commune system in China. He felt that
was going to discredit his form of Socialism moving toward Communism;
that they were leaping too fast. China does not like the fact that .it is
excluded from high level conferences such as the Summit. They feel
they have to agitate and do things in order to get themselves advertised
and not to be left behind. The situation is unhappy. But they can't
afford to break. And I don't see any likelihood of breaking. What
China today gives to the Soviet Union is pretty much on a cash and
carry basis. There are not'any large outstanding credits being given
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
f
? ? 15.
tat the present time of the nature that the Soviet is extending lavishly
elsewhere, which are very largely fictitious Credits anyway. The
Soviet is not giving, as far as we can tell, any very sophisticated
modern weapons of the nuclear ballistic type to the Soviet Union.
They may have given them some short range ballistic missiles but no
nuclear warheads, we believed. opposite Formosa. I think the
frictions are likely to continue and maybe even to grow more serious.
I rather hope they do. It's all in our interest that they should. But
as I say it is at the moment not a happy marriage. But still a
marriage.
One of the questions. Allen, that some of our participants are
interested in was whether there has been any acceptable change in any
of the Soviet policies resulting directly from Mr. Khrushchev's visit
to this country. You feel that had any impact on the immediate or
basic long-range policies?
AWD: Well, one important result of the visit was the agreement
by Mr. Khrushchev that there was no specific time limit on his Berlin
ultimatum. He pretty nearly revived the element of a time element in
his speeches in Indonesia but didn't quite go over the danger line at
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
?Pd ? P
-
a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0
?
that time. I think that Khru,shchev got two or three things out of
?his-visit here. I'm inclined to think from the reports we have that
-
ice?w-int back believing that the A
16.
ican people by and large wanted
peace. He thinks that among a group such as this there are quite a
Lot of war mongers and munitions makers and so forth and so on that
still believe that war is necessary or might be helpful for business;
but by and large I think he got somewhat of a changed view of the
attitude of the American people. He certainly was impressed by our
industrial power. I think that he found it even greater than he
expected. We do not see any basic changes in his policy and I th nk
he still went back to the Soviet Union, as he indicated in his final
speech, with a view that in the long run his system was going to
overtake and destroy our system and that our great.grandchildren
would probably live under a Communist regime. That idea he has
not changed. We find nothing in the subversive and the covert side
indicating any relaxation if anything there's been a step.up of
covert subversive actions against the Free World and not any decline
over the last year.
Allen, I'm sorry, this is extremely interesting, and I
apologize to our audience for having to slop it here. Thank you
very much.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/30: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502600006-0