FREE WORLD PRESS OPINION ON MIDDLE AND FAR EAST CRISES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050022-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 23, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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'1/4-) CO NTIAL
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
January 23, 1959
MEMORANDUM FCR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD
1'titi,'!7?? -7 ?
c-Pa)
SUBJECT: Free World Press Opinion on Middle and Far Eas
Crises
The enclosed interim assessment of "Fres World Press
Opinion on. Middle and Far Eaat Crizes", pmpared by the
U. Si, Information Agency, is transmitted herewith for the
information of the Planning Board in connection with the
project on "Conclusion Drawn from Recent Developments in
the Near East and the Taiwan Straits",
MARION W. BOGGS
Director, Polley
Coordinating Secretariat
CONFI IENTIAL
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CONF I NTIAL
December 22, 1958
UNIT1D STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
OFFICE OP ;NTELLIGENCE
FREE WORLD PRESS OPINION ON MIDDLE
AND FAR EAST CRISES
AN INTERIM. ASSESSMENT'
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CONFI NTIAL
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
Reactions in Western Europe, the Near East, South Asia--
and Africa to both the Middle and Far Eastern crises were so
mixed and complex that it is extremely difficult to state
categorically that the U. S. came out worse or better than
the USSR and Communist China as a result of their actions in
both these crises. However, based on the evidence available
at this time, it would appear that, with few exceptions,
articulate opinion in the countries of these areas responded
more unfavorably than favorably to U. S. actions in the 1958
Middle and Far Eastern crises; Taiwan Strait action produced
a more unfavorable response even than action in Iraq and
Lebanon.
In the non-Communist Far East articulate opinion was
generally unfavorable with respect to U. S. action in the
Middle East; it was generally. favorable with respect to U. S.
action in the Taiwan Strait issue, an issue closer to home.
In Latin America, U. S. action in both the Middle and
Far Eastern crises, while not receiving unequivocal support,
nevertheless produced more favorable than unfavorable
reaction. This was particularly true in the case of Iraq
and Lebanon; less so in the case of the Taiwan Strait,
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CONF NTIAL
FREEWORLD PRESS INIOONMIDDLEAND FAR EAST CRISES
WESTERN EUROPE
Middle East
During most of its duration, the Middle East crisis of
the summer of 1958 was a major topic of news and comment in
the Western European press. Either explicit or implicit in
the generally mixed editorial reaction were a number of
salient factors bearing upon the specific problem of Western
Europe-United States relations.
Iraq
Although startled by the unexpectedness of the Iraqi
revolt, there was general agreement that it was fundamentally
an expression of anti-feudal and anti-western Arab nationalism
symbolized by Egyptian President Nasser rather than the
consequence of Soviet machinations.
Since Iraq was the only
oriented Baghdad Pact, there
currence that the revolt was
western policy in the Middle
of it alleged bankruptcy --
necessary steps to adjust to
and popularly-supported Arab
Arab member of the western-
was similar widespread con-
not only a severe setback for
East but also a sharp indictment
its failure to have taken the
the rising tide of legitimate
nationalism.
While there was no real concern that Western Europe's
access to Middle East oil would be seriously impaired -- as
there had been following the abortive Anglo-French-Israeli
Suez affair -- there was general agreement (except in
violently anti-Nasser France) that a new and more realistic
accommodation with the Middle East was imperative if it were
to be kept out of the anti-west camp.
As the successor to the British and French mantles in the
Middle East, the United States was criticized with varying
degrees of sharpness for having pursued an essentially
unrealistic and weak policy in the region so vital to the
economic livblihood of Western Europe.
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CO ENTIAL
Lebanon and Jordan Troop Landings
Unlike the virtual unanimity that had characterized the.
editorial-reaction to the Iraqi revolt, the Western European
press was sharply divided in its reaction to the Anglo--
American decision to respond to the Lebanese and Jordanian
governments' request for military assistance against alleged
external agression.
Dispite the inherent explosiveness of the situation,
particularly in view of the bellicose and threatening posture
assumed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, there apparently was little
real fear that the Anglo-American troop landings would pre-
cipitate-a war with the Soviet Union, This underlying
optimism was based on the unexpressed conviction that the
Soviet. Union Would not risk nuclear devastation over the
Middle East (as seemed clear from its backdown on Syria the
previous year) on the assumption that nO Anglo-American
invasion of Iraq was contemplated, and on the Soviet over-
tures for a conference on the Middle East.
With the major exceptions of France and Germany, the
press tended to react to the troop landings along essentially
political lines. In the main, the rightist-conservative-
centrist papers, while fully cognizant of the dangers an4
risks involvedl.tended to approve them on the ground that
they were necessary not only to stabilize the immediate
Situation in Lebanon and Jordan, but also to reassure other
small countries that western promises of support were real
and, not hollow, as sometimes alleged. In sharp contrast,
most of the (non-communist) leftist-labor-liberal papers,
while conceding the'legality of the Anglo-American action,
tendedtocriticize it as a futile Metternichean response to
the stirrings of legitimate Arab nationalism -- particularly,
as an accommodation with it could not be escaped -- and as a
unilateral aggravation of world tension (which, incidentally,
put the West at a distinct propaganda disadvantage vis-a-vis
the Soviet Unite) since it had not been approved in advance
by the United Nations which already had the matter under
cognizance.
In France, the widespread conviction that Nasser was at
the root of France's troubles in Algeria apparently induced
all but the Communist segment of the press to approve the
Anglo-American decision to help.Lebanon and Jordan preserve
their independence and to hail it as welcome evidence of a
western return to a realistic anti-Nasser Middle East policy.
In Germany, the Federal Republic's increasing economic stake
in the Middle East and the nationalistic resentment over the
unilateral American decision to use Germany as A staging base
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for ferrying troops to Lebanon were apparently responsible
for not only the reservations expressed by the pro-government
papers, but also for the sharply critical reaction of many
independent and conservative papers and the opposition Social
Democratic press,
Underlying much of the French, German and Italian
editorial reactions was a sensitivity to the Anglo-American
bypassing of the consultative procedures of the Atlantic
alliance in favor of direct bilateral action. This was
particularly makked in the French press which tended to re-
flect De Gaulle's nationalistic resentment over an alleged
Anglo-American inner circle within NATO, almost as much in
the German press which was acutely conscious that the Federal
Republic had not been consulted about the decision to use
Germany as a staging base, and least of all in Italy. While
the Italian press was eventually mollified by official
assurances that no slight had been intended and the West
German press by Secretary Dulles' special visit to Bonn to
consult with Chancellor Adenauer, no similar development seems
to have occurred in the case of the French press. And
throughout all of the Western European press, even among
those papers which supported the troop landings, there was
recognition of the anomalous fact that by bypassing the
United Nations the United States had done the very thing that
it had sharply condemned its British and French allies for
two years before.
Despite the above diversity of reaction there was vir-
tually unanimous concern over whether and when the situation
in the Middle East could be sufficiently stabilized so as to
permit the Anglo-American partners to extricate themselves
without any substantial loss of face from an essentially
untenable position.
East Conference
As in the case of the Iraqi revolt, the fundamental
reaction of the Western European press to the various pro-
posals for a Middle East conference tended to be fairly
unanimous, for most papers apparently subscribed (but with
differing degrees of enthusiasm) to the Churchillian dictum
that "it is better to jaw, jaw, than to fight, fight."
Despite its obvious propagandistic intent, the Soviet
proposal for a "summit" Middle East conference was generally
welcomed (even though .many reservations were voiced as to its
particulars), for it was widely interpreted as a tacit
admission that there would be no Soviet military intervention
in the Middle East, The British counterproposal for a special
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IfJyr.,1DINTIAL
United Nations heads-of-government conference received an
even more favorable reception (except in prestige conscious
France) because it was regarded as embodying a firm western
decision not to undermine the prestige of the United Nations
as a force for world peace. And this generally favorable
attitude towards a conference was not appreciably shaken by
the Soviet Union's qualified acceptance. For, despite the
realization that the Soviet Union was intent on making the
most propaganda capital possible from its well-publicized
role as the defender of Arab nationalism against western
colonialism, there was general agreement that the West has no
alternative but to accept the Soviet conditions. Much could
nevertheless be salvaged, it was widely felt, if the West
could devise a plan which, while safeguarding its vital
interests in the Middle East, would still be acceptable to
modern Arab nationalism, The surprising last minute Soviet
rejection of such a conference, seemingly at the behest of
Communist China, evoked sharp criticism coupled with cons-
ternation at this unexpected turn of events,
Throughout these involved negotiations for a Middle East
conference there was a strong undercurrent of criticism,
particularly in the British press, of the alleged American
reluctance to sit down with the Soviet Union -- a reflection
of the widely held view that American foreign policy tended
to_be too moralistic, too rigid and too unrealistic, part-
icularly with regard to negotiations with the Soviet Union.
United s A senL...1_....Xly)Deba.tie
Despite the widespread feeling that the West would
suffer a serious propaganda reverse if the Anglo-American
troop landings were not finally "legitimatized" by the United
Nations, the initial reaction of most of the Western European
press to the western decision (following the Soviet veto of a
conference) to seek a resolution in the United Nations General
Assembly was not favorable -- largely because of the prevalent
conviction that a debate in the Assembly was more likely to
provide an occasion for propaganda than to result in an
acceptable resolution of the crisis.
This initial pessimistic reaction, however, was largely
(but not entirely) dissipated by President Eisenhower's
Middle East proposals, For, despite some criticism of the
overall approach and of particular measures, they were widely
interpreted as a realistic, though somewhat belated, western
recognition of the strength of Arab nationalism and a con-
comitant desire to come to terms with it on a basis of mutual
amicability,
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J
Nevertheless the Assemblyts delay in following up
these proposals with a solution acceptable to all re-induced
a note of pessimism which was not wholly allayed by the un-
expected Arab "peace formula?? which ended the immediate ?.la
crisis. For there was general agreement that, while it
enabled the beleaguered Anglo-American partners to withdraw
from an embarrassing and dangerous situation without too much
loss of facet it had not resolved the fundamental Middle East
problem -- the conditions that had given rise to the crisis
in the first instance. There was a vague suspicion too, that
when all was said and done, the whole episode had resulted in
more of a victory for Khrushchev and Nasser than for
Eisenhower and Macmillan.
Far East
For most of its duration the Far Eastern crisis of the
fall of 1958 was a major topic of news and comment in the
Western European press. Even more so than in the case of the
earlier Middle East crisis, the opinions expressed in the
rather strong editorial reaction throw a revealing light on a
continuing irritant in Western Europe's normally close
relations with the United States.
This irritant arises from the Western European view of
what constitutes political reality. While the primacy of
the American interest in and concern with the Far East has
alway4 been clearly recognized by the Western European
press, its reactions to developments in this area have bean
influenced by two fundamental considerations. First, strong
disapproval of what is generally regarded as the unrealistic
American policy of supporting Nationalist China as the
legitimate government of all China despite the viability of
the Communist regime on the mainland.-- a policy, it is con-
tended, which has given rise to the unrealistic American
refusal to face up to the fact of international life that
Communist China cannot forever be denied diplomatic
recognition and membership in the United Nations. Second,
the even stronger feeling that nuclear war must not be lightly
risked, particularly so in the pursuit of objectives which
are not central to the continuing survival of the West in a
world which is polarized between the United States and the
Soviet Union.
In light of the above considerations and mindful of how
close (in its opinion) the world had come to war over a
similar crisis in 1954-55, the Western European press revealed
a deep and serious concern over the developing Quemoy-Matsu
crisis in the fall of 1958. Although fundamentally of the
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CONFID AL
view that neither Communist China nor the United States
desired war it was generally felt that Communist China had
precipitated the crisis to compel international recognition
of its status as a major world power and its right to be con-
sulted on all major issues and that the United States would
be additionally restrained by its recognition of how unpopular
such a war would be with its allies -- the press tended to be
more than normally fearful that the adamancy of the two
belligerents might inadvertently spark a nuclear war which
would inevitably involve Communist China's Soviet ally and
America's Western European allies. This fear was not entire-
ly allayed by the eventual resumption of Sino-American
"peace" talks in Warsaw.
The burden of the voluminous and strong editorials can
be conveniently summarized as follows:
First, while there can be no doubt that Communist China
had deliberately precipitated the crisis for reasons of its
own, the United States cannot be absolved of the responsibil-
ity for having permitted a situation to develop which had
enabled Communist China to do so. The basic American policy
of continuing to regard the rump Taipei administration as the
only legitimate government of all China despite the obvious
existence of a viable government on the mainland, it was con-
tended, was tantamount to a boycott which no nation, let alone
a face conscious Communist China could be expected to accept
without a struggle. More immediately, the argument continued,
in view of the 1954-55 offshore islands crisis the decision
to permit Nationalist China to fortify the essentially inde-
fensible Quemoy and Matsu islands and to station so large a
proportion of its best armed forces on them was a deliberate
-- and foolish -- provocation which Communist China could not
be expected to ignore indefinitely.
Second, while the United States is obligated to defend
the island of Formosa against a Communist attack and must
honor its commitment even if unsupported by its allies, it
would be unwise, it was generally agreed) to consider that
this obligation encompassed the offshore islands as well,
since they could only be defended against a fullscale
invasion by a counter-attack upon the Chinese mainland. For
such a step, it was contended, would not only be sharply
disapproved of by America's allies but would inevitably
precipitate a war which might involve them all. The argument
that the West must not permit Communist aggrandizement
through the threat of force was a sound and logical one, but
its application to the islands off the Chinese mainland, it
was contended, seemed particularly dubious in view of the
fact that they rightfully belonged to Communist China -- just
as much as Staten Island did to the United States, some papers
suggested.
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CONF TIAL
Third while the Sino-American agreement to resume
ambassadorial "peace" talks in Warsaw was widely regarded as
indicative of a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the
two protagonists and of the strength of their desire to avoid
war if at all possible, a final resolution of the Far Eastern
problem, it was felt, was unlikely in view of the apparent
reluctance of both parties to make the necessary concessions
to each other -- a serious mistake in the opinion of most
papers which held that there could be no real world peace so
long as the Far East situation remained unresolved. In this
connection, there was widespread approval of what were common-
ly regarded as incipient signs of an imminent change in the
direction of American Far Eastern policy and sharp criticism
of Nationalist China's apparent refusal to accept any change
which, in the opinion of the Western European press, might
lessen the danger of a Sino-American clash.
Fourth, while initially only a very few papers were
willing to support a strong United States stand in the Far
East, arguing that it was in the interest of all that
Communist expansion be opposed wherever it threatened, this
sentiment gained increasing (although somewhat reluctant)
support during the course of the crisis, particularly among
the serious segment of the British and Italian press.
Although it was never more than a minority view, it repre4
sented a striking difference between the 1954-55 and the 1958
reactions to the developments in the Far East.
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NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA AND AFRICA
Basic U. S. policies were under general attack by the
countries of the Near East, South Asia and Africa during
both the crisis in Lebanon and the one in the Formosa Strait.
Only a few countries in the area (Turkey, Iran and Jordan)
fully supported the United States on both occasions. With the
development of the crises to their denouements, however, the
United States picked up some support, not necessarily for its
policy, but for the way in which it handled the situations
within the context of its policies.
Middle East
Public reaction in the area to the landing of U. S.
troops in Lebanon was generally unfavorable. Universally
favorable comment in the press was observable only in Iran,
Jordan and Israel at the time. Even in Turkey some opposition
papers were critical of the move, while in Lebanon itself only
the pro-government press gave indications of relief. The
Indian press was gravely concerned about increased tension in
the Middle East and the possibility of Soviet counteraction,
while the press in Greece was at least mildly critical.
Following the Soviet call for a summit conference on the
question, there was general agreement that some sort of inter-
national gathering was desirable, although in Turkey, for
example, there was recognition that the USSR's proposal was
advanced for propaganda purposes. In Lebanon, Israel,
Pakistan and India there was concern over the composition of
the meeting -- Lebanon and Israel desiring a voice in such a
conference and Pakistan fearing that India would gain inter-
national prestige by being a participant. There was consider-
able question as to the type of forum, whether it should be
a summit conference as proposed by Khrushchev or a UN General
Assembly meeting. The ultimate decision that it would be a
General Assembly meeting found ready acceptance, especially
in Africa, because of African consciousness that the new states
there would have a voice in Assembly debates on these im-
portant issues. President Eisenhower's speech at the United
Nations and the proposals it embodied were met with outright
disapproval only in the UAR and Iraq, although other Arab
states, such as Jordan and Lebanon, were somewhat critical
of the avoidance of the basic question, to their minds, of the
presence of Israel in the Middle East. Prime Minister Nehru
of India also was critical of the economic emphasis of speech,
opposed the suggestion for a UN police force, and called for
the withdrawal of U. S. troops, although he stated that he
would "consider favorably" the suggestion that the UN observer
team be reinforced.
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CONFIDENTIAL
With the unanimous passage of the Arab resolution there
was general relief that the crisis had passed, although the
Turkish, Iranian, Israeli and pro-government Lebanese press
questioned whether the resolution would be implemented and
the UAR press questioned whether the United States would
Immediately withdraw its troops -- a theme that was continued
until the troops had indeed all gone. Many of the Arab states
viewed the passage of the Arab resolution as a victory for
Arabism over the West, a Syrian paper citing it as evidence
that control of the UN had passed from the imperialist camp
to that of positive neutrality. In Africa particularly, the
U. S. was praised for its efforts to keep the issue within
the framework of the U. N.
Far East
Public reaction to the Formosa Strait crisis in most
countries of the Near East, South Asia and Africa was critical
of the U. S. policy toward Communist China, as unreasonable
and advocated the admission of Red China to the U. N.
Officials of Ghana, Tunisia and India were in agreement that
the Chinese Communists could be better handled within the UN
than outside it, Nehru stating that he could not see how the
UN could assist in the Far East situation since the UN does
not recognize the Communist Chinese.
In some countries where public opinion was critical of
U. S. policy, however, there was also criticism of Communist
China for the belligerent tactics it adopted. Indian papers
felt that Communist China was deliberately creating a tense
situation and strongly condemned its action. Greece reacted
in much the same way, with criticism of China outweighing
criticism of U. S. policy. In such countries there was like-
wise a tendency to critize the U. S. for its obdurate refusal
to give up what was considered clearly Red Chinese territory,
namely, the offshore islands. But again countries such as
India and Greece strongly disapproved of Communist tactics.
In the Arab states -- particularly the UARi Iraq and
Morocco -- support for Communist China was the rule and
generally this support was emotionallvociferous, and propagan-
distic. On the other hand, Turkey and Iran considered the
Communist Chinese position a "bluff" that needed to be called
And fully supported the United States. Nepal and Afghanistan
supported the Communist Chinese on the principle of admission
Into the UN and indicated at least tacit support for the
tactics they were employing. Pakistan supported the U. S.
officially, but press comment, especially in the more in-
fluential papers, tended to be critical of the U. S.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Certain tentative generalizations can be given on current
attitudes in some of the countries toward the Middle East and
Far East crises. These are more impressionistic than the
result of detailed study.
Africans carry little impression of either the two crises.
Nevertheless, there is a growing acceptance of Communist China
among African states. In addition to the Arab state of Iraq,
which exchanged diplomatic relations with Communist China
immediately after the July coup, Morocco and the Sudan have
done so since the Quemoy issue, and the Provisional Govern-
ment of Algeria, recognized by Communist China, has expressed
its "solidarity" with China's Communists.
In Lebanon itself, some of the partisans of the "rebel"
forces are now willing to admit privately that perhaps the
American landings were not altogether bad. There is a feeling
that the presence of American troops did serve to limit the
extent of the rebellion and prevent out-and-out sectarian .
strife. The Lebanese Christians are generally appreciative.
Furthermore, the withdrawal according to schedule and the
exemplary conduct of American troops have cut the ground out
from under criticism at the least and at the most have pro-
duced volunteered praise. The offer of U. S. aid without
any conditions improved the psychological climate. American
standing in Lebanon is thought to be high at the present time.
In India the present climate is better than it was during
the two crises. The Indian leadership group appears to be
inclined at the present not to doubt U. S. motives through it
continues to be critical of U. S. action. There is consider-
able question of Sino-Soviet motives and this questioning--
which undoubtedly was initiated or impelled by the Bloc's
actions in the two crises -- may well have been reinforced by
the Berlin dispute. It is thought that the Indians are coming
to see that there is a pattern in the crises this year.
FAR EAST
Articulate Asian opinion was directed towards the U. S.
on two prolonged occasions during 1958: once when American
troops were despatched to Lebanon and again when the U. S.
stood firm in the face of Chinese Communist threats in the
Taiwan Straits. Press and official statements during the
crisis atmospheres of those times reflected a pervasive pre-
occupation with the U. S. and the implications of its actions
which rapidly diminished as the threat of war receded.
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,
During the times of crisis, Asian opinion was generally
critical in terms of a pervasive apprehension that U. S. policy
might set off a new war and a conviction that the U. S. was
actually engaged in "interference" in the internal affairs of
other countries. Sympathy for Lebanese and Arab.nationalism
was intense. However, as events moved on, the critical views
were tempered by a mounting respect for U. S. willingness to
stand by its commitments in the face of a Communist threat as
well as a growing fear of Chinese Communist strength and
military potential.
On balance it would appear that present Asian opinions
of the U. S. have not shifted appreciably as a result of the
U. S. stand during' these two crises. Scattered evidence, in
the form of newspaper editorials and official reactions to
subsequent actions of the U. S., indicates that U. S. prestige
has certainly lost nothing from these two events and indeed,
may have gained from or despite them. Perhaps the most per-
suasive influence to support this belief is to be found in
the gradually improved attitude of the Indonesian Government
towards the U. S. This is not, however, to posit a necessary
correlation between governmental attitudes and "public"
opinion.
LATIN AMERICA*
Based on press reactions in Latin America to both the
Near East and Taiwan Strait issues during the crisis period,
it appears that the U. S. came out ahead of the Soviet Union
and Communist China, though the U. S. lead over them was less
in the Taiwan case than in the Lebanese-Iraqi case.
Excluding the Communist press, which assumed the postures
one might expect, the rest of the press, in greater or lesser
degree, supported the side of the U. S. None of the non-Com-
munist press actually sided with the Communist position,
although a minority was critical of the U. S. action in both
cases. However, there was a difference even here in the
reaction to the two events. While the criticism of the U. S.
came solely from moderately liberal or left-wing, though
non-Communist papers, the volume of such criticism was con-
siderably greater during the Taiwan crisis than during the
Near East crisis.
A typically critical attitude toward the U. S. in the
Middle East crisis was that the policing Job could be done
more appropriately and with less risk to world peace by a UN
police force. A typical criticism of the U. S. in relation to
the Taiwan Strait issue was that the U. S. position lacked
reality because Red China represented a sixth of the world's
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population while the Taiwan government was a synthetic regime.
However, these and similar attitudes expressed by area press
commentators were in a minority. In general, the press
supported U. S. action, although interpretations of what these
two crises really meant tended to vary, with a good-sized
minority expressing the feeling that the Soviet Union and
Communist China did not want war, where employing what might
be called classical cold war techniques and that the U. S.
should stand firm as victories in the cold war could be
achieved only over a frightened and uncertain adversary.
Much of the area's press made the crises the subjects
for lengthy analyses of what was involved, scolded the USSR
and Communist China for their heartless exploitation of
people's feelings and frequently used the crises to recall
other instances of Communist pressures, threats and intransi-
gence.
All in all, the Near Eastern crisis was taken more
seriously, received more comment and news play, had its
issues more clearly defined, and provoked more sympathetic
comment and support for the U. S. than did the Taiwan Strait
issue.
- 14 - CON DENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050022-1