SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE QUERY: DO STUDY ON SEIZURE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000600770014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: February 24, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE SEIZURE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM
June 1973
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THE SEIZURE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM
Summary
In the early evening hours of 1 March 1973, eight Black
September Organization (BSO) terrorists seized the Saudi Ara-
bian Embassy in Khartoum as a diplomatic reception honoring
the departing United States Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) was
ending. After slightly wounding the United States Ambassador
and the Belgian Charge d'Affaires, the terrorists took these
officials plus the United States DCM, the Saudi Arabian Ambas-
sador and the Jordanian Charge d'Affaires hostage. In return
for the freedom of the hostages, the captors demanded the re-
lease of various individuals, mostly Palestinian guerrillas,
imprisoned in Jordan, Israel and the United States.
Fatah representatives based in Khartoum
participated in the attack, using a Fatah vehicle to transport
the terrorists to the Saudi Arabian Embassy.
Initially, the main objective of the attack appeared to
be to secure the release of Fatah/BSO leader Muhammed Awadh
(Abu Datud) from Jordanian rantivity
Negotiations with the BSO terrorist team were conducted
primarily by the Sudanese Ministers of Interior and of Health.
No effort was spared, within the capabilities of the Sudanese
Government, to secure the freedom of the hostages. The ter-
rorists extended their deadlines three times, but when they
became convinced that their demands would not be met and after
they reportedly had received orders from Fatah headquarters
in Beirut, they killed the two United States officials and
the Belgian Charge. Thirty-four hours later, upon receipt
of orders from Yasir Arafat in Beirut to surrender, the
S1`6.13I'
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terrorists released their other hostages unharmed and surren-
dered to Sudanese authorities.
The Khartoum operation again demonstrated the ability of
the BSO to strike where least expected. The open participa-
tion of Fatah representatives in Khartoum in the attack pro-
vides further evidence of the Fatah/BSO relationship. The
emergence of the United States as a primary fedayeen target
indicates a serious threat of further incidents similar to
that which occurred in Khartoum.
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THE SEIZURE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM
Introduction
Planning the Operation
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The attack in Khartoum was planned to occur on a national
holiday celebrating the first anniversary of the end of the
Sudanese Civil War, and on the occasion of a state visit by
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.
There is no specific information to explain the BSO deci-
sion to strike on the occasion of the Saudi Ambassador's recep-
tion, nor to explain why the terrorists selected Ambassador
Noel or Mr. Moore as their victims. Some reasons may be de-
duced, however.
The Saudi Ambassador is the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps
in Khartoum and his farewell reception for Mr. Moore (a cus-
tomary event for departing senior diplomats), to which all the
senior diplomats in Khartoum were invited, could be expected
to bring together all those in the Khartoum diplomatic communi-
ty whom the terrorists wished to capture. Since the occasion
was only for the diplomatic corps, there were no Sudanese
guests. The terrorists quite possibly saw this as an advan-
tage. Their initial statement from the captured Embassy noted
that the operation was not directed at the Sudanese. Past
Saudi receptions for departing chiefs of mission were always
stag and the lack of dependents at the reception could elimi-
nate possible complications. The Saudi Embassy.itself is well
suited for withstanding a siege. It does not have common walls
nor is it in close proximity to other buildings. It has a
high outer wall and an unobstructed view in all directions
from the upstairs balconies. Since the Fatah representation
in Khartoum was in diplomatic and social contact with other
Arab diplomats locally, an Arab installation offered them bet-
ter access for casing purposes than other non-Arab installa-
tions where the targeted diplomats may have gathered. Finally,
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the terrorists also may have anticipated that the Sudanese
security services would be heavily committed in protecting the
visiting Ethiopian Emperor.
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Preparations for the Attack
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The Attack
At about 1850 hours the Landrover pulled into the driveway
of the Saudi Embassy as United States Ambassador Cleo A.
Noel, Jr. was departing. The Landrover rammed and effectively
blocked Noel's car. The terrorists leapt out firing their
weapons, and slightly wounded the American Ambassador and the
Belgian Charge, Guy Eid. In the confusion several guests, in-
cluding the Dutch Charge and the Ambassador of the Soviet Union,
escaped. Other guests, including the Japanese and Spanish Am-
bassadors, were captured but released when the terrorists
determined that they were from "friendly" countries.
Having seized the Embassy and the hostages, the terrorists
set about implementing their tasks. They demanded the release
of Muhammad Awadh (Abu Da'ud), certain military prisoners im-
plicated in earlier threats against the Jordanian Goverment
and other imprisoned fedayeen. Other demands were for the
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release of Sirhan Sirhan from the United States and the release
of the two women involved in the Sabena hijacking of May 1972,
who are imprisoned in Israel. The terrorists threatened to
kill the hostages if their demands were not met.
The Siege and the Negotiations
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Negotiations for the hostages' release were begun imme-
diately after their capture. Heavily armed troops and police
quickly surrounded the Embassy. The Sudanese Ministers of
Interior and Health were the chief negotiators. Most of their
contact with the terrorists was by telephone or through bull-
horn exchanges between the terrorists in the Embassy and one
of the negotiators outside. The Minister of.Health had one
two-hour meeting inside the Embassy with the terrorists, which
appears to have been the only extended face-to-face exchange
between the terrorists and the negotiators. The only other
person who was able to enter the Embassy and converse with the
terrorists was the Sudanese doctor who treated the wounds of
Ambassador Noel and Mr. Eid and the injury to-Mr. Moore.
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The Sudanese made one final unsuccessful attempt to dis-
suade the terrorists after the final deadline,,asking them to
wait until the arrival of high-ranking United States officials.
When the terrorists were ordered to kill the three diplo-
mats, the victims were instructed to write their wills and last
letters to their wives. A request by Ambassador Noel to call
his wife was.rejected. At 2100 hours local time on 2 March
1973, the three Western diplomats were taken into the basement
of the Saudi Embassy and machine-gunned to death.
The two Americans were key targets of the terrorists, as
previously noted, and their murder appears to have been planned
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from the beginning.
/The life of the Jordanian
Charge may have been spared because of his Palestinian origin
and a family relationship with the widow of a senior Fatah
official. There appears to have been no intention to harm the
Saudi Ambassador or his family. The Ambassador's children were
released 19 hours after the seizure. His wife was allowed to
stay and both had the run of the Embassy. One of the terror-
ists, when queried by the Jordanian Charge as to why no restric-
tions were imposed on the Saudi Ambassador and his wife, replied
that the terrorists had received special instructions regarding
the treatment of the Ambassador and his wife.
Despite murdering the three hostages the BSO team still
believed that they would be allowed to leave the Sudan freely,
and they demanded that they be flown out of the Sudan with
the remaining hostages. The Sudanese refused and demanded
that the terrorists surrender and release the remaining hos-
tages unharmed. With water, electricity and the telephone cut
off, the terrorists became less and less confident that they
would escape.
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Conclusions
The Khartoum operation again proved the capability of the
BSO to strike at a place and time of its own choosing.
Fedayeen terrorists and guerrillas have conducted opera-
tions against Jordanian officials and installations since
September 1971, but the Khartoum attack showed a willingness
to strike at an embassy of a country which had provided finan-
cial support to Fatah and do it in an Arab country with a
government friendly to Fatah.
As in most BSO operations outside Israel, the attack took
place in a country which hosted Fatah and PLO representatives.
In this instance, however, for the first time a local Fatah
office was openly involved in the planning and execution of
an attack.
As in Bangkok, which also was considered an unlikely place
for an Arab terrorist operation, the attack in Khartoum caught
its victims completely by surprise and occurred on a day of
national celebration.
The Khartoum murder of the three hostages re-established
the credibility of BSO threats to kill hostages. The murders,
furthermore, were the first instances in which a BSO threat to
kill hostages in cold blood was carried out without some out-
side influence such as that which occurred at Munich when West
German authorities attempted to secure the release of Israeli
hostages by shooting the BSO terrorist team.
Although the slaughter of the three hostages was repug-
nant to many Arabs, the attack succeeded in boosting the morale
of some supporters of the Palestinian movement by removing the
stigma of recent failures, most notably at Bangkok, and by
showing the world in general and the Arab population in par-
ticular that fedayeen terrorists could strike at United States
interests with impunity. There have since been reports from
reliable sources that United States officials and installations
are now primary targets of the fedayeen terrorists.
These results were not gained without some costs. The
direct and open involvement of the Fatah representatives in
Khartoum in the operation has resulted in the loss of the aura
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of "moderation" which Fatah leaders had sought to project to
the world. The incident further demonstrated that Fatah and
the BSO are one and the same.
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Crude sketch plan of Sandi Arabian embassy, drawn for guidance
of terrorist squad by Al Fatah representative in Khartoum, Fawaz
Yassin Abdel Rahman. Sudanese police found it when they raided
his office. Below, transliteration of the plan. 1, Stores block is actually
about same size as main building; 2, pyramid effect crudely repre-
sents four-storey embassy; 3, rough indication of office block on
pillars.
Anerpeldates
house
Mustafa's
house
WALL (2 metres high)
AMBASSADORS
STORES I ROUSE )
0 2 metres r---j?VS11 2metres
offes
Steps leading
' to house KALL-1
Iron windows Iron windows
Steps.
Garden
Garage
OFFICES
MM.
Ammo.
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Empty place
mla
'Door
TO
? LICE
for oartir.
MAIN ROAD
Pavement
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Figure 1: Plan of the Saudi Arabian Embassy
in Khartoum, Prepared by the Local
Fatah Representative.
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Figure 2: Fatah Terrorists in the Saudi Arabian
Embassy in Khartoum.
Figure 3: Surrender of the Fatah/BSO Terrorist
Team to Sudanese Authorities.
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Figure 4: One of the Khartoum Terrorists
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