IRAN/IRAQ: SHATT-AL-ARAB SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000600010057-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: January 4, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
INFORMATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/20: CIA-RDP08C01297R000600010057-5
S
CLASSIFICATION
SECRETIii
NO
DATE OF INFORMATION
December 1959
U.S. Naval Attache, Tehran
INFORMATION REPORT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIG.ENCE.
OPNAV FORM 3820-2 (REV. 5.58)
SOURCE
Various
SERIAL NO.
1-3-60
DATE OF REPORT
4 January 1960
EVALUATION
A-1
REQUEST NO.
SUBJECT
IRAN/IRAQg Shatt-al-arab Situation
BRIEF ( FOR REPORTS OF MORE THAN ONE PAGE, ENTER CAREFUL SUMMARY)
Iran desires to negotiate with Iraq regarding the Shatt.el-arab with the ultimate goal
being to acquire equal rights on the Shatt. Iraq has refused to negotiate.
1. Sometimes the Shatt-al-arab situation seems NAM confusing. This summary is
G.GIA1
2. Situation prior XX KASSEM Coup - Under a 1937 treaty Iraq controlled the Shatt to
the Iranian bank except at Abadan and Khorramshahr at which locations thalweg
was observed thus placing the Abadan and Khorramshahr jetties in Iranian waters*
(Iranians state that this treaty, unfavorable to Iran, was forced on Iran by the
British who then controlled Iraq and who then could inflict their will on Iran*
Believing the British to have been the basic cause of Irangs present troubles on the
Shatt? Iranians now tend to act to the contrary when the British advise restraint.
Iranians contend that the British are siding with Iraq in this dispute thus to
ingratiate themselves with KASSEM so that the British oil concession in Iraq can be
continued under favorable conditions. Iranian sources on Shatt information are
reluctant to pass information to anyone known to be in contact with British officials.
If one suggests that the 1937 treaty was preceded by an earlier similar treaty with
the Ottoman Empire Iranians retort that the British were then sponsoring the "sick
man of Europe". Iranians state that KNIXIK KASSEM? while condemning imperialism,
continues a classic example of imperialism in the case of the 1937 treaty). Under
the 1937 treaty Iraq, acting through the Basra Port Authority, furnished Shatt pilots,
collected the pilot fees, and in return kept the Shatt dredged. With Iran and the
FaSAL government of Iraq on friendly terms, Iran accepted this arrangement with no
strenuous objections, SPECIALHANDLINGP7QUIPED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOLEIGN NATIONALS
submitted as an attempt at clarification.
THIS REPORT CONTAINS UNPROCESSED INFORMATION. PLANS AND/OR POLICIES SHOULD NOT BE EVOLVED OR MODIFIED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THIS REPORT.
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*U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 467594
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/20: CIA-RDP08C01297R000600010057-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/20 CIA-RDP08C01297R000600010057-5
INFORMATION REPORT
OPNAV FORM 9820-2 (C) (REV. 6-55)
CLASSIFICATION.
ERESECRET NOF?J
FROM
NA Tehran
'REPORT NO,
DATE
euary Lr--)
3. Situation after KASSrM COUD and prior to Khosrowabed matter - After K:1:e5R7d took over
in Iraq, the Iranians at first apparently wanted only a reassurance that Iran's rights
under the 1937 treaty would continue. AALX KASSEM apparently did not care to discuss the
Shatt, perhaps suspecting that Iran vented rights in excess of those eranted by the 1937
treaty. The longer KAS= stalled the more insecure the Iranians apparently becane and
the idea of seeking treaty revisal, as original y suspected by KASSEM, began to grow.
The arrival of Soviet militery aid in Iraq added to the feelings of insecurity felt by
the ?anti-Comeunist Iranians. The arrival of Soviets as advisors to the Basra Port
Authority was particularly galling in regards the Shatt question (A similar case would
be for a conservative Canadian government controlling the EX St. Lawrence Waterway to
change into an enigmatical government accepting Soviet military aid and hiring Soviet
advisors for the Waterway authority). Nevertheless, a status quo an eared grudgingly
acceptable to the Iranians up until the time of the Khosrowabad problem.
4. Khosrowabad - The Iran Pan Al,lerican Oil Company, a company licensed in Iran wanted to
use Khosrocabad, a former British oil supply base on the Iranian side of the Shatt, as a
supply base for offshore drilling operations in the Persian Gulf. Iraq refused permission
on spurious technical grounds. This refusal was interpreted by certain influential
officials in the Iranian government as unfair Iraqi interferences in a legitimate maritime
enterprise. Iran has allowed the company to use Khosrowabad and has provided naval
escort for all company ship movements in open di defiance of various Iraqi threats to
interfere with these movements. There has been a growing program to somehow force Iraq
into negotiations leading to equal rights for Iran on the Shatt. "Equal rights" apparently
involved thalweg, joint administration, and equal distribution of pilotage income.
Blacklisting was one maneuver to force negotiations.
5. The .5f,lacklistine- Fiasco - Certain Iranian officials thought that the major maritime
powers Would urge Iraq to negotiate in regards the Shatt if these powers became
sufficiently concerned about the Shatt situation. Iran sought to stimulate their concern
by a ble!cklistine technique. Iran devised a scheme which they knew would be unacceptable
to the Iraqi Shatt pilots; i.e, demanding that Iran bound ships under Iraqi pilotage fly
the IraAan instead of the Iraqi flag. This office was informed by knowledgeable Iranian
sources that Iran could not afford to enforce the blacklistings and that the blacklistings
scheme would fall through in a short time. This office reported in that tenor and the
blacklisting scheme actually was abandoned. The next step was a press campaign.
6. The War of Words - The Khosrowabad and blacklisting affairs were not carried in the
Iranian Press. Several weeks after the blacklisting scheme had failed, Iranian demands
for "just" rights on the Shatt suddenly began to be carried in the Iranian press. This
press campaign was intended to sell Iran's case to the U.S. and other western nations.
KASSEM rOse to the bait with some critical remerks which were seized upon by Iran as an
occasion to send troops to the Abadan area to "protect Iran from Iraqi attacks".
7. The Iranian troos mevenent - The Iranian troop movement to the Abadan area was that
of an unbalanced, token force. Its presence there is calculated to frighten the major
western powers with the possibility of an Iranian/Iraqi conflict. Apparently the reason-
ing is that if the western powers are sufficiently frightened over the possibility of
conflicti these powers will urge Iraq to negotiate with Iran in regards the Shatt.
SPECIALHANDLINGREQUIRED $ff
AL ri)6N IN E.
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONS 2 ?FORK
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/20: CIA-RDP08C01297R000600010057-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/20: CIA-RDP08C01297R000600010057-5
INFORMAT1O
REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3/320- (C) (REV. 6-55)
CLASSIFICATION
D
SECRET NOF0? C
FROM ,
NA TAran
REPORT NO.,
1*.S..60
DATE
:.4 January 1960. -
SolgsprgAi.pn: ,rrrious
PreiLarinp._gffjger!?s Coulents:, None
Prepared and forwarded:
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
50X1
FlF
O P 11-
N
: 111
s- ?
NOFORN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/20: CIA-RDP08C01297R000600010057-5