THE OUTLOOK FOR US INTERESTS IN LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A007600020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 19, 1956
• Content Type: NIE

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?CONY/
--SE?REP 363C
3 JUL 1956
NIE 3 6.5-5 6
19 June 1956
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 36.5-56
(Supersedes the Libyan section of NIE 71-54)
THE OUTLOOK FOR US INTERESTS IN LIBYA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY commrrizz
on 19 June 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the /AC and the Assist-
ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
DOCUMENT HO. 1 ..,
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NED:7 FiEtivLi.v DATE: /99/
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AUTH: HR 70-2
243
COPY NO.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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STAT
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at? e*
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r!-S-E-G-R-E-cP
THE OUTLOOK FOR US INTERESTS IN LIBYA'
THE PROBLEM
To estimate likely developments in Libya over the next few years and their im-
pact on US interests, particularly base rights.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Provided the ailing 66-year-old King
Idriss remains at the head of the govern-
ment, Libya will probably be able to main-
tain a precarious political stability over
the next few years. However, political
immaturity, factionalism, and rivalry be-
tween the provinces will be continuing
problems for the foreseeable future. The
death or incapacitation of the king would
remove Libya's principal unifying force
and probably precipitate a complex in-
ternal struggle for power, with intensified
competition for influence between Egypt,
the USSR, the UK, and other foreign
powers. (Paras. 12-13, 17, 19-21, 28-29)
2. Premier Ben Halim is not popular and
his tenure remains largely dependent
on royal favor and support. However, he
will probably succeed in strengthening
his political position, and if still in office
on the death of the king, will seek to as-
sume full control. (Paras. 14-15, 18-20)
3. Unless current and projected oil ex-
plorations prove extraordinarily success-
ful, Libya will remain heavily dependent
Supersedes the Libyan section of NIE 71-54,
"Probable Developments in North Africa," 31
August 1954.
on foreign assistance to pay for essential
imports and to meet governmental ex-
penses. (Para. 16)
4. Libya's foreign policy is likely to be
ambivalent. The king tends to be pro-US,
but his principal advisers and possible
successors, including Ben Halim, are more
opportunistic. Despite Libya's depend-
ence on US and UK financial subsidies,
it is sympathetic with the anticolonial
and anti-Western feelings of the Arab
world, and is subject to extensive Egyp-
tian influence. Libyan leaders fear Egyp-
tian domination and suspect Egyptian
intentions, yet they will cooperate with
Egypt in various policies, some of which
are hostile to Western interests. How-
ever, at least as long as Idriss is in con-
trol, Libya is unlikely to join the ESS
Arab bloc. (Paras. 12-30)
5. With respect to Soviet relations, Ben
Halim has recently rejected, and has
promised to reject in the future, Bloc of-
fers of technical and economic assistance.
Nevertheless, he or his successors will al-
most certainly again use any future Bloc
offers as bargaining counters to gain con-
1
far0 TVCrtarn Ir A 41
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cessions from the US and UK. As time
goes on, the Libyan government will prob-
ably be increasingly tempted to follow
through with some deals with the Bloc,
particularly if the principle of dealing
with the Bloc becomes generally accepted
in the area. Although the Libyans will
probably cOntinue to be restrained by
fear of alienating the US and UK, and
thus prejudicing the continued receipt of
substantial Western assistance, they will
probably go as far in the direction of
deals with the Bloc as they think the traf-
fic will bear. Should future US-UK aid
fall substantially short of expectations, or
should Idriss depart from the scene, the
likelihood of Libyan deals with the Bloc
would increase. (Paras. 31-34)
6. There are unlikely to be any serious
moves toward the repudiation of US base
2
rights so long as King Idriss remains in
power. However, retention of US base
rights in Libya is likely to become increas-
ingly costly and troublesome. There is
likely to be increasing nationalist opposi-
tion to base concessions, which might lead
initially to demands for a reduction in the
present degree of US control over these
bases. Moreover, in the confused situa-
tion which would probably result from
the king's death or retirement, while a
continuation of u4 base rights would not
be precluded, the difficulties and risks
would be increased. (Paras. 38-42)
7. In view of the authoritarian character
of the regime and the low level of popular
political consciousness, we consider it un-
likely that the local security of US bases
will be seriously threatened within the
next year or two at least. (Para. 40)
DISCUSSION
I. LIBYA'S SIGNIFICANCE TO THE WEST
8. After four years of independence,2 Libya
remains a weak and essentially artificial po-
litical entity heavily dependent upon contin-
uing foreign subsidies, chiefly from the US
and UK. It is of strategic value to the West
by virtue of its position athwart North Afri-
can and Mediterranean communications lines,
and even more because of the important US
and UK military bases and operating rights
2Formerly an Italian colony, Libya was occupied
during World War II by British and Free French
forces. Thereafter, until 1951, it was divided
into separate British and French administrative
areas, with the British controlling the provinces
of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and the French
ruling in the province of Fezzan. A UN resolu-
tion of 1949, calling for an independent and
sovereign Libya, was implemented in December
1951, and the three provinces were joined in the
United Kingdom of Libya, under King Idriss al-
Sanusi, the Amir of Cyrenaica. The kingdom
maintains a federal structure, with provincial
legislatures and governors and a central parlia-
ment and prime minister.
on Libyan territory. Under a 20-year UK-
Libyan treaty of friendship and alliance
signed in 1953, the UK maintains more than
8,000 troops in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica,
and operates certain important air facilities,
notably at Idriss Field, near Tripoli, and at
El Adem near Tobruk. At present, the prin-
cipal US military asset in Libya is the large
US Air Force installation at Wheelus Air
Field ? first occupied in World War II?
which is an important SAC base. The US
Army has also shown interest in acquiring
base sites in Libya. While the US has no
treaty of alliance with Libya, US interests are
covered until 1971 by the Libyan-American
Base Agreement of 1954. The small French
garrisons in the Fezzan are currently being
withdrawn under a 1955 French-Libyan agree-
ment, not yet ratified by the French, calling
for complete French evacuation by November
1956.
9. In recent years, the US has increasingly
assumed the principal Western power role in
coNFIDENTIO
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Libya. Britain's once-paramount political in-
fluence in Libya has declined with growing
Libyan recognition of the limited ability of
the UK to assist Libya financially. Moreover,
the UK ambassador, who is apparently given
considerable latitude by his government, has
taken a relatively passive attitude toward
Libyan internal affairs despite the fact that
the British withdrawal from Suez and emerg-
ing challenges to the British position else-
where in the Middle East have tended to en-
hance the military importance to the UK of
its Libyan facilities. As a result, the Libyan
government now looks primarily to the US
as a source of economic aid and support even
though the British subsidy continues to be
large.3
10. Libya is an extremely poor country. With
the possible exception of petroleum, explora-
tion for which is now going forward, Libya is
believed to be devoid of mineral and fuel re-
sources. By far the greater part of its terri-
tory is desert, and its predominantly agricul-
tural-pastoral economy yields a per capita
income of less than $50 per year. Even in
good crop years, Libya's exports pay for less
than one-third of its imports; recurrent
droughts have recently necessitated sizable
grain imports, including US relief wheat
grants, to avert starvation. Libya is depend-
Under the terms of the UK-Libyan treaty of
1953, the UK is to contribute a total of $55 million
to Libya over a five-year period ending in 1958
(the subsequent British contribution is then to be
reviewed) . Approximately 75 percent of the
UK contribution is intended to meet yearly
deficits in Libya's ordinary budgetary expendi-
tures. Through 1954, the UK was the largest
contributor to Libya, but in 1955 US assistance,
totalling $12.3 million, exceeded the UK con-
tribution of $10.5 million. In an exchange cf
notes accompanying the 1954 US-Libyan Base
Agreement, the US promised Libya $40 million for
economic development through 1971. In addi-
tion, the US grants Libya funds separately under
the Foreign Aid program, and recently decided
to increase these from $3 million in fiscal 1955
to $5 million in 1956 and $7 million in 1957, to
provide $6 million in training and equipment for
the Libyan army, and to continue gifts of relief
wheat. Moreover, the US has operated a techni-
cal assistance program in Libya since 1951. See
appendix for data on sources, types, and amounts
of external assistance to Libya, 1952-1955.
3
ent on foreign grants and local foreign mili-
tary expenditures, which together totalled
approximately $40 million in 1955, to meet its
recurrent foreign trade deficit. Moreover, the
operations of the government itself would be
virtually paralyzed without external financial
assistance, since it depends on foreign grants
for 50 percent of its ordinary government ex-
penditures and for all of its recently-initiated
and somewhat visionary development pro-
gram.
II. THE PRESENT INTERNAL SITUATION
11. Libya's enormous area ? 90 percent of
which is desert ? is divided into three prov-
inces, among which strong jealousies persist.
Tripolitania, the wealthiest, most sophisti-
cated, and most populous (750,000) of the
three provinces, is resentful that its influence
is not commensurate with its size. Cyrenaica
(290,000) has a disproportionate influence in
the government as a result of the king's pref-
erence for his own area, and it fears Tripoli-
tania's superior political and economic poten-
tial. Leaders in the remote Fezzan (50,000)
dislike their exclusion from the mainstream
of Libyan affairs.
12. Position of the King. Libya maintains its
unity and a precarious political stability pri-
marily through the personal unifying force of
the ailing 66-year-old King Idriss, head of the
Sanusi family.4 A governmental framework
exists, but it is still largely a facade, and there
is no political party organization in the West-
ern sense. Loyalty to the nation is secondary
to the common Arab family and tribal alle-
giances, and there is little real public opinion.
There is a general lack of responsible, trained
political leaders and administrative officials,
and the government is weakened by wide-
spread nepotism and graft.
13. In the unstable and shifting pattern of
personal and family alliances which charac-
terize Libyan politics, the king has emerged
as the strongest political force, not only
4 The Sanusi family has provided religious and
political leadership in the Libyan area for more
than 100 years. It led the sporadic tribal strug-
gle against the Italians after their occupation
of the area in 1911, and aided the Allies in occu-
pying Libya in World War II.
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through the use of his far-reaching constitu-
tional powers, but also through his willing-
ness to employ extra-legal devices to consoli-
date his authority.5 Yet Idriss has not al-
ways ruled firmly or judiciously. Particularly
in the past year and a half ? since the assas-
sination of his closest friend and adviser, Ibra-
him al-Shalhi ? the king has tended to dele-
gate increasing responsibility to the prime
minister, and has isolated himself in Cyre-
naica, occupying his attention largely with
local and family matters. The king's health
is clearly not of the best, and there have been
some indications of decreasing mental vigor.
14. The Prime Minister's Position. In these
circumstances, Ben Halim, the 35-year-old
Egyptian-educated prime minister (who is of
Cyrenaican origin) has been able to strength-
en his position. By catering assiduously to
the king's wishes in most respects, Ben Halim
has successfully out-maneuvered his opposi-
tion, forced key opponents out of official posi-
tions or out of the country, and rigged recent
parliamentary elections to assure a pro-
administration majority. Ben Halim's power
continues to depend on the king's blessing,
however, since Ben Halim himself lacks the
strong family and tribal connections so im-
portant in Libyan politics. He is confronted
with opposition from urban nationalist ele-
ments who consider him too closely aligned
with Egypt, from a powerful array of Cyre-
naicans close to the king, from certain influ-
ential tribes, from the Ahmed Sharif branch
of the king's family, and from the elder of
King Idriss's two wives.6
15. One of Ben Halim's primary objectives is
to consolidate the authority of the central
government under his own control. To this
end he has also sought to strengthen the na-
5The constitution gives the king the power to
dissolve the House of Representatives, issue spe-
cial decrees, appoint one-half of the Senate, and
appoint and remove the prime minister at his
discretion. He has used these powers on occa-
sion during the past four years, and has also
resorted to promulgating, through royal decrees,
laws which properly should have been the sub-
ject of national legislation.
? The Sanusi family is divided into two principal
branches, the Mahdi and Ahmed Sharif branches,
4
tional army and police in relation to the Tripo-
litanian and Cyrenaican provincial defense
and police forces. His efforts to increase the
power of the central government have been
largely thwarted by the king, who withdrew
his initial support of centralization in response
to Cyrenaican pressure. Since the king's
strength derives primarily from Cyrenaican
tribal support, he has been unwilling to sacri-
fice this allegiance for a unitary government
championed largely by the prime minister.
Thus Ben Halim was unsuccessful, in the face
of Cyrenaican opposition, in his efforts early
this year to increase central control over cer-
tain budgetary and administrative matters
and the security forces. In the case of the
army, his supporters have been working to
insure its loyalty to the prime minister by
staffing it with selected young Tripolitanian
rather than Cyrenaican officers. However, it
now numbers only about 1,300 (in contrast
to a planned mobile force of 5,000) , and de-
spite continuing improvement under a British
training mission, is still inferior in training,
efficiency, and strength to the provincial
forces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan,
which have a combined strength of 5,700.
III. THE INTERNAL OUTLOOK
16. Unless current and projected oil explora-
tions prove extraordinarily successful, Libya
will remain heavily dependent on foreign as-
sistance to pay for essential imports and to
meet governmental expenses. Even if the gov-
ernment's development program achieves
maximum results in terms of increased agri-
cultural production, it is unlikely to do much
more than keep pace with the requirements
of a population increasing at an annual rate
of at least 1.2 percent. Moreover, it is likely
that recurrent droughts will continue to ne-
descendants of the two sons of the founder of
the family. King Idriss is head of the former;
his older (and favorite) wife, Queen Fatima, is
a member of the latter. Relations between the
two branches have long been characterized by
jealousy and suspicion, and deteriorated even
more when one of the Ahmed Sharif family
assassinated Ibrahim al-Shalhi in 1954. This
event increased the king's hostility to the Ahmed
Sharif branch of the family, and his determina-
tion to prevent any member of that branch of
the family from succeeding to the throne.
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cessitate grain imports for emergency relief
assistance.
17. So long as the aging King Idriss remains
active, he and a few close supporters are likely
to retain primary power, thus giving Libya
a degree of political stability. During this
period, the unity of the kingdom and the
effectiveness of the central government may
be strengthened to a limited extent, particu-
larly if the king should give greater support
to Ben Halim's persistent efforts to increase
the power of the national government.
18. Meanwhile, the tenure of cabinets, includ-
ing that of Ben Halim, will remain largely
dependent on royal favor and support. Al-
though opposition to Ben Halim will probably
grow, his opponents are unlikely to succeed
in overthrowing him legally during the next
year or so unless some maladroit action on
his part arouses the king's displeasure. In-
deed, Ben Halim may succeed in neutralizing
some of the present Cyrenaican opposition by
means of alliances with one or more of the
opposition elements in that province and by
the use of government patronage or of bribery
to woo key tribal leaders. However, the pro-
gram of strengthening the central govern-
ment will continue to be confronted with
strong resistance, particularly in Cyrenaica.
Ben Halim would probably be unable to secure
a firm position in the central government, in-
dependent of the king, unless he had several
years of unchallenged control in which to
build up the central army and insure its loy-
alty to himself. ?
19. The death of King Idriss would probably
lead to a factional struggle for power which
might easily threaten such political unity as
now exists. The king is childless, and the
chances of his having a male heir appear in-
creasingly slight, despite his recent acquisi-
tion of a second, younger wife. Even if an
heir were born, however, it is uncertain that
the force of dynastic loyalty, which is not
strong in Libya, could hold the kingdom to-
gether until he could assume the throne. Ben
Halim has gained the king's approval for the
establishment of a throne council to rule in
the event the king dies without heir. Under
a recently enacted law, the throne council can
rule for three years, pending a referendum to
determine the "leadership" of Libya. How the
referendum is to be conducted is as yet
undefined.
20. Upon the king's death, provincial sepa-
ratist tendencies, which have increased dur-
ing the past four years, would almost cer-
tainly be intensified, particularly the strains
between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Com-
plex provincial and factional intrigues would
probably ensue. There is evidence that cer-
tain Tripolitanians hope to seize power on the
king's death, and similar hopes are probably
held by certain elements in Cyrenaica. The
Ahmed Sharif branch of the family is almost
certainly prepared to assert its claims, and
Ben Halim may be expected to seek power.
21. The eventual outcome of such a complex
struggle for power cannot be foreseen with
certainty. Should Ben Halim be in office, he
would probably attempt to gain paramount
authority, either through interim arrange-
ments with the throne council or by asking
parliamentary approval of his assumption of
power ? possibly as head of a newly-pro-
claimed Libyan republic. Should the present
parliament, or one similarly oriented, be in
existence at the time, it might be sympathetic
to such a request. However, the shifting and
uncertain personal and family alliances which
underlie Libyan politics make this uncertain.
Much might depend on Ben Halim's success
from now on in strengthening and gaining
the personal loyalty of the federal army.
Finally, the eventual outcome would probably
not only depend on internal factors but also
on the efforts of interested foreign powers ?
including Egypt, the USSR, and the Western
nations ? to influence the situation.
IV. LIBYA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
22. In general, Libya's foreign policy is an
ambivalent and opportunistic one, reflecting
its extensive reliance on the West for material
and diplomatic support and its political and
cultural orientation toward the Arab world.
At present, Libyan foreign policy is largely
conducted by Ben Halim, who has shown con-
siderable shrewdness in exploiting great-power
interest in Libya. His freedom of action, how-
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ever, remains subject to one crucial limita-
tion ? the basically pro-US orientation of
King Idriss, who shares with many Libyans
strong suspicions of Egyptian and Soviet in-
tentions toward his country.
23. With Egypt and Other Middle East States.
Since it became independent, Libya has
been the object of Egyptian efforts to develop
strong political and cultural influence, if not
actual hegemony, in the young kingdom.
These efforts have been facilitated not only
by geographical proximity, but also by the
common language and religion; Libya's use
of the Egyptian legal code; the presence in
Libya of numerous Egyptians as jurists, gov-
ernment advisers, and teachers ? part of
whose salaries are paid by Egypt; the Libyan
tradition of sending young men to Cairo for
education; and past Egyptian aid to Libyan
leaders in the struggle for independence
against Italy. The Egyptians have also had
some success in developing influence in Libyan
labor organizations, which are not large but
which constitute almost the only organized
mass groups in the kingdom.
24. Under Nasser's regime, the Egyptian cam-
paign has been intensified as part of broader
Egyptian ambitions to acquire leadership in
the Arab-African world and to eliminate
Western (particularly UK) influence in the
Middle East and Africa. In Libya, Egyptian
propaganda and political efforts have been
directed against British (and by association,
American) military bases, and against the
influence of Turkey and Iraq. Egypt's propa-
ganda exploitation of such themes as Arab
solidarity, anticolonialism, neutralism, and
attacks on Israel, finds a response among
some of the limited number of politically con-
scious Libyans.
25. Egyptian efforts have been particularly
directed toward the king, the prime minister,
certain prominent Libyan families and fac-
tions, and public opinion in general. In the
case of the prime minister, various Egyptian
pressures and inducements ? probably in-
cluding outright bribery ? have been instru-
mental in causing him to bring Libya into
closer relations with Egypt and the Arab
League (though Libya has never joined the
6
Arab League Collective Security Pact) .
Egyptian influence on Ben Halim has not,
however, altered his adherence to the king's
policy of alignment with the US. As for King
Idriss himself, he has become more suspicious
of Egypt and hostile toward the extension
of Egyptian and other Arab influence in
Libya ? particularly because of his suspicions
that the Egyptians connived in the assassina-
tion of Shalhi in 1954. These suspicions have
tended to bolster the king's pro-US senti-
ments.
26. The Egyptian government will continue
its efforts to influence Libyan affairs, to use
Libya as a base for advancing Egyptian poli-
cies elsewhere in North Africa, and to induce
Libya to adopt a neutralist policy. Egyptian
opposition to French control of French North
Africa, to Israel, and to the vestiges of "impe-
rialism" will continue to find a favorable re-
sponse among many Libyans. The Libyan
government, at least under Ben Halim, will
almost certainly remain desirous of preserv-
ing reasonably good relations with Egypt, and
to this end will probably give at least lip
service to the Arab policies advanced by Cairo.
It will also continue to cooperate with Egypt
and the North African nationalists by permit-
ting shipments of military supplies to be sent
from Egypt across Libya to the rebel forces,
and by allowing nationalist leaders from the
French territories to enter and use Libya as a
meeting place.
27. Libya's cooperation with Egyptian policy
is unlikely to go beyond this point, at least as
long as King Idriss remains in control. Spe-
cifically Libya is unlikely to join the ESS Arab
bloc. The king's sensitivity about foreign
domination, by Egypt as well as the West, will
have the support of a small but growing body
of nationalist opinion in both Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica. Indeed, increasing friction be-
tween Libyan officials and the often inept and
domineering Egyptian advisers may result in
a Libyan move to cut down the number of
Egyptian personnel in the country.
28. The death or overthrow of the king would
remove the chief defender of a pro-US policy,
and the influence of Egypt would probably
grow. However, we believe that Ben Halim,
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or any other likely successor to actual power
in Libya, would prefer to play foreign powers
against each other rather than to become irre-
vocably committed to any one of them.
29. There is a possibility that the Egyptian
RCC regime may seek to overthrow Idriss, for
example by instigating an attempt to seize
power by a dissident branch of the royal fam-
ily or even by Ben Halim. We believe this
possibility to be slight because, in addition
to the international complications likely to
result, it would be difficult for the Egyptians
to find a successor acceptable both to them
and to the Libyans. The risk of Egyptian
intervention in Libya would become substan-
tial during the critical period which is likely
to follow the king's death or incapacitation.
30. Other Middle East states particularly in-
terested in Libya are Iraq and Turkey, the
former of which contributes some military
training assistance to Libya. The Libyan
army continues to be commanded by an Iraqi
officer. Turkish influence, however, has de-
clined in the last year or two, largely because
of Ben Halim's coolness toward Turkish at-
tempts to cultivate closer relations between
the two countries.
31. With the Soviet Bloc. In September 1955,
Libya agreed to establish diplomatic relations
with the USSR, a move which Ben Halim
undertook by way of manifesting Libyan in-
dependence from Western tutelage, and prob-
ably in exchange for Soviet support of Libyan
membership in the UN. Early in 1956 the
USSR established a relatively large diplomatic
mission in Libya. In addition, the Soviets of-
fered Libya various kinds of aid, including
gifts of about 40,000 tons of wheat and un-
specified materials for development projects,
a 20-year loan at two percent interest repay-
able in raw materials, and doctors to staff
rural dispensaries. The USSR also expressed
interest in establishing an information center,
and informally requested petroleum conces-
sions which, under Libyan law, could involve
the establishment of certain radio communi-
cations, air transit, and airfield rights in the
kingdom.
32. In April 1956, Prime Minister Ben Halim
rejected these Soviet offers and requests after
7
securing assurances that the US would in-
crease its presently planned aid program and
would give sympathetic consideration to
Libya's development needs in the future. In
turn, Ben Halim gave the US secret written
assurance that Libya would turn down simi-
lar overtures from the Satellites, and would
accept only those foreign assistance offers
"which do not endanger Libyan-American
relations."
33. While the USSR has thus far made only
limited headway, its efforts to cultivate influ-
ence in Libya and to undermine the Western
position there are likely to increase. For some
time to come, the Bloc will probably continue
to concentrate on attempts to lure Libya away
from the West by means of attractive political
and economic offers rather than on efforts to
create an indigenous Communist party or
other instruments of subversion. At present,
Communists in Libya are believed to number
no more than a hundred, almost entirely com-
posed of Italians in Tripolitania. Taking ad-
vantage of the fact that the expulsion of West-
ern influence in Libya is a common aim of
Egyptian and Soviet policies, the USSR will
probably continue to cooperate closely with
Egypt, allowing the Egyptians to assume a
considerable degree of leadership in joint dip-
lomatic and propaganda efforts. While Egyp-
tian predominance in Libya would presumably
be incompatible with ultimate Soviet designs
in the area, the USSR might be willing to
acquiesce in the achievement of such pre-
dominance by Egypt for a period, for the sake
of preserving Egyptian-Soviet cooperation in
the larger purpose of elithinating the special
position held by the West in other parts of
the Arab-African world.
34. For the immediate future, Ben Halim will
probably adhere to his recent promise to re-
ject Bloc offers of assistance. However, he or
his successors will almost certainly again use
any Soviet aid offers as bargaining counters
to gain concessions from the US and UK, and,
as time goes on, the Libyan government will
probably be increasingly tempted actually to
follow through with some deals with the Bloc,
particularly if the principle of dealing with
the Bloc becomes generally accepted in the
area. Although the Libyans will probably
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continue to be restrained by fear of alienating
the US and UK, and thus prejudicing the con-
tinued receipt of substantial Western assist-
ance, they will probably go as far in the direc-
tion of deals with the Bloc as they think the
traffic will bear. Should future US?UK aid
fall substantially short of expectations, or
should Idriss depart from the scene, the like-
lihood of Libyan deals with the Bloc would
increase.
35. With the UK, France, and Italy. The
UK's position in Libya is unlikely to undergo
either radical improvement or critical deterio-
ration in the next year or so. Libyans remain
sufficiently removed from the controversies
which have led to a weakening of the British
position elsewhere in the Middle East, so that
abrupt or violent challenges to the British
position, such as occurred in Cyprus or Jor-
dan, are unlikely in the short run at least.
At the same time, Libyan resentment of Brit-
ish "imperialism," and the UK's limited ability
to assist Libya financially make it unlikely
that the British will regain their once domi-
nant position in Libya. The UK is likely to
be confronted during the next few years with
Libyan pressures for increased financial con-
tributions, particularly in view of anticipated
British requests to base increased numbers of
troops in Libya.7
36. Libyan-French relations are likely to
worsen during the next few years as a result
of Libyan support for North African nation-
alists ? particularly the transit of Egyptian
arms for Algeria through Libya. To some
extent Libyan resentment of French North
African policies may adversely affect US and
UK interests, since Libyans believe that
France's allies are capable of influencing
French policy. French-Libyan relations will
also be subject to tensions over: (a) possible
French continued failure to ratify the 1955
agreement on Fezzan; (b) demarcation of the
Libyan-Algerian border; (c) oil exploration
rights near this border; and (d) problems
'The outlook for the British position in Libya, as
well as elsewhere in the area, will be considered
in NIE 30-2-56, "The British Position in the
Middle East," scheduled for completion in the
third quarter of 1956.
8
arising from the use of the Fezzan as a transit
area for French vehicles, which is permitted
under the 1955 French-Libyan agreement.
37. Italy' relations with its former colony
have been marked by disputes over private
Italian property claims arising out of Italy's
loss of Libya in World War II. An agreement
on these matters has been signed but has not
yet been ratified by either party. Italian-
Libyan relations promise gradually to im-
prove. Italy will continue to enjoy some cul-
tural and commercial, though little political,
influence in Libya.
V. THE OUTLOOK FOR US INTERESTS
38. The retention of US base and operating
rights in Libya is largely dependent in the
short run upon the continued good will of
the king. At present, he is not only strongly
in favor of the US retaining its present assets,
but is also sympathetic to an expansion of US
facilities. While his attitude may change ?
he has changed his mind on important ques-
tions before ? we do not consider this prob-
able, at least during the next year or two. The
attitude of the opportunistic Ben Halim is less
certain, but so long as the king retains para-
mount influence, Ben Halim is unlikely to
challenge him on the issue of US facilities.
Moreover, the prime minister himself remains
keenly aware of Libya's dependence on US
assistance and values US political support as a
counterweight to Egypt.
39. Even under Idriss and Ben Halim, how-
ever, retention of US base rights in Libya is
likely to become increasingly costly and trou- ?
blesome during the next few years, particu-
larly if American military facilities are to be
expanded. In future negotiations over US
facilities, Libya will probably press for sub-
stantial increases in US economic assistance.
At a minimum, Libya will probably demand
that the US underwrite the present $68 mil-
lion shortfall in Libya's planned six-year de-
velopment program. While the Libyans would
probably lower this price in the course of
negotiations, the demand would almost cer-
tainly be renewed at a later date. In addi-
tion, the Libyans are already seeking greater
Libyan control over the expenditure of devel-
opment funds.
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40. Internal opposition to US bases is not
now a serious threat and will probably not
become one while the king holds power. Po-
litical consciousness is still too limited to
make it likely that strong popular pressures
for elimination of foreign bases will develop
at an early date. Among Libya's few politi-
cally active elements, some opposition to the
Libyan-US Base Agreement will probably con-
tinue, but the king and Ben Halim will prob-
ably remain able, in the short run at least,
to block any pressure which might arise for
repudiation or reduction of US base and oper-
ating rights. Libya's extreme need for US
assistance will continue for the foreseeable
future to serve as a brake on serious moves
against US interests. The low level of politi-
cal consciousness in Libya, together with the
authoritarian character of the regime, will
probably prevent serious threats to the local
security of US bases during the next year or
two at least.
41. In the longer run, however, US interests
in Libya will face increasing challenges. De-
veloping bonds with the Arab world, and the
growth of nationalist sentiments among
9
younger Libyans will probably produce in-
creasing opposition to US and UK base con-
cessions. Initially, such opposition might lead
to demands for a reduction in the present
degree of US and UK control over these bases.
If Egypt and the Soviet Bloc succeed in ex-
ploiting these trends, and offer to replace
Western support, there will be increasing pres-
sures on the Libyan government to go even
farther in restricting or terminating US
rights.
42. In the meantime, the clearest foreseeable
danger to the US position in Libya is that
likely to arise upon the death of King Idriss,
when rival groups will be competing for ad-
vantage, and ties between the provinces are
likely to be more strained than at present.
Such instability would not preclude a con-
tinuation of present US rights, but it would
add to the difficulties and risks involved.
Moreover, should competing Libyan factions
look abroad for assistance in the unstable situ-
ation, as is likely, Egypt and the USSR would
be presented with increased opportunities for
direct interference against Western interests.
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Appendix
EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO LIBYA, 1952-1955
(Thousands of US Dollars)
10
Types of Assistance
US(a)
UK
France
Italy
Turkey
Egypt
UN
Total
1952
Budgetary support
-
6,608.0
. 330.4
-
-
-
-
6,938.4
Grants for economic
development
-
1,092.0
280.0
28.0
-
-
-
1,400.0
Technical assistance
1,537.0
-
-
-
-
na
654.4
2,191.4
Relief wheat
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Other
-
-
-
-
-
-
58.2(b)
58.2
Total 1952
1,537.0
7,700.0
610.4
28.0
na
712.6
10,588.0
1953
Budgetary support
4,947.6
431.2
5,378.8
Grants for economic
development
98.0
1,621.2
364.0
196.0
-
-
-
2,279.2
Technical assistance
1,343.0
-
-
-
na
772.0
2,115.0
Relief wheat
-
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
Other
-
-
-
-
_
-
79.9(b)
79.9
Total 1953
1,441.0
6,568.8
795.2
196.0
na
851.9
9,852.9
1954
Budgetary support
-
7,700.0
459.2
-
-
-
-
8,159.2
Grants for economic
development
5,000.0
2,800.0
280.0
28.0
28.0
28.0(c)
-
8,164.0
Technical assistance
1,493.0
-
-
-
-
na
584.2
2,077.2
Relief wheat
606.2
-
-
-
135.0(d)
-
-
741.2
Other
-
-
-
-
-
480.0+(e)
178.6(b)
658.6
Total 1954
7,099.2
10,500.0
739.2
28.0
163.0
508.0+
762.8
19,800.2
1955
Budgetary support
-
7,700.0
-
-
-
-
-
7,700.0
Grants for economic
development
7,000.0
2,800.0
371.0
28.0(1)
28.0(1)
na
-
10,227.0
Technical assistance
1,654.0
-
-
-
-
na
591.5
2,245.5
Relief wheat
3,689.0
-
-
-
-
-
-
3,689.0
Other
-
-
-
-
-
840.0+(e)
47.4(b)
887.4
Total 1955
12,343.0
10,500.0
371.0
28.0
28.0
840.0+
638.9
24,748.9
Grand Total 1952-1955
22,420.2
35,268.8
2,515.8
280.0
191.0
1,348.0+
2,966.2
64,990.0
NOTE: na Not available
(a) Based on US fiscal year; grants for economic development include annual payments for military
base rights and grants from US foreign aid funds.
(b) Includes aid from the WHO and UNICEF.
(c) Committed in 1954 but no evidence of actual receipt of funds by Libya.
(a) Estimated value of 2,000 tons of wheat at world market prices.
(e) Egyptian subsidy to Egyptian teachers, technicians, and other personnel employed by Libyan govern-
ment, estimated at $1,200 per annum per person.
(1) Estimated.
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12 16 16 20 24
32
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road
--CANDRET.
25467 5-55
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