THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000200050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1988
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/14: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200050001-1
Director of Central Intelligence
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39-42 NIO (ACTION OFFICER)
Seert
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The Prospects for Change
in Sino-Soviet Relations
National Intelligence Estimate
Key Judgments
These Key Judgments represent the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
et
NIE 13111-22-88W
August 1988
Copy
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The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of these Key Judgments:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support, Department of the Treasury
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs.
The full text of this Estimate is being published
separately with regular distribution.
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Key Judgments
We believe there is a high probability of significant improvement in Sino-
Soviet relations in the next six months or so that will ultimately lead to a
Sino-Soviet summit within the two- to three-year time frame covered by
this Estimate. While Sino-Soviet relations have been improving since the
early 1980s, General Secretary Gorbachev's ascendancy and his subse-
quent reorientation of Soviet policies have added significant impetus to the
process. In particular, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the
warming of US-Soviet relations, and progress on the Cambodian issue have
changed China's attitudes and increased its flexibility in dealing with the
USSR:
? The Sino-Soviet relationship could even advance to the point where there
is also a Sino-Soviet border agreement, resumption of party-to-party ties,
a statement of principles on relations, and perhaps the beginning of talks
to reduce forces along the border.
Relations, however, are not likely to progress to the point where China
moves to a truly equidistant position in the Sino-Soviet-US triangular
relationship or stops competing with the USSR in many regions of the
world. Although we expect military contacts to develop, we do not believe
they will extend to major arms sales, advanced technology transfer, or
genuine military cooperation. Past disputes, lingering distrust, geopolitical
rivalry, and conflicting national ambitions will continue to bound the
reconciliation and promote disagreements.
The pace and extent of improvement will depend in large part on whether:
? Both sides maintain a reformist course at home and continue to see a
more peaceful international environment as essential to the pursuit of
domestic reforms.
? The Soviet-US and Sino-US dialogues remain essentially on track.
? There is continued progress toward resolution of the Cambodian conflict.
? The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is interrupted.
? The Chinese maintain their positive assessment of Gorbachev and his
staying power.
Improved Sino-Soviet relations will increase Chinese and Soviet leverage in
relations with the United States and add to Gorbachev's image as a
peacemaker. The already minimal potential for Sino-.Soviet military
conflict will recede even further. This will increase pressure on the United
States to articulate its policies in a more challenging political environment.
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? ,
Moreover, the more rapid the pace of improvements in Sino-Soviet
relations, the more pronounced will be their impa& on US freedom of
maneuver in East Asia. For example, in an atmosphere of triangular
detente, Japan probably will be under greater pressure to improve its
relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, if the image of the Soviet
milita}3; th-reat in East Asia is diminished, US allies may see less need to
spend money on 'defense or permit US military access.
Nonetheless, the improven-tents iii Sino-Soviet relations envisioned in this
Estimate Will not, in our view, fundamentally threaten US interests in the-
,
next two to three years:
? Expanding contacts will make it easier for the two sides th coordinate ac-
tions where their interests coincide, but they will remain competitors
purSuing their OWn very different geopolitical agendas.
? We do not believe that any Chinese or Soviet forces withdfawn from the
borderregien as 'result Of diminished military competition will be
redeployed to measurably augment the threat to NATO or to US allies in
the Pacific.," ?
? Although Moscow will try to take advantage of increased Sino-Soviet
economic interaction to try to get more Western technology, China will
act to sueh gains lest it jeopardize its own access to such technology.
? If Siri&So'vjet'telations improve sufficiently to be perceived as threaten-
ing, Asian countries may seek greater US support.
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