SOVIET EXPLANATIONS OF 1979 ANTHRAX OUTBREAK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000100120005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 13, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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NIC O1342_1r,
OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
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7. Admin Officer
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SUSPENSE
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National Intelligence Council
Kt I
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Of* C1i Fiib
NIC 01342-88
13 April 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: MG David W. Einsel, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer at. Large
SUBJECT: Soviet Explanations of 1979 Anthrax Outbreak
1. There was a public, unclassified, meeting to discuss the April 1979
Sverdlovsk-BW incident at the National Academy of Science on 11 April
(reported in this morning's Washington Post). A repeat series of meetings are
scheduled at John Hopkins University (14 April) and Harvard University (18
April). These meetings will involve Dr. Matthew Meselson, Harvard University
(the host) and three Soviet Ministry of Health Officials who were involved in
the Sverdlovsk incident.
2. Dr. Meselson has arranged this exchange in return for his
Soviet-sponsored visit to Moscow in late August 1986 on the same subject, at
which the Soviets provided a new and detailed account of the 1979 outbreak of
Anthrax in Sverdlovsk. The 1986 invitation to Dr. Meselson was hastily
arranged, probably to coincide with the September 1986 Biological Weapons
Review Conference, to establish a propaganda position in the public domain and
tion
f
i
.
orma
n
a version plausible to persons without access to intelligence
3. The timing and composition of invited guests (to include press, members
of foreign embassies, etc.) would indicate that a major aim of the present.
series of meetings may be to publicly discredit past administration charges of
Soviet violation of the Biological Weapons Convention--and in turn, influence
world opinion as to Soviet openness and US intransigence at Geneva in the CW
Disarmament Talks.
4. The Soviet account of the Sverdlovsk incident is virtually identical
to the 1986 Soviet account, which claims there was accidental contamination of
livestock feed with anthrax, which led to gastrointestinal anthrax when
infected meat was distributed through black-market channels. Sixty-four.
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JCI,RG 1
NIC 01342-88
Page 2
SUBJECT: Soviet Explanations of 1979 Anthrax Outbreak
deaths resulted-from seventy-nine cases, with no inhalation anthrax cases, no
cases among military personnel, no involvement of military authorities, and
differs from 1979 and 1980 Soviet accounts which indicated either no deaths or
only a very few deaths from eating contaminated meat in a restaurant.
5. While, as Dr. Meselson states, the current version is:"plausible" it -
does not reconcile with all source intelligence. For example:
Intelligence indicates a likely airborne accident
Current version says two-thirds of casualties were among males, with
nearly all cases among adults, and never more than one case per
household--a surprising set of statistics, which would be far more
consistent with a work-related accident than the result of eating
black-market infected meat.
-- urren explanation of the 6-week duration, the delay in
identification, and high incidence of truck drivers/chauffeurs could
be equally consistent with exposure to airborne exposure since
vehicles would resuspend an aerosol and decontamination of an aerosol
usual annual incidence, from Soviet-reported data for period
1965-1978 is about 17 intestinal gastric anthrax cases per year.
Never before, nor since, have 60 some cases been reported and until
September 1986 the Soviets did not admit to this high number of
cases, nor did they report the outbreak to the World Health
Organization.
It is at best surprising that it took six weeks to contain this
.particular anthrax epidemic. Normal Soviet response is much better
than that.
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SUBJECT: Soviet Explanations of 1979 Anthrax Outbreak
6. Since this matter is likely to continue to be discussed in the public
press, there is little that we can say other than the 1986 DIA discussion in
their unclassified pamphlet, Soviet. Biological Warfare Threat, pages 4-7
(attached).
David W. Einsel, Jr.
Attachment:
As stated
SECRET
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SUBJECT: -Soviet Explanations of 1979 Anthrax Outbreak
Distribution:
Orig -.DDCI
1 - ER
1 - AC/NIC
1 - OCA
1 - PAO
I - OSWR/LSB
1 NIO/AL
1 - A/NIO/CBW
1 - NIO/AL Chrono
I - NIO/AL File
SECRET
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Al
rcent fatal) if treatment is not begun promp
tough anthrax bacteria are penicillin. sensi
ful treatment of the disease depends,
succe
killing
611e microorganisms before a le
of anthrax toxin is produ
centratiot`,
skin form
invades the bl
quickly. In addii
are effective.
infection can also
tream and thera
Anthrax spores can
a liquid or dry form. Al
the environment, the
disinfectants or
non-contagious
spores require
individuals (
8,000 and
trations
over
tech
pr
sseminated in either
ugh highly resistant in
can
tempe
killed with strong
nt. The nu
re. Anthrax is a
to kill 50 perce
'that dose 50 or LD56
of exposed
between
,000. Even though such hi
anthrax are required to be d
target population, the Soviets ha
cal difficulties in achieving this. Ha
vered
no
uced BW agents they must also be concerne
their destruction. See Appendix D.
The Sverdlovsk Biological
Warfare Facility: The Events of 1979
During early April 1979, an accidental release
of anthrax occurred in Sverdlovsk that caused
many casualties and most probably a very high
death rate among Soviet citizens who were ex-
posed. The Soviet Government at that time admit-
ted only to some public health problems, which
it said were caused by the illegal sale of anthrax-
contaminated meat. They have never acknowl-
edged the existence of the Sverdlovsk facility and,
of course, have never revealed the nature of the
work conducted there. The U.S. Government
has requested an explanation of what happened
in Sverdlovsk on numerous occasions but the
Soviets persist in blaming contaminated meat for
the anthrax epidemic.
Our analysis shows that the following
events occurred:
? Early in April 1979, an accidental release of
anthrax occurred within the Microbiology
and Virology Institute in Sverdlovsk City.
The Institute is a military facility located in
the southwestern outskirts of the city. While
Accident
Aerosol
Potential
Release
Lab Operations
Low-Medium
mg-9
Pilot Plant Scale
Low-High
g-KG
Production
Medium-High
50g-300 KG
Training
Medium
up to 5KG
Testing
High
up to 100g
Storage
Low
up to 100KG
Waste Handling/
Low
g
Decontamination
Each of the various operations involved in
the production of anthrax has the potential for
releasing aerosols in quantities indicated (one
thousandth of a gram to 300. kilograms). The
scale of operations, whether the agent is in
liquid or dry form, and whether the operations
involve high pressure, volatile solvents, or ex-
plosives also affects the potential for aerosol
release. It is difficult to aerosolize more than
10% of wet anthrax spores. It is relatively easy
to aerosolize almost 100% of anthrax spores in
dry form. These factors plus other information
were critical in our analysis of the Sverdlovsk
accident.
bulk quantities of anthrax spores in dry form
were probably being prepared, a pressurized
system probably exploded. '
? As much as 22 pounds (10 kg) of dry
anthrax spores were released from the
Institute.
? The bacterial aerosol contaminated an area
with a radius of at least 2-3 miles.
? Within two weeks, which is within the time
frame expected for the disease to develop, a
significant number of deaths occurred.
? Residents and workers within the contam-
inated area contracted pulmonary anthrax
through inhalation. In addition it is possible
that some may have contracted anthrax by
skin contact and, over time, a number may
have contracted anthrax by consumption of
food contaminated by the fall-out of spores.
? Initial disinfection and decontamination
procedures were largely ineffective.
? Mass immunizations with the Soviet anthrax
vaccine were partially effective at best.
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? Vaccinations and antibiotic treatment were
administered too late as an initial response.
? Containment procedures were effective in
confining the problem to the southwest area
of Sverdlovsk City.
Strict censorship as to the true nature of the
incident served to neutralize early panic and
limit the fears of the Sverdlovsk population.
Containment procedures continued into July
1979. Some inspection procedures were
conducted until the Fall of 1979.
? A major outbreak of anthrax occurred at a
closed military installation.
? The Soviets have persisted in claiming that a
routine outbreak of anthrax among animals
caused intestinal anthrax among people who
consumed the bad meat.
. The extraordinary efforts to "clean-up" are
inconsistent with the Soviet explanation.
. It has been reported that hundreds of Soviet
citizens died from inhalation anthrax within
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seven to ten days of the outbreak despite
heroic attempts by Soviet doctors to save
their lives.
? It has also been reported that in subsequent-
weeks there may have been 1,000 or more
cases. These figures are about 100 or more
times the annual incidence of inhalation and
intestinal anthrax throughout the USSR in
recent years.'
? Heavy military involvement and early military
casualties immediately after the accident,
total military control within two weeks,
plus roof top spraying of decontaminating
solutions from aircraft are not consistent
with public health control measures for
dealing with anthrax acquired by eating bad
meat.
? The reported aerial spraying activity and
disinfection with steam and hypochlorite
solution around the military facility are clear
attempts to decontaminate surfaces affected
by an infectious aerosol.
Accidental release of anthrax from Biological Warfare Facility at Sverdlovsk.
In the USSR the usual incidence of clinical anthrax in humans has been approximately 95 percent cutaneous (skin), 2.4 percent
intestinal, 1.2 percent inhalation, and 1.4 percent other forms. Based on Soviet data, the estimated total number of cases in the
USSR during 1978 was about -00 for all forms of anthrax. This translates to seventeen expected intestinal cases and eight expected
inhalation cases. The 1978 incidence of anthrax is similar to that for the period 1965-78.
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? Collectively, these events are a very strong
contradiction of the Soviet position which
claimed the anthrax outbreak was just a
public health problem resulting from the
sale of contaminated meat.
Regular Soviet Chemical Troops of the Mi 'try
of Defense are involved in BW activities. D pite
the ame Chemical Troops, this force is r spon-
sible or ensuring that Soviet units can perate
under y type of contaminated battlefiel includ-
ing nuc ar, biological and chemical ( Q. This
force h some 45,000 officers and oldiers in
the groun forces alone in peacetim . They man
special NB reconnaissance and dec ntamination
units which a part of ground fore formations
at all levels fr m regiment to fro . Similar units
exist in the of er branches of se 'ce.
The responsilties of the/Chemical Troops
include oversight f:
? Testing and evaluat
warfare (CW) age
dissemination sys
? Technical a `ice to combat ommanders
regarding a use of and effe iveness of
biological /weapons.
? TraiAing of all forces for survival on ~ battle-
field contaminated with BW agents.
Operating the Chemical Academies (colle
equivalent).
over
reconn
New Soviet Chemical, Biological,
Radiological Protective Mask.
specialists of the Chemical Troops haN
.000 vehicles specifically designed for
sance and decontamination of pers,
lent. Special training areas
and equip
training unitt
of the Chemical Troops
n Soviet vehicles h
ally, most mod
protection sv,~teti
d(