CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM TSINGTAO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003300020001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY, ti0..T4
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
TO_ SECRET
OR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF
UNITED STATES FORCES FROM TSINGTAO
.c42.
t .2.1731.1
ORE 47-48
Published on
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ORE 47-48 TOP/RET
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FORCES
FROM TSINGTAO
SUMMARY
1. Communist forces in Shantung Province are presently capable of seizing Tsing-
tao.
2. US expulsion from Tsingtao by Communist force of arms would most severely
damage US prestige. A voluntary US withdrawal would obviously avoid this extreme
contingency.
3. If the US forces remain, it is highly improbable that the Chinese Communists
would assault Tsingtao, at least within the next six months, although the possibility
of local raids cannot be dismissed.
4. Although voluntary US withdrawal from Tsingtao would avoid the extremely
damaging consequences of expulsion by Communist force of arms, such a withdrawal
would certainly incur grave damage to the US position in the Far East and throughout
the world. Whatever explanation was given for the withdrawal, Soviet and Communist
propaganda would herald it as a US strategic retreat reflecting US judgment that
the force of Communist' expansion in Asia was irresistible, and popular opinion through-
out the Far East and the world would accept this interpretation. In particular:
a. The Chinese National Government would be incensed and the Chinese Com-
munists greatly encouraged by the withdrawal, which would be universally accepted
as reflecting no confidence in the survival of the National Government and a with-
drawal of moral support. The psychological impact of the event would prejudice exist-
ing measures intended to aid the National Government, hasten its disintegration, and
facilitate the expansion of Communism in China.
b. The withdrawal would also contribute toward Soviet domination of all
Korea by weakening confidence in US support of resistance to Communism and
assist in establishing a conviction that Communism must eventually prevail throughout
that country.
c. Native elements in Southeast Asia (Burma, Indochina, and Indonesia)
already susceptible to Soviet propaganda against Western imperialism, would accept
US withdrawal from Tsingtao as evidence of weakness, and would be encouraged
toward alignment with the USSR as the best means of promoting and protecting local
interests.
Note: The information in this report is as of 9 June 1948.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, and the Navy have con-
curred in this report; the Air Intelligence Division, Air Intelligence Directorate, Department
of the Air Force, had no comment.
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FORCES
FROM TSINGTAO
1. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TSINGTAO.
a. To the National Government.
Tsingtao is the best port in North China and the Chinese National Government's
most important naval station. It is valuable as a base for Nationalist operations in
the Shantung Peninsula. In addition, it is acquiring increasing importance as a for-
ward echelon supply base for Nationalist forces in Jehol and Manchuria and as a base
for amphibious operations in support of such supply movements. Tsingtao is the last
open harbor with adequate facilities which the National Government can use to sup-
port its position farther north and as long as Tsingtao remains in Nationalist hands,
there is a possibility of maintaining the Government troops still left in Manchuria.
This city is also the site of the US Naval Advisory Group's school which has already
demonstrated that it can increase the effectiveness of the Chinese Navy and thus
permit that service to play an increasingly important role in the civil conflict.
Of less importance to the Nationalists than the port facilities of Tsingtao,
but of considerable value nevertheless, is the industrial plant of that city. Although
the civil conflict and the inflation have sharply curtailed industrial activity in this
area, production of many desperately needed commodities could be undertaken if
fuel and raw materials were made available.
b. To the US.
As noted above, Tsingtao is the base of the US Naval Forces Western Pacific and
the headquarters of the US Naval Advisory Group. There are more than 3500 marine
and naval personnel now on shore duty in this city. Although there is no other
suitable port on the China mainland to which the fleet base and Naval Advisory
Group's school could be transferred, it may be possible to move these operations to
Taiwan. Tsingtao is the most suitable base from which Americans in North China
and Manchuria could be quickly evacuated by either air or sea in case of emergency.
In addition to its direct importance as a US naval base, Tsingtao has broader
strategic interest to the US: By keeping a foothold in North China, the US could
maintain contact and give support to non-Communist de facto independent regimes
which might emerge in North China as the power of the National Government declines.
Furthermore, the US base in Tsingtao serves, in some measure, to offset the advantages
accruing to the USSR as a result of that power's occupation of Dairen and Port Arthur.
c. To the Chinese Communists.
Tsingtao would offer the Chinese Communists few positive advantages. The
Communists have no navy and but few merchant ships so that the port facilities would
be of little direct use. The USSR, of course, would be able to exploit the port; trade
opportunities would expand between Tsingtao, Dairen, and the ports of North Korea
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with a consequent strengthening of the economies (and military potential) of both
the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. On the other hand, the Communists
already have ports in Shantung, and it may be to their advantage to continue using
Tsingtao as a means of trading through the Nationalists with non-Communist areas.
The most important strategic advantage that the possession of Tsingtao would
provide the Chinese Communists, however, would be its denial to the Nationalists.
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST ATTACK ON TSINGTAO.
The Chinese Communists are believed capable of launching a successful assault on
Tsingtao if they choose to do so. They are capable of taking Tsingtao even if
the US forces now present in that area join the Chinese Nationalist Army in the de-
fense of the city, but would probably be unable to do so if the US forces were materially
reinforced. It is unlikely that the Chinese Communists will attempt to assault Tsing-
tao in the course of the next six months, although raids with limited objectives are
possible.
a. Communist Capabilities.
Chinese Communist troops outnumber the Nationalist troops in Shantung
Province (the Communists have an estimated 295,000 troops, the Nationalists 200,000)
6 and could provide more troops in an assault on Tsingtao than the Nationalists now
have defending that city. The Communists are reported to be considerably superior
to the Nationalists in morale and combat efficiency. The Communists have consider-
able mobility, while the Nationalists are pinned down in the cities and the possibility
of reinforcing one garrison with units from another must be discounted. The acute
replacement problem facing the National Government would render ready reinforce-
ment of troops to Tsingtao difficult. There is little question but that the Nationalists
have sacrificed the military security of Tsingtao in terms of both the quantity and
quality of troops allocated to its defense in the expectation that the presence of US
forces will deter the Communists from attempting to take the city.
b. Communist Intentions.
There appears to be little probability that the Communists will choose to as-
sault Tsingtao within the next six months. The advantages which the Communists
feel they can now derive from Tsingtao probably will not justify the price of a frontal
attack, although it is not improbable that the Communists will conduct raiding oper-
ations.
Although Chinese Communist propaganda is strongly anti-American, the Com-
munists thus far have shown little inclination to risk direct conflict with the US, in
part at least, because of the possibility that this would be disadvantageous to a Com-
munist de facto regime seeking international recognition. However, this is no guar-
antee that they would not assume such a risk if it were felt that the benefits accruing
to them (and perhaps to the USSR) would so justify. At this time it appears that the
presence of US forces in Tsingtao will deter a Communist assault. However, the Com-
munists may attempt, in the next six months, to control trade between the city and
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its hinterland and to exploit civil disorders resulting from a large refugee population,
widespread unemployment, and general war weariness. Such civil disorders, of course,
would be an excellent mask for Communists' raiding operations. The effectiveness of
such measures to bring about the reduction of the city would be very questionable,
inasmuch as the Communists' capability to blockade the port from the sea will probably
remain nil.
3. CONSEQUENCES OF US WITHDRAWAL.
Unless the deteriorating military and political trends throughout China are re-
versed or materially retarded, there is an increasing possibility that a Chinese Com-
munist attack on Tsingtao will occur eventually, even with US forces in existing
strength present in the area. Therefore the US may be confronted with a situation in
which it may be forced to withdraw in order to avoid involvement in the Chinese civil
hostilities. However, such a withdrawal would probably become imperative only at a
time when the situation of the National Government would have so deteriorated that
it would be but one of many necessary decisions in a re-examination of the entire US
position in China and the Far East.
a. Favorable Factors.
Withdrawal of US forces from Tsingtao might somewhat offset the virulent
anti-US sentiment currently rife among many groups in Nationalist China. If care-
fully arranged, a withdrawal could be presented as evidence of the "anti-imperialist"
policy of the US. However, in view of the strong position of the Chinese Communists
in Shantung, it would be difficult to convince Chinese opinion that the sole or primary
reason for the evacuation of US personnel was a gesture of good will.
Withdrawal would avert the possibility of direct involvement of the US in the
Chinese civil conflict. The consequences of direct involvement in the war are par-
ticularly serious because of the political, economic, and military weakness of the Na-
tional Government. To make direct US participation in the civil warfare effective
in achieving a conclusive victory for the National Government would require a sub-
stantial outlay of US resources. US involvement would probably occur when the
National Government was on the verge of complete disintegration, and in such circum-
stances it would be very questionable whether the US, at that time, could change the
tide of military events in China. As a result, the United States would suffer a very
serious loss in prestige and gain little but the hostility of the Chinese people.
Immediate withdrawal from Tsingtao would also avoid the grave, albeit re-
mote, risk of conflibt with the USSR. If the US found itself actively engaged in the
Chinese war on the side of the Nationalists, it is possible that the USSR would counter
such aid with similar assistance to the Chinese Communists. It is estimated, however,
that while the USSR will exploit every opportunity to hinder or embarrass US efforts
on behalf of Nationalist China or in the protection of US interests in the Far East, the
Kremlin will, for the time being, avoid an armed clash between US forces and Soviet-
dominated forces.
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Withdrawal now would avert a possible hurried and embarrassing withdrawal
later. Immediate withdrawal would entail a grave loss of US prestige, but such a loss
of "face" would certainly be less than if the withdrawal were carried out hurriedly and
under the very obvious pressure of the Communist Army. If US forces were to par-
ticipate in the initial defense of the city, it would be difficult to extricate them and,
even if that could be done, it would involve an irretrievable loss of "face"; the Chinese
Communists would undoubtedly proclaim a major military victory over the US.
Finally, withdrawal now would eliminate the danger that US forces might find them-
selves on Chinese soil at the time of the downfall of the National Government.
b. Unfavorable Factors.
(1) Adverse Effects on US Interests in China.
The evacuation of US forces from Tsingtao?no matter how or when
it was accomplished?would be regarded by the Chinese as a withdrawal of US support
from the National Government. (Chinese Communists and USSR propaganda would
certainly emphasize to the Chinese and to the world that the US had forsaken the Na-
tional Government.) This might set off a chain of events which would seriously
undermine and probably accelerate the disintegration of the already weakened Na-
tional Government.
Many Chinese who have tolerated the National Government primarily
because of the prestige and material benefit resulting from support by the US may
become disaffected if there were evidence that (for whatever reason) the United States
was withdrawing its support. The evacuation of Tsingtao would, in effect, jeopardize
the psychological benefits that have accrued to the Chinese Government and the United
States Government as a result of the US aid programs. The position and the influence
of Chiang Kai-shek would be weakened with a consequent acceleration of trends toward
disintegration of the Government.
The alarm which the Chinese Government expressed at the proposed US
warning to American nationals to evacuate the Tientsin-Peiping area is an indication
of a probably more violent reaction to any move involving the evacuation of US forces
from Tsingtao. The grave concern with which the Chinese Nationalists regard the
Government's situation in North China and Manchuria might degenerate into utter
hopelessness with a consequent snowballing of sentiment for a compromise peace with
the Communists.
To the extent that the Communists have been holding off a direct attack
on Tsingtao because of their reluctance to stir up additional US support to the National
Government, the removal of US forces from that city would increase the probability
of an early assault. If such an assault were to be undertaken and were to prove
successful, the National Government would very probably blame the US, thus worsen-
ing Sino-US relations.
US withdrawal from Tsingtao, at the present time, would in effect write
off the possibility that the National Government, through its own efforts and with
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foreign aid, might in the immediate future salvage the situation in North. China, or
reverse present trends of Chinese Communist military and political successes. If such
a change occurs, the US probably would not be confronted by the necessity of with-
drawing from Tsingtao under Communist pressure. It is likely that in the foreseeable
future the war will continue favorably for the Communists.
(2) Adverse Effects on US Interests in the Far East and Elsewhere Throughout
the World.
A withdrawal of US military forces from Tsingtao at this time would serve
to increase political instability in the Far East. Regardless of any rationalization made
by the US for the evacuation, such a move would be interpreted by the "face-conscious"
people of the Far East as evidence of US weakness and an indication that this country
has discounted the possibility that the Chinese Communist forces could be defeated.
In addition, the US would suffer a loss of prestige throughout the world with a con-
sequent gain in the political influence of the USSR. Furthermore, the USSR, itself,
would interpret such a withdrawal as a sign of weakness on the part of the US and
would be encouraged to assume a more aggressive course in Far Eastern affairs.
The downfall of an anti-Communist central government in China would
accelerate the trend toward a USSR-oriented Far East. Although the Chinese Gov-
ernment has been steadily declining in power both as a consequence of its own in-
eptitudes and the growing strength of the Chinese Communists, the continued existence
of a National Government provides some check to the Communist of USSR-oriented
movements in the rest of the Far East. To the extent that US evacuation of Tsingtao
at this time will accelerate the disintegration of the National Government, it would
jeopardize an opportunity for coping with the spreading USSR influence in the Far
East.
In Korea the US position would be adversely affected. The South Ko-
reans and their newly elected leaders could easily be convinced by Soviet-inspired
propaganda that the withdrawal of US forces from Tsingtao was a victory for the
Chinese Communists and the USSR. Resulting uncertainty regarding US intentions
and capabilities would probably weaken the determination of South Koreans to resist
Communist pressure to accept the Soviet-sponsored regime established at Pyongyang.
Even though US forces continued to occupy South Korea until a reasonably adequate
native security force was developed, a previous US withdrawal from Tsingtao might
still have unfortunate consequences. North Korean authorities might reason that
they could force the withdrawal from South Korea of any US military or diplomatic
missions merely by initiating a determined offensive action against the South Korean
Army. Consequently the new South Korean Government's very existence might be
seriously threatened at a time when the regime was in its formative stages and least
able to cope with external aggression without US assistance.
In the Asiatic countries the creation of independent national govern-
ments and the formulation of international policy within these governments are being
undertaken. In Burma, French-Indo China, and Indonesia, the issue of political orien-
6
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tation toward the Western Powers or the USSR is uppermost in the minds of native
political leaders. It is highly questionable whether the United States could convince
these people that the evacuation of American forces from Tsingtao at this time is any-
thing but a victory for the Communist elements throughout the Far East.
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DISTRIBUTION
The President
Secretary of State
Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, US Army
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Research and Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, US Air Force
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group
Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission
Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Chief, Acquisition and Distribution, OICD, Department of State
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thiti Isi 31 PH '48
TOP ECRET
U. 8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2644-8--1948
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