INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 26 FOR WEEK ENDING 4 JULY 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010090-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 90
• Publication Date: July 4, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION
? OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIVISION WEEKLY
VOL. III - NO. 26
For week ending 4 allz. 1950
4 July 1950
Document No.
NO ANGE in Class. 0
ECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth:
Date:2 8 FEB1978 By:
NOTICE: WORKING-PAPER
This document Is a working-paper, not an official issuance,
since it has not necessarily been coordinated with and review-
ed by other components of ORE. It represents the formulative
thinking of one group of analysts in ORE and is designed to
provide the medium for transmitting their informal views to
other intelligence analysts of the US Government who are work-
ing on similar or overlapping problems. Itis intended for the
use of the addressee alone, and not for further dissemination.
a,
COPY FOR:
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION
WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 26
For week ending 4 July 1950 Volume III
The International Week
The moral authority of the Security Council decision recom-
mending armed assistance to the Republic of Korea was greatly
.increased by the concurrence of India. To date, 43 UN members
have voiced their support.
THE UN AND KOREA
grsacisaugieUl. The first week after UN
intervention in the Korean crisis brought virtual blanket endorse-
ment from non-Soviet UN members and some offers of military
assistance as well. India's declaration of support more than
counter-balanced Egypt's embittered abstention and this move of
India, Asia's largest non-Communist state, will significantly
undermine the contention that UN measures merely express the
policy of Western imperialists. There is some basis for hope
that Egypt's position will not set the pattern for all Moslem
states. Pakistan has denounced Egypt's attitude as "foolish and
illogical" and has taken the initiative in approaching Syria,
Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile in Washington the Lebanese and
Syrian Ministers have privately condemned the Egyptian position.
Reaction in the Far East is one of relief at prompt US action.
Burma's Prime Minister declared that a folded arms policy would
have made it impossible for him to have resisted current efforts
of Burmese leftists to align Burma with the Soviet bloc. Even
Yugoslavia followed its negative SC vote with a noteworthy effort
to explain to the US that, although open alignment with the West
would have undermined Tito's ideological warfare with the USSR,
it privately welcomed UN action as reinforcing Yugoslavia's
security against attack. The Yugoslays have now gone a step
farther and a Belgrade press release hints approval of the UN
decision.
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This almost universal endorsement of vigorous UN action con-
stitutes a development highly favorable to US security. For the
first time the UN has sanctioned the use of military force to re-
sist aggression, and the wide approval of international public
opinion will weigh heavily on the crucial ideological level. Thus
what would otherwise be a unilateral armed intervention by the US
in a disputed area of power politics rises to the dignity of a
collective international effort to'uphold law and order.
A a UN d forces,. The prompt emergence of an a, bela
UN armed force to dea w t the Korean situation demonstrates the
ability of the UN to respond to vigorous leadership under a flex-
ible interpretation of the Charter and in the absence of Soviet
obstruction. Under Article 43 of the Charter UN members under-
took to make available to the SC, on its call, and in accordance
with special agreements, "armed forces, assistance and facilities,
including rights of passaCge." Since from the outset Soviet non-
cooperation has erevented the Unitary Staff Committee from assist-
ing the Security Council on UN military planning matters under its
Charter mandate, no special agreements have yet been concluded.
In this situation the need for immediate action compelled the SC
to rely on general Charter provisions and aah22, arrangements in
calling on UN members to "furnish such assistance to the Republic
of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack....."
In order to counter Soviet efforts to exploit any tendency
to view US action as unilateral, and to emphasize and formalize
the UN3s role in the military aspects of the Korean crisis, some
UN members are actively considering the creation of a SC coordina-
tion committee to screen offers of military aid and receive reports
from the field forces. Some officials also favor the formal designa-
tion of General MacArthur as UN Commander-in-Chief and the display
of the UN flag by armed contingents defending South Korea. All
such efforts to put the UN stamp on measures taken in Korea will
strengthen the prestige of the UN and also place US action on a
high moral plane.
.11194.11,2?SILaps.mtatizozegagil=. Throughout
the Korean crisis; Secretary General Lie has demonstrated an uncom-
promising attitude in support of strong UN measures against aggres-
sion. With the chips down, Lie has again shown undivided loyalty
to the UN and his actions refute the frequent charges that he has
pro-Soviet leanings. In feet his record in the Korean affair now
makes it doubtful whether the USSR, in the event that it should at-
tend the General Assembly, weuld accept an extension of his term of
office as Secretary General.
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As for the Secretariat in general, its members are theoretic-
ally international civil servants Obligated to put national alle-
giance to one side in the execution of their duties, Approximately
eighty are nationals of the USSR or its satellites, and in view of
the universal character originally envisaged for the UN, naturally
no attempt has ever been made to exclude communists as such. Fur-
thermore, the important post of Assistant Secretary General for
Security Council Affairs is held by Konstantin Zinchenko, a
Soviet national. As the Gubitchev case revealed, it is too much
to expect that communists will place their loyalty to the UN
above that to the Kremlin. Therefore at a time when the UN is
virtually at war with a Soviet puppet, it would be dangerous from
a security standpoint to afford the secretariat access to any
military information. Thus in setting up machinery to coordinate
military contributions to the UN for use in Korea only carefully
screened members of the secretariat will be used in conjunction
with a new Asi b.22 organ.
41.Ir
OCR
Et t o Ko e isis th If " cm'.n The immediate
effect of t e orean war on t e Communist "peace campaign will be
to decrease its effectiveness, and at the same time to increase its
intensity.
The Communist invasion of South Korea hands the West a clear-
cut issue with which to point up the hypocrisy of Communist peace
pretensions, In the first place the UN Security Council, acting
on information supplied by a UN Commission in Korea at the time of
the attack, quickly branded the North Korean regime as the aggressor.
Furthermore, this and subsequent UN action elicited overwhelming
approval in the non-Soviet world. Lore specifically, the concur-
rence in UN action by India (a leading proponent of neutrality in
East-West conflicts) should carry great weight with fence-sitters
whose support the USSR seeks to enlist. These clear indications of
fiorth Korean culpability plus implicit Soviet inspiration in the .
now familiar pattern of Communist-organized civil strife reveal more
clearly than ever the sharp contrast between C( munist peace talk
and aggressive actions,
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Facing what could prove to be a set-back to the peace cam.
paign, the USSR will probably redouble its peace propaganda in
an attempt to shift the blame and drawn out charges of Soviet
complicity. Initial Soviet treatment of the Korean situation in-
dicates that two main themes will probably be developed: 1) that
the US has now moved from the stage of war preparations to "direct
aggression," and 2) that the ramming through of "illegal" Security
Council decisions under American pressure exposes US cynicism to-
ward the peaceful principles of the UN. The basis for such charges
has been proclaimed with increasing vigor in recent months, and
US military action in Korea will be cited as proof of these standard
peace campaign assertions.
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SE .T
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