NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00659R000100280001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/21 : CIA-RDP88T00659R000100280001-6
Director of I o i
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
.W, dnesday
4 February 19,87
Top ~
CPAS NID 87-028JX
4 February 1987
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Contents
Too Secret
Philippines: Implications of Plebiscite ........................................ 1
USSR: Ready To Resume Nuclear Testing .................................. 2
Portugal-US: Defense Debate ...................................................... 3
Czechoslovakia: Concern Over Antiregime Violence .................. 6
Western Europe: Competition for US Aircraft Vendor ................ 7
Suriname: Labor Strife ................................................................ 8
Special Analyses
South Korea: Human Rights Controversy Heats Up .................. 10
Eastern Europe: Halfhearted Discipline Campaigns .................. 14
Top Secret
4 February 1987
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Implications of Plebiscite
The large vote in favor of the draft Philippine constitution will
give President Aquino a stronger political position from which to
address such critical issues as counterinsurgency, the economy,
and forthcoming national and local elections, but she must first
Top Secret
1 4 February 1987
deal with an increasingly distrustful military.
favor of the constitution.
Unofficial returns announced by the National Citizens' Movement for
Free Elections indicate that approximately three-fourths of the voters
on Monday favored the draft constitution. Only in the home regions of
former President Marcos and ousted Defense Minister Enrile were
"no" votes barely in the majority. Muslim areas of the southern
Philippines, in which strong opposition was expected, voted heavily in
the Aquino government is illegitimate
Comment: The overwhelming support for the constitution provides a
new mandate for Aquino's government. The margin of victory will
make it more difficult for coup plotters to justify their actions. The
establishment of constitutional authority for the government will
defuse the arguments of supporters of Marcos, Enrile, and others that
their concern about the growing Communist insurgency
The new political strength the plebiscite gives Aquino will help her
tackle the critical issues facing her government, but it will not be easy
to heal the rift between civilians in her government and the military
that was underscored by the coup attempt last week. The military will
watch closely how she punishes those involved. Stiff punishments risk
undermining Chief of Staff Ramos's tenuous hold on military
discipline; leniency, however, would encourage further maneuvering
among elements of the military loyal to Enrile. Over the longer run, the
military will be looking for signs that Aquino and her advisers share
aggressively once the cease-fire ends this weeken
may result in the military receiving permission to pursue them
The Communists may have been hurt by the outcome of the plebiscite
since the constitution was approved by large margins in areas where
they campaigned actively for its defeat. Their opposition to the
constitution demonstrates that they are out of step with the majority
of Filipinos. The insurgents must calculate that Aquino's new mandate
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'N.r The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
Novaya Zemlya Test Area
1 standdown
1 early-stage preparation
Soviet Union
Soviet Nuclear Test Preparations
Degelen Test Area
4 early-stage preparations
1 midstage preparation
1 late-stage preparation
Shagan River Test Area
6 early-stage preparations
17 shafts completed
11 sites under construction
Mongolia
4 February 1987
Semipalatinsk"
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Ready To Resume Nuclear Testing
The Soviets are prepared to resume nuclear testing on short
notice but may wait until their international peace conference in
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Moscow ends on 16 February.
US nuclear test this year.
TASS reacted-quickly to yesterday's-announcement that the US had
conducted a nuclear test in Nevada, calling the action a challenge to'
world opinion. Immediately before the test, First Deputy Foreign -
Minister Vorontsov, Moscow's chief arms negotiator, had reiterated
that the 18-month-old Soviet test moratorium would end with the first
avoid undercutting their "peace initiatives."
Comment: The Soviets almost certainly will use the US test to try to
focus deliberations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on
the issue of-nuclear testing. They probably will also delay a
resumption of testing until after their elaborate peace conference to
proceed.
The USSR nonetheless is poised to resume a vigorous test program,
having conducted extensive preparations during the moratorium. Its
first weapons test could occur within two weeks of a decision to
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2 4 February 1987
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k
PORTUGAL-US: Defense Debate
A debate on defense policy in the Portuguese parliament today
may expose the government to close questioning on its security
ties to the US, especially in light of recent allegations in the
press that the US may have used Portugal to ship arms to
anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua.
For the past two months, the Portuguese press has been rife with
reports of shipments of Portuguese arms to Iran and, more recently,
to the anti-Sandinistas. The press has focused less on the
government's possible complicity-the current and previous
governments have denied any involvement-than on alleged US
attempts to use Portugal to procure and transship arms.
The fledgling center-left Democratic Renewal Party of former
President Eanes called for the debate on defense policy several
weeks ago. Under the current system, an opposition party can call for
an interpellation in parliament only twice during the legislative year.
Comment: The Democratic Renewal Party is anxious to carve out an
identity for itself. It has chosen to use the defense debate to try to
embarrass the minority, center-right government of Prime Minister
Cavaco Silva. Given the possibility of an early election this year, the
Socialists and the Communists probably will also use the debate to
score points with the public.
The debate is likely to extend beyond Lisbon's arms export policy to
broader Portuguese-US security issues, including Lisbon's concern
about the declining level of US assistance, the US military's ability to
transit Lajes airbase in the Azores, and possibly the longstanding
dispute over the construction of a US satellite tracking station in
southern Portugal. All opposition parties probably will try to capitalize
on a growing public perception that the US tends to take Portugal for
granted.
In the past, successive Portuguese governments-whether of the left,
right, or center-generally have favored strong security ties to the US
and NATO. While the broad consensus for doing so still exists,
Portugal's accession to the EC and Spain's entry into NATO are
prompting the Portuguese to look increasingly to their interests in
Western Europe and to scrutinize more closely their ties to the US.
Top Secret
3 4 February 1987
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Top Secret
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Concern Over Antiregime Violence
k
The recent bombing of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's
headquarters at Ceske Budejovice and subsequent attempted
attacks on the party's buildings in other cities have alarmed
authorities and led to heightened security at facilities across the
country he regime reportedly
believes these acts are the work of youth gangs controlled by
unidentified foreigners.
Comment: It is unclear whether this violence represents random
protests or is the work of an organized opposition movement or
outside group. The sketchiness suggests that such
activity is not widespread. The regime will nonetheless employ
whatever resources are necessary to contain quickly any antiregime
violence before it escalates or results in major protests that could
evoke a response from the usually apathetic population.
Top Secret
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Too Secret
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WESTERN EUROPE: Competition for US Aircraft Vendor
The West European aircraft consortium Airbus Industrie is trying to
win over the airlines that were the first customers for the new
McDonnell Douglas MD-11 long-range wide-body aircraft. According
to the US Embassy in Stockholm, Airbus Industrie has offered a
25-percent discount on its new A340 long-range aircraft to entice
Scandinavian Airlines to switch its order. The US Embassies in Rome
and Bangkok report similar offers to Alitalia and Royal Thai Airlines-
including free use of substitute aircraft between the MD-11 delivery
date in 1990 and that of the A340 in 1992. These initiatives are
causing governments and airlines to reevaluate their choices.
Comment: Airbus Industrie has been aggressively seeking customers
for its A330/A340 aircraft for the past year. The apparently successful
marketing of the MD-11 has forced the consortium to adopt a
strategy of trying to reverse the purchase decisions of the airlines.
The design and development costs of the A330/A340 would add
another $2.9-3.1 billion in subsidies to the $7.5 billion provided by
member governments in support of Airbus Industrie since its
inception in 1970.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Guyana
Area of
main map
,, Moengo
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Attempts by disgruntled bauxite workers to close the US-owned
Suralco refining facilities on Monday and periodic sabotage by
_Z insurgents may prompt the company to pull out of Suriname. The US
V
Embassy in Paramaribo reports that 80 bauxite workers tried to shut
down the powerhouse at Suralco's Paranam alumina refinery. The
police dispersed workers. but a US official reports the refinery was
damaged extensively.
Suriname.
says that wor
after the company laid off at least 500 workers last week when
sabotage of powerlines by the rebels forced closure of the smelter.
According to the US Embassy, the company, which accounts for
50 percent of Suriname's hard currency earnings, has demanded
major financial concessions from the Bouterse regime to stay in
close down entirely-even if it receives additional concessions.
Comment: This is the first significant labor strife in Suriname since
1984, when militant bauxite workers won tax concessions from the
Bouterse government. Continuing insurgent activity, coupled with the
labor problems and resultant damage, probably will cause the
company to cease operations for an extended period-or possibly to 25X1
Top Secret
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Middle East - Indirect flow of Libyan oil products from Europe to US down
sharply, . increased deliveries to
Italy, northern Europe ... Eur for oil allowing Tripoli
to command premium prices.
appointment shows increased conservative influence.
media campaign against liberalization, attacks on intellectuals ...
epartment, replacing protege of Hu Yaobang ... influential in
Uassy~ang Renzhi to head China's propaganda
Chinese gold production up 14 percent last year .. ~
estimate annual output at 50 tons ... Beijing pu
production, exports to bolster sagging foreign exchange holdings.
attention may limit more flagrant human rights abuses. 25X1
180,000 people to remote regions by September ... international
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Ethiopia to resume controversial resettlement program, probably
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9 4 February 1987
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
SOUTH KOREA: Human Rights Controversy Heats Up
x
The recent death of a South Korean student in police custody has
reinvigorated President Chun's political opponents and set back
his timetable for constitutional reform. Despite the government's
efforts at damage control, public indignation over recurring
human rights abuses remains strong, increasing the prospect for
large crowds at rallies scheduled this Saturday to protest
torture. Seoul is ready to take harsher measures to prevent the
opposition from capitalizing on the current mood, but the fallout
from the torture issue raises the likelihood of political conflict
this spring.
Opposition leaders are mobilizing a broad spectrum of religious and
dissident groups for rallies in Seoul and 10 provincial cities to
coincide with memorial services for the student. Rally sponsors claim
that 20,000 volunteers are helping organize activities.
The government, in an attempt to diminish the turnout, has declared
that the rallies are designed to foment social unrest and are therefore
illegal. In addition, the press reports that police have intensified
efforts to arrest student radicals, probably in an attempt to keep
dissident extremists on the sidelines.
Despite the indictment of two police interrogators in the student's
death and the promise of a special presidential committee to prevent
further abuses, critics of the government have used the incident to
highlight past human rights violations. According to the US Embassy,
opposition lawmakers recently took advantage of a special
parliamentary session called to investigate the student's death to grill
government officials on Seoul's human rights record.
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Opposition Offensive
Leaders of the New Korea Democratic Party, the main opposition, see
the rallies scheduled for Saturday as an opportunity to galvanize
support for their platform-particularly their call for a directly elected
president.
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Top Secret
The opposition is banking heavily on its ability to convert public
outrage into political capital. Street rallies on Saturday, however,
open the party to a potentially embarrassing setback such as
occurred last fall when public apathy-as much as massive
deployment of riot police-scuttled opposition efforts to mobilize
broadbased support.
The human rights focus of the organizers nonetheless raises risks for
the government. For example, any police interference in religious
services would give credence to opposition claims that Chun lacks a
real commitment to political liberalization. This would reinforce the
suspicions of many South Koreans that Chun sees constitutional
reform solely as a means to perpetuate his power beyond 1988.
Even if the rallies pass without serious incident, Chun will not be out
of the woods. The public and the opposition will be watching the
police trial and the proceedings of the watchdog committee for signs
of a coverup.
If Chun gives the committee broad powers, the investigation could
produce politically explosive findings.
In any event, failure to contain the human rights issue will bog down
Chun's efforts to move forward on the constitutional revision issue
this spring.
Top Secret
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Special Analysis
EASTERN EUROPE: Halfhearted Discipline Campaigns
Many East European regimes, spurred by Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev's new policies and their own economic
needs, are implementing antialcohol and worker-discipline
campaigns, but the leaders lack the commitment necessary to
overcome these deeply rooted and costly social problems. The
East European peoples generally regard these programs as
insincere efforts by the regimes to curry favor with Moscow at
the public's expense.
The East European governments have legitimate economic motives to
combat alcohol abuse and poor worker discipline, which have long
contributed to the region's chronic productivity and quality control
problems. In some cases, efforts to increase worker discipline
predate Gorbachev's initiatives. In Romania, for example, President
Ceausescu has imposed draconian labor controls since the early
1980s to increase hard currency earnings. The Soviet discipline
campaign is appealing to the other, more orthodox East European
states, such as Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, as a palliative for their
economic ills that is less risky and controversial than systemic reform.
managers whose workers arrive late.
To combat the problems of alcoholism and poor worker discipline, the
East Europeans generally have relied on raising the price and
restricting the availability of alcohol, on public exhortation and
reprimands, and on well-publicized firings of lax managers. Aeeerdfftg--
ta-t the US-E , the Hungarians have hired-a +& ---
public relations firm to develop an educational program aimed at
young people, and they have begun to withhold bonuses from
does not publicly acknowledge alcohol or discipline problems
the firings of two alcoholic district party secretaries. East German
Both the Czechoslovaks and the Bulgarians have mounted press
campaigns against corruption and laxity among managers and
workers in recent months, and Prague gave broad press coverage to
vodka monopoly provides substantial revenue.
East European leaders for years have allowed these problems to
fester and still appear to lack Gorbachev's determination to tackle
them. Workers are among the most volatile groups in Eastern Europe,
and most regimes-especially those in Warsaw and Budapest-are
unwilling to risk their ire by clamping down too much. There is even an
economic disincentive to an overzealous antialcohol campaign-
severe restrictions in liquor consumption could reduce tax earnings
from alcohol sales, especially in Poland, where the government's
continued
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The current programs have done little to reform popular lifestyles.
Even though some groups, such as the Catholic Church and Solidarity
in Poland, are supportive of antialcohol campaigns, widespread
distrust of regime motivations tends to undermine popular support for
any such government initiative. Most East Europeans probably will
continue to react to these appeals, as they have to other mobilization
campaigns, by shrugging them off and seeking new methods of
circumvention.
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