WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300090020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 10, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/14 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300090020-8
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' T e Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. ?0505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
NIC 05013-87/1
10 December 1987
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for MESA
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia
1. Attached is my report to the Director for the November warning
meeting. The next meeting will be Thursday, 17 December at 1015 hours in
Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Our first discussion from 1020 to 1100
hours will focus on Israel-Syria-Lebanon. Syria's involvement in support
of the successful hang glider attack in Israel proper raises the
possibility of a spiral of retaliatory incidents. What might Israel do
(if they haven't already taken action by the time of the meeting) and
what are the ramifications? Does this incident reflect a belief by Assad
that (in the wake of the Amman summit) he must reinvigorate the armed
struggle with Israel to compete (in the Arab world) with the Iranian
threat? Or did the PFLP-GC simply exceed everyone's expectations of what
it could do with such an attack? Finally, what's happening in southern
Lebanon generally (PLO reinfiltration, PLO-Hizballah relations, etc.)?
What are the implications?
2. Our second topic from 1100 to 1130, is Bangladesh (a first, as
far as anyone here can remember). What are Ershad's prospects? What are
the alternatives to Ershad and under what circumstances could he be
replaced? What is the significance of the potential scenarios for
US interests?
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3. P e your clearance
s pa
ssed and call
the NIO
/MESA
office
with names of th
e at
tendees by NO
ON,
16 December 1
987.
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Attachment:
As stated
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. ?0505
National Intelligence Council
NIC-05013-87
10 December 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: NESA Warning-and Forecast Report, 19 November 1987
The Persian Gulf
Another Offensive? CIA/NESA led the discussion with a review of the
evidence associated with preparations for an Iranian offensive. In CIA's ,
view, there is sufficient evidence to support their conclusion in the
October meeting that Iran is making preparations to support an offensive,
which cotald occur as early as January of next year. Some of the specific
indications include large mobilization rallies, unusual training of armored
forces, a call for an offensive by members of Iran's political leadership,
the erection of new tent camps, and military construction. CIA believes the
most likely area for an offensive is the southern front region--from Dezful
south to Al Faw. This comment led to a discussion about the possibility of
a move against Umm Qasr. There was general agreement that this was
certainly one potential target and one in which both Iranian political and
military objectives would be served.
Use of Chemicals. Addressing the next topic on the agenda, the CIA
analyst note tat if there is another large offensive next year we could
see the use of chemicals by both sides. Iraq has used chemicals to blunt
Iranian attacks and Iraqi counterattacks. Iran has acquired its own
chemical stockpile, a capability it may decide to demonstrate to deter large
scale Iraqi use of chemicals.
In addition to use as a deterrent, Iran could use chemicals in
conjunction with conventional attacks to break the coherence of Iraqi
defenses in a critical area. A discussion of this possibility followed,
with some disagreement over the utility of this option for Iran. On the one
hand, if Iran used a persistent agent (like mustard) against frontline Iraqi
troops, it would create problems for its own units engaged in the attack.
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Iran could, however, use chemicals against Iraqi headquarters and
reenforcing units to disrupt command and control and isolate Iraqi units
under attack. The general consensus of the group seemed to be that if Iraqi
forces were generally surprised--beyond the use of chemical weapons--Iranian
chemical weapons could be a significant reenforcing factor. Otherwise, the
use of chemicals by either Iran or Iraq would probably play a contributory,
but not decisive, role in the outcome of any battle.
What Next in the Gulf? CIA's senior political analyst for Iran
presente ~s views on t e most likely next steps for Iran in the Gulf.
Iran's basic motivations in the Gulf remain unchanged: (1) keeping pressure
on the Gulf States supporting Iraq and (2) demonstrating 'its opposition to
the US presence in the region. Although the Iranians are not intimidated,
they have been sobered by several developments: the European resolve
demonstrated by the deployment of European naval forces to the Gulf region,
the uncharacteristic resolve and unity of the Arabs on the issue, and the
embarrassment and failure of Iranian forces in their direct encounters with
the US in the Gulf.
CIA believes Iran probably will continue avoiding direct attacks on
US forces in the region. Rather, it will pursue the same general tactics
with the focus on pressuring Arab supporters of Iraq and demonstrating
resolve but avoiding a provocation that forces a major escalation by the
United States. Under this view, we could expect a continuation of
activities like mining, sabotage against Arab oil facilities, and Silkworm
attacks against Kuwaiti ships or facilities. If, however, the proximity of
US and Iranian forces in the Gulf results in another embarrassing incident
for Iran, especially one producing significant Iranian casualties, Iranian
restraint could "go up in smoke" with the political necessity for a direct
response outweiahina the desire to avoid a broader confrontation with the
United States.
Diplomatic Developments. There was general agreement that Iranian
diplomatic activities do not demonstrate genuine flexibility. The Community
believes Iran is stalling by showing occasional "reasonableness" while
simultaneously maintaining pressure on Iraq and its Arab supporters.
Warnin Issues. Over the last several months, Iran has met with little
success in a vancing its fundamental objectives. Its policies to intimidate
and divide the Arabs have had, if anything, the opposite effect. The United
States continues to escort Kuwaiti ships and maintains its augmented naval
presence, with little domestic or international pressure on it to stop.
While the Iranians have had a reasonably good year economically, more
recently they have been forced to discount their oil exports and they are
having trouble finding buyers to maintain export volumes. While much of
this is good news and may gradually lead Iran to adjust its goals, it raises
a warning issue. Will these frustrations lead Iran to conclude that it must
make obvious progress in the ground war to offset these setbacks? Its
to date mean that it is, at minimum, keeping that option open.
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Afghanistan
The Military Situation. DIA began the discussion of
Afghanistan with a review of t-he military situation during this year's
fighting season. ointed to three discernible trends.
-- There has been a shift of emphasis in Soviet operations from
military to political objectives.
-- Soviet forces are shouldering an even greater part of the war
effort.
-- The effectiveness of Soviet close air support has decreased.
An assertion of a shift in emphasis from military to political issues
does not imply that the military situation was not as intense this year. In
fact, it was a busy year militarily for both regime and Soviet forces.
However; military operations and forces have been used more frequently for
what are clearly political ends. For example, the Soviet military focused
considerable resources in trying to make the regime's reconciliation scheme
work, the Soviet commander in Afghanistan has spent an unusual amount of
time on other (non-military) issues, there has been a more concerted effort
to establish the declared peace 'zone in the Qandahar area and there have
been several crude attempts to use military activities to demonstrate a
success in the regime's political activities.
On the subject of air support, indicated that whatever we
eventually conclude about total Soviet air osses, there was no doubt that
Soviet operations had been adversely affected by the increasing
effectiveness of Mujahideen anti-air weapons. This change is demonstrated
by altered Soviet tactics, the increasing security of Mujahideen caravans
and the difficulty the Soviets have had in protecting their own convoys.
Political Developments. Politically, the Soviets and the Afghan regime
have had a very bad year, with several high profile attempts to demonstrate
progress--national reconciliation, Party Conference, etc.--leading to
naught.
A Soviet analyst gave his assessment of the view from Moscow. Moscow
probably is not optimistic about the situation but does not believe it is
losing control of the situation. The Soviets are now sending mixed signals
on their willingness to consider new initiatives, including numerous hints
about the possibility of a substantial pull-out of Soviet troops. This
precipitated a general discussion of whether the Soviets have made a
significant fundamental shift in their position. (Note: There was obvious
range of opinion on this topic. Since it primarily involves judgments about
the Soviet Union, this discussion led NIO/USSR to convene a special warning
meeting on the Soviet position. See his report of that meeting for amore
detailed examination of this issue.) Opinions on this topic ranged from the
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group of analysts who believe that the Soviets have not come to the point
where they can accept less than aCommunist-dominated government to the
group at the other end of the spectrum that believe the Soviets have already
decided to get out and are now concentrating on modalities.
NIO/NESA Comment: Although a spectrum of judgments has always existed
on this issue, the shift in the spectrum is striking. No more than a year
ago, the two spectrums ranged from "they'll never get out" to
"maybe--eventually--they could be convinced. Even those who believe the
Soviets have not decided they can accept less than aCommunist--dominated
regime, now believe it is an evolving position.
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