QUICK THOUGHTS ON STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE NIC AND THE ESTIMATES SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100030003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MISC

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Quick Thoughts on the Strengths and Weaknesses
of the NIC and the Estimative System
Although I feel the system is in fairly good shape, overall, I will spend
more space below in discussing continuing problems--since such exposition will
be of greater help in seekingg future improvements. My remarks pertain largely
to the NIC as I know it--up to last fall.
Strengths
1. The basic estimative system is probably in as good a shape
overall--and except for a few precinsts, see below--than it has been since its
founding in 1950.
2. Every Administration, Democratic and GOP, since that time has valued
the product and the process, and has wished the basic interprice to continue.
It certainly should.
3. Over the years--and again with some exceptions--the endeavor has
gained a fine reputation for objective, candid service.
4. The substantive batting average on estimative judgments has been
pretty good, certainly better than the sometime view that stresses only those
past examples of bum estimates.
5. The reorganizing of the estimative system into the NIC, in 1979-1980,
has in the main been a positive step. Except as I indicate below, I would not
recommend any major overhaul of the present system.
6. The greatest strength of the NIC, other than objectivity, is the
greater contact this system provides between estimators and policymakers.
7. The system has been improved, since the NIC's founding, in various
ways: greater contact with policymakers, larger quantitative output, more
relevant output, more policy-connected "fast track" projects, greater contact
between estimators and the DC I, more private NIC think papers for the DC I, etc.
8. The system of rotation and of drawing NIC personnel from abroad
spectrum of backgrounds is a sound one. This is not a "CIA" endeavor, but a
Community one. And, the variety and turnover provide for new blood, and for
avoiding institutional analytic biases.
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Continuing Problems (in no particular order of priority)
1. The most serious danger in the NIO system is that it gives too much
analytical/substantive authority to one NIO person. There have been cases
where a strong, assertive NIO has been able to bull his way through and
produce a National Intelligence Estimate that is not "National," but
essentially the particular views of the NIO. A strong, senior, aggressive NIO
can thus have his own way--with, in practice, little collegial input from
others in the NIC, and little effective input or challenges from (usually
junior) DDI experts. This danger much be attended to.
2. As an allied point, NIOs, especially the strong and assertive ones,
have resisted collegial input, and most efforts to date to effect a systematic
program of NIC/NIO panels have come to naught. This must be remedied: many
of the NI Os are people with broad experience and keen insights; they can and
should bring their wisdom and input to bear on many of their colleagues'
projects.
3. There is insufficient review of estimates within the NIC, for both
substance and presentation. In addition to collegial input, there must be
much more loving care given to review by the NIC front office. This is
difficult because the C/NIC and the VC/NIC are so caught up in so many
endeavors, and deadlines are often so short. But extraordinary steps should
be taken: either add more people to the front office, to relieve C/NIC-VC/NIC
of some of their many present tasks; or assign a senior NIC officer to serve
in the front office as the quality control person, full time, and the officer
who assures that each product has had decent collegial and other review within
the NIC .
4. Drafting of estimates has many short-comings, and demands major
overhaul. The problem lies in the gret proportion of outside drafters to whom
NI Os have to turn. Many of their products are so-so or poor, and when this
occurs it is very difficult for a beleaguered NIO, fighting many deadlines, to
bring repair to bear. Especially so because these drf tern do not belong to
NIC, and the NI has no direct authority-discipline-standards it can directly
bring to bear.
5. The best answer is to enlarge the NIC's AG in a major way, and
strengthen the quality of its officers.
a. Create an AG of 25-30 officers who would then do the bulk of the
drafting.
b. Get the DCI to give the C/NIC the authority (as obtained at the
outset of the estimates process in 1950, Beedle Smith - Dr. William L.
Langer) to pick and get any officer he wishes in the Intelligence
Community for a tour in the AG drafting staff. These officers should come
from many offices/agencies, as well as from outside the Intelligence
Community. There was some such muscle from above (Bruce Clarke) when the
AG was established in 1980, and certain of the CIA's very best analysts
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were anted up at that time for the AG
But since Clarke's departure there has
een a singu ar lack both of muscle from above, and of willingness of DDI
barons to let their best people have tours in the AG.
6. Much lasting repair work needs to be done in NIC-DDI relations.
a. The above-mentioned DDI practice. Allied: the refusal in many
DDI offices to consider NIC products and service the elite endeavour they
deserve. DDI managers often try to fob off second rate people and
products on the NIC, and not reward their own people for having performed
NIC duty, either as drafters or as rotatees here.
b. There needs to be much more DDI-NIC substantive contact and
interchanges, especially at senior levels. Some takes place (NIOs,
A/NIOs, AGers), but it is varied and haphazard. C/NIC, VC/NIC, NIOs, and
top DDI officers need to create more systemized contact on substantive
issues.
7. There have been too many instances in recent years of policy
corruption of objective NIC judgments. Some of this has come directly from
NSC staff, State, and Defense policymakers. Some from the DCI and DDCI. Some
(and this is the worst of all) from NIC (and DDI) officers who in effect
tailor their own analytic messages so as not to rile superiors who hold--or
are suspected of holding--contrary positions. This is prticularly marked, in
varying degree, on issues concerning Iran, Central America, the USSR in the
3rd world, and overall Soviet policies. This weakness must be corrected. The
NIC must tell it like it is, and let the chips fall where they may.
Otherwise, the NIC loses its integrity and becomes part of a policy flak.
This weakness has been particularly marked in the last six years, but there
have been examples in previous years; the weakness is not the monopoly of the
Casey/Reagan/GOP era.
8. The SRP could be made into a stronger service than it is, by bringing
about closer SRP-NIC relations. The chief problem has been the SRP's style of
insisting on getting into the art fairly late in the substantive process
(whether CP/TORs or estimate drafts), and on confining their input to formal,
written comments--paper mortar shells lobbed into the process. The SRP would
be much more helpful if its members also got into the act, early, in
face-to-face give and take with NIOs and NIO panels. Also needed is a
clarification for the DCI of just which draft he's reading, and what the
SRP-NIC inputs already have been. The chief hazard to date has been Amb.
Bill Leonhart--who is an extremely wise, learned, experienced, and effective
critic; but whose pride is insured so quickly and deeply whenever any efforts
at change are suggested. Such change must come from the DCI.
9. Physical space is a real problem, especially in the 7B Warning, etc.,
area, and in 2E49 (SP/GPF). This may be solved when the new building opens.
In any event, the NIC needs a lot more space, and its offices should be
contiguous, not scattered.
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10. Secretaries/Registry. Our secretaries (How do you like that "our"?)
are senior and able, but have to spend far too much of their time having to do
bird jobs that could be done by GS-04/05 clerks. The Registry (7E47) at one
time belonged wholly to the estimates office; now the NIC only has a small
look-in. Situation could be improved greatly by assigning two clerks there
wholly to mechanical NIC duties.
11. Minding the store duties by the C/NIC-VC/NIC front office. There is
a need there--but will be remedied by the incoming of Fred Hutchinson.
12. Fuller use and recognition of the AG by the NIC front office and the
NIOs. These people have much to offer, often having broader viewpoints than
NIOs. They need to be systematically brought into more face-to-faces, etc.,
including collegial NIO panels.
13. NIO private think papers. A fine idea and should be continued. But
very necessary are relaxed deadlines and care to have checked these papers
with senior DDI (or other) outside officers, and with the NIC front office,
before these are sent to the DCI. This review should not inhibit an NIO from
offering his/her thoughts to the DC I, but will guard against front office NIC
(and DDI) officers being blind-sided--and will offer them an opportunity to
offer the DCI countering views should they wish.
14. A/NIOs and AGers should also be encouraged to do think pieces for the
DC I. Though checked in advance by the NI Os, DDI (or others), and NIC front
office.
15. Marketing of NIC products. Here is need and opportunity for
considerable improvement. Too often we just sign off and assume that our
products get consumed by the readers we would wish. This absolutely does not
happen. DCI, DDCI, C/NIC, VC/NIC, and NIOs must do much more to propagandize,
market, personalize--so that all our effort and wisdom does not die in the
outbaskets of our desired readers' assistants or filters.
16. Also, must be more top NIC officer personal briefings of Key
Judgments to President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, Carlucci, JCS, etc. Also continue experimenting with new and better
means of presenting NIC products: e.g., more maps, graphics, video
presentations.
17. The USG needs a closer and more systematic tie between intelligence
and consumers (especially White House). NIC should help advise the devising
of such a system, and be prepared for example to place top rate NIC officers
(one or two at a time) to such duty downtown, in cojunction with policy
officers.
18. Much more, and more systematic contact on substantive issues between
NIC officers and non-CIA officers of the Intelligence Community. This to
include informal sessions elsewhere.
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19. The new DCI will have an opportunity to urge SecDef to assign NFIB
principals who have substantive competence and are not simply managers. NFIB
is often a shallow sitting, with certain Principals buoyed up by cue cards.
20. Same for coordination meetings. The Cols, Lt Cols, and Majors should
be chosen from on high (DCI - SecDef and down the chains) so that they can
actually and effectively enrich coordination sessions, and not simply show the
flag, etc.
21. C/NIC needs constantly to reinforce the demand for (1) sharply,
clearly, and succinctly stated estimative products; and (2) clearly stated
differences of view in the estimate. Above all, avoid coordinated mush. This
means that C/NIC should put the real heat on any NIO who is too gentle, or
gentlemanly. Need for NIO/Chairman balance between gentility and above-stated
Hitlerian approaches.
22. NIC use of consultants is spoty. Use more, and at early stages of
projects.
23. HOId regular pre-NFIB sessions - DCI, DDCI, DDI, C/NIC, and relevant
NIOs - to go over the coming agenda, take care of last-moment problems, get
everyone on board.
That's enough*
In haste,
*I'm sure I've neglected to include some more--
Distribution:
1 - John Bird
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