REVISION OF DCID 1/7

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP02B05208R000100180002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 31, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DMECTIOROFCENTRALINTELUGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-121
31 May 1'983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Secretariat Staff
FROM:
Chairman
SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/7
1. Attached is a draft revision of DCID 1/7 to provide the Community
guidance on "Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Informa-
tion." It was unanimously endorsed by Security Committee members at their
25 May 1983 meeting. It has also been coordinated with and is concurred in by
Legal Advisor to the Intelligence Community Staff. Also attached STAT
is a summary of changes in the draft revision.
STAT
2. The attached draft is worded as an implementer pursuant to the pro-
visions of the DCID on the Security Committee. Please consider whether it
should be issued as a DCID, since it does provide a significant amount of
policy guidance on matters of high-level interest to the Community. For
example, this draft covers DCI policy on contracting for operation of intel-
ligence support functions; conditions for use of controls such as ORCON,
NOCONTRACT and NOFORN; and relief for the Community from certain aspects of
the "third agency rule." Please call me after you have reviewed this draft to
discuss how we should proceed to obtain necessary approvals for issuance of
this policy guidance.
Attachments
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. .
SECURITY CONTROLS ON THE
DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION1
(Effective ... 1983)
Pursuant to the provisions of the Director of Central Intelligence
Directive (DCID) on the Security Committee (SECOM), the following controls on
the dissemination and use of intelligenceoinformation and related materials
(hereinafter referred to as intelligence)' are hereby established.
1. Purpose
These provisions establish certain common controls and procedures for the
dissemination and use of intelligence to ensure that, while facilitating its
interchange for intelligence purposes, it will be adequately protected. These
provisions amplify applicable portions of the 23 June 1982 Information Secu-
rity Oversight Office (IS00) Directive #1 which implements Executive Order
(EO) 12356. They also prescribe additional controls on the dissemination of
intelligence to foreign governments and to foreign nationals and immigrant
aliens, including those employed by the US Government. Policy on release of
intelligence to contractors and consultants is set forth in the Appendix.
2. General
a. Applicability. The controls and procedures set forth in these
provisions shall be uniformly applied in the dissemination and use of intel-
ligence originated by all Intelligence Community organizations as defined by
EO 12333.
1These provisions supersede DCID No. 1/7, effective 4 May 1981.
2For purposes of these provisions the terms "intelligence information and
related materials" (or "intelligence") mean:
(1) "Foreign intelligence and counterintelligence," as these terms are
defined in EO 12333;
(2) Information describing US foreign intelligence and counterintel-
ligence activities, sources and methods, equipment, and methodology used for
the acquisition, processing, or exploitation of such -intelligence, foreign
military hardware obtained for exploitation, and photography or recordings
resulting from such US intelligence collection efforts; and
(3) Information on Intelligence Community protective security programs
(e.g., personnel, physical, technical and information security).
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b. Implementation. The substance of these provisions shall be published
in appropriate regulatory or notice media of each Intelligence Community
organization, together with appropriate procedures permitting rapid
interagency consultation concerning the dissemination and use of
intelligence. For this purpose, each Intelligence Community organization will
designate a primary referent. Originators of Intelligence bearing control
markings or other restrictions required by these provisions shall ensure that
requests concerning them are answered promptly.
c. "Need-to-know" Principle. "Need-to-know" is a determination by an
authorized holder of classified information that access to specific classified
material in his or her possession is required by one or more other persolls to
perform a specific and officially authorized function essential to accomplish
a national security task or as required by Federal Statute, Executive Order,
or directly applicable regulation. In addition to an established "need-to-
know," a person must possess an appropriate security clearance and access
approvals, as required; prior to being provided classified information.
3. Use and Dissemination Among US Intelligence Community Organizations
a. "Third Agency" Rule. E0 12356 states that classified information
originating in one US agency shall not be disseminated outside any other
agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the
originating agency. This is commonly described as the "third agency" rule.
b. Advance Authorization. To facilitate the dissemination and different
uses made of classified intelligence within and among Intelligence Community
organizations and to assure the timely provision of intelligence to consumers,
it is necessary to provide controlled relief to the "third agency rule" within
the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, Intelligence Community organizations
hereby consent to the use of each other's classified intelligence in their
respective intelligence documents, publications, or other information media,
and to disseminate their products to other Intelligence Community
organizations, except as specifically restricted by control markings
prescribed in paragraph 6. Classified intelligence documents, even though
they bear no control markings, will not be released in their original form to
third agencies without permission of the originator.
4. Use and Dissemination To Other US Organizations
Classified intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control
markings, will not be released in its original form to US organizations
outside of the Intelligence Community without permission of the originator.
Any organization disseminating intelligence beyond the organizations of the
Intelligence Community shall be responsible for ensuring that recipient
organizations understand and agree to observe the restrictions prescribed by
these provisions and maintain adequate safeguards.
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5. Foreign Dissemination of Intelligence
a. Dissemination to Immigrant Aliens, Foreign Contractors, and other
Foreign Nationals.
(1) Classified intelligence, even though it bears no control
markings, will not be released to foreign nationals and immigrant aliens
(including US Government employed, utilized, or integrated foreign nationals
and immigrant aliens) without permission of the originator.
(2) Release of classified intelligence to a foreign contractor/com-
pany under contract to the US Government will be made according to paragraph
5b through the government under which the contractor/company operates. Direct
US-to-foreign contractor/company release is prohibited.
b. Dissemination to Foreign Governments.
Classified intelligence, even though it bears no control markings
authorized by these provisions, will not be released in its original form to
foreign governments without permission of the originator. Information con-
tained in classified intelligence of another Intelligence Community organiza-
tion, and which bears no restrictive control markings, may be used by the
recipient Intelligegce Community organization in reports disseminated to
foreign governments provided:
(1) no reference is made to the source documents upon which the
released product is based;
(2) the information is extracted or paraphrased to ensure that the
'source or manner of acquisition of the intelligence cannot be deduced or
revealed in any manner; and
(3) foreign release is made through established foreign disclosure
channels and procedures, such as prescribed pursuant to the DCIDs on the
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) and the SfGINT
Committee.
6. Authorized Control Markings
a. "WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS-INVOLUD" (WNINTEL)
(1) This marking is used, with a security classification, to
identify information whose sensitivity requires constraints on its further
dissemination and use. This marking may be used only on fntelligence which
identifies or would reasonably permit identification of an intelligence source
or method which is susceptible to countermeasures that could' nullify or reduce
its effectiveness.
3Excepting RESTRICTED DATA and FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA, which is prohibited
from foreign dissemination under Sections 123 and 144 of Public Law 585,
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
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(2) Classified intelligencenso marked shall not be disseminated in
any manner outside authorized channels' without the permission of the ori-
ginating agency and an assessment by the Senior Official of the Intelligence
Community (SOIC) in the disseminating agency as to the potential risks to the
national security and to the intelligence sources or methods involved. In
making such assessment, consideration should be given to reducing the risk to
the intelligence sources or methods which provided the intelligence by sani-
tizing or paraphrasing the information so as to permit its wider dissemination.
To avoid confusion as to the extent of dissemination and use restrictions
governing the information involved, the marking may not be used in conjunction
with special access or Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) controls.
This marking may be abbreviated as "WNINTEL" or as "WN."
b. "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR" (ORCON)
(1) This marking is used, with a security classification, to enable
a continuing knowledge and supervision by the originator of the use made of
the information involved. This marking may be used only on intelligence which
clearly identifies or would reasonably permit ready identification of an intel-
ligence source or method which is particularly susceptible to countermeasures
that would nullify or measurably reduce its effectiveness. This marking may
not be used when an item of information will reasonably be protected by use of
any other markings specified herein, or by the application of the "need-to-
know" principle and the safeguarding procedures of the security classification
system.
(2) Information bearing this marking may not be disseminated in
whole or in part through briefings, incorporation into reports or in any other
manner outside the headquarters elements' of the recipient organizations, or
used in taking investigative action, without the advance permission of and
under conditions specified by the originator. As this is the most restrictive
marking herein, agencies will establish procedures to ensure that it is only
applied to particularly sensitive intelligence and that timely procedures are
established to review requests for further dissemination of intelligence
bearing this marking. This marking may be abbreviated as "ORCON" or as "OC."
4Unless otherwise specified by the Director of Central Intelligence in
consultation with the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) or as agreed
to between originating and recipient agencies, authorized channels are the
Intelligence Community, as defined in EO 12333, and Intelligence Community
contractors and consultants and officials of agencies represented on the NFIB
as determined on a "need-to-know" basis by recipient Senior Officials of the
Intelligence Community (SOICs).
5At the discretion of the originator, the term "headquarters elements" may
include specified subordinate intelligence-producing components.
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?
c. "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS" (NOCONTRACT)
This marking is used, with a security classification, to prohibit the
dissemination of information to contractors or consultants (hereinafter
contractors) without the permission of the originating agency. This marking
may be used only on intelligence which, if disclosed to a contractor, would
actually or potentially give him a competitive advantage which could reason-
ably be expected to cause a conflict of interest with his obligation to
maintain the security of the information; or which was provided by a source on
the express or implied condition that it not be made available to contrac-
tors. The restrictions applicable to this marking do not apply to consultants
hired under Office of Personnel Management procedures, or comparable proce-
dures derived from authorities vested in heads or organizations by law, and
who are normally considered to be extensions of the office by which they are
employed. This marking may be abbreviated as "NOCONTRACT" or as "NC."
d. "CAUTION--PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN)
This marking may be used, with or without a security classification, to
identify information provided by a commercial firm or private source under an
express or implied understanding that the information will be protected as a
trade secret or proprietary data believed to have actual or potential value to
other individuals, organizations, or foreign governments which have interests,
actual or potential, in competition with the source of the information.
Information bearing this control marking shall not be released to contractors
oi-%foreign governments without the permission of the originating agency. This
marking may be abbreviated as "PROPIN" or as "PR."
e. "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (NOFORN)
This marking is used with a security classification to identify intel-
ligence that may not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign
nationals, or non-US citizens without permission of the originator. This
marking may be used on intelligence which if released to a foreign government,
foreign national, or non-US citizen could jeopardize intelligence sources or
methods, or when it would not be in the best interests of the US to release
the information from a policy standpoint upon specific determination by a
Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC). SOICs are responsible
for developing, publishing and maintaining guidelines consistent with the
policy guidance herein for use in determining the foreign releasability of
intelligence they collect or produce. These guidelines shall be used in
assigning NOFORN control markings, and by primary referents (paragraph 2b
above applies) in responding to inquiries from other organizations on
application of this control. This marking may be abbreviated "NOFORN" or as
f. "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO (name of country(ies)/international
organization)" (REL ----
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This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an
originator has predetermined to be releasable or has released, through
established foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign
country(ies)/international organization indicated. No other foreign dissemi-
nation of the material is authorized (in any form) without the prior approval
of the originator. This marking may be abbreviated "REL (abbreviated name of
country(ies)/international organization)." In the case of intelligence and
related materials controlled under DCID 6/2, authorized distribution indica-
tors, published separately, may be used instead of the "REL" control marking.
7. Procedures Governing Use of Control Markings
a. Any recipient desiring to use intelligence in a manner contrary to
the restrictions established by the control markings set forth above shall
obtain the advance permission of the originating agency. Such permission
applies only to the specific purpose agreed to by the originator and does not
automatically apply to all recipients. Originators should ensure that prompt
consideration is given to recipients' requests in these regards, with parti-
cular attention to reviewing, and editing if necessary, sanitized or para-
phrased versions to derive a text suitable for release subject to lesser or no
control markings.
b. The control markings authorized above shall be shown on the title
page, front cover, and other applicable pages of documents, incorporated in
the text of electrical communications, shown on graphics, and associated (in
full or abbreviated form) with data stored or processed in automatic data
processing systems. The control markings also shall be indicated by paren-
thetical use of the marking abbreviations at the beginning or end of the
appropriate portions. If the control markings apply to several or all
portions, the document may be marked with a statement to this effect rather
than marking each portion individually.
c. The control markings in paragraph 6 shall be individually assigned at
the time of preparation of intelligence products and used in conjunction with
security classifications and other markings specified by EO 12356 and its
implementing ISO() Directive. The markings shall be carried forward to any
new format in which the same information is incorporated, including oral and
visual presentations.
8. Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures
Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result
in unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intelligence of another shall
be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence through the DCI Security
Committee.
9. Obsolete Restrictions and Markings
The following markings are obsolete and will not be used subsequent to
the date of this directive: WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS
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1,UNI-11.r1 1HL
DIRECTOROFCENTRALINTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Executive Secretary, NFIB/NFIC
SECOM-251
19 December 1983
FROM:
25X1
Chairman
SUBJECT: DCID on "Security Controls
on the Dissemination of
Intelligence Information"
25X1
REFERENCE: Memorandum to Holders of
DCI Directive Series, dated
1 September 1983, Subject: Control and Classification of
DCI Directive Series
1. The draft of subject DCID that you sent us on 10 November 1983 has
been reviewed, necessary corrections made, and the result coordinated with
appropriate Community components. A final draft ready for publications review
and printing is attached. Sidelining in the left-hand margin indicates lines
or sections in which changes have been made. All changes are editorial with
the exception of the addition to paragraph 1 addressing the classification of
this DCID.
memorandum.
That was
added in consonance with the provisions of the referent
25X1
2. The
referent
memorandum requires all DCIDs to be controlled as Secret
unless other specified. DCID 1/7, which the subject draft would replace, has
been unclassified since its origin in the early 1970s. Classification of the
new guidance at the Confidential level would provide a degree of protection
hitherto lacking for the security guidance
on this subject. However, classi-
fication of this suidance at the Secret
level would
STAT
/, impose
unnecessary costs on many departments and agencies in transmitting and
accounting for this guidance document, and invite challenges on overclassifi-
cation grounds under the provisions of E.O. 12356. The Security Committee and
the Community has found that Confidential classification of the DCI Security
Policy Manual for SCI Control Systems, effective 28 June 1982, has provided a
sound balance between security protection and effective use of the security
guidance. We request_approval for issuing the new DCID on this subject at the
Confidential level.
3. Since there are no changes to the substance of this draft DCID as it
was approved unanimously by Security Committee members, we see no reason for
CONFIDEI\TIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
further coordination and recommend that it be published and disseminated to
the Community subject to DCI approval of the proposed classification level.
Attachment
Draft DCID
CONFIDENTIAL
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LA I
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Revised DCI Directive on Security Controls on the Dissemination of
Intelligence Information
FROM:
Walter El der
ExecSec , NFIB/NFIC
EXTENSION
NO.
IC/83/7623
DATE
t JAN 1S'C
Room 5S01 ,
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
1. tiDDCI
0 7 JAN
1984

2.
fae
,
3.
NFIB/S - 1O
AN
1984
5S01
,
4.
5.
6.
7.
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8.
9.
10.
-
12.
13.
14.
DC1
EXEC
REG
15.
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS -
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UULMUJHMLL
IC/83/7623
6 JAN 19P4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Walter Elder
Executive Secretary, NFIB/NFIC
SUBJECT: Revised DCI Directive on Security Controls on the
Dissemination of Intelligence Information
1. Action Requested: That you approve the revised DCI directive
and its classification as CONFIDENTIAL.
2. Background: The revised DCI directive (attached) has been
coordinated by members of the Security Committee speaking on behalf of
their principals.
It would replace DCID 1/7, dated 18 May 1976 (attached).
The changes, which are annotated on the revised version, are
primarily editorial. The revisions also include the following:
- References to the executive order and other
policy directives have been updated.
- Section 2. Definitions has been expanded to
include information on Intelligence Community protective
security programs.
- The language on controlled relief from the "third
agency rule" has been revised to conform to the language
of Executive Order 12356.
- The restrictions on dissemination of Originator
Controlled (ORCON) information without the consent of the
originator have been broadened to include the use of such
information in briefings or "in any other manner" outside
the headquarters of recipient agencies and its use in
taking investigative actions.
25X1
rni\IFI&NTIAL
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11.1Lit int_
- The revised DCI directive makes it clear that
information marked "CAUTION - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
INVOLVED" shall not be released to contractors or foreign
governments without the permission of the originator.
- A new paragraph has been added to state DCI
policy cautioning Intelligence Community components
about potential consequences of contracting out support
services which could diminish government control over
intelligence.
The Chairman, Security Committee, recommends that this directive
be classified CONFIDENTIAL. This would provide a balance between adequate
security protection and effective use of the directive by all components
and contractors.
I concur in his recommendation.
Attachments
As Stated
Approved:
Walter Elder
Direr ot Lentral Intelligence
Disapproved:
Date:
Director of Central Intelligence
2,
CTINIFINATIA1
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Distribution
IC/84/7623
Original - DCI w/atts
1 - DDCI w/atts
1 - ER w/atts
1 - Security Committee w/atts
1 - NFIBCChnono w/atts
1 - DCID Subject w/atts
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